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THE RULES OF THE GAME 
This Ph. D. thesis is, in large part, a deepening of my M. A. dissertation, entitled: "Diffigrance 
Beyond Phenomenological Reduction (Epoche)? " - an edited version of which was published in 
The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Issue 2,1989. The M. A. dissertation explores the 
development of the various phases of the movement of epoche in Edmund Husserl's 
phenomenology and its relevance for Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. The analyses not 
only attend to the need for an effective propaedeutic to an understanding of phenomenology as 
method, they also serve to demystify the logics of Derridean non-teleological strategy by explaining 
the sense of such a manoeuvre - as a kind of maieutic response to the Husserlian project - which 
operates within the horizon of a radical epocU. According to this orientation, Derrida's 
deconstruction of phenomenology is permitted to open itself up to a phenomenology of 
deconstruction. 
This doctoral thesis develops these analyses and utilizes a form of critique that points the 
way to the possibility of a phenomenological-deconstruction of the limits of Derrida's project of 
deconstruction through the themes of epoche, play, dialogue, spacing, and temporalization. In order 
to trace the resources from which he draws throughout the early development of deconstruction, this 
study confines itself to a discussion on the texts published between 1962 and 1968. This subjection 
of deconstruction to a historical de-sedimentation of its motivational, methodological, theoretical, 
and strategic moments, involves a certain kind of transformational return to the spacing between 
phenomenology and deconstruction that urgently puts into question the alleged supercession of 
phenomenology by deconstruction. 
The expression of such a 'beyond' is already deeply sedimented in contemporary 
deconstructive writing to the point at which it is now rarely even noticed, let alone thernatized and 
brought into question. This conviction (regarding the transgression of phenomenology by 
deconstruction) traces itself out in the form of an attitude to reading which is, in fact and in 
principle, counter to D6rrida's own call for care. The meaning and limits of the very terms, 
transgression, beyond, supercession, etc., must be continually subjected to deconstruction. 
The notions of play, dissemination and supplementarity - with the concomitant sense of 
transforinatiQnal repetition that defines them - do not function as a mere excuse for lack of 
scholarly rigour. Deconstruction is a movement of critical return, which must insert itself (with a 
sense of irony) within the margins and intersections of that which gives itself up to this practice of 
textual unbuilding. The strategy of play encourages the structural matrix of that with which it is 
engaged to turn in upon itself, exposing its limits and fissures in a kind of textual analogue to a 
psychoanalysis. To be sure, this does involve a certain kind of violence -a violation of the 
( system's' own sense of propriety (what is proper [propre] and closest to itself) -but in no sense is 
this an anarchical celebration of pure destruction. We speak rather of irony, parody, satire, 
metaphor, double-reading and other tactical devices, which permit a reorganization of the 
deconstructed's (textual analysand's) self-relation and the possibility of playful speculation. Such 
play demands care and vigilance in regard to the appropriation of the logics of the system with 
which it is in a-relation of negotiation. In order to play well, one must learn the game-rules. 
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PREFACE 
i. Ekstatic Interchangeability -- the Intra-Communality of Time in 
its Spacing 
The title of this text contains the words 'before, ' 'after, ' and the 'spacing between, ' thereby 
expressing the three ekstases of time. However, it is meant to indicate more than mere 
'differentiation' between the temporal horizons of past, present, and future (as the presence of the 
word 'spacing'would ordinarily suggest). What unfolds throughout the text is a phenomenological- 
deconstructive account of the ways in which they are interchangeable with one another. This 
interchangeability is a mark of their'essential' interpenetration. By adumbrating the structures of this 
interpenetration, the following discourse stands in stark contrast to the view in which the three 
ekstases are principally held to be distinct (e. g., as in the case of formal grammar, which rigidly 
distinguishes between different tenses and which forbids their intermixture). For instance, the before 
of 'Before Husserl' in the title is not only an index to what is 'prior' to his philosophy, it also 
indicates that which lies 'ahead' -- a project whose initiation awaits fulfilment: a task that lies before 
phenomenology. The first and more traditional 'past' sense could trace itself out in an examination of 
the historical background (context) which motivated Husserl's project of phenomenology as a radical 
critique of this history. This perspective on the 'before' would be to focus on the historico-contextual 
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milieu (and its outstanding moments of aporia) out of which Husserl's critical investigations on the 
question of lived-thne grow and announce their urgency. 
One example is the uneasy relation between Husserl and his mentor Brentano. To ask about 
the degree to which Husserl's discourse on intentionality actually surpasses that of his teacher is to 
pose a number of considerable problems. Oscar Kraus and David Wood have noted that Husserl's 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness establishes the radicality of its orientation on the 
question of the temporality of lived-experience by distancing itself from Brentano's theses purely on 
the basis of its thernatization of the latter's 'early' views. Husserl does this without really 
acknowledging that Brentano's ideas had undergone a significant alteration before the date of his 
lectures -- an alteration that was even more marked before the actual publication of The 
Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness in 1928.1 
The orientation that is required by such a difficult question weaves itself in a number of ways 
throughout the thesis, but not in the specific form of an examination of the differences between the 
texts of Brentano and those of Husserl. The reason for the preceding opening is purely strategic in that 
it repeats a fascinating analogue to how Derrida, in Speech and Phenomena, strategically reduces 
Husserl's phenomenological project in general to the early 'static' analyses of the Logical 
Investigations (1901). This reduction obscures, at a thematic level, the theoretical and methodological 
significance of some of the most radical research projects undertaken by Husserl in his later 
development of a 'genetic' phenomenology (e. g., Experience and Judgement, Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Traýiscendental Phenomenology (Crisis]). Such obfuscation is not only unjust with respect to the self- 
understanding of phenomenology, but also, somewhat ironically, to that of deconstruction. However, 
it is important to constantly distinguish between what is explicitly thematic in Derrida's writing and 
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Husserl once wrote, 
In order to attain its total horizon, the phenomenological reduction would require a 
'phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction! (Crisis. Part IIIB, Sec. 71, P. 247). 
In other words, a truly rigorous phenomenology needs to continually confront itself (as 
method) critically. Such a phenomenology would be another name for deconstruction. Deffida! s 
deconstructions of some of Husserl's key theses on intentionality, signification, temporality, 
historicity (to nwne but a few), provide a profound and often exciting response to this challenge -a 
response that raises, re-situates, and critically re-evaluates the question of the limits of 
phenomenology itself. This brings us to yet another possible sense of 'before' that confounds the 
'chronology' of phenomenological and deconstructive thought. Since Derrida has provided new ways 
of reading the Husserlian project, in certain cases the re-reading of Derrida, in the following critique 
of the relations between phenomenology and deconstruction, comes before the reading of Husserl. 
The sense of this strategy lies in the need to take into account the ways in which Derrida's readings 
influence 'how' Husserl. is re-read today. In other words, we take into account how the chronology of 
reading is an issue that, in a sense, comes before the question of the chronology of the written 
(without, that is, invoking a paradoxical denial that the written must precede the reading). 
These re-readings provisionally guide us while they themselves are simultaneously subjected 
to critical scrutiny. This double movernent is vital in order to open a space of 'dialogical exchange' 
that restores the Husserlian text in an 'interlocutionary' capacity -- as opposed to one that is 
consigned to the silence of a past horizon (as a mere historical curiosity) apparently delimited by 
deconstruction and robbed of the possibility of an effective response. Therefore, if such a dialogical 
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opening is to be secured, a deconstruction of phenomenology has to coincide with a phenomenology 
of deconstrucfion. 
But what of the after of 'After Derrida!? Is there an after Derrida or is this question limited to 
the perhaps of that which is yet to happen? Is there not yet a time for the copula 'is'? But is not this 
'after' precisely what we are already faced with 'noW -- a now, present, current horizon in which 
deconstructive strategies for reading are already sedimented, already motivating and defining the 
scope of future possible styles of interrogation? Are we limited to an understanding of this now- 
horizon purely within the confines of a milieu of post-structuralist writing that has emerged since 
Derrida? -- a milieu which has, in many significant respects, forgotten its methodological 
indebtedness to in phenomenology? In this sense, 'After Derrida! designates the 'critical movement 
of return! by which deconstruction. must seek to unearth, through a process of de-sedimentation, the 
tracing of its own history. Therefore, the 'after' is a return to the before, but a 'returiY that is a 
radicalized re-orientation on the spacing between deconstruction and deconstruction. Since 'After 
Deffida! also names a task that lies before Husserl, in this case, Husserlian phenomenology can 
perform as a mediator between Derrida and Derrida. 
There is also an 'after' which traces itself out in the sense of what it is to 'pursue' -- the futural 
orientation of the chase. But, we must be careful here. If this is merely thought in terms of the desire 
for mastery (which speaks of an objectivating / idealizing / totalizing intention), then the true 
profundity of Derridean thought will, perhaps, perpetually elude us. The question of style, for 
example, does not give itself up easily to the imposition of a structural grid with its demands for 
objective classification (mastery). The reader must bear this in mind when considering the various 
analytical orientations outlined above. These perspectives are in no way to be taken as exhaustive. 
We wish, instead, to begin to illuminate the 'open multiplicity' Of Possible fields and strategies of 
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deconstructive 'encounter' that have not, as yet, been rigorously explored, but which have, in a 
certain sense, already been anticipated by Husserlian phenomenology and Derridean deconstruction. 
Our overall orientation is one that could be said to concern itself with the politics of reading. 
But what of the 'Spacing Between' ? In truth, it has already been articulated through the play 
of the foregoing. It is the open horizon of the interchangeability of the before and after: the tracing of 
their play (as a lack of fixedness). Each ekstasis (including the presene) slides due to the essential 
'play' in its structure. This play is not something that happens merely in terms of an inter-play 
between originally 'heterogeneous' zones. Their play is not really a question of inter-connectivity, 
but of intra-communality. The relations between different ekstases are not only of a horizontal order. 
There is a vertical dimension that needs to be taken into account. Each ekstasis is already the 
embodiment of play at the heart of itself. the outside of its inside. The 'between' is the opening of 
inter- and intra-relationship -- the fabric of that which stands-out itself to itself as Other. It is the 
horizon of an original intertwining, where difference and identity are of the smne flesh. 
In the specific context of the subtitle, the 'Spacing Between, ' which is also to say, the history 
or 'duration-between' Husserl and Derrida, is the opening site for the radicalization of the thematic 
of time within philosophical discourse -- extending as spatializing and ternporalizing - spaced-out- 
time. 
The copulation of between and spacing also expresses the emergence of a form of 
spatializing that is not simply 'in' time,, ' but is 'of time -- for both terms have spatial and temporal 
aspects. In this sense we could say, but with some caution, that the 'spacing between' refers to the 
tracing of the movement from Husserlian phenomenology to Derridean deconstruction, between the 
years 1901 to 1968. But, it is in no way restricted to this. 
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There is a deeper non-linear sense to the 'spacing between' for which we could equally have 
spoken of the time-space between or chiasm. 
Consider Heidegger's discourse on time-space in his analysis of the fourth dimension of time 
-- which is not to be understood as an increment to the other three ekstases, but is the opening of 
their essential interplay - when he writes 
the unity of time's three dimensions consists in the interplay of each towards each. This 
interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth 
dimension, so to speak -- not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter ("Time and 
Being. " On Time andBeing. P15). 
Compare this structure of ekstatic interplay to the following comments by Merleau-Ponty. 
Taken ý from the working notes of his last and unfinished book, The Visible and the Invisible, they 
express the same forrn of interplay. They also anticipate Heidegger's shift in perspective on the 
question of time and its articulation in the lecture entitled "Time and Being" - which was published 
just over one year later (3 1 st. January, 1962). 
Time and Chiasm November, 1960 
The Stiflung [foundinglestablishment] of a point of time can be transmitted to the others 
without "continuity" without "conservation, " without fictitious "support" in the psyche the 
moment that one understands time as chiasm. 
Then past and present are Ineinander, each enveloping-enveloped -- and that itself is 
the flesh (P. 267-8. Translation modified). 
xiv 
What Merleau-Ponty says about the enveloping-enveloped structural intertwining of the 
present and the past is also true of their relation to the future. Chiasm expresses the vertical 
intertwining (Ineinander) of the three ekstases of time. Time is understood as invaginated flesh, 
where past, present, and future are offered up to one another as folds in the same flesh (which has 
certain spatializing resonances). The flesh as fold -- in its folding-in upon itself -- is the un-folding 
of differentiation within a horizon of belonging. 
Time-space is Heidegger's name for that interweaving of the three temporal ekstases -- the 
giving that determines all -- which expresses a horizon that first articulates their unity and 
difference, and which is irreducible to the limits of the common bifurcation between time and space. 
The opening of this extending as an original intertwining (in both cases) precedes space as an order 
of coexistences and time as an order of successions. ' 
What is crucial here is the way in which both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger have 
appropriated and developed Husserl's thought on time as Absolute Flux: the play of the transversal 
intentionalities of primordial temporalization -- a play which Derrida comes to express in terms of 
temporizing and / is spacing. 
This thesis explores the extraordinary contribution made by Husserl's phenomenology to the 
radicalization of discourse on time and how it traces itself out in Derrida! s early writing. 
As opposed to a systematic coverage of a far broader range of writers throughout the 
investigation of the methodological and theoretical trace-structures at work in the movement from 
phenomenology to deconstruction, this thesis specifically restricts itself to an engagement between 
Husserl and Derrida. Other philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, essentially provide various different orientations on the central relations between 
Husserl and Derrida, but their work is not actually subjected to a critique in any detailed form. Tbree 
xv 
other writers also make themselves felt here, but only one of them acts as a kind of pivot for the 
encounter between phenomenology and deconstruction. In every case, however, their function is 
primarily one of mediation, their differences producing a kind of epochg that encourages dialogue. 
This multi-textual or pluri-vocal epoche brings out some fin-ther orientations and possible spaces for 
dialogue between Husserl and Derrida. 
From a certain point of view, the addition of works by other writers would really be quite a 
superfluous gesture here because Husserl and Derrida, already have the capacity to multiply 
themselves endlessly within the spacing of their return to one another. The movement Trom! 
phenomenology 'to' deconstruction is not a simple progression or surpassing. The foregoing 
discussion on the interchangeability of the 'before, after and between, ' which structure (and re- 
structure) the fabric or spacing of their ongoing encounter, has already problematized such thought. 
It is really a case of the 'play' between phenomenology and deconstruction. 
Consequently, we return to one of the fundamental meanings of 'After Deirida -- which 
coincides with the futural sense of that which is 'Before Husserl': history is the name of a task that 
lies ahead. A dialogue between phenomenology and deconstruction obviously does not consist in 
Derrida encountering Husserl as the mere signature of a dead text. It is a living dialogue in which the 
relationship goes both ways. Husserl's texts resonate with a life of their own and ask questions of the 
questioner. 
It is in these terms that history does not merely lie behind us, it also lies before us. 
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I Note: textual dialogue 
The endnotes to this text, which serve as the outside-inside of the thesis as a whole, are 
important in their capacity to flesh out the inter and intra-dialogical moments of the following 
engagements. Their principal function is not merely one of qualification, as addenda that 
substantiate the critical direction of this thesis, but, in many cases, they also serve as critical 
interruptions' to any tendency toward slipping into the comfortable rhythm of a monologue. (Such a 
tendency is somewhat encouraged by the presentational demands placed on an academic 
philosophical text -- which generally prescribe a linear format / style regardless of the non-linearity 
of the content). This 'other' text -- which situates itself within the same text to which it is other -- 
inscribes and re-iterates a certain movement of dehiscence that is fundamental to the unfolding of 
the text as a whole. It is the signature of an epochg within the monologue that reminds us of the 
dialogical opening that already precedes and constitutes it. Such a 'dialogical epochO should be 
understood in reference to the comments above about the before, between, and after of the relations 
between phenomenology and deconstruction. It is the dual sense of the movement of epochi as 
'cutting' and 'reappropriation! that provides the main thread for the thesis. It is a withdrawal that 
produces an opening from which new life pours. forth; a breaching of attitude, which permits a 
transformational return (e. g., to alternative orientations, spaces, narratives, positions, contexts, etc. 
[consider the pivotal role of strategic displacement for Derrida, which opens up philosophy to its 
Other, which is to say, opens it up to dialogue and negotiation]). The importance of this theme 
demands a careful examination of the development of the thought of epochd in Husserl's work. 
This involves a number of areas of research, which are adumbrated in the Introduction. Their 
forms of presentation are not to be taken as independent and self-sufficient; neither do they indicate 
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a particular pattern of consecutivity. They are moments of a whole that. jare, in a certain sense, 
coextensive with one another (like intercalated leaves or folds in, thO same flesh): they announce one 
another simultaneously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Re-Reading the Deconstruction of History 
Deconstruction, as a project of critique, of re-situation, has a history -- a history whose own 
origins cannot be clearly distinguished from that which is deconstructed by its movement, except 
through the theme of a kind of supplementation (supplementary), which, in effect, already 
undermines the issue of origins. The very question of re-situation itself is that which gets closest to 
the matter of what distinguishes the history of deconstruction from the history that it deconstructs. It 
marks out the time in which the reorganization of our questioning - with respect to its forms and 
sites / methods and orientation - is announced as the central task of this history. If deconstruction 
represents another epoch, then this is only because it has been inaugurated by a movement of 
dehiscence that is already at work in the history that it re-traces. Such an epoch can only structure 
itself on the basis of an epochi through which history is always already re-writing itself. To reduce 
the history of Western philosophical thinking to one principal form of desire, limited by a particular 
concept of presence (as defined by Derrida), speaks of a project of idealization about which we 
should be suspicious. It is only one narrative, one story. It must be worked 1hrough. 
The time of this history is not only constitutive of such an ideal orientation, it is also that 
which undermines it. The traces of this thought and the means by which such idealization can be 
subjected to further critique are to be found throughout the history that is, somewhat ironically, shut 
out by this motif in deconstruction. There are so many moments in this history that scream out to be 
heard -- which do not fit into the overarching grid that is supposed to delimit them. We cannot enter 
into a protracted discourse on the entire history of Occidental thought so we shall confine ourselves 
to what we might call, with some caution, a more immediate epoch in this history as a whole: the 
spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction. This is a paradigm: an exemplary instance of 
the exhibition of the violence of the deconstructive delimitation. 
I 
On the other hand.. 
Derrida! s project of deconstruction should not be limited to this purely violent 
characterization, for it only makes reference to the effect of what we should_call a 'strong' reading. 
Derrida! s writing is labyrinthine in structure, articulating itself in different tones, operating on many 
different levels, and along multiple pathways. It cannot be reduced to its sensational forms of 
sloganizing. Derrida! s own writing offers clues as to how it must be deconstructed in order to flesh 
out its depths. 
We need to strategically put into operation a breach -- a doubled Derrida, with the 'strong' 
thesis, on the one hand and the rigorous critical practice of unbuilding (Abbau) on the other, which, 
if taken to its limits, already undermines the whole concept of a'strong' thesis in deconstruction. The 
point here is also to express another Derrida who has contributed to phenomenological thought. One 
must unravel the 'strong' thesis in order to reach the subtle, and at times profound, insights that 
structure his writing. The former remains within brackets. It is not to be ignored, but it is to be 
viewed with a careful degree of irony. Therefore, we shall not entirely restrict ourselves to a critique 
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of Derrida! s sensational claims -- for they often obfuscate what is really significant in the exchange 
between phenomenology and deconstruction. 
Several influential texts have been written about the relations between the Husserlian and 
Derridian projects, but arguably, there are only three books that contribute significantly original 
perspectives to this exchange. These texts are: J. Claude Evans's Strategies of Deconstruction, David 
Wood's The Deconstruction of Time, and Rodolphe Gasch6's The Tain of the Mirror., The three 
writers offer a broad spectrum in their various approaches to Derrida and Husserl. At first glance, if 
we restricted ourselves to the narrow margins of the Husserl contra Deffida arena, their differences 
might be characterized in the following terms: Evans, as the outraged Husserlian who displays a 
rather anti-Derridean posture; Wood, as the phenomenological-deconstructionist, who subjects the 
theoretical, methodological and strategic relations between Husserl and Derriýa to a form of critique 
that puts both writers through their paces and Gasch6, as the pro-Derridean, for whom Derrida can 
do no wrong. In actuality, their respective orientations are not so clear cut. These texts actually 
explode the narrow spectrum limited by such stereotypes. 
The most important point to bear in mind here, is that this study refuses to take sides in the 
so-called Husserl / Derrida debate (I am somewhat fatigued by this limited form of approach to their 
relations). If there are significant differences that truly divide Husserl and Derrida, they are far more 
subtle and difficult to pinpoint than anything that has been presented by commentaries that set 
themselves up in either of the opposing camps. 2 The only texts that seem to realize this (and which 
explore the issue thoroughly) are the three titles cited above. These books cannot be situated 
comfortably within the familiar disputational space between opposing forces. They are also very 
different to one another - but, in ways that lead to a more open space of dialogue between 
phenomenology and deconstruction rather than a closed arena of contradiction. 
3 
The Husserl contra Derrida 'debate' must be subjected to a form of epoch-j (suspension) in 
order to explore the dialogue between them via a different route. Such a movement of re-reading 
may be viewed as highly speculative, with respect to its examination of the route[s] that must be 
examined, but it need not sacrifice rigour or balance'ih regard to its treatment of the two principal 
interlocutors -- not opponents. 
2. The Point of the Metaphysics of Presence 
Evans's Strategies of Deconstruction is a penetrating study of the limits of Derrida! s stronger 
claims in Speech and Phenomena regarding the limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Although the 
former text is quite specific in its style of approach to the critique of Derrida -- which takes the form 
of a highly detailed comparative analysis -- when making reference to Derrida's comments on 
'protocols of reading, ' Evans leaves open the possibility that "... we are using the wrong protocol" 
3 Strategies of Deconstruction [SDI, Conclusion, P. 168). However, he remains clear that 
deconstruction can and must give itself up to a critique which tests it against its own standards of 
rigour. It is for this very reason that Strategies ofDeconstruction needed to be written. 
On the positive side, it marks the point at which deconstruction comes of age in the 
realization of its responsibility to continuously return to the question of care through unremitting 
self-critique. The book also gives, by example, the limits of the kinds of critique that may be 
employed in any approach to DerriHs writing. There are other protocols of reading, but they do not 
come ready-made. 
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One of the main claims of Evans's text is built upon a careful demonstration that Derrida's 
'strong thesis' (in his reading of Husserl) is, in many ways, untenable. Although Evans does express 
how Derrida's project must ultimately be put at risk by the strategic misappropriations and 
misreadings of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena, he does acknowledge that deconstruction resists 
being pinned down in this way. Strategies of Deconstruction explores a number of different 
suggestions regarding the motivations and strategies of the Derridean text: such as fiction, 
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misreading, parody, satire, comedy, careless distortion, and performance, etc. 4 On the negative side, 
however -- if one keeps to the specifics of Evans's orientation -- when Derrida's texts are 
"... measured in terms of their own standards of rigour ... they fail to live up to those standards" (Ibid. 
P. 169). Even if Derrida! s writing is geared toward reinscribing the notion of truth in and by the text 
under deconstruction, Evans maintains that it is difficult to find suitable justification for the degree 
of distortion at work in his reading of Husserl. 
In the Conclusion of Strategies of Deconstruction (subsection: "Deconstruction and 
Rigour"), Evans raises the question of textual plausibility in reference to Derrida! s treatment of 
Husserl's phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena. 
The entire deconstructive strategy of the book is to allow the argument to develop strictly 
and only from the reading of Husserl. One may well leave aside the question of the adequacy 
of the reading of Husserl, but if 'Derrida! s Husserl' is not independently plausible, the overall 
argument lacks plausibility. I would venture to suggest that a Husserl who argued like 
Derrida! s Husserl would never have been taken seriously (Ibid. pp. 174-5). 
There is much to be said for the suggestion that 'Derrida's Husserl' of Speech and 
Phenomena "would never have been taken seriously" -- and this points to an unjust attitude to 
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Husserl's phenomenology that must be rectified. However, it is quite a different matter when one 
considers 'Derrida! s Husserl' in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry. " There are 
problems associated with any approach to Speech and Phenomena that treats it in isolation. We do 
not undertake the task of rigorously comparing the two texts here, but the spirit of the ongoing 
dialogue between them (as the reverse and obverse of one another) is evident in the various readings 
that follow. 5 
In a particularly intriguing passage, Evans carefully shows that "... in spite of their unclarities, 
Derrida! s claims all admit of a Husserlian. reading; indeed, only that reading seems to make sense of 
them" (SD. P. 82). 
This theme is at the focus of the following study -- which places specific emphasis on what 
is probably the most important misreading in Speech and Phenomena: that which concerns Derrida! s 
misrepresentation of Husserl's concept of the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) as a point-like 
presence. Evans is right to speak of this issue when he lends stress to his argument concerning the 
lack of rigour in Derrida! s engagement with Husserl 
To take a specific example ... Derrida's attempt to show that Husserl is committed to the 
instantaneousness of the present fails to respect the demands of rigour in reading (SD. 
P. 175). 
This theme of the "instantaneousness of the present" is 'the' fundamental issue that extends 
itself throughout a range of Derrida's texts -- for its logic is bound up with his characterization of the 
'metaphysics of presence. ' The seeds of this determination are to be found in Heidegger's Being and 
Time. The following quotation exemplifies what is, perhaps, the principal inspiration for Derrida's 
particular orientation on the question of presence. 
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Heidegger writes 
... in our process of destruction we find ourselves 
faced with the task of Interpreting the basis 
of the ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality (Temporalitdt). When 
this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of beings is 
oriented towards the 'world' or 'Nature' in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 
'time' that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this (though of 
course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of Being as parousia or 
ousia, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' [Anwesenheit]. Beings are 
grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a 
definite mode of time -- the 'Present [Gegenwart]. (Being and Time [BT]. P. 47 / H. 25. 
Translation modified). 
However, Derrida's appropriation of this insight does not authorize the leap by which he then 
relates the present and presence to the metaphysics of the instant: the now as a point. In The Basic 
Problems ofPhenomenology [BPP], Heidegger's examination of Aristotle's treatment of the question 
of time culminates in a characterization of the now that is very different indeed. 
In singularly Eleatic terms, Heidegger claims, 
Every now and every time-determination is spanned within itself, has a range that varies and 
does not first grow by means of a summation of individual nows as dimensionless points. 
The now does not acquire breadth and range by my collecting together a number of nows, 
but just the reverse: each now has this spannedness within itself in a primary way. Even if I 
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were to reduce the now to a millionth of a second it would still have breadth, because it 
already has it by its very nature and neither gains it by a summation nor loses it by 
diminution. The now and every time-determination has a spannedness intrinsically. And this, 
too, has its basis in the fact that the now is nothing but the 'expression, ' the 'speaking out' of 
original temporality itself in its ekstatic character (BPP. P. 269-70). 
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This orientation in Heidegger's discourse on temporality does rather upset Derrida! s reading 
of the now as a point and his attribution of this conceptual trace to Western metaphysics as one of its 
fundamental characteristics. It is significant that Derrida's essay, entitled "Ousia and Gramm6 -- a 
note on a note from Being and Time" (Margins of Philosophy [Margins]), takes up the project 
originally announced by Heidegger, concerning an analysis of Aristotle's discourse on time, but 
which Derrida maintains was unfulfilled. Although this analysis was meant to be presented in the 
Second Half of Being and Time, which never materialized, it did in fact emerge in The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology (from which the passage above has been taken). However, this text 
was not available to Derrida at the time that he wrote "Ousia and GrammV -- since Heidegger's text 
(based on a lecture course given in 1927) was not published until 1975. Derrida's essay was 
published in 1968. It is worthy of note that the latter article begins with an epigram from 
Heidegger's essay "Time and Being. " This should be taken into account for a number of reasons that 
will soon become apparent. 6 
The thought of the now or present as a source point of unmediated presence is subjected to 
an extended critique by Derrida. The project has a certain value in its own right, since it questions 
the traditional logic of immanence / immediacy (which traces itself throughout the history of 
Occidental discourse on presence) as the criterion by which presence, Being and existence are 
measured. However, to associate this concept of the corpuscular or atomic now with Husserl's 
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lectures on time is a complete mistake and, in particular, it undermines the basis of Derrida's strotýq 
thesis. Since this represents one of the principal orientations at work in Speech and Phenomena, if 
one does not grasp the full irony of Derrida's double-reading it is very difficult to assess the value of 
this text as a whole given that it is supposed to be a critique of Husserl's phenomenology. This is the 
case if the strong thesis is taken as anything more than a playful strategy. 
Our task here is to restore the historical context and methodological scope of Husserl's 
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writing on temporality and the manifold phenomenon of presence. 
Evans finds it hard to understand what was actually so compelling about Speech and 
Phenomena. However, that it had a certain seductive appeal cannot be ignored. The reasons why 
tantalize. Evans quotes Wood's The Deconstruction of Time in this regard. 
Wood notes that "Husserl. scholars have not reacted too favourably to it, but it has had an 
enormous impact on the wider perception of the limits and indeed the very possibility of 
phenomenology" (Wood, 1989,111). There can be no doubt about the impact of Derrida's 
work on many contemporary attitudes toward Husserlian phenomenology (SD. P. 179). 
However, 'contemporary attitudes toward Husserlian phenomenology' seem to be caught up 
in a rather linear perspective. Their 'singular' orientation appears to say -- ask not what 
phenomenology has done for deconstruction, ask what deconstruction has done for phenomenology. 
Actually, why not ask both questions -- and without restriction to past-tense? 
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3. Transcendence, Things, and Signs 
It would be a worthwhile task to take up Wood's call in The Deconstruction of Time, where 
he expresses the hope that his remarks 
will one day find their proper place in a positive revaluation of Derrida! s relation to 
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phenomenology (P. 126). 
Wood's scholarly analyses on Husserl's lectures on time and their impact on Derrida's 
thought do indeed present fascinating opportunities for re-evaluating the theoretical and 
methodological relations between phenomenology and deconstruction. One can appreciate the sense 
of balance that Wood's text is trying to promote but, unfortunately, Derrida's writing often exhibits a 
carelessness in his reading of Husserl that cannot be ignored. We are left unsure about the degree to 
which the present study can (or ought to) be 'positive. ' From a methodological point of view, a forni 
of suspension is required. 
The following passage from Of Grammatology is an exemplary instance of the way in which 
Derrida casually underplays the radicality of Husserl's phenomenological project (and its meaning) 
when he adumbrates what he sees as the fundamental difference between the philosophies of Husserl 
and Pierce. This acts as a pivot for his 'strong' reduction of phenomenology to the mere 
'I restoration of the metaphysics of presence. " 
Pierce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the 
transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the 
reference from sign to sign. I have identified logocentristu and the metaphysics of presence 
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as the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a signified. Now Pierce 
considers the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us to recognize that we 
are indeed dealing with a system of signs. What broaches the movement of signification is 
what makes its interruption impossible. The thing itseýf is a sign. An unacceptable 
proposition for Husserl, whose phenomenology remains therefore -- in its 'principle of 
prin ciples' -- the most radical and most critical restoration of the metaphysics of presence 
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(P. 49). 8 
This is a paradigmatic example of what one can call Derrida! s strong-reading of the limits of 
Husserl's phenomenology. However, it is somewhat disingenuous. For example, Husserl's ironic 
reference 'to the things themselves' does not participate in the Kantian metaphysical disjunction 
between appearances and things-in-themselves. From a 'methodological' point of view, one could 
say that phenomenological interrogation proceeds as though that which is given to experience is 
precisely the Thing in itself rather than a mere representation. The orientation is such that it refuses 
to take up a position on the actuality or non-actuality of the signified in any Kantian terms that 
would put it beyond the bounds of experience. After all, it is experience itself that is the source of all 
judgements about actuality. 
Derrida's approach to signification employs a radicalized notion of the sign, which takes a 
path that is in advance of the limits of mere phenomenal reproductions, objective images, 
appearances, etc. This is a pathway that was opened up by Husserl himself. 
Derrida's early orientation (especially in Speech and Phenomena) is engaged primarily in a 
phenomenology of the sign as sign (a sphere that he appears to treat as a rather exclusive horizon). 
He simultaneously criticizes the logics of such a project through a rather loaded deconstruction of 
Husserl's phenomenology while ostensibly performing an eidetic analysis of signification. 
One can argue that the dimension of the phenomenological-deconstruction of that which 
structures experience in the giving of meaning is the result of bracketing anything that could be 
construed as an original extra-significational referent. This is then followed by subjecting the 
'presence' of meaning to an eidetic reduction -- which unravels the structures of such a presence 
(presencing) to a play of different signs. We shall conduct a brief analysis of some of Derrida! s 
principal themes (in his critique of Husserl's phenomenology) in these terms. 
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Husserl's critique of re-presentation is aimed at the presuppositional foundations of 
'imagistic' thinking. Therefore, his critique of representation must be considered in its proper 
context: as a radical overturning of the thesis in which experience is said to be of a merely re- 
presentational order -- where representation is thought purely in terms of reproduction and 
substitution. Certain kinds of experience can indeed be imaginal or pictorial but, for Husserl, this 
dimension is not the principal form of consciousness as it encounters phenomena. His position on 
the intentionality of consciousness does not do away with the question of re-presentation (or relegate 
it to a minor role), but re-situates it. 
Husserl's, phenomenology presents us with a powerful critique of a deeply sedimented and 
limited historical conception of the meaning of representation -- that is rooted in a weltanschauung 
enmeshed in the logic of a Cartesian metaphysical divide (which, in turn, is the echo of a platonic 
schism). Contrary to the tone of Derrida's Speech and Phenotnena, Husserl's polemic against the 
substitutive / opaque theory of the sign as a model of consciousness actually restores the complexity 
and variety of different forms of representation as they function in experience. 
At the level at which Derrida raises the issue of the sign, Husserl might, from a structural 
(and functional) point of view, agree with the claim that we are "dealing with a system of signs, " but 
with a certain reservation and warning. 
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Firstly, the source of Husserl's reservation can be found in his descriptions of the retentional 
and protentional intertwining of time-consciousness -- an interplay which, as the unfolding of 
temporal flux (a continuum which is both dispersive and recuperative), originarily constitutes the 
horizons of what we would call 'intuitiod and 'presence. ' The consciousness of duration, and thus 
continuity (which is always married to consciousness of change), is the primordial condition of any 
possible experience (understood in the most general sense). The consciousness of duration (whose 
extension and inherent unity is only possible due to the transversal interplay of retention and 
protention) does not involve the experience of the passing away of actual times or mere temporal 
signs by somehow collecting them together and comparing them in the 'present' consciousness re- 
productively. This would not give duration -- in much the same way in which collecting together 
different spatial locations would not give 'motion. ' Since there is consciousness of duration / 
successivity, as opposed to a communalization of all past moments within the same consciousness, 
presencing as now, there must be a form of return whose very possibility precedes that of mere 
'reproductive' repetition, i. e., a passive living of the past as distinct from remembering as a 'picturing' 
of the past through an act of evocation. 9 
One can say that different times are not actually concrete moments / existences strung 
together representatively, but in a way, signs in themselves. However, the double aspect of the word 
sign must be considered with great care. We shall see that these moments are rather intentional 
correlates to changing modes of consciousness -- that is, changing modes of temporal orientation, 
which find themselves continually modified in their manner of presencing. Such modification should 
also be understood not as something that befalls a temporal object after its original presentation, but 
as that which internally constitutes it as a temporal object in its givenness as something that is 
'extended. (this includes a certain positionality with respect to other temporal moments). 
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Consider, for a moment, what is involved in a judgement about the actuality-status of 
something. In a way, 'indefiniteness of reference' does point to a system of signs but, for Husserl, 
this is an indication of the limitlessness of the different orientations (spatial and temporal), which 
give the sense of the excess of the Thing that is experienced. For instance, the spatiality of the Thing 
announces itself in the fact that it cannot 'fully' present itself in its totality within any particular 
perspective. If it is truly 'extended' then it requires a multiplicity of orientations to deliver it up. In 
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these terms, 'indefiniteness of reference' points to the unfolding of a mobile matrix of intertwining 
orientations, whose very structurality is precisely openness / indefiniteness. This speaks of time and 
repetition in a way that is irreducible to classical discourse on representation. While Derrida places 
emphasis on 'indefiniteness' of reference, in many cases this actually translates as 'incompleteness' 
of reference or givenness. 
If we turn to the phenomenological concept of the noema, there is another way of examining 
the question of 'indefiniteness of reference! Consider the following classic example (which Derrida 
himself uses [see SP. P. 91]). 
To say that Napoleon is the identical object of the two statements 'the victor at Jena' and 'the 
vanquished at Waterloo' is a trivial truth. What is important is that we have two 'different' noematic 
configurations of meaning. However, they still point to the same object (even though the meant 
appears very differently in each case) and do not cancel each other out or cause the referent to 
vanish in a puff of Aristotelian logic (according to the law of non-contradiction). Napoleon is the 
pole through which each noema is vertically related, but it exceeds its various aspects. Indefiniteness 
of reference, in this instance, has to do with- the essential potential for a multiplicity of different 
styles in which that which is meant may stand-out. The noema does not substitute or stand-in for 
something else, it is the meaning of the meant precisely cis il is n7ectiv. In these terms, indefiniteness 
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of reference does not cancel out the thing in favour of its substitution by signs. The X of the play of 
its signs is, to use a common Thai expression: "same, same, but different. " 
The transcendence and invisibility of the Thing is, in an almost paradoxical sense, evidence 
of its actuality. Evidence, here, involves a certain kind of recession of presence. In contradistinction 
to Derrida! s reduction of the phenomenological sense of evidence -- as that which merely repeats the 
limits of what he calls the 'metaphysics of presence' -- evidence also refers to the speaking-out of an 
'essential absence. ' The evidence of transcendence as transcendence has its own peculiar kind of 
phenomenal meaning. It is the givenness of a certain lack of givenness: a lack that must necessarily 
accompany the presence of any Thing. That which is 'spatio-temporal' must, in an important sense, 
recede before any 'particular perspective' if it is to give evidence of its spatio-temporality. That is, 
although the object as a whole must be capable of presenting other faces according to different 
perspectives (its sides, inside, back, top, etc. ), if it is truly extended, then 'all' these profiles cannot 
be 'present' in any one moment. The exhibition of something always involves relations of presence 
and absence within the horizon of its givenness. The Thing is a nexus of latent or potentially 
actualizable perspectives or modes of exhibition, which announce themselves despite their non- 
presence. We shall return to this issue in chapter one. ' 0 
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4. The Play of Presence and Absence 
For Husserl, the givenness of the 'actual' is not the 'primary' basis of all other types of 
perception, it is just one phenomenal value among others, e. g., the imaginary, the remembered, the 
anticipated, etc. These modes of signification do not merely float upon a more originary perception 
of 'actuality' -- in the sense in which they did for the early empiricists: in particular, John Locke. For 
example, he thought that the imagination played a secondary or higher level role of merely 
abstracting that which had already been given (by means of those senses which were affected by 
certain powers inherent in bodies / entities / Things). There is no metaphysical distinction in terms 
of such levels for Husserl. The initiation of the phenomenological reduction reduces the 
signification 'actuality' to actuality-phenomenon. Therefore, what is really at issue is the careful 
description of various different kinds of phenomena in their giving of themselves without 
presupposing, and thus merely reiterating, any underlying metaphysical substratum -- which 
effectively remains in [brackets]. 
The givenness of the past, for instance, is certainly due to a movement of signification, if we 
turn to the Derridean meta-general viewpoint, but this must be understood in the correct context. For 
Husserl, the originary givenness of the past as Other than, and yet intertwined with, the present 
(which, when thought in conjunction with protention, is the extending or stretching-out of duration) 
is not the 'product' of a 'reproductive' consciousness. 'Retentional' consciousness may be said to have 
the character of the movement of signification (representation) and yet that which is given by means 
of retention is immanent. This does not mean the mere immanence of a reproductive image / 
substitute / proxy / sign over and above that which is reproduced. It is an originary presencing, not a 
presentification. 
It is the question of such immanence that rules out the simple continuation of the 'traditional' 
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terminology of representation for Husserl. This is why he is careful to warn us in Ideas I that the 
inside / outside dyad is an inappropriate model for discussing perception. " It is rather the intentional 
play of immanence and transcendence that must be studied and described. To fall back into the 
language of inner and outer dimensions would bring with it the danger of the possibility of 
imagistic-thinking returning through the back door. One must tread most carefully here. Derrida 
himself is clear when he writes, "... the property of the sign is not to be an image" (OG. P. 45). Of 
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course, Derrida, does not restrict the meaning of representation to 'reproduction, ' since the latter 
definition falls back on an antiquated model of originals and copies of which he is highly critical. 
Husserl does not restrict representation to this definition either. However, he found himself having 
to dispute a community of thinking in which consciousness was specifically reduced to discourse on 
representation in precisely these terms. It is Husserl's careful working-through of an alternative 
terminology that provides deconstruction with the means of re-evaluating the meaning and function 
of the sign. It is difficult to understand why Deffida appears to go out of his way to obfuscate this. 12 
Unfortunately, although Derrida establishes a more general horizon in which to situate his 
discussion on the sign -- which is designed to be free of imagistic presuppositions -- his writing 
obscures a certain contextual difference when drawing material from Husserl. What Husserl's 
phenomenology aims to disclose is that intentionality (which defines consciousness as 
consciousness of something) is precisely the movement of articulation itself -- where the giving of 
phenomena ffor' consciousness) is irreducible to the mere language of appearances, reproductions, 
signs, or images. The sense of the phenomenon equally embraces the language of 'presencing' or 
cappearing' -- a language which, as in the case of 'horizon, ' brings out the essential functioning of 
absence without simply inverting such absence into the mere secondary negation of appearance. 
There is a paradox of the phenomenon in that its presence simultaneously involves a certain kind of 
occultation (once again, this can be thought in terms of 'indefiniteness of reference') which is 
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constitutive of any form of appearance. 
This double movement of immanence and transcendence is in play in Derrida's discourse on 
the sign. Signs are irreducible to 'objects, ' since they primarily efface themselves in order to function 
as signs. Signs surpass themselves toward other signs in an open referential matrix where 'there is 
nothing but signs. ' However, without rigorous qualification, there is a significant danger here of a 
return to a 'doctrinal' form of anti-realism. 
Derrida has often fallen victim to this interpretation of his meaning (which is somewhat 
irritating). That there is nothing outside the text is not the pronouncement of a newtextual idealism, ' 
but points to the play of signification that produces the con-textual unfolding of any form of 
presence -- the contexture of the ways in which meaning, sense, truth, the real, etc., are 'articulated. ' 
Derrida's discussion on the Latin con-texere in the essay "Form and Meaning" (Margins), brings out 
the vital significance of 'the bringing-together, ' as the weaving of a text or fabric -- a con-textual 
matrix of interwoven significations. 
In order to fully appreciate Derrida's discourse on signification / representation it is 
impossible to bypass phenomenology, or to simply dismiss its importance on the basis of his 'strong' 
theses. These orientations tend to place excessive stress on the reduction of the essence of the sign to 
the pure structure of substitution -- although this must not be confused with the thought of the sign 
as a substitute for something extra-significational. 
For Derrida, there are aspects of the sign that must be understood in terms of a certain 
withdrawal of presence, a self-surpassing or self-erasure. Signs are not principally opaque, and they 
are certainly not merely -objective replacements / phenomenal substitutes for things. As we have 
seen, the thought of the sign is not to be reduced to that of the 'image. ' The movement or tracing of 
signification is primarily one of self-effacement -- a transcendence that, in a certain sense gives 
presence. What is at stake for Derrida in his early texts, in regard to the question of the possibility of 
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any kind of presence, is the play of transgression and recuperation that articulates it, repeatability, 
and the detour that is implied in the movement of a repetition that transforms. These are important 
issues, but it is far from being clear that the pathways of Derrida! s analyses somehow contradict or 
problematize Husserl's form of approach. 
Derrida, in concordance with Husserl, does not begin with the traditional logic of duality that 
purportedly divides consciousness and world or signifier and signified in classic philosophical 
discourse. Articulation is not a secondary process that occurs only after there is consciousness and 
things. Neither Husserl nor Derrida explicitly reject both poles of the dyad in any metaphysical 
sense -- they consign the bi-polarity to parenthetical suspension. Instead, they concern themselves 
with the 'between, ' the play that permits such polarization. The insistence that there is 'nothing 
outside the text' is consistent with a methodological or strategic necessity only. For Husserl, it is a 
question of epochi. For Derrida, it is similarly a matter of a certain kind of displacement and the 
suspension of a particular thesis: the perpetual deferment of metaphysical decision. The kind of 
'betweenness' disclosed by, on the one hand, Husserl's intentional analyses and, on the other, 
Derrida's writing on the theme of diffirance -- trace, iterability, arche-writing, etc. -- is not actually 
'situated' as such. It is certainly not restricted-to or positioned-within the traditional space which 
divides the bi-polarity, but is u-topic (no-place, non-lieu). This speaks of the originary opening-up of 
presence, structure, meaning, temporality, spatiality, etc. We shall see that this radical displacement 
in deconstruction, should be understood, as it is for Husserl, in terms of a certain kind of epochi. 
Derrida! s early writing moves within its spacing. 
The danger alluded to above, regarding the meta-generality of the level at which Derrida 
discusses representation, concerns the possibility of the appropriation of his writing on the sign from 
an image-theorist's perspective, which would be to remain situated within the old bi-polarity. 
Derrida's theory of supplementarity -- which presents us with the notion of a supplement without 
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origin, a movement that has no starting-point or final resting-place -- does resenible the 'structure' of 
the old model of re-presentational consciousness that Husserl rejects, but the resemblance is purely 
superficial. The classical image-theory still bases itself on an ontological divide in which the 
principal problem is how to get beyond that which is played out on a mere mental imaging screen to 
that which is purported to originally subsist outside of its representation. Although this model 
radically upsets the possibility of the continuation of discourse on an 'outside' in any coherent and 
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consistent form (since it cannot support the basic criterion that would make such a distinction 
possible), it still maintains itself within the presuppositional limits of the classical ontological 
duality. 
According to Derrida! s orientation, however, there is nothing outside representation. This is 
not to say that his analyses merely shift to one side of the familiar schizoid world-view. In a move 
that echoes Nietzsche's claim that with the loss of the real world, we have also lost the apparent, the 
old model is lifted into quite a different dimension. 13 
It is also certainly the case that when Derrida re-situates discourse on what actually presents 
itself to experience, at no time does this suggest that presence is merely the product of an 
engagement between consciousness and signs. Clearly, this would be to fall back on the canon that 
both he and Husserl strongly criticize -- a tradition of thought that simultaneously displaces the 
ontological status generally assigned to the Thing, or the object of a pure intuition, in favour of 
purely mental phenomena. In this kind of tradition these 'objects' implicitly retain a residual 
connection to a more originary source -- when such phenomena are called appearances, 
representations, images, or signs (thus assuming 'the standpoint of a profoundly problematic 
ontology in epistemological clothing which conceals a massive paradox within itself). While it 
allows the possibility of a clandestine attempt to reinstate the Thing at another level (e. g., the 
nournenal for Kant, for whom this was surely much more than a mere limiting concept "... to curb 
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the pretensions of sensibility" [Critique of Pure Reason. A255-B31 1, P. 272]), we find that this 
would be to maintain a presupposition that cannot be qualified within the parameters of its own 
logic 
Similarly, one of the most important issues for Husserl's thesis on intentionality is that we 
are not principally conscious of signs -- which should read as 'sign-objects' -- but relations of 
significance, meanings, things, states of affairs (Sachverhalte). This kind of consciousness is not to 
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be confused with the consciousness of signs -- which, on its own, would actually problernatize the 
possibility of the consciousness of signs as signs. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that signs only stand-out as signs once meaning has already been 
'given. ' He spoke of this as being the consequence of a certain kind of 'return' -- a Riickgestaltung 
(back-formation or reverse-structuration): 14 a recursive movement by which a sign can come to 
exhibit its value as a sign. It is like the difference between looking toward the finger that points as 
distinct from that towards , yhich it is pointing. In a certain sense, the sign's value or meaning as a 
sign stands out only in that its function originally involves a form of self-effacement through the 
directing of the gaze away from itself. To be sure, from another point of view, one can still make the 
rejoinder that the sign in pointing away from itself comes before that which it points out, but this 
does not necessarily involve recognizing itsfunction as a sign. If one did not recognize the function 
of the finger that points it would merely become an empty sign of itself (an object-in-itself). This 
emptiness does not necessarily mean the complete annihilation of its significational capacity, but it 
does mean that its value as a sign for something Other is not, itself, signified. A sign is pure 
reference -- it transcends itself towards that which gives itself through the signification (as Other). 
If it merely terminated in itself, such termination would literally mean the destruction of the horizon 
of the lived experience of difference. 
It is vital that the sense of erasure or self-transcendence that is intrinsic to the sign be thought 
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simultaneously with any reference to the sign in its 'substitutive' capacity. 
What has to be taken into account is a subtle change in discourse on the sign that transfonns 
the theme into a more 'dynamic' sense of signification. The move is analogous to the 
phenomenological shift from being as noun to its verbal form -- a move that embraces time with all 
its dispersive and recuperative connotations. In German, verbs are known as zeitworte (time-words). 
For Husserl, consciousness is a self-transcending (ekstatic) intentional thrust. It is the outside-itself Iý1 
movement of signification. If we were to say that the consciousness of a Thing is really the 
consciousness of a sign (or, more accurately, a matrix of signs) this would be to disregard an 
absolutely vital phenomenological distinction that can have the effect of plunging us into a mere 
phenomenalism. There is not consciousness and signs, but 'signification' itself -- of which these 
terms are intertwined moments. It is this interwoven tension and movement of surpassing that 
Husserl describes in terms of the language of intentionality. 
This brings us to the form of the possible warning by Husserl -- a warning that revolves 
around the problem of privileging discourse on the sign without due regard to the question of its 
'phenomenological-intentional' meaning. It is through the latter that it already announces the 
unfolding of a distanciating and recuperative relation between appearance and appearing (in which 
absence or non-appearing is a constitutive moment). This can be translated as the 'opening' through 
which the sign announces itself as the unity of signifier and signified. When the term 'sign' is 
discussed in a purely 'substitutive' sense, this tends to conceal the double-aspect to its function. This 
generally restricts it to a purely objective determination caught up within the limits of the language 
of the appearance or the image -- some-1hing that points. Husserl would insist that we are not first 
conscious of signs or reproductive images, by means of which we then infer the existence, meaning, 
or truth of that which is indicated. This is not to say that signs, when understood according to 
Husserl's phenomenological standpoint, are extrinsic to perception, since the preposition qf of 
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intentional consciousness implicitly announces the movement of signification within itself as the 
very possibility of its being as a n7eaningful-comportment-towards something (which is a movement 
that can be repeated again and again). Husserl's theory of intentionality does not concern the 
relationship between 'consciousness and an extra-phenomenal reality, ' but describes the relational 
(which is to say, intentional) structure of consciousness itself in its various forms of encounter: the 
'field' of experience. It is the horizon of the encounter -- the of -- that defines the meaning of 
0 
consciousness. That things are only given (articulated) through the movement of signification - the 
Latin particle re- of representation referring to the 'agaie of return -- is a mundane truth. However, 
this is a completely different proposition to Husserl's contention (arrived at through a meticulous 
series of phenomenological [intentional] descriptions) that consciousness, understood on the basis of 
its prepositional / transitive sense (as consciousness of something) is primarily engaged with 
meanings / things and not signs (in the sense of objective symbols). 
Husserl maintains that, 
The spatial thing which we see is, despite all its transcendence, perceived, we are 
consciously aware of it as given in its embodiedform. We are not given an image or a sign in 
its place. We must not substitute the consciousness of a sign or an image for a perception 
(Ideas 1. Sec. 43, P. 123). 
Derrida places too great an emphasis on the substitutional function of the sign in perception - 
- the detour through the sign as indication (Anzeichen). 
15 We must endeavour to pay more attention 
to that aspect of the sign which should be understood as its pure self-erasure or transparency -- for 
without such invisibility before that which it [re]presents (whatever that may be) it would cease to 
function 'as a sign. ' It could do nothing but turn in upon itself, its own density causing it to collapse 
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like a dying star. Such density would, in the end, merely resituate the question of presence, not 
deconstruct it. Such substitution would be to replace the presence of the Thing with the mere 
presence of a sign -- which Derrida himself clearly means to avoid .16 
The reduction of signification to a play between signifiers (where the signified is not 
dependent on an extra-sigrificational substratum) is a powerful model for grasping those functions at 
work in the constitution of meaning. There are independent reasons for the production of such a 
0 
model (for one thing, it is the legitimate result of an eidetic reduction), but these have little to do 
with simply reversing an old hierarchy. Derrida himself is only too well aware of this. There are 
important phenomenological differences that get effaced. One does not simply substitute the 
presence of a sign for the presence of something extra-signficational. The question of what 
originally comes to presence is re-situated only on the basis of a purely 'provisional' move. What is 
really at issue is that the 'substitutional' aspect of the sign is founded upon a certain performance of 
'erasure. ' What is 'essential' to the functioning of signs is their ability for self-effacement. The 
meaning or the standing-out of the sign as substitution is contingent on tliý original transparency of 
the sign. 
The problem is that Derrida utilizes the theme of substitution against Husserl's discourse on 
what actually gives itself in perception. This is completely inappropriate. The indicative sign or 
representation, as 'substitute' or 'proxy, ' only represents one of Husserl's definitions of Vorstellung 
(according to Evans, the 8th). 17 There is a deeper aspect to the performance of the sign (its self- 
effacement) that is better suited to Derrida! s form of engagement with Husserl. Not that it would 
actually help Derrida overturn Husserl's theses, but it would at least address Husserl on the level at 
which he himself actually conducts his inquiries on the difference between expression (Ausdruck) 
and indication (Anzeichen). Their differences are not to be thought in terms of a distinction between 
non-signs and sign, but a difference between two types or functions of signification. 
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5. The How of the Articulation of the Question 
Historicity, for Derrida, is another name for writing -- and the n7ovement of historicity should 
be understood, in the most primordial sense, as arche-writing / tracing. The working-out of this 
thought can be found in the movement of DerriMs Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" - 
- which is one of the appendices of Husserl's last (and unfinished) text: The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Crisis]). 
In the Crisis, Husserl investigates the possibility of a transcendental phenomenology of 
history. By working through some of the key differences between description and explanation (the 
life of the plane and the life of depth) in his discussion on the historical movement of the Idea, 
Husserl proceeds to uncover the horizon of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time Consciousness is a vital resource for this work (as Derrida himself claims). But then 
again, so is the Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgement, since these texts primarily 
concern themselves with the possibility of a genetic or constitutional plienomenology according to a 
transcendental orientation. The paths taken by Husserl are long and convoluted, and the movement 
is far from linear. The continuous working-out of the thought of epoche throughout the movement of 
Husserl's phenomenology demanded this. 
With the Logical Investigations (1901), Husserl outlined the basis of an early (static) 
dimension of phenomenology through the development of a certain style and method. The rest of his 
career was taken up exploring the 'possibilities' of phenomenology -- in terms of both a pure 
phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy (a double-aspected 'self-critical' movement 
announced in the title of Husserl's Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und17hanomenologischen 
Philosophic [1913]). The working through of the critical method of epochj was a task to which 
flusserl returned again and again. It was a constant return to beginnings: the question of the'how' of 
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the articulation of the question. 
The young Heidegger, on the other hand, appropriated the 'practical method' of 
phenomenology (ready-made -- as developed in the Logical Investigations, which was prior to the 
thernatization of the phenomenological reduction) without Husserl's obsessive drive for an ongoing 
critical examination of its liMitS. 18 This is not to say that Heidegger was in any way careless, but it 
does suggest an over-confidence regarding the degree to which the methods of phenomenology had 
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been grounded. Yet, he was unable to 'complete' the project of pursuing and authentically 
determining the meaning of Being as it was 'initially' raised in Being and Time. During this phase, 
Heidegger seems to have had little interest in Husserl's later discourse on the epochi and his 
constant return to the question of its scope. This is intriguing since the radical orientation of the 
analyses of Being and Time can be said to take place against the background of the transcendental- 
phenomenological reduction. It is not surprising that the text of Being and Time constantly tends 
toward a return to the critical question regarding the 'how' of the 'articulation' of the 'question of the 
meaning of Being. ' There is no closure, only a further deepening. Husserl's obsession clearly caught 
up with Heidegger. The reason for this has to do with the non-linear manner in which 
phenomenological interrogation actually unfolds itself. 
With the lecture entitled, "Time and Being" (1961) we see a reversal of sorts -- although it is 
not simply a reversal of names or the undermining of an old hierarchy, since its revolutionary 
movement was already anticipated, to a certain extent, in Being and Time. The moment that 
Heidegger brought to light the question of the transcendental attitude of Temporalitdt in 192719 he 
actually undermined the limits of his initial task. The question of Being owes its very possibility to 
time. The task of 'formulating the question of the meaning of Being' has to proceed by way of a 
detour. This detour initially involves an analysis of that being for whom Being is in question 
[Dasein]. With the examination of Dasein as care -- Sorge, the structurality of which is 
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fundamentally 'temporal 20 -- the detour is not a mere delay in the passage of the guiding question of . 
Being and Time. The interruption is not simply surmounted, and what is unearthed is not merely 
incorporated into the limits of the initial project. It becomes 'interminably' postponed. The delay of a 
certain epochi defines the whole direction of Being and Time. 
With the deepening of the thought of the 'question' of the meaning of Being with respect to 
time, from the standpoint of the transcendental horizon of Temporaliteit, the very task becomes 
I 
transfigured. At this point Heidegger's research is not strictly existential in orientation unless one 
falls back on the etymological relation between existence and ekstasis. Being always has to be 
thought in terms of time -- but one can argue that the question of time is the principal problem, not 
Being. The terms Being and time are not tied together in a symmetrical relationship. Time cannot 
necessarily be thought in terms of Being. 21 
It is for this reason that Heidegger could not continue to ask St. Augustine's question "What, 
then, is time? " (Confessions. Book 11, Sec. 14, P. 263). To ask, "what 'is' time? " is to ask about its 
Being. One first has to ask about Being before one can ask about the Being of time. And has not 
Heidegger shown us that one first has to ask about the being that asks the question of the meaning of 
being? Since Being always already has to be thought in terms of time, which always withdraws (as 
is also the case with Being), this project must defer its own fulfilment -- indefinitely. 
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Regardless of whether or not this question was implicitly at work in Heidegger's thinking -- 
as a continuation of the opening question in the lecture "The Concept of Time" 1924, where he says, 
"The following reflections are concerned with time. What is time? " -- one could argue that he is 
inevitably drawn back to a more Husserlian type of problematic with respect to the how of the 
articulation of the question. 
Existentialism was borne out of phenomenology. In the case of Being and Time, the young 
Heidegger's predispositions informed the manner and direction of his utilization of 
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phenomenological methods. One should not overlook the theological background to the reading of 
Husserl in Heidegger's development of phenomenological-ontological inquiry -- which restores the 
questions of Being, death, and anxiety. To be sure, it is not a restatement of an old onto-theology, 
given that he is deeply critical of its history, but it does take his own research in a different direction 
to that of Husserl's phenomenology. One might even suggest that Heidegger's work is not strictly 
'phenomenological' (as Husserl himself understood this expression). However, this would be to 
confuse the aim with the language. Heidegger can rightly be considered as the father of 
existentialism precisely because it is his rigorous application of the language of phenomenology that 
unearths the existential horizon. The falling-away from the Husserlian project is a kind of falling- 
upwards, but there are always problems associated with any kind of fall. 
With the lecture "Time and Being" we find a fundamental example of Heidegger's turn 
(kehre), which he could never have foreseen since the method of phenomenology itself only 
gradually informed him about the scope of what he could 'authentically' articulate. This makes itself 
felt with particular force in the fascinating closing remarks of his address where he expresses the 
'problem' of having conducted the lecture by means of propositional statements. 23 
Derrida, in certain fundamental ways, returns the method of phenomenology to itself 
stripped of the existential character of any particular ontological orientation. It is very much a case 
of the later Heidegger providing the resources through which Derrida discourses with the earlier 
incarnation. There is some indication that this also involves a detour through Husserl. Conversely, 
we have seen -- with reference to the intimacy of Anwesenheit and Gegenwart, as the lynch pin of 
the deconstruction of phenomenology -- that Derrida reads Husserl through Heidegger. Derrida! s 
analyses are already based in a plurivocal (dialogical) dimension. 24 
Derrida appropriates Heidegger while displacing the questions of Being, temporality and 
historicity by re-situating them according to a modified perspective: the quasi-transcendental field of 
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writing / arche-writing. There is a sense in which Derrida reads Heidegger with the more 'formal' 
eye of the Husserlian. The re-reading begins in existential-phenomenology and goes beyond only by 
'returning' to phenomenology in a manner that radicalizes / re-organizes its orientation. Such a 
'beyond' requires examination for it has very definite limits. 
There is nothing outside the text, which is to say that everything that is is by virtue of the 
opening up of structure and the structurality of the opening through which it is articulated (con- 
textualization: co-founding, con-founding, etc. ). As a deeply sedimented and yet mobile matrix, the 
theme of 'textuality' performs a similar role for Derrida as the discourse on the Lebenswelt -- 
opened up by the implementation of the transcendental- phenomenological reduction or epoche -- 
does for Husserl in the Crisis. 
To return to the Heideggerian trace in Derrida! s thought, that there is nothing outside the text, 
is not a reduction of Being. It is the opening up of the sense or horizon of the possibility of its 
articulation, which is, in a sense, prior to the question of Being. However, it is only through the 
working out of the 'question' of the meaning of Being that this deeper horizon is announced as a task 
for thinking. The urgency of the question announces itself only after a careful phenomenological 
investigation of the problematics of the question of Being in terms of the problem of 'method' itself- 
the how of the articulation of the question. This is a task that Heidegger took up and which 
ultimately undermined the limits of the original aims of Being and Time. The promise of a second 
part to this project, as announced and anticipated in Being and Time, was never fulfilled -- nor could 
it be, as Heidegger himself remarks in his author's preface to the seventh German edition of this text. 
While the previous editions have borne the designation 'First Half, ' this has now been 
deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first 
were to be presented anew. Yet the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, if 
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our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being (Being and Time, P. 17). 
The "road, " path, or way "remains a necessary one. " The question of method itself is perhaps 
'the' phenomenological task. And it is the methodical care with which Heidegger's magnum opus 
unfolds itself in these terms that justifies its greatness. With the addition of his later views, however, 
should there not also be some reference to the necessity of Dasein being "stirred by the question of 
time? " Much of Derrida! s writing may be seen as a vigorous response to these issues. A critical re- 
reading of Derrida! s readings of Husserl need not necessarily be a return to the latter in any sense of 
an undoing of that which followed Husserl (i. e., Heidegger's programme) and thus a 'return to the 
same. ' We shall attend to that aspect of deconstruction which (through a Heideggerian lens-piece) 
has the capacity to further refine Husserl's self-professed drive to leave no philosophical stone 
unturned in the exploration of the question of method (hodos -- way, road). 
Task or Play? 
Husserl's enterprise laid open the 'pathway' to an understanding of essence (eidos and Idea -- 
which are by no means identical) that does not restrict it to a mere 'static' phenomenology. His 
studies take into account the diversity of the meanings of essence in terms qf time -- meanings that 
are often in diametrical opposition to the unworldly Platonic essence or form (a conceptual matrix 
which has, on occasion, been incorrectly attributed to his philosophy). 
Derrida's reading of Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" recognizes the 'dynamic' sense of 
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essence in the concept of Geschichtlichkeit -- the tension (one might even suggest, 'dialogue') 
between eidos and Idea. Tradition is the articulation of the movement of the Idea, the unfolding of 
its inscription. The recursive movement by which the Idea announces itself again and again (immer 
wieder) is that which constitutes any form of Weltanschauung25 since it originally traces out an 
inscription capable of transmission: a significational matrix that is extended and available for re- 
iteration. Such 'historicalness' (or its possibility) is thernatized in Husserl's writing by the concept of 
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historicity. For Derrida, it becomes arche-writing. Although this 'writing' indicates a transcendental 
dimension of the unfolding of history and language, the word 'writing' itself is retained by Derrida 
because of its connection to the worldly, mundane or empirical sphere. The 'actual' graphic 
performance of writing goes hand in hand with the Idea. The latter is nothing without its articulated 
transmission in the constitution and maintenance of a tradition / community of thinking (which is 
just one of the reasons why any reference to the transcendental in Derrida's writing will be preceded 
by the prefix 'quasi-'). This is of course in direct contradistinction to the Socratic / Platonic 
assignment of writing (in the Phaedrus) to a merely secondary role. 
Essence could be said to be a certain kind of organizational formation announced through the 
movement of writing. it is fruitful to think this in terms of the tracing of primordial temporalization 
and Geschichtlichkeit. In this regard, Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, 
Crisis, and Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry'are the most significant texts to 
take into account. What Derrida takes up is the question of the structuralization at work in the 
historical passage of the Idea -- where the Idea is an 'absence, ' which is, nonetheless, qf ct ve . 
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throughout the movement that seeks to realize it. The Idea is not self-subsistent and non-temporal, 
because the historical movement that strives toward its realization actually constitutes it. Therefore, 
in contradistinction to the Platonic assigninent of the ideal to a timeless realm, the Idea -- 
understood (as Husserl says) in the Kantian sense -- is precisely nothing without the moments (in 
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flux) that reach out toward it. The expression of the Idea relies on such 'movement. ' Therefore, it is 
far from being outside time. The asymptotic tension between eidos and Idea is precisely the 
unfolding of historicity. This is the 'inscription' and 'transmission' of tradition and thus the 
possibility of the Idea: a dialectic between finitization and infinitization. 26 
The convoluted twists and turns of Husserl's investigations, throughout his development of 
phenomenological method, announce a rigorous response to the problem of how we can be 
apodictically certain of anything, and as such they operate on the very cutting edge of heuristics. At 
the same time, the articulation of the fundamental sense and role of the epochi -- as both breach and 
transformational return -- informs us of the 'infinite' horizon of such a task. The question of some 
kind of totalizing authority at a higher (or lower) level is not something about which we are 
permitted to speculate. It is rather a question of what is at stake in the movement itself that should be 
of fundamental concern -- the how in contrast to the what. Derrida parenthesizes, by means of a 
more radical epochi, the 'teleological' sense of such a 'task' and speaks of the importance of 'play. ' 
However, this does not undermine the value of Husserlian methodology because play, 
dissemination, fictionalizing, etc., from a functional point of view, are other names for the 
phenomenological movement ofimaginary variation. ' 
Husserl, himself, writes that, 
if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say with strict truth if he will allow for 
the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life ofphenomenology as qf all eidelical 
science is ! fiction, ' that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its 
sustenance (Ideas 1, Sec. 70, ). 
The movement of 'fictional izing' in Husserl's writing is known as the procedure of 'eidetic 
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reduction. ' Economically, eide are those moments or aspects of an Ideal (the latter being what 
Husserl calls an Idea in the Kantian sense) that extend toward a terminus without ever 'actually' 
attaining or encapsulating it -- the ideal / whole sense of which they are articulations or 
adumbrations. This asymptotic relation between eide and Ideas is remarkable in that it expresses 
time and the movement of interrogation beyond the bounds of a merely linear and irreversible 
movement. Disclosure is the meeting-point between a multiplicity of perspectives. The Idea is 
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constituted through this inter-play / negotiation -- a movement 'to-and-fro. ' Such plurality in play is 
also the key to the value of Derrida's relation to phenomenology. It is because of such fundamental 
plurality that there is the possibility of what we would ordinarily call discourse -- which includes 
any 'internal' dialogue by means of which any particular tradition of thought is permitted to 
thernatize its own character and motivation through a process of self-critique. Such a form of 
critique involves a form of self-distanciation - the space that is constitutive of irony. This pluri- 
dimensional movement at the heart of any tradition (whose essence cannot be divorced from 
'temporal' considerations) is that which permits both renewal and transformation through a play of 
contrasting orientations / perspectives. Tradition is a mobile matrix. It is not static. 
In a more straightforward phenomenologically descriptive sense, eide are those aspects or 
characteristics of an object (the word 'object' being understood in the broadest sense) without which 
it would cease to be what it is. The general idea is that the practicing phenomenologist, in the 
attempt to disclose the 'essence' of that which is subjected to eidetic reduction, imaginatively varies 
the object only up to the point at which its structural integrity, form and meaning would otherwise 
dissolve. Such play, both in terms of the movement of variation and in terms of the play in the object 
itself -- its lack of 'absolute' fixedness, since its 'essential' elements cannot be divorced from the 
manner in which it is interrogated, i. e., what the interrogator is interested in -- announces that an 
element of fiction is already at work in an appeal to a regulating principle, essence, concept or Idea, 
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(once again, these are not identical). What is really intriguing is the multiplicity of ways in which 
this movement implicates time. The dispersive effects of time are also those which permit the 
possibility of synthesis and appropriation. Both intertwining movements are at work in the 
possibility of repetition at the very heart of the Idea -- a claim that is fundamental in both Husserl's 
work and that of Derrida. 
The essence of the Ideal lies in its repeat-ability. However, this notion of essence cannot be 
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heterogeneous to that which it articulates. Essence is not a 'static' principle that resides outside time, 
but is of it. Regulative principles, essences, or grounds have the constitutive function of permitting 
organization in flux, but they are constituted as well as constituting. Husserl often paraphrases 
Heraclitus in this respect, and the following comments are probably the most characteristic of 
Husserl's own position regarding the mobility of essences, regulative principles and 'grounds. ' 
... every 'ground' [grund] that is reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up 
awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is 
oriented toward the unity of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that we could ever 
simply grasp and understand the whole; rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered the 
universal form of meaning-formation, the breadths and depths of this total meaning, in its 
infinite totality, take on valuative [axiotische] dimensions: there arise problems of the totality 
as that of a universal reason (Crisis, Part III A, Sec. 50, P. 170). 
Husserl's implementation of the epochi, in its many different phases -- which invariably 
involve an eidetic aspect -- expresses the fundamental importance of a form of recuperation through 
distanciation (for distanciation, also read delay and duration) and the openendedness of possible 
modifications in orientation that frees the'depth' of the'whole' from the'shallow' limits of any noil- 
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reflexive and totalizing grasp. The movement is that of 'opening' rather than that of 'closure, ' or 
rather, closure is an operative moment in the movement of opening. Here, the expression closure is 
not equal to the thought of terminus (e. g., when closing a door on a space behind, has not another 
space already opened up ahead? ). The epochi is a movement of dehiscence, a rip in the fabric of 
lived experience from which pours forth the structure of its own possibility. In these terms, it is the 
methodological analogue to the retentional and protentional interwovenness of time, in its spacing, 
where closing is coextensive with opening and distanciation is the other face of a transformational 
return. 
Therefore, the unfolding of the One takes time, since it requires a 'multiplicity' of 
adumbrations, to articulate it, but the very movement of articulation itself is also that which defers 
adequate fulfilment in that it continually modifies the scope of that towards which it directs itself. 
Such modification of the meaning of the desired is coextensive with the continuous modification of 
the sense of the desiring itself. Each alteration grows out of prior reflections in a transgressive 
movement that always already has the capacity to fold in on itself. The methodological epocW is the 
philosophical gesture that raises this to the level of a theme in its own right. Thus, Husserl claims 
that... 
... the phenomenological reduction itself -- and this is part of its essence -- could reveal 
its 
sense, its inner, necessary requirements, and its scope only in steps. Each step required new 
reflections, new considerations, which in turn were possible only through the self- 
understanding and the practiced accomplishment of the other steps (Ibid, Part III B, Sec. 71, 
P. 247). 
The final pages of the main text of the Crisis (the text that had such a profound impact on 
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Merleau-Ponty's thought, e. g., the themes of Lebenswelt, Ineinander (chiasm), kinesthesis, motility, 
etc. ), give an account of a reflexive continuum that is dialogical in form. To reflect is to adopt a 
position and thus to enter into dialogue with one's past. In a peculiar sense it is to interact within the 
community of oneseýf 
Husserl makes this clear in the Crisis when, after establishing the life-world [Lebenswelt] as 
a'first intentional heading', by means of the strict implementation of epochg, he suggests a shift to a 
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'second level of reflection, ' which 
leads to the ego-pole and what is peculiar to its identity. Let us here point out only what is 
most important, the most general aspect of the ego's form, namely, the peculiar 
temporalization by which it becomes an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time- 
modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in a sense, in every past that belongs to it, 
another -- i. e., as that which was and thus is not now -- and yet, in the continuity of its time it 
is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before it. 
The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past ego, even 
though the latter is no longer present: it can have a dialogue with it and criticize it, as it can 
others (Crisis. Part III A, Sec. 50, P. 172). 
This speaks of the original-communality [Urgemeinschaftung] of the temporal unfolding of 
the 'life' of consciousness -- a transgressive and recuperative passage through which consciousness 
has its unity (is simultaneous with itself) precisely by being 'in communication' with itself as Other 
(its unity is also a spacing). These changes in orientation (distanciating shifts) articulate the pure 
movement (historicity [Geschichtlichkeit]) of each individual history. In other words, the ego is 
constituted within an intra-subjective intentional horizon; whose form unfolds in a way that is 
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structurally analogous to that of inter-subjectivity. It is a dialogical temporal-spacing through which 
it both establishes its continuity and marks itself off from that which it is no longer. 27 Time gives the 
spacing through which there can be dialogue and negotiation -- the condition of the possibility of re- 
evaluation and the fleshing-out of structure and meaning. 
The movement of phenomenology (the time of its unfolding / development) as a whole, is 
one of self-critique, which does not, for instance, detach itself from its past, but through its intrinsic 
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futural thrust, permits a change in orientation on the meaning of its past. The same is true of the way 
in which the past (revisited) gives the future its various contours as an incalculably open field of 
uncertainties, hopes, fears and expectations. As Merleau-Ponty writes in the preface to the 
Phenomenology ofPerception, 
Phenomenology ... must ... put to itself the question which it puts to all branches of knowledge, 
and so duplicate itself infinitely, being, as Husserl says, a dialogue or infinite meditation, and 
in so far as it remains faithful to its intention, never knowing where it is going (P. XXI). 
Since the epochi plays such a fundamental role, in the realization of the significance of the 
question of openings and openness throughout the constitution of alternative perspectives (which 
expresses the 'interminability' of the scope of their interplay), this must surely make us pause when 
we consider what Derrida's project is actually doing -- e. g., his employment of the strategy of sous 
rature, his ironic approach to 'reading' (textual maieutic technique), his project of dissemination, etc. 
Deconstruction is a kind of 'philosophy of suspicion' -- a strategically non-teleo logical 
manoeuvre, which has thematically crystallized a primary operational element in Husserlian method 
announced by the epochi and its various movements of unravelling, bracketing, and suspension. In 
these terms, Derrida continues (in a 'stylistically' more radical way), the task of phenomenology's 
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own critical dialogue with itself as method. Derrida has often been accused of de-contextualizing 
mere 'moments' of texts -- which is an over-simplification of the sense of what he is doing when he 
'displaces' or 're-situates' them. Deconstruction is a movement of de-sedimentation -- a dis- 
entangling or unravelling (as in the sense of the German word Auflosen, which means 'to unravel a 
mystery'). It is not the kind of disentangling which merely 'renders unintelligibility. ' It is the demand 
for dialogue with, in contrast to passive assimilation of, traditional theoretical axioms, the 
motivations that they rationalize, and the milieu of thought that they characterize. Deconstruction, in 
many ways, can be seen as a healthy poke in the arm of philosophical writing as critique. 
What we are faced with is a movement of play / variation that brings out the temporal- 
spacing of the unfolding of con-textuality. If sedimentation indicates 'stratification' or 'reification, on 
the one hand, ' it also expresses evolution, the material inscription of change (which is married to 
continuity), and the clue to possible futures (expectational horizons) on the other. Although there is 
a certain kind of 'invariability' about the structural unfolding of history (any possible history) -- a 
tracing that both Husserl and Derrida attempt, in their own distinctive styles, to uncover -- this does 
not mean that we are reduced to one meta-context that effectively delimits all others. We are not 
freed from difference, uncertainty, and variability. Variability or the possibility of variation, is also 
the condition of the possibility of contextualization -- the writing out of differential narratives of the 
One. In a Husserlian sense, the unfolding of the interplay between eide and their vertical relation to 
Ideas (which is analogous to a dialogue) constitutes the 'depth' and formation (contexture) of the 
meaning of the Ideal. 
It is precisely along these lines that the theme of play in Derrida's deconstruction has much 
in common with Husserl's discourse on imaginary variation and eidetic reduction as. fictionalizing. 
Play is 'differing and deferring' -- play disseminates -- it is fictionalizing. As such, the non- 
teleological strategies permitted by the movement of play are non-teleological precisely by virtue of 
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the fact that play or dissemination is a 'de-centering. ' It cannot help but displace the intimately 
related questions of origins and ends through the very process of unravelling that it traces -- which is 
to say that there is a certain kind of freedom in the movement of return. This is a freedom that 
deconstruction expresses by thernatizing the form of its own passage as one that embraces both 
"chance and necessity" ("Dififirance, " Margins. P. 7). 
There is no 'pure origin, ' primordial 'center, ' ideal simplicity, or synthesis that draws 
0 
deconstruction (or in the most general sense, any form of interrogation) inexorably towards itself. 
From the point of view of the language of presence, such a center can only ever be an idealization -- 
a fiction constituted by work. Derrida! s essay "Ellipsis" (Writing and Difference [WD]) perfectly 
illustrates the breach in the concept of the center as both origin and telos of Western metaphysics (in 
terms of the space opened by the examination of the open differential / deferring spacing between 
the 'book' and the 'text'). What is intimated in the structure of such a breach is an absolute lacuna -- a 
sort of purified Sartrean nothingness "... an unnameable bottomless well" ("Ellipsis, " WD. P. 297). As 
the 'opening' of all possible articulation, it necessarily effaces itself. It is pure effacement. This lack 
is the motivation to write, to speak-out. 28 
Unlike the hermeneutical gaze (as Derrida sees it), deconstruction does not give itself up to a 
drive that seeks to passively unearth a pure plenitude of meaning, " but instead, it recognizes its 
responsibility to thematize that which 'actively, ' although invisibly, traces itself out in the drive 
itself. The space opened here permits an interrogation of characters/styles of interrogation and the 
constitutive impact they have on that which they bring to light. The clues to the strategic and 
theoretical relevance of this perspective, as already indicated, are to be found in the Derridean 
concept of 'play, ' and the Husserlian method of 'fictional izing. ' Such play or fictionalizing is possible 
because of the pure absence / non-presence of a center or primordial substrate of meaning. Like an 
Idea 'in the Kantian sense, ' it recedes infinitely: it is a finite infinity (an ideal finitude, but 
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empirically non-totalizable, non-realizable). The passage to the 'limit' is infinite. This is an 
asymptotic relation of Eleatic proportions -- Achilles cannot catch up with the tortoise. 
Therefore, deconstruction, in contradistinction to the anguish or dread in the face of the 
future about which such luminaries as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre speak, joyfully celebrates 
the openness and uncertainty of its futural horizons. Nietzsche's influence here is clearly apparent. 
Husserl's own comments on the sense of fictionalizing in the 'imaginary variation' at work 
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(or in play) in the movement of eidetic reduction (Ideas 1. Sec 70, P. 184 -- which Derrida himself 
remarks upon in his Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, P. 45 as the "vital element of 
phenomenology") is one of the principal sources of the logic intrinsic to the dynamic, constitutive, 
and disruptive play of Derridean dissemination. This thematization of the element of fiction in 
eidetic reduction is the methodical announcement of the phenomenological opening through which 
deconstruction emerges as the expression of both rigour and play. The originality of Derridean 
thought and hyper-textual manoeuvrability partly lies in the fact that although he is a master of 
hermeneutic technique he does not restrict his writing to that of a hermeneutical teleology. 29 It is not 
a question of rigour or play. In the context of Derrida's writing, there is no either / or. Is this then 
also the case for the and / or of task and / or play? 
Deconstructive play is passive and active, responsive and provocative -- which returns us to 
the fundamental sense of deconstructive 'adventure' as indicated above, a joyful embrace of both 
chance and necessity; a project that is both playful and rigorous. However, with this thought, do we 
find Derrida transgressing the horizon that Husserl repeatedly expressed as an 'infinite task? Have 
we burst through some kind of phenomenological membrane where the last echoes of the call "to the 
things / matters themselves! " fade into a past now only delivered up to the 'ironic' gaze of 
deconstruction? Such motifs of deconstructive practice as the attitudes of sous rature, dissemination, 
de-sedimentation, and irony (which always announce themselves through play) express an openness 
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beyond specific tasks, no matter how inexhaustible in scope, in that they speak rather of infinite 
play. Is this the point at which play is freed from the 'teleology' of the task? 
As Derrida writes in Of Grammatology, 
One could call play the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that 
is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence (P. 50). 
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But, is this to free play from the teleology of the task or to turn to play in such a way as to 
transfigure the sense of the task? Did Husserl reduce play or fictionalizing to the limits of 
predelineated tasks -- thus indicating that his project was still absorbed within an agenda rooted in 
the dimension of presuppositional thinking that he himself called the 'natural attitude'? Has play 
always been subsumed in this way? Does Derrida effectively deconstruct the notion of the 'tasle to 
the point at which 'play' shows itself to extend beyond its limitations, in such a way as to express the 
open field through which the sense of a task can first be explored? Is it the case that in Husserl's 
work we find the method of play initiated under the guiding influence and thus 'limiting parameters' 
of a specific teleological drive, i. e., a task which aims toward totalization, absolute disclosure, full 
and immediate presence? But, does not Husserl repeatedly deny such a possibility? Does Derrida! s 
deconstruction, then, announce a significant difference to phenomenology by freeing play from 
teleology in general -- or is the question of 'teleology' itself, perhaps, subtly subjected to a new style 
of interrogation? The anticipation of this can actually be found in Husserl's examination of the 
possibility of a transcendental-phenomenology of history and the development of the concept of 
Geschichtlichkeit in the Crisis. 
The primary concern for Hussert (especially in the latter stages of the Crisis) is to further 
undertake a careful examination of the methodological role and limits of transcendental- 
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phenomenological reduction (epochj) -- a movement that continuously displac--s the question of 
origins and defers the question of ends. How could a'perpetual return to beginnings' do otherwise? 
7. The Epochal Play of Time as Task 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida writes 
To think play radically the ontological and transcendental problematics must first be 
seriously exhausted; the question of the meaning of being, the being of the entity and of the 
transcendental origin of the world -- must be patiently and rigorously worked through, the 
critical movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively 
followed to the very end, and their effectiveness and legibility must be conserved. Even if it 
were crossed out, without it the concepts of play and writing to which I shall have recourse 
will remain caught within regional limits and an empiricist, positivist, or metaphysical 
discourse. The counter-move that the holders of such a discourse would oppose to the 
precritical tradition and to metaphysical speculation would be nothing but the worldly 
representation of their own operation. It is therefore the game of the world that must be first 
thought; before attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world (P. 50). 
Does not the very generality of a project that seeks to uncover "the game of the world, " as 
opposed to "attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world, " indicate, from the very 
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beginning, a danger of conflation? Does this not implicate a certain kind of violence that forces 
disparate elements into some overarching unity that is superimposed upon them? In general terms, 
would this not undermine Derrida! s own call to 'rigour' (that the texts under examination be allowed 
to deconstruct themselves according to their own logics)? Is there not also the possibility of 
interpreting this project as one that is 'essentialist' in orientation? Is there not the suggestion that "all 
the forms of play in the world" should be tackled on the basis of "Ihe game of the world"? 
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It is also a question of whether the central questions raised by Husserl and Heidegger have 
actually been 'followed to the very end' but, even more importantly, we need to continue to ask: 
what is meant by 'end'? There is no 'beyond' to philosophy, as Derrida himself makes quite clear. 
The end-limit recedes infinitely. 'Closure, ' then. But, what would closure actually mean in regard to 
the limits of transcendental phenomenology? 
Perhaps Derrida is primarily 'playing' with the issues of origin and telos -- subjecting them to 
a subtle form of problematization, and thus submitting the course of his own project to a certain 
ironic orientation or self-epochi? The sense of play, 'as the absence of a goal, ' finds its origins in 
Derrida! s readings of both Husserl and Saussure on the questions of intentionality on the one hand, 
and the sign on the other. Derrida! s notion of the 'trace' emerges out of a model of signification in 
which we are to speak of a'play of signifiers without an original extra-significational referent. ' 
This mirrors one of Husserl's earliest moves -- the phenomenological reduction. The 
manoeuvre, through which phenomenology initiates a radical yet responsible critical gesture, 
'suspends' any position-taking with regard to the horizon of presuppositional being that is referred to 
as the 'natural attitude' -- which is, in principle, the name of a non-reflexive and habituated 
orientation. It is not the phenomenon of being that is bracketed (and even less is it doubted) '30 but a 
certain way of being: a Weltanshauung, a noesis, a thesis. The Welthesis of the natural attitude is 
suspended. It is not lost, but parenthesized. This radical displacement, this lateralization of 
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orientation, constitutes an opening that restores a certain wonder. The methodological withdrawal 
from any continued participation, of a merely passive order, within its limits is motivated by a call to 
focus on the world as phenomenon (as the unity of the out-standing -- ekstatic -- logics of appearing 
and appearance). No metaphysical decision is made about the actuality or inactuality of any extra- 
phenomenal substratum. 
The familiar becomes strange and thus begins to stand-out. Familiarity is the site of a kind of 
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recession of presence; it is undemanding, it asks nothing of us and so it shrouds itself in invisibility. 
The comfortable withdraws itself within the homeliness of habit (habitation / habituation -- habitat / 
habitus) and only finds its voice when its strangeness is restored. That which is the most familiar, 
the closest in proximity, is for this very reason that which is furthest from us. The familiar is not at 
the focus of vision; it recedes into a bland undifferentiated horizon. Like the stand-point of vision, 
the placefrom which sight extends itself, it is a blind-spot. 31 
Within the brackets of the phenomenological reduction, the noetic-noematic correlation or 
intentional intertwining is the phenomenological-eidetic correlate to Saussure's radicalization of the 
signifier / signified relation as one which has no 'natural attachment' to an extra-linguistic reality -- a 
'naturalness' that is thereby permitted to open itself up to interrogation. 
When it is a question of the appearing of meaning or sense, the so-called thing-in-itself does 
not do any of the real work. The logics at play here owe a great deal to Husserl's reading of Berkeley 
and Hume -- both of whom subjected Locke's theoretical disjunction between primary and 
secondary qualities to the most critical of examinations. The distinction crumbles under their 
skeptical gaze. However, their skeptical orientation allowed the re-emergence of idealism through 
the backdoor. As far as Husserl was concerned, their attitudes were indicative of a drive that merely 
assumed the standpoint of a diametrical opposition -- and thus trapped them within presuppositional 
limits that they had failed to recognize. If Husserl's procedure of reduction is 'skeptical' in character, 
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it is only so in a methodological sense. Here it is a question of style, critical vigilance, or strategy 
rather than doctrine in the form of a mere counter-theology. 
Husserl's project is concerned with the phenomenality of meaning -- the unfolding of sense 
as 'intentional relation. ' Intentionality does not refer to a relation that holds between appearances and 
things-in-themselves, but to the structurality of appearing itself -- the articulation of significance. 
This is the difference that sets phenomenology apart from a mere phenomenalism, naturalism or 
psychologism. Similarly, Husserl escapes the naivete of skepticism. It is the 'method' of 
phenomenology itself that prohibits the assumption of a standpoint on any type of referentiality or 
connectedness other than that of intentionality. The phenomenological reduction is not so much an 
exercise in 'systematic doubt' as one of 'systematic suspension. ' That which is bracketed is still, in a 
certain sense, retained -- but in parentheses. The noetic-noematic correlation (whose structure stands 
out by means of an eidetic reduction) is an 'intentional unity' of signifer and signified - but, within 
the dimension of this phenomenological orientation this is a matrix that has no necessary relation to 
any absolute or substantive signified outside itself. 
What we have here is a referential interplay that has no need of absolute referents. This is not 
so much representative of a reduction that 'closes-off as one which 'opens-up' its field -- motivated 
by a concern that addresses itself to the structurality of intentional play rather than that of relations 
of cause and effect. The latter is parenthesized along with what Husserl calls the 'natural attitude. ' 
The world as world-thesis is retained, but the very sense of the 'naturalness' of this thesis is itself put 
into question. In other words, it is subjected to a form of play. This procedure thematizes itself 
through the very movement of epochi -- a movement that discloses sense precisely at the moment at 
which it is breached. It thematizes at the level of method that which is already operative in 
perception, language or the movement of signification -- a tmce of postponement, a detour that 
disrupts in order to disclose. For Derrida also, play is openness without specific spatial and causal 
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limitation (thing-in-itself, absolute referent, centeredness, etc. ), and without determinate temporal 
limitation (the present, origin, telos, etc. ). Play is the opening through which he discourses on 
different kinds of trace structure - where trace is not a trace of any thing. 
The instituted trace ... has no 'natural attachment' to the signified within reality. For us, the 
rupture of that 'natural attachment' puts in question the idea of naturalness rather than that of 
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attachment. That is why the word 'institution' should not be too quickly interpreted within the 
classical system of oppositions. 
The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference 
within a structure of reference where difference appears as such and thus permits a certain 
liberty of variations among the full terms (OG. P. 46-47). 
Firstly, the phrase "... where difference appears as such" shows how even the functioning of 
difference cannot do without presence to some extent. However, such difference, here, is constituted 
(as we shall see) by means of a certain delay at work in retention -- which is not present except as a 
trace of itself in the difference that appears. Of the two moments of diffirance, it is only really 
deferral that resists the language of presence. We say 'resist! -- it is not 'beyond' it as that which is 
alien to presence. Their relation is in fact intimate -- so intimate that it can no longer be 'seen. ' 
Secondly, the all-too-casual use of the expression 'the retention qf difference' reaffirms Derrida's 
indebtedness to Husserl's theory of intentionality and his studies on time-consciousness. This should 
not go unnoticed. Furthermore, it implicitly replays the 'structure' of Husserl's noetic-noematic 
correlation (intentional relation) which can be understood as a synthesis of the language of 
appearances and the language of appearing without presupposing a 'connection' or 'natural 
attachment' to things-in-themselves. The call "to the things / matters themselves" announces a 
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project that entirely re-situates itself with respect to the old ontological divide. 
This brings us to a third and most vital point. As we have already seen, the opening-up of the 
noetic-noematic intentional space is facilitated by the procedure of epochi. In this case, it is a 
movement of phenomenological reduction, which is a reorientation that concerns itself with the 
world as phenomenon, coupled with an eidetic reduction, which focuses on the essential structures 
of the experience of phenomena. In these terms, the epochi permits a turn to the essential 
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configurations of experience in its pure generality while, at the same time, it allows us to 
concentrate on the 'phenomenality of meaning' by suspending any position-taking in regard to the 
question of an extra-phenomenal reality. We are left with an intentional synthesis of meaning and 
meant, where the noema of the noesis is the meaning of its meant. It is a shift that puts the questions 
of 'naturalness' and'attachment! into question. Derrida may only be concerned with the former, but, 
for Husserl, it is also a question of re-considering the sense of 'attachment' or 'connectedness. ' The 
peculiar form of epochal return to this question is that which literally opens up the horizon of 
intentionality -- and thus the space of phenomenology itself. This is the opening that traces the 
tortuous paths of the many different moments of the epochg (phenomenological reduction, eidetic 
reduction, transcendental-phenomenological reduction, Abbau and Aufbau, etc. ). 
Derrida shows us that it was Husserl and Saussure who originally recognized, in a thematic 
way, that the signifer / signified relation did not depend on any substantive, extra-linguistic reality 
outside itself. However, Derrida does not stop here. What he is interested in bringing to light is the 
very 'structurality' of signification as trace. Derrida maintains that 
the trace affects the totality of the sign in both its faces. That the signified is originarily 
and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in 
the position of the signifier (Ibid, P. 73). 
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Derrida arrives at this thought after having worked through the logic of the Husserlian 
intentional correlation between 'appearance' and 'appearing. ' 
The unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [Papparaissant et 
Papparaltre] (between the 'world' and 'lived experience') is the condition of all other 
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differences, of all other traces, and it is already trace. This last concept is thus absolutely and 
by rights 'anterior' to all physiological problematics concerning the nature of the engramme 
[the unit of engraving], or metaphysical problematics concerning the meaning of absolute 
presence whose trace is thus opened to deciphering. The trace is injact the absolute origin of 
sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of 
sense in general. The trace is the dififirance which opens appearance [Vapparaitrel and 
signification (Ibid, P. 65). 
What we have here is a radicalization of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, 
which is fully cognizant of the profundity of the development of the theme of epochi in Husserl's 
work. It is a radicalization that brings together the epochal moves that lead to the transcendental 
orientation of Husserl's Crisis by taking them to their limits. 32 '17he movement of primordial 
temporalization, as the unfolding of historicity for Husserl, is precisely arche-writing for Derrida -- 
and arche-writing is another name for the structure of the trace. However, Derrida goes on to say 
that, 
The concepts of present, past, and. future, everything in the concepts of time and history 
which implies evidence of them -- the metaphysical concept of time in general -- cannot 
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adequately describe the structure of the trace (Ibid, P. 67). 
Firstly, what notion of 'evidence' is Derrida working with? Secondly, can he really speak of a 
'metaphysical concept of time in general'? And thirdly, is it legitimate of him to argue that the 
'structure of the trace' cannot be adequately described in temporal terms. Is not 'delay' one of the 
principal aspects of diffirance? The neologism actually makes reference to both 'spatializing and 
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temporalizing' in their intertwining, where temporizing is a spacing and spacing is a temporizing. 
The phenomenological discourse on the interplay of retention and protention is vital to 
Derrida's thesis that there is no 'pure origin' -- see Speech and Phenomena for instance, with the 
(only apparently) startling claim that... "there never was any 'perception... (Speech and Phenomena. 
The section entitled "The Supplement of Origin, " P. 103). 
One of course has to ask about which sense of perception he is talking about. Husserl gives 
two definitions in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness [PITC] -- and Derrida refers 
to both in Speech and Phenomena. 
At first Husserl defines perception as an 'originary presentation, ' but with a bias toward that 
which is given 'now' (see Sec. 16, PITC) -- which means that provisionally, perception is contrasted 
with primary remembrance (retention). However, in continuing the thought of perception in terms of 
originary giving, Hussed later claims that retention, too, is an 'originary presentation' since it is that 
through which the past or no-longer-now is 'originally' given (see Sec. 17, Ibid) -- and which is 
always already a background to the now. 
Derrida plays with the movement here. His arguments revolve around seeing the former 
characterization of perception as the one that provides the foundation of the latter. In fact, Husserl's 
movement is one that unearths a deeper dimension to the former -- digging beneath the foundation. 
Since the now can be nothing for itself, as far as Husserl is concerned, any now-presentation must 
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necessarily have a past-horizon from which that which is given in the present moment can stand out 
in relief as that which is now. And, since the present moment is the fulfilment of a past protention, it 
necessarily contains reference to a futural horizon of further possible fulfilments in ever-flowing 
future present-perceptions. 
Although Derrida, on many occasions, subjects Husserl's phenomenology to an a 
chronological and non-linear critique, his reading still treats the phenomenological enterprise as 
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something that is linear in itself. However, Husserl's movement from perception as 'now- 
presentation' to perception in the broader sense as 'originary-presentation' -- which includes retention 
and protention -- does not follow a linear architecture. The former determination does not provide 
the foundation for the later. It is effectively superseded through a form of sublation. The latter is an 
overturning of the former -- digging deeper rather than forging ahead. 
The principal logic at work in Derrida! s claim that "there never was any 'perception"' is 
founded upon Husserl's own discourse on the temporalizing structures of return, which are produced 
by the transversal play of retention and protention. This is a primordial interplay, which constitutes 
presence, the present, present perception, remembrance and expectation of the Living Present of 
experience in general. Consciousness is always already extended. In other words, there never was 
any 'original' or 'non-extended' perception that started the sequence. Consciousness lives in the effect 
of its own repetition -- and this is the necessary 'horizon' of all experience. 33 However, from 
Husserl's point of view, this can also mean that 'there has always been perception' -- in that 
perception is another name for what is essentially an extended / extending horizon. Extendedness is 
part of its essence -- which is to say that the structure of the 'always already' is the constitutive 
horizon of that which he calls perception: its timeliness. For Derrida, the horizon of the 'always 
already' is named by the expression: trace. 
With Derrida's announcement that "there never was any perception, "' perception is being 
50 
defined in the first sense -- which is why he does not qualify the statement with the addition of 
'original' or 'non-extended. ' However, it is insufficient to characterize Husserl's meaning of 
perception in these terms, as it denies his profound insights on the temporalization of consciousness 
-- that which constitutes its horizons. His discourse on temporalization cannot be limited to Derrida! s 
reduction of the themes of time and presence. 
This reduction of all discourse on time to a mundane language of presence (an apparently 
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naive or unreflective metaphysic) is subjected to a careful critique in David Wood's Deconstruction 
of Time. He points out that the language of temporality is still operative in Derridean deconstruction 
-- and for very good reasons (from a theoretical point of view, I am in sympathy with Wood's 
position when he criticizes Derrida on this point). However, at the same time, Derrida attempts to 
avoid adhering to the metaphysical foundations upon which his language is based. The question is: 
does he merely use the vocabulary of time (according to a transcendental- phenomenological 
perspective) under erasure (sous rature) and if so, why is he not explicit about this in a consistent 
manner? For example, in Of Grammatology (and this is by no means the only text), there are 
numerous examples of Derrida! s casual utilization of the terms retention and protention. These 
expressions have been appropriated from Husserl's writing, but without explicit reference to their 
functional and theoretical origin in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (despite the 
fact that these terms play a crucial role in Derrida's delineation of the various senses of dýf . 
firance -- 
as the opening-up of differences, as arche-writing, trace, iterability, supplementarity, etc). We sliall 
see how the form of the transversal interplay between retention and protention, as originally 
described by Husserl in his lectures on temporality, is integral to the. movement / tracing designated 
by Derrida! s quasi-concept dif 
. 
Tirance. This casts doubt on the validity of Derridaýs general 
characterizations of philosophical discourse on time and puts into question the degree to which lie 
imagines that its substitution by such terms as arche-writing, trace, supplementarity, etc., exceeds 
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the limits of the language of temporality as explored by phenomenology. 
As Wood writes in The Deconstruction of Time, 
... the belief that a postmetaphysical. account of temporality can rise again after Deffida must 
surely be encouraged by his inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis 
(P. 113). 
Derrida has no option but to utilize the language of temporality, but he does so 'under 
erasure' [sous rature]. This is precisely a 'strategic suspension' or 'displacernent, ' which permits play, 
or rather, is the articulation of play itself. The very possibility of such play is expressive of the pure 
movement of epochi -- the tracing of an altering return through a detour or delay. 
It is this sense of epochi that guides the present thesis toward an exploration of the theme of 
temporality as it emerges in Husserl's work and that of Derrida. This horizon of temporality gives 
spatiality through a giving of itself to itself, a temporalizing / spatializing writing, which recovers 
(returns upon) itself only by originally displacing / deferring itself. 
Accordingly, this study resonates with the theme of time as epochi, for such movement 
signifies in itself all the elements of postponement, delay, reserve, detour, etc., that are pivotal for 
Derrida's delineation of the structurality of the trace. The 'ends' of the following inquiry exemplify a 
form of return that transforms and puts into question the limits of the Derridean project in which 
"ontological and transcendental problematics must first be seriously exhausted, " and where "the 
critical movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the 
very end. " There is no 'end. ' It is rather a question of whether such afollowing-through represents a 
transfigurative continuation on the basis of a certain critical vigilance or whether such a task is 
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undertaken in the hope of a radical break. How could there ever be such a breach, where the 'end' 
would be a complete distanciation from roots, tradition, teleology, phenomenality, Oedipality, and 
habits of thinking? 
Mien we consider that these questions make reference to the movement of transformative 
return that originally defines the unfolding of phenomenological method -- that this tradition of 
interrogation is always already in process of radically re-situating (or re-reading / writing) itself -- 
0 
then in what sense can we speak of its 'exhaustion? ' Husserl's phenomenology dances at the very 
edge of an envelope that pushes ever outward by folding in on itself -- critically. 
34 
The phenomenological discourse on time and the structure of play, when understood 
according to the logic of epochi, announces urgent questions about the actual scope of 
deconstruction. It raises serious objections concerning its reduction of the history of Western 
philosophy -- by means of its engagement with phenomenology -- to a single continuous strand that 
apparently cannot be divorced from the limits of what Derrida describes in terms of a desire for pure 
unmediated presence. Here, presence really translates as evidence -- but what kind? This question 
echoes, in a slightly different way, the issue concerning which type of perception Derrida is talking 
about when he writes "... there never was any perception. " 
For Husserl, there are many different kinds of evidence, which have their own form of 
registration or signature. There is an important distinction between what Husserl calls apodictic 
evidence and that which would be classed as adequate. Apodicticity is sheer obviousness; it refers to 
a horizon that must be presupposed by any mediate form of evidence -- which our language already 
requires in order to function. Yet, that which is apodictic does not 'present! itself adequately. Like an 
Idea in the Kantian sense, it recedes, leaving only traces of itself. It lies open as a possible field of 
work that aims at its disclosure. To do this 'adequately, ' makes reference to the regulative principle 
of the conduct of interrogation. However, adequacy itself, as an actual attainment, is merely an Ideal 
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goal. Full, unmediated disclosure -- presence -- is impossible. There can be no actual point of 
termination. There is only an endless return in which phenomenology is in dialogue with itself. The 
movement is not linear and homogenous. It is a mobile matrix of differing and deferring 
orientations, re-directing itself along many different paths, where the thought of detour 
postponement is raised to the level of a methodological gesture. 
Phenomenology is motivated by a drive toward clarity of meaning on the basis of that which 
I 
'gives' itself: evidence. However, such evidence can also be a kind of withdrawal of presence. The 
phenomenological striving for'adequate' evidence -- as a regulative principle of comportment -- is a 
movement which already understands that fulfilment is constantly deferred by the very methods put 
to use in the name of such interrogation. Once again, it is a question of the asymptotic tension 
between eidos and Idea (the Idea in the Kantian sense). Derrida discovers the logics of the 
deconstruction of presence within phenomenology itself -- and this is the primary theme of his very 
first published text, Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction. 
However, it is Derrida's later strategic misrepresentations of Husserl -- a trend that started 
with Speech and Phenomena (as a kind of maieutic or even 'cat and mouse' form of play) -- that 
creates the illusion that Phenomenology is no more than the last stronghold of a naive metaphysic. 
The true radicality of Derrida! s orientation is something that, in fact, needs to be interrogated and 
assessed on the basis of its participation in the history of what is already a radical tradition of 
thinking. 
The theme of'returif shall be our guide and pivot for what follows. 
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CHAPTER ONE: RE-READING THE DECONSTRUCTION 
OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
ol 
Because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently. ' 
Jacques Derrida 
8. The Theatre of Dialogical Play 
A phenomenological-deconstructive turn toward the significance of the issue of 'return / 
repetition' in Husserl's treatment of the question of the temporality of lived-experience demands care 
in its own movement of re-turn. Certainly if it is to open up the possibility of 'critically' re-reading 
Derrida's texts on the basis of the limits of his own readings and re-readings of Husserl. 
Our task is to open up an inter-dialogical field in which we can begin to deconstruct the 
intra-dialogical matrix of Derrida! s criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology in his early work. The 
possibility of such an inter-dialogical opening rests on restoring Husserl's voice, so to speak -- not 
the inner phenomenological voice that Derrida thematizes and criticizes, but tile voice of Husserl, 
the radical philosopher and perpetual beginner: Husserl, the Other. Which is to say that we must 
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restore Husserl as textual interlocutor to the Derridean text in order that the latter may, once again, 
open itself up to the possibility of inter-dialogical engagement -- that is, open itself up to a certain 
outside: a deconstruction of deconstruction. This would be the point at which a deconstruction of 
phenomenology would coincide with a phenomenology of deconstruction. Our aim must extend 
beyond the parameters of Derrida's specific characterizations of phenomenology -- characterizations 
that, strategically, leave little actual room for 'dialogical exchange. ' 
There can be no 'absolutely' neutral position for ourselves at the inauguration of this opening. 
Neither can we hope to attain such an 'ideal' neutrality at a later stage as this horizon of dialogical 
possibilities unfolds itself. The vertiginous pluri-dimensionality of this space (or spacing) constantly 
forces us to take up positions. Could a dialogical analysis, if it is to show fidelity to its task, ever do 
otherwise? This is equally true for Husserl and Derrida as interlocutors. There can be no closure 
here. Both can and must speak -- with new and vital resonances that cannot be anticipated or 
contained by any re-reading or series of re-readings. 
Our task, then, does not consist in an attempt to unearth a 'royal road' to some kind of 
totalizing view of the field. The aim is oriented in a critical manner toward certain questions 
concerning the politics of reading. Moreover, if the dialogical dimensions announced by these 
questions are to be rigorously explored, such a 'politics of reading' must be interrogated in terms of 
the politics of re-reading. We shall see that the latter, rather than being contingent upon the former 
(in the way of a relation between before and after, if / then, or genus and species), is that which first 
opens what we would normally designate as a politics of reading. 
What is required in the manner of our insertion into this dialogical opening / spacing 
between Husserl and Derrida is a concernful sense of irony. We should take care not to simply 
plunge in without due regard to the character and bias of our attitude toward each interlocutor, since 
it is within the fold of our reading (not simply my reading -- note the scarcity of personal pronouns 
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in this writing -- given that the reader is already involved in some degree of dialogical negotiation 
with this text) that Husserl and Derrida enter into discourse with one another. The trick is to 
endeavour, with the utmost care and vigilance, to monitor our tendencies toward merely limiting our 
reading through the eyes of either one or the other. To help facilitate this strategic aim, we need the 
addition of a further frame of reference that will help us to maintain some kind of balance. For 
reasons that will shortly become apparent, Rodolphe Gaschd's text, The Tain of the Mirror, performs 
this role very neatly. 
To be sure, the suspension of any bias on our part is an ideal goal that even the most 
rigorous style of investigation can only ever approximate. At the same time, 'excessive' rigour, in the 
form of obsessive self-critique, can lead to a kind of slippage that would undermine the possibility 
of such a project from the very start. Let us take our cue from Derrida and say that we must give 
ourselves up to both 'chance and necessity. ' By introducing Gaschd's Tain of the Mirror in the role 
of textual third-person -- as a kind of 'provisional' middle-voice, but not one that is immune to 
critique -- it becomes necessary to articulate some general differences between the Derridean text 
and the milieu or tradition of reading to which it has given rise. This milieu is responsible for the 
'dissemination' of Derrida! s work in both senses of 'spreading' the word and 'fragmenting' it. There 
has been a certain degree of carelessness in the appropriation of the logics, styles and claims of 
Deffida's early writing by some of his contemporary avatars -- and yet it is through this milieu that 
we return to the Derridean text. Indeed, for those who seek 'introductions' to Derrida, which promise 
to demystify his often, difficult style, this is doubly true. We may even inquire as to what extent his 
work is influenced by the writings of his avatars. Derrida does not give us the last word on 
deconstruction. And, from another point of view, when we consider some of the work of his 
commentators, which continue to re-situate the logics of the origins of deconstruction, neither is he 
the first. These considerations must be raised in order to indicate the extreme difficulties involved in 
57 
any attempt to pinpoint the differences between the Derridean text and the larger deconstructive text 
or tradition that has grown in its wake. The evolution of this tradition has brought with it an 
evolution in the way in which Deffida is re-read. This milieu of deconstruction or deconstruction[s] 
(the latter requiring that we also substitute evolution with its plural form), as a matrix of interwoven 
texts, is in dialogue with itself, but often in such a way as to exclude the possibility of an open 
dialogical exchange with an outside since one of its key critical approaches in its engagement with 
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texts involves a strategic suspension of the 'values' of its textual Other. It proceeds by way of a kind 
of methodic irony that continually displaces the Other's opportunity and means for an 'effective' 
rejoinder. 2 Although Derrida! s deconstructive 'strategy' is, in many ways, a contemporary parallel to 
Socrates's maieutic technique of disputation, in that he insists on the analysis taking place 'within! 
the margins of that which it subjects to deconstruction (by utilizing the same language), this is not 
always the case in practice. Wood has coined an appropriate expression for what is a rather 
irritating, and at times disingenuous, attitude in deconstruction, which often considers itself immune 
from criticism by its victims. Critical responses are often dismissed on the basis that they are said to 
remain caught up in the limits of a logocentric discourse, whose very canons of epistemic 
accountability are already under erasure (through the method of deconstructive critique). As Wood 
writes in The Deconstruction of Time, "The structure of this defense mechanism is classic. It could 
be called rebuttal by preemptive engulfment" (P. 268). 
The deconstruction of the Derridean text must, to a certain extent, simultaneously involve the 
deconstruction of what has become a tradition of deconstructive readings -- readings that have 
collectively produced a new kind of canon for writing. This in itself indicates a uniquely ironic state 
of affairs that appears to run counter to the strategic thrust of Derrida! s utilization of deconstructive 
techniques: as critical devices whose 'play' cannot be that of a comfortable self-regulating science or 
tradition. Deconstruction undermines the possibility of itself as a tradition since it is a critical 
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movement which must, in principle, always remain unsettling-in relation to itself: to win is to lose 
and to lose is to win. 
It is required that we turn to certain themes in Derrida's writing that have remained 
unquestioned. We cannot engage in a critique of every writer in the milieu, but we can turn to those 
issues presented in Derrida! s own writing that operate invisibly and without question in this sphere -- 
like a general mood. Gasch6's book is valuable in this context because it is one of the most 
philosophically rigorous examples of deconstructive writing on deconstruction. However, at the 
same time, it is not sufficiently critical of Derrida! s 'strong' claims that still persist in colouring the 
reader's perception of the actual limits of phenomenology -- and, in turn, the limits of 
cleconstruction, itself. 
This is one of a number of strategic reasons why The Tain of the Mirror acts as a kind of 
pivot for the following inquiries. One cannot ignore the impact that Gasch6's book has had as an 
original piece of writing in its own right. This text is not merely a commentary on deconstruction. It 
presents a clearly worked out thesis that makes a significant contribution to the self-understanding 
of deconstructive thinking. Gaschd's book has had a massive impact on the contemporary 
philosophy and non-philosophy arena (a distinction that is rapidly becoming more difficult to grasp). 
Readers who are not remotely interested in the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and 
Derridean deconstruction, constantly refer to it, quote from it and praise it -- and with very good 
reason. However, is there not also a danger in this that has to do with the possibility of confusing 
Derrida with Gaschd's Derrida? The book is extremely well informed, and the arguments are often 
seductive. The overall programme unfolds at a careful pace and, most of all, Gasch6's text presents a 
powerful study of Decostruction's roots in the most rigorous methods of what one might call 
'respectable' philosophy. All in all, it is a landmark text for arguing against the iconoclastic excesses 
of certain proponents of deconstruction and a compelling apologia that aims toward the recruitment 
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of the philosophically unconvinced. Given the widescale dissemination of The Tain of the Mirror 
amongst Derridean scholarship it is interesting (and perhaps also a cause for anxiety) that there are 
very few writers that have engaged with this text on a 'critical' level. And it is precisely those issues 
in Gasch6's book which go without question that point to something rather like a general tone or 
mood in the contemporary milieu of deconstruction -- a contextual backdrop that needs to be 
unravelled and subjected to critique. 
The only text (which in my opinion is worth citing), that does engage in serious critique is a 
short article by Claude Evans entitled "Phenomenological Deconstruction: Husserl's Method of 
Abbau" (The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 2 1, No. 1,1990). The essay 
examines Gaschd's determination of the origins of the method of Abbau and its relation to the 
question of reflection and shows how he is mistaken in assigning the introduction of this technique 
to Heidegger instead of Husserl. 
The Tain of the Mirror is generally treated as if it was some kind of 'manual' on 
deconstruction and, more specifically, 'the' exemplary examination of the relations between 
phenomenology and deconstruction. However, Gasch6s book still treats this relationship as a 
movement of surpassing from one to the other. It is more a genealogical study of the movement 
from phenomenology to deconstruction. In other words, it is principally linear in its approach. Its 
pages span a certain Historic rather than a Geschichte. Issues of chronology are important, and we 
shall explore many references of an historio-logical order, but they can never be sufficient. This is 
particularly the case in view of the ways in which phenomenology and deconstruction have already 
problematized the traditional -assignment of a certain privilege to this limited dimension of history 
and historical analysis. 
It must be stressed, at this point, that Gaschd's book is introduced here not as an archetypal 
expression of the contemporary face of deconstruction, but as one moment or perspective that is 
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situated within it. It is one orientation, one voice at work in a deconstructive. milieu of intra- 
dialogical exchange that simultaneously 'positions' itself, in a critical manner, in relation-to this 
horizon. However, this is not to say that Gaschd presents a sufficien_t critique of Derrida. 
The critical orientation of The Tain of týe Mirror presents us with a powerful and eloquent 
attack on a pervasive tendency in deconstruction to see itself as a basically 'anarchic' enterprise: a 
non-structural, non-systematic, a-logical game. However, despite the clear value and effectiveness 
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of his project to undermine this tendency, Gaschd's 'structurally oriented' language (though 
scholarly) has certain ill-effects that also obscure the logics of Derrida's post-structural leap 
throughout his discourse on diffirance. Derrida's writing radically re-situates the question of 
structure by embracing questions on temporality (the temporal unfolding of the depth 
sedimentation of any structure). 
The following analyses direct their attention to that aspect of Gaschd's writing which 
obscures the vertical (temporizing) horizon of diffirance as 'deferral' and 'return. ' Certain absences 
make themselves felt -- which are treated as clues, as indications of a number of further possible 
fields of dialogical exchange between Husserl and Derrida. This is not merely 'idle play. ' As we 
shall see, the very 'glare' of these absences, for they shall indeed illuminate our path, also informs us 
of the 'philosophical urgency'of our'task. ' 
This is a suitable point at which to refer back to the epigram above. To 're-read' differently is 
to re-read with regard to difference -- to take difference into account. Such an accounting must also 
turn to itself in these terms. Specifically, this means taking account of the forces of both rupture and 
return at work in the 're' of such a reading -- a return that does not erase the breach that already 
inhabits it, since it is a return with a certain critical 'reserve, ' which registers a difference. Its passage 
of recuperation involves a detour. It is an appropriation that, in a crucial sense also withdraws. Such 
reserve signs the point at which the return is not merely a movement of [re]acquisition, which seals 
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a breach, but one that raises the breach to the level of a theme. It is retained as an integral character 
or style of both the recuperating and the recuperated. As such, this tracing of differing / deferring 
return is the very opening of dialogical 'play. ' 
The neologism, diffirance (as both quasi-transcendental concept and 'strategy') functions as 
the locus through which the thematic of difference is permitted to open itself up to rich and diverse 
analyses. To take account of difference along these lines is to re-situate it with due regard to its 
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participation in time -- to think difference temporally. Here is the opportunity to begin to articulate 
further (and perhaps more profound) ways in which to explore the re- of return as an index to the 
trace of a'repetiton that transforms. ' 
In these terms, a careful re-reading of the epigram above suggests that the radical thrust of 
Derrida! s meaning would be grasped more adequately if we were to re-write it as follows... "Because 
we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread diff6r-a-ntly. " 
This is our guide throughout the course of the following readings and re-readings. Through a 
critique of Gasch6's reading of Derrida! s reading of Husserl, we shall explore the theoretical, 
historical and methodological relations between a number of dimensions and dynamics expressed by 
the neologism diffirance and the movement and structure of primordial temporalization as 
articulated in Husserl's phenomenology. 
In these terms, the investigation is directed toward a phenomenological-deconstruction of the 
early development of the Derridean logic of supplementarity. This is a non-linear logic that 
radicalizes the sense of representation (by problematizing the language of beginnings and ends), 
taking it beyond the traditional order of secondariness, as the originary uqfolding qf presence: the 
tracing out of the intertwining of appearance and absence. 
The key strategy at work here involves a de-sedimentation of the theoretical substrata in play 
in Derrida's articulation of this theme in relation to the pivotal (the hinge, la Brisure) concept of 
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iterability -- as explored in Of Grammatology. In turn, the unfolding of this orientation also traces 
out a path for the deconstruction of Gasch6's development of a general theory of duplicity, which is 
based on Derrida! s varied forms of discourse on the double and doubling. Gasch6s appropriation of 
this theme -- as presented in The Tain of the Mirror -- is primarily locked into an orientation that 
explores it in purely 'structural' terms, without giving due consideration to the temporal thernatics in 
Derrida! s early writing that underpin such a structural matrix. We shall see that Gasch6 fails to grasp 
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certain fundamental aspects of the originality and profundity of the Derridean quasi-concept of 
diffirance precisely because his text limits itself (through a particular emphasis on 'difference' and 
'duplicity') to a pre-phenomenological understanding of the relations between space and time. As 
such, this limitation underplays the significance of Derrida's [re]readings of Husserl's 
phenomenology and the genealogy of his thought on diffirance as deferral. 
It is vitally important to bring out the 'temporal' aspects of difference here: deferral, detour -- 
difference as articulated in durational terms. Differentiation between past, present and future is the 
horizon or fissure through which successivity is given. The possibility of consecutivity -- as the 
unfolding of the no-longer, now and not-yet as opposed to an eternal present in which all is given 'at 
once' -- rests not on absolutely distinct and concrete differences of a purely linear order, but on an 
interplay of mutual 'delay. ' Such deferral is intimately tied up with returnability -- the possibility of 
return through which differences can stand-out against each other and find themselves stretched-out 
extended. 3 
The significance of this stretching-out makes itself felt when we consider that difference 
alterity / Otherness stands-out as Other through a recursive movement where the return is a 
recuperation that transforms. This complicity of return and reserve always already functions as an 
indicator of temporal shift / duration. The no-longer and not-yet as Other must be announced as 
such. They can no longer simply be treated as negations of the present for this would both efface 
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their fundamental differences in relation to one another and obscure the constitutive nature of their 
intertwining within the horizon of the present itself Derrida suggests that "... only differences can be 
'historical' from the outset and in each of their aspects" (Margins, P. 11) -- but then again, without the 
structurality of the unfolding of the 'historical as such, ' such differences would not stand-out. The 
structurality or historicality of such an unfolding is not so much a question of difference as of a 
certain constitutive movement of delay. This is the primary consideration throughout our strategic 
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insertion into this dialogical opening. 
From a theoretical point of view, Gasch6's discourse on 'doubling' -- which proceeds by way 
of a discussion on the logics of the non-Platonic simulacrum -- is caught up, for structural reasons, 
in a one-sided approach to the Latin word differre. This appears to reduce its meaning to a 
translation of the Greek diapherein (difference of a principally spatial order). However, in the essay 
"Diff6rance, " Derrida writes that 
the verb diffirer (Latin verb differre) has two meanings which seem quite distinct .... the 
distribution of meaning in the Greek diapherein does not comport one of the two motifs of 
the Latin differre, to wit, the action of putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking 
account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a 
detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation -- concepts that I would summarise here in 
a word I have never used but that could be inscribed in this chain: temporization (Margins, 
P. 7-8). 
Gasch6's'heterological' study of difference, and ultimately diffirance, does take temporizing 
/ deferral into account to a certain extent, but only, it would seem, as one infrastructural moment of a 
non-unitary matrix of syntheses in which temporization / temporal i zatio n and spacing are equi- 
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primordially related while at the same time being irreducibly different. However, as we have seen, 
the temporization of which Derrida speaks finds its root in the Latin differre (the French verb 
diffdrer also has a dual spatial and temporal meaning) that indicates a region in which the 
differences between temporalizing and spacing are less originary than their intertwining. We should 
remember, in accordance with the logics of supplementarity, that the 'and' of difference and deferral 
does not function merely as a sign of 'addition' (a supplement in the mundane sense), but shares a 
peculiar affinity with the copula 'is, ' in such a way that it is intimately tied up with delay. ' 
According to Derrida, 
... this temporization is also temporalization and spacing, the 
becoming-time of space and the 
becoming-space of time, the 'originary constitution' of time and space, as metaphysics or 
transcendental phenomenology would say, to use the language that here is criticized and 
displaced (Ibid). 
Derrida! s reference to the language that is 'criticized and displaced' indicates an adherence to 
a radical reorientation that must be embraced -- an attitudinal epochi -- whose sense is to be found 
throughout Husserl's writing and that of Heidegger. In the later stages of Heidegger's thinking, in 
particular, the orientation and tone of his writing is geared toward causing the form of propositional 
statements to slide (see the lecture, entitled: "Time and Being"). 
Derrida's strategic utilization of the dual (but not bi-polar) character of dýfferre functions as 
the primary locus of the following analyses concerning the structuralist limitations of Gaschd's 
formulation of a 'general theory of duplicity. ' A careful study of Derrida! s key theoretical 
incorporation of phenomenologically rooted temporal significations (throughout his discourse on 
difference), shows that one of the most powerful aspects of the post-structural character of 
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deconstruction and the theme of diffirance (as that which produces differences) lies precisely in the 
radicality of its return to the question of time. This is a question that structuralism can not 
adequately grasp (or formulate) due to the theoretical limits of its language and orientation. Derrida! s 
shift to a more temporal perspective in regard to the themes of language and difference owes its 
radicality, on the one hand, to his somewhat idiosyncratic critique of Husserl's phenomenology 
(which often seems to convey the character of a polemic) and, on the other, to his own active (but 
not necessarily always thematized) appropriation of Husserl's theories on time-consciousness. This 
dual tension is to be found, in particular, in the theoretical orientation, thrust and style of Derrida! s 
Speech and Phenomena. 
A certain Husserlian character, of a specifically temporal orientation, also inhabits the 
theoretical matrix articulated in the early part of Derrida! s Of Grammatology, which, in fact, sets the 
scope for that text as a whole. Gasch6's underestimation of Derrida's indebtedness to Husserl's 
phenomenology in this respect indicates a weakness in The Tain of the Mirror's approach to the 
question of diffirance. Indeed, by underplaying the crucial role played by the question of 
temporality in Derrida! s writing on spacing, supplementarity, trace, iterability, etc., Gasch6's 'general 
theory of doubling' continually falls short of its target. 
For Derrida, diffirance is the arche-synthesis of difference and deferral, and yet Gasch6's 
analyses overemphasize (give privilege to) the function of difference. However, 'deferring as 
temporizing / lemporalizing, ' necessarily eludes reduction to what, in Gaschd's theoretical 
architecture, is merely expressed in terms of one moment or infrastructure of a matrix of equi- 
primordial, but "... incommensurable and heterogeneous kinds of differences" (TM, P. 204). This 
general theory of duplicity gives us little more than a flattened plane of simultaneous differentiality 
under which Gaschd attempts to subsume all the moments of the trace. Is not this orientation already 
anticipated in the very title of his text? Although the intended applications of the words 'tain' and 
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'mirror' are meant to extend beyond the thought of play as a mere game of mirroring without depth, 
these terms still function as 'spatial' metaphors for a play between different surfaces lplanes. As we 
shall see, any considerations of 'verticality' or 'depth' actually lie outside their province. Such themes 
remain irrecoverable within the bounds of an orientation governed by the thought of difference and 
duplicity -- which forgets the question of the 'opening' (which must always implicate depth), of any 
possible difference: its temporalization. 4 
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As indicated above, our aim is to restore a balance by turning to the issue of dififirance as 
deferral, detour, relay, Relay: that which produces / articulates space and duration (spatializing- 
temporalizing); that diffracts / refracts / deflects: a bending (rather than mere differentiation through 
a divisive movement of 'doubling) -- a bending-back-of-a-return, which permits differences or 
doubles to stand-out: that is, stand-outside-themselves ekstatically / temporally. Of course, any 
move toward a restoration of balance involves a certain degree of violence -- but is this not essential 
to a critique that must proceed by way of a movement of deconstruction /A bbau / de-sedimentation / 
dissemination? The violence in question here, though, is not indicative of a negative theology (as 
Derrida would say), which would subject its field of interrogation to annihilation or destruction. 
Rather, we speak of a 'playful textual critique' -- an unbalancing and unearthing that aims toward the 
recovery of an operative absence within the text as the trace of a violence that has already been 
perpetrated and concealed by the text. Here 'text' also refers to the structurality of the reading-of-the- 
text: the horizon of the 'encounter' between text and text. 
In order to facilitate a non-violent deconstruction of Gaschd's reading of Derrida (without 
drawing his investigations out of context), we shall attend to the theoretical movement that 
constitutes one of the key Derridean texts from which Gaschd himself has drawn as a source for his 
'general theory of duplicity. ' This brings us back to Of Grammatology. Clearly, we must aim to 
engage with Gasch6 on his own ground. 5 
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In accordance with this aim, some of the main quotations that are drawn from The Tain of 
the Mirror, in the following analyses, are unabridged and, at times, quite lengthy -- the first of which 
includes his own quotations of Derrida. The full impact and context of these passages would have 
been lost had they been shortened or broken up into bite-sized chunks. And, perhaps even more 
importantly, their display in this form -- particularly in regard to the first quotation -- permits us to 
reflect on the ways in which Gaschd incorporates Derrida! s writing into his own narrative. The 
smooth transposition traced out in Gasch6's narrative must come under scrutiny. Therefore, we must 
remain vigilant in regard to certain differences that risk effacement in the casual continuity with 
which Gaschd slips in and out of the Derridean text. For us then, a certain critical distance is 
required. These passages must remain, in a fully thematic way, quotations of quotations if we are to 
unravel a space in which to articulate a range of differences between Gaschd's text, Gasch6's 
Derrida, and Derrida's text. 
Of Grammatology presents us with a rigorously formulated and decisive theoretical 
framework for an understanding of some of the many different senses of 'supplementarity, ' which is 
the main logic to which Gaschd's development of a general theory of doubling is tied. 
Supplementarity needs to be considered in the light of such themes as play, opening (which is 
always married to a certain movement of closure), tracing, arche-writing, temporization, etc. All 
these aspects extend the boundaries of the thematic of temporality beyond the limits of a merely 
successive or linear time and confound the language of beginnings and ends. 
Linearity is a key term here, for Derrida's project also extends beyond the limitations of a 
structural / synchronic linguistics with which the term grammar is usually associated. One of the 
most significant meanings of the word grammar that must be taken into account is to be found in its 
etymological relation to the Greek word gramme, which signifies 'line' (as distinguished from 
gramma, which means mark or letter). For Derrida, this functions (in the context of a 
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grammatology), as a crucial sign for how structural considerations traditionally articulate 
themselves: that is, in 'linear' terms. As a project of deconstruction, grammatology concerns itself 
with more than a syntactical plane of linear contemporaneity and is thus not reducible to structural 
or linguistic concerns in the usual sense. It rather announces the inauguration of a critique of the 
history of the gramme of grammar -- a deconstruction of linear thinking. The most exemplary essay 
in this regard after Of Grammatoloýy is "Ousia and grammV (Margins), which explores a number 
0 
of linear models of time. 6 The concept of supplementarity provides a way in which to turn to non- 
linear forms of temporality. For Derrida, it also disrupts, in one stroke, the idea of presence -- the 
possibility of an unmediated exhibition of fullness, plenitude, and absolute truth, since there is no 
truth before the opening up of the possibility of its articulation, and thus it is nothing outside the 
play [supplementarity] of signification. 
Supplementarity, according to Derrida, "... is precisely the play of presence and absence, the 
opening of this play... "(OG, P. 244). The quasi-transcendental thernatization of supplementarity, in 
Of Grammatology, organizes Derrida's movement beyond the mere discussion of regional or 
instituted forms of language as writing to the meta-general and pluri-dimensional field of arche- 
writing. This leads to the claim that... " Writing will appear to us more and more as another name for 
this structure of supplementarity. " (Ibid. P. 245). Here, structure is thought in terms of the intimacy it 
always already shares with time. 
The focus of this study, then, is to show how Derridaýs discourse on the structure of 
supplementarity as arche-writing is also, in a vital theoretical sense, an expression of a radical return 
to the question of temporality / temporalizing / temporizing: teniporal-spacing as deferring / 
differing return. The three main sections of Of Grammatology to which we refer (which guide the 
critical direction of our investigation concerning possible dialogical openings), are to be found in 
chapter two: Linguistics and GrammatologT. They are entitled: "The Outside and the Inside, " "The 
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Outside is the Inside, " and "The Hinge [La Brisure]. " These three interconnected themes express a 
hinged movement that articulates the intertwining of the supplement 'and' and the copula 'is. ' This 
brings us to another -side of the strategy at work in this particular choice of text, which concerns the 
development of the theoretical trace that guides Derrida's discussion on the logic of the supplement - 
- an investigation that facilitates Derrida! s arrival and subsequent delineation of the quasi- 
transcendental concept of arche-writing. What is unearthed is an 'operative absence' that both 
I 
indicates and effaces a massive theoretical indebtedness to Husserlian phenomenology: specifically, 
Husserl's text of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This is a resource that 
Derrida, within the context of Of Grammatology, simply cannot do without. 
The fact that Of Grammatology does not critically engage with Husserl and yet it displays 
(though unthernatically) a certain Husserlian phenomenological character, is our point of entry to a 
horizon in which we can recover the possibility of an 'open' dialogue between phenomenology and 
deconstruction. 
The aim is to put continually into question the popular claim that deconstruction goes 
'beyond' phenomenology -- a claim whose own deconstruction can no longer be deferred. 7 
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Presence: a question of appearance? 
In The Tain of the Mirror, Gaschd's discourse on Derrida's deconstruction is organized 
according to the framework of a general 'critique of reflexivity' -- a critique which, he maintains, 
fundamentally characterizes Derrida! s project. However, Gaschd's form of argumentation underplays 
a number of Derrida! s theoretical sources and, in particular, does not give sufficient attention to the 
Husserlian phenomenological treatment of the question of reflexivity under the heading of 
'intentional analysis' (which has far more than a passing significance for Derrida). The general tone 
of The Tain of the Mirror is one, which suggests that no major advance had been made regarding the 
problem of reflection since Hegel or, more precisely, the Hegelian phenomenological tradition -- 
until Derrida, of course. However, the general dynamics of signification, reflexivity, and the 
possibility of any kind of presence, which play themselves out in Derrida! s writing on dififirance, 
point to a combination of static and genetic intentional analyses originally undertaken by Husserl 
(whose phenomenology must be distinguished from that of Hegel). 
Husserl's phenomenological-intentional (as opposed to dialectical) analyses provide a rich 
resource for Derrida! s development of some of the primary motifs of deconstruction in his own first 
major texts. Despite Gasch6's acknowledgement of the influence of the method of Abbau8 for 
Derrida! s project (a movement of de-con-struction that initiates a phenomenological-genetic turn: a 
movement of Abbau and Aufbau), he commences with an inadequate understanding of the specific 
reflexivities brought to light at a transcendental level in Husserl's theory of intentionality. He 
underplays the originality (and continuing relevance) of the Husserlian phenomenological- 
intentional treatment of the questions of reflexivity and temporality and the theoretical impact of 
these studies on Derrida. We shall see that this insufficient approach by Gaschd, throughout his 
discourse on 'doubling, ' ultimately leads to a fundamental misrepresentation concerning the context 
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and true radicality of the thought of the trace in Derridean deconstruction. 
In the quotation below, Gasch6's claim concerning the generality of the 'theory of 
duplication' exhibits a profound misunderstanding about the scope of phenomenology -- which is 
due, in part, to his rather casual acceptance of Derrida! s critical position regarding Husserl's 
'principle of principles. ' 
0 
The general theory of duplication not only undercuts speculative dialectics but reaches 
beyond phenomenology as well, in particular in its Husserlian form. Derrida! s critique of 
Husserlian phenomenology does not focus only on the privilege Husserl attributes to the 
instance of the living presence, nor is it limited to Husserl's bending of the form of all 
experience to this essentially metaphysical motif, whether it concerns experience in general 
or, more particularly, transcendental experience. In addition to this criticism, and to his 
questioning of transcendental phenomenology's unadmitted complicity with the mundane, 
Derrida asks the more fundamental question whether'the phenomenological model [is] itself 
constituted, as a warp of language, logic, evidence, fundamental security, upon a woof that is 
not its own? And which -- such is the most difficult problem -- is no longer at all mundane' 
(OG. P. 67). As Derrida insists, such a question is undoubtedly provoked by certain 
developments in Husserl's phenomenology itself Yet phenomenology cannot entirely certify 
this question, which refers phenomenology 'to a zone in which its 'principle of principles' (as 
we see it, its metaphysical principle: the original seýf- evidence and presence of the thing 
itself in person) is radically put into question' (WD, P. 164). As a matter of fact, the theory of 
originary duplication dislocates and displaces this principle of principles. If it is true that the 
principle of principles of phenomenology hinges on the possibility of the self-presentation of 
the thing itself, originary duplication puts the very possibility of that which is called a 
72 
0 
phenomenon radically into question (The Tain of the Mirror [TM, P. 228-29). 
These claims are based on readings which are misleading. in a number of crucial ways and 
they express an unquestioned bias in favour of the now 'traditional' view that deconstruction, in 
some way, transgresses (goes 'beyond') the limits of phenomenology. With the suggestion that if 
"... the principle of principles of phenomenology hinges on the possibility of the self-presentation of 
the thing itself, originary duplication puts the very possibility of that which is called a phenomenon 
radically into question" (Ibid), Gasch6 is working with a number of different and incommensurable 
senses of Thinghood and appearance -- under which the question of the 'phenomenon' becomes 
subsumed in his discourse. The phenomenon of phenomenology is reduced to the same kinds of 
aporia that befall discourse on the 'thing itself on the one hand, and its 'appearance' on the other, 
which ultimately distorts Husserl's meaning. Perhaps Derrida has forgotten something that Gasch6 
simply does not know -- that Husserl brought these issues into question, by means of an 'intentional 
analysis' (analysis of intentionality) with a radical originality that has transformed, and is still 
continuing to transform, the ways in which they are articulated in the current philosophical forum. 
Husserl's critique began in the form of a powerful phenomenological-deconstructive 
engagement with psychologism, objectivism, phenomenalism, etc. -- rigorously articulating the 
inherent paradoxes of the 'imagistic' thinking upon which they base themselves and unravelling the 
logic responsible for their 'objectivist' conflation of the fleeting contents of experience with lived- 
experience itself. It must be stressed here that the phenomenological motivation of this critique 
resists falling back into any particular form of realism. In the opening of The Phenomenology Qf 
Internal Time Consciousness (section two: The Question of the "Origin of Time"), Husserl writes, 
We do not classify lived experiences according to any particular form of reality. We are 
73 
concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended, represented, intuited, or conceptually 
thought (P. 26). 
Gaschd's reading of Derrida! s suggestion that phenomenology is referred "to a zone in 
which ... the original self-evidence and presence of the thing 
itself in person is radically put into 
question" (TM, P. 228-29 [TVD, P. 164]) confuses a vital phenomenological difference of which 
Derrida (through his various readings of Husserl) is already aware -- that is, between the 
phenomenology of appearing and that which appears. 9 We not only find a misreading of Husserl's 
meanina by Gasch6, but a misreading based on a misreading of Derrida! s reading. Accordingly, to 
cite a fundamental Derridean aim, "We must learn to re-read what has been thus confused for us" 
(Of Grammatology, P. 75). 
Firstly, for Husserl the articulation of the phenomenon embodies a fundamental difference 
within itself by comprising both the language of appearances and the language of appearing in their 
intertwining (the noetic-noematic intentional correlation), and is thus not to be confined to mere 
'objective' discourse. Husserl's theory of intentionality does not present us with an 'object-theory' or 
'image-theory' of perception, caught up in a 'container-type' conception of consciousness, but one 
which considers object-perception in terms of the contextual-unfolding-of a certain 'phenomenal 
content. ' Consciousness is characterized as a self-surpassing, sense-directed -- transitive/intentional - 
- relation between meaning and meant. For Husserl, the giving or standing-out of phenomena is 
irreducible to the appearance of mere 'objective' simulacra that stand-in for extra-phenomenal 
existents (as images or'doubles' of the world [doubles in the more mundane sense]). The call to the 
'things themselves' does not base itself on a naive / presuppositional metaphysics, but is a call to 
methodological vigilance, which ultimately re-situates discourse on the question of the Thing. In the 
context of this turn, which is also a critical re-turn, to questions of method, it must be understood 
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that this is in no way tied to a mere 'call to idealism' -- certainly not in any doctrinal sense. 
Husserl's concern in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" (one of the main texts along with 
Ideas I that is so often quoted in regard to the call 'to the things themselves) is with 'phenomenal 
evidence. ' For methodological reasons, the Husserlian directive is not limited to existential matters 
in classical objective terms, since it only addresses questions of existence in terms of their 
'phenomenological sense. ' The existential character of the appearing of a phenomenon (its 
10 
phenomenal givenness as an 'actuality) is simply one possible mode among many. For 
phenomenology, questions concerning the givenness of the 'pastness' of the remembered or the 
'imaginality' of the imagined are just as significant as any interrogation of the 'real' and are not 
merely consigned to a'secondary' or 'representational' field as has traditionally been their fate. 
Husserl is not an 'image-theorist' -- for whom the question of extra-phenomenal existents and 
the veracity of their givenness through images would be 'the' fundamental question (the perennial 
issue for Cartesian metaphysicians). 10 Phenomenology does not begin as a system that is built upon 
a metaphysical divide between a world of appearances or mental-images and that which appears 
(things-in-themselves). This would suppose a covert act of hypostatization that is characteristic of a 
phenomenalism and not phenomenology. The call 'to the things themselves' is a kind of attitudinal 
categorical imperative that seeks evidence as it gives itself. It does this without confining such 
interrogation to the reductive limits of, on the one hand, a naturalistic objectivity, which seeks to rid 
itself of any residual subjectivity (representation) in its interrogation of 'Things' or, on the other 
hand, a further re-presentative notion of consciousness, of a psychologistic orientation, that reduces 
all experiences and objects of experience to subjective states articulated as successive mental events 
and facts. Each view, in its own way, completely undermines the possibility of discourse on 
questions concerning our lived access to what we might call truth -- or more specifically, the truth of 
the world of lived-experience. Here, we speak of both Erlebnis and Lebenswelt. 
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The inadmissibility of these questions within the bounds of these viewpoints is inscribed at 
the outset. As in the case of the image-theory / phenomenalism, they cannot, for reasons of 
principle, extend themselves beyond a closed dimension of 'mental objects' (representational' 
images) without due access to an independent and external criterion by means of which their 
veracity, regarding that which they represent, can be tested. We find nothing more than a kind of 
mimetic doubling -- echoes of echoes -- words which, in this context, must be re-situated with 
I 
regard to their traditional lexical significations. This is because they attach themselves to a 
movement that originally problematizes the question of sources, beginnings: the original point that 
would inaugurate a sequence of doubles or echoes. Here, they no longer automatically imply the 
echo of something other than, and more originary than, an echo. We are left with nothing more than 
echoes that are caught up in the reflective (yet another word whose semantic horizon has been 
caused to slide) vortex of an infinite regress. In this realm, signs or images ultimately, and 
inadequately, substitute for the consciousness of things / objects (understood in the broadest sense) 
and the world itself. 
Husserl insists that... "On no account should we fall into the fundamentally perverse copy and 
sign theories... " (Ideas 1, Sec. 52). If the world resists 'adequate' exhibition it is not, for Husserl, due 
to any inadequacy in our perceptual apparatus (as the representational / image / sign doctrine of 
consciousness suggests). When we speak of transcendence, this expression does not designate 
something that subsists beyond some impermeable membrane behind which consciousness is 
forever trapped within a matrix of immanent mental-objects or images -- cut off from all that is 
transcendent. The 'transcendence' of the world has a 'sense, ' or rather, an infinite diversity of senses 
that articulate themselves 'within' or 'through' lived-experience. From an important 
phenomenological viewpoint, they are actually bestowed (as horizonal characters of that which 
appears) by the transcending consciousness as it 'encounters' the world" -- that is to say, to extend a 
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Heideggerian twist, through its situational engagement in the world. 
Consciousness does not name a dimension that is closed within itself. It is already familiar 
with transcendence for this constitutes part of its own essence. Consciousness is always already 
outside-itself-in-the-world -- out amongst the things. As such, the question of transcendence is 
eminently susceptible of phenomenological analysis. 12 At the same time it must be stressed that this 
is not simply a subjectively oriented claim. 
Husserl writes, 
Whatever is transcendent, in so far as it comes to be consciously presented, is an object of 
phenomenological study not only on the side of the consciousness of it, of the various 
conscious ways, for instance, in which it comes to be given as transcendent, but also, 
although essentially bound up with the viewpoint just noted, as the given and that which is 
experienced in it (Ideas 1, Sec. 76, P. 195). 
What appears are horizons of different constellations of meaning, which are not to be set 
against the Thing of experience in the same way that subjectivity is traditionally contrasted with 
objectivity or immanence is distinguished from transcendence. For Husserl, the giving of meaning 
qua phenomenon is also transcendent to the consciousness that perceives it. Such appearing is non- 
situated, in a certain sense, in that it is 'intentionally immanent' without being really inherent (or 
contained in) consciousness itself. It is not a case of different realities that somehow stand side by 
side -- where it can be said, in a way that has become firmly habituated, that what is experienced is 
the mere subjective duplication of the objective other. Thegiven' is not 'in' consciousness, neither is 
it necessarily 'of consciousness (although this can also be a dimension of phenomeno logical 
inquiry), butfor consciousness. 
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In these terms, the sense of giving or appearing signifies more than a mere horizon of 
'subjective' and immanent images. The world as it is given participates in both subjectivity and 
objectivity -- and is both immanent and transcendent. Since appearances (a word that we must treat 
with the utmost care) are not treated, according to the phenomenological perspective, in the way of 
subjective hypostatizations that 'immanently' duplicate a transcendent reality, but are designated as 
'transcendent' in themselves, the phenomenality of the phenomenon (the giving of its givenness) 
I 
must be grasped in a way that no longer sets it in opposition to transcendence. The phenomenon 
always already participates in transcendence and is that through which transcendence is articulated. 
This, of itself, must re-invoke questions concerning the meaning of evidence as it gives itself 
-- without postulating any particular form of transcendence that would force us to think in terms of 
an extra-phenomenal horizon of sense / truth / reality to which we would need 'direct' access in order 
to assess the validity or truth-value of such evidence. An external 'source' or 'measure' of this kind is 
not required. The question of the 'meaning of evidence' in terms of 'its-giving-of-itself is 
phenomenological. The preposition'of (which defines both consciousness and world) is decisive in 
a number of vital ways. The dimension of transitivity it indicates is one of the most fundamental of 
phenomenological themes. 
In objective terms, to stand-out is not merely a question of a dual relation between 
appearance and that which appears, but involves a certain structure and character or tone of such a 
standing-out. The phenomenon expresses this in terms of the 'ways' or 'modalities of giving' in 
which something stands-out. Phenomenality cannot be reduced to either the language of appearances 
or that which appears for it first constitutes the space of such a distinction. In addition, this space, 
though it is the necessary horizon of presence, is not present itself (in any sense of being a present 
'object'). 
There is not one principal definition of the phenomenon. It has constantly been confused 
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(and, in some quarters, is still being confused) with appearance, appearing, presence, representation, 
etc. The term appearance alone is just as problematical. Although there are intimate associations, it 
must be distinguished from the meaning of the phenomenon. To say that the phenomenon is simply 
that-which-is-manifest (which, on one level is not incorrect) allows anything -- including an 
appearance -- to be called a phenomenon. The 'showing' or 'making-manifest' as distinguished 
from 
the 'showW or 'that-which-is-made-manifest' are expressions that can be applied indiscriminately in 
the word 'presence. ' However, appearance, or better here, visibility is only one moment of the 
phenomenon. It is to be granted that there are many different forms of visibility, ranging from that 
which gives itself in itself to different kinds of substitutional forms of appearing in which that which 
gives itself can, in certain instances, actually conceal that which it indicates (that for which it is the 
proxy). And it is not only in regard to the latter moment of this vast spectrum that we must 
understand that there is equally a zone of invisibility associated with the phenomenon, which is 
constitutive of anything that stands-out. The phenomenon is the site of the opening of the giving-of- 
the-given, and is presupposed by any'form'of appearance. 
There is an aspect of principal importance here that always plays at the heart of any 
discourse on the phenomenon (above all, in line with Heidegger, discourse on the phenomenon as a 
kind of speaking-out) 13 as that-which-gives-itself-in-itself or from-itself. The very possibility of 
discriminating between different kinds of appearing (which is the descriptive task of 
phenomenology) lies in a certain modal announcement in the phenomenon -- which rounds out the 
definition as follows: the phenomenon as that which gives itself from itself as it gives itself It is in 
the 'as-it-gives-itself' that we find the 'meaning, ''modality, ''truth-, %, alue, ' etc., of that which appears. 
This is the vital phenomeno-logical sense that announces itself in the structure of the appearing of 
something as distinct from mere appearance. Evidence has to do with a certain 'style' of appearing. It 
announces itself as the meeting point of an intentional structure of negotiation (that is stretched 
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temporally) and is not to be limited to either the appearance in itself or that which is said to give 
itself (inadequately) 'in' the appearance. 
The pre-phenomenological problematization of the question of the veracity of phenomenal 
evidence, as-it-gives-itself through the various kinds of directedness'of consciousness toward the 
world, disregards the fact that it is on the basis of such evidence that questions regarding actuality, 
transcendence, truth, meaning, and evidence first find themselves articulated. The question of 
evidence points to the intentional structures of experience itself (the nexus of experiencing and the 
experienced) and does not indicate another more original source from which it is bestowed. 14 This 
does not, it must be said, rule out questions of 'exteriority, ' but resituates them. The thought of the 
standing-out of the phenomenon in terms of evidential-giving rediscovers, in more Derridean terms 
now, the outside that already inhabits its inside. 
The phenomenon, as the appearing of that which appears, is not an object that duplicates 
doubles / stands-in for the world as something 'extrinsic' to it, but is the appearing of the world 
itself However, we must be careful here, since the thesis 'actual world' must be understood within 
the context of the phenomenological reduction. With this procedure, which disconnects the 'thesis' 
actual world by means of a kind of methodological detour, we do not lose the world as such, but 
regain it qua the world offived-experience. As Husserl writes... 
... whatever is phenomenologically 
disconnected remains still, with a certain change of 
signature, within the framework of phenomenology (Ideas 1, Sec. 135, P. 346). 
The parenthesizing of the actual world through the implementation of the phenomenological 
epoche does not annul the evidence of its appearing as such, i. e., the world is thematized 'in its 
appearing' as an intenflonal nexus of 'actuality phenomena. ' What is at issue here is a particular kind 
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of 'change in signature. " 5 
Evidence cannot be thought without the logics of appearing. Here, we speak of the style or 
mode of the appearing of that which gives itself through the appearance. This is to be distinguished 
from a merely opaque or substitutive appearance. It is a question of what shapes the character of 
that which appears in its appearing, e. g., the appearance of something as perceived, as remembered, 
as imagined, etc. (Note: the careful reader should, by now, be less confident about the meaning of 
the phrase 'mere appearance'). The appearing of the appearance can also express non-appearance, 
e. g., the specific moment of an apprehension that speaks of the non-fulfilment of an expectation: in 
other words, non-appearing as a kind of evidence. 
From a phenomenological point of view, the various meanings of the term appearance are 
tied, for essential reasons, to the thought of 'perspective variation! (Abschattung). Although we often 
speak of the 'appearance' of something as a kind of 'singular' occurrence, as that which stands-out as 
the self-identical exhibition of a self-same object, there is an important sense in which such an 
appearance is continually changing. It is enmeshed in a manifold of different patterns of appearing 
which pass-over into one another. The appearance, in connection to this, is also to be grasped as an 
adumbration, perspective, or profile of that which gives itself through the appearance. An 
appearance, in these terms, is not the terminus of a perception (for part of its essence lies in a certain 
'transparency' in that it essentially refers), but is that through which perception is focused in its 
directedness towards something. The 'something' is always in excess of the appearance, in the same 
manner as a three-dimensional spatial object with determinate extension and shape resists, for 
essential reasons, adequate presentation in the exhibition of just one of it sides. The appearance 
indicates the transcendence of that towards which consciousness is directed, not by standing-in for it 
as the terminus of an intention (although this is possible through a higher order performance of 
reflection) as a mere representative replacement or 'image, ' which would conceal as much as it 
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disclosed, but by expressing a certain 'orientation! of that which appears: an orientation that runs off 
into other orientations of the one object as-a-whole. 
The object is an X-pole of a multiplicity of adumbrations. The structure of this intentional 
movement is analogous to the form of ideation about which Husserl speaks when distinguishing 
between eidos and Idea. There is an asymptotic tension that holds between eide and Ideas in the 
Kantian sense. The latter can never be given adequately, although this is not the same as saying that 
P 
it does not give itself at all. Its realization is a passage toward an infinite limit -- a play between the 
many and the one and the one and the many. We do not so much speak of the seeing of 'objects' but 
the unfolding of the 'horizons' of objectivity. The concept of Abschattung (perspective-variation), 
which expresses the constitutive role of appearing (in the unfolding of appearances), resituates the 
logic of the appearance by taking into account the question of how an object can be continuous with 
itself throughout the running-off of the changing profiles that deliver it up. Husserl shows that the 
'flux' of Abschattungen -- which are experiences and nothing spatial in themselves 
16 
__ is that which 
originarily unfolds the 'spatiality' of the object. It is of the essence of something spatial that it can 
only express its 'spatiality' by withholding itself in a certain way. It appears as a nexus of potential 
perspectives (e. g., near or far, from above or from the side, etc. ), which cannot all be given in any 
one orientation. They can fulfill themselves only through further modes of exhibition that coalesce 
within the unity of their running-off within the flux of varying orientations through which the object 
is filled (or fleshed) out. This flux literally spatializes the object. 
With the addition of the pivotal thought of Ablaufsphdnomene ('running-off-phenomena, ' 
'modes of temporal orientation'), which is intrinsically enmeshed with the concept of the 
f dýffierence influx, Abschattung -- in that both are understood in terms of the unity qf the unfoldin q 
-- this flux is also that which temporalizes the object. 
17 Any thing that is spatial must also be 
temporal -- that is, if it can be said to be coincidental with itself throughout the duration of its 
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'changing' orientations (or modes of appearance). ' 8 
Husserl speaks of an 'analogous' relationship between the ways in which the spatial and the 
temporal unfold. 
If in reflection we immerse ourselves in the unity of a structured process, we observe that an 
articulated part of the process 'draws together' as it sinks into the past -- a kind of temporal 
perspective (within the originary temporal appearance) analogous to spatial perspective 
(PITC. Sec. 9, P. 47). 
And in an adjoining footnote, Husserl writes, 
It is tempting to draw a parallel between these modes of the consciousness and appearance of 
temporal Objects and the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is known with changing 
orientation, to pursue further the 'temporal orientations' in which spatial things (which are 
also temporal Objects) appear (Ibid. Sec. 9, footnote 7, pp. 46-7). 
Although questions of spatiality and temporality generally indicate different 
phenomenological dimensions, when viewed eidetically, each sphere actually exhibits a similar 
intentional structure. 19 It should be pointed out that the eidetic reduction (like the phenomenological 
reduction) was not presented in a thematic form (for publication) until 1913 in Ideas 1, but the 
germinal orientation was still clearly at work in Husserl's early meditations on temporal experience 
(1905-10). 
The essential complicity of spatiality and temporality, when considered from the point of 
view of the transcendental concept of 'flux' (which is not of an 'objective' order of temporality), is 
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made explicit by Husserl in the lectures that make up The Phenomenology of Internal Time 
Consciousness. In the following passage Husserl shows why the 'intentional' intertwining of 
appearances and the structures of different modes of appearing (of that which appears) must be 
grasped if we are to take into account the myriad differences that await us at the gateway to the 
phenomenological horizon. 
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Every temporal being 'appears' in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, 
and the 'Object in the mode of running-off is in this change always something other, even 
though we still say that the Object and every point of its time and this time itself are one and 
the same. The'Object in the mode of running-off we cannot term a form of consciousness 
(any more than we can call a spatial phenomenon, a body in its appearance from one side or 
the other, from far or near, a form of consciousness). 'Consciousness, ' 'lived experience, ' 
refers to an Object by means of an appearance in which 'the Object in its modal setting' 
subsists. Obviously, we must recognize talk of 'intentionality' as ambiguous, depending on 
whether we have in mind the relation of the appearance to what appears or the relation of 
consciousness on the one hand to 'what appears in its modal setting' and on the other to what 
merely appears (PITC. Sec. 9, P. 47-8). 20 
We shall explore the phenomenological theme of intentionality in a way that does not so 
much reduce its ambiguities, according to some overarching thesis called the 'metaphysics of 
presence, ' as bring them into the foreground. They are indices of fundamental dimensions of 
intentionality itself (that originally problematize the schema 'metaphysics of presence, ' when applied 
to phenomenology), which must be permitted to articulate themselves in their own right. It is in 
connection to this that we must retain the thought of flux -- as that which spatializes and 
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temporalizes. This concept of 'continuous alteration' -- where continuity and change, structure and 
genesis, simultaneity and succession, etc., are not treated as heterogeneous dimensions (within the 
bounds of a classic bi-polarity) -- re-surfaces again and again throughout the following analyses as 
its significance is examined in relation to the Derridean logic of diffirance. 
When we speak of spatio-temporal objects, that which gives itself through the appearance is 
necessarily given inadequately, and in a certain sense incompletely. However, the perception of one 
0 
side of a house is not limited to that which is literally seen, but extends itself into the unseen -- for 
the wall intrinsically refers to the house as-a-whole. Once again, the term appearance expresses 
'aspect / perspective. ' With this thought the sense of the 'appearing of something in its intertwining 
with appearance becomes clearer. The question of the appearing of that which appears in the 
appearance refers us to the modal organizations and perspective variations that inscribe the ways in 
which something stands-out -- the characters or modalities of illumination (Erscheinung) and sense 
(Sinn) through which that which presents itself is given. This is not restricted to the positional 
orientation of the house as it gives itself, it can also include its appearance as an object of desire, or 
as something that is forbidding. 21 The latter characters of appearing are not of a merely subjective 
order, they are intrinsic to the object itself as it stands-out. For every desiring there is a desired, for 
every recollection there is something that presents itself as remembere"d -- that is, with the modal 
character of the remembered as opposed, let us say, to the perceived or imagined. Such characters 
are forms of illumination that play about the object itself in its appearing, giving the as meant of 
that which appears as the correlate of the meaning-intention that is directed toward it. 
In Ideas 1, the 'principle of principles' is presented by Husserl as an interrogative norm 
which prescribes that "... whatever presents itsetf in 'intuition' in primordial, form (as it were in its 
bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in 
which it then presents itself' (Sec. 24, P. 83). In other words, the study of whatever presents itself to 
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the phenomenological gaze must take into account the participation of the noetic contextual ray 
through which it is illuminated in its appearing (the noesis of the noema). This is the attitude or 
orientation that inscribes the 'style' of the appearing of that which appears. There are many different 
possible attitudes (regional ontologies) through which that which appears can be filled-out -- that, in 
fact, constitute its meaning[s]. Thus, it is in terms of the preposition 'of (e. g., the judging of the 
judged, the perceiving of the perceived, etc. ) that both consciousness and world find themselves 
0 
articulated and defined. There is very little that speaks of closure or totalization here. One would be 
very much mistaken to think of the 'principle of principles' in this way. It is actually a call to self- 
critique. 
22 
Phenomena, for reasons of essence, speak of transitivity and encounter (regardless of 
whether our orientation is concerned with the horizon of phantasy or that of the real). It is the 
question of the 'structurality of the opening' of phenomenality (its articulation as encountered) that 
refers us to one of the most fundamental meanings of intentionality. 
On the basis of a somewhat confused reading of Derrida! s remarks (cited above), Gaschd 
discusses the issue of 'presence' in purely objective terms, which is why his treatment of the 
meaning of the phenomenon in Husserl's phenomenology leaves much to be desired. As we have 
already argued, the question of evidence, for Husserl, is not simply a matter of objective appearance, 
in any traditional sense. It does not make an appeal to any metaphysical thing-in-itself that is 
extraneous to the world of phenomena, as the source of the truth of the appearance. Likewise, this is 
also the case for any consideration of certainty. 
Recall the distinction between apodicticity and adequacy. These terms name two types of 
evidence or modes of certainty. 23 The expression 'adequate evidence' concerns Tulfilment in 
presence, ' whereas the term 'apodicticity' refers to what cannot be doubted without self- 
contradiction, but which does not make itself present as such. For example, I can be in the dark 
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about my own motivations and reasons for doubting, but I cannot say the same about the fact and the 
meaning of the doubting itself. The latter is given adequately whereas the former refers us to that 
which should be classed as apodictic. We can be apodictically certain that doubt has its motivation, 
but this is not to say that it gives itself adequately (which happens to be one of the principal areas in 
which Descartes fell into error) . 
24 Living-in the doubting, much of the deeply sedimented 
significance of its character and motivation may remain a mystery to the one who doubts. Here we 
speak of an affective absence that may be unconscious, but certainly not unconsciousness. 25 It makes 
itself felt like a mood rather than as a presence in any objective sense. There is a fascinating 
ambiguity here, which calls for attention. Clearly, we can still speak of a certain presence -- the 
living-presence of a mood, as the lived tone of a phase of comportment -- but this must be strictly 
distinguished from what we would call an appearance. Moods are more feeling than felt. They are 
the colouration of the given. Only through reflection -- through a certain kind of self-distanciation / 
deferment of the prior lived-mode, can I begin to unravel what is in play and subject it to 
thernatization: that is, bring it to presence -- make it'appear' as an objectfor consciousness. Husserl 
would be the first to argue that such thetic presence (especially if this signification is also meant to 
extend over the range of that which we would call 'apodictic') is not simply given, but is constituted 
by work -- a kind of excavation of layers of sedimented structure. 
26 
We are, once again referred to the thought of an intertwining of presence and absence. Like 
the Idea in the Kantian sense, its presence is also that of a withdrawal of presence. The Idea traces 
itself out through a multiplicity of adumbrations that never quite reach it (e. g., it is the difference 
between pure red / redness in its ideality and particular instances of the colour red), but then this is 
true of the very expression 'presence' with respect to the multifarious ways in which we try to grasp 
its meaning[s]. This is why we must be careful about the general deconstructive delimitation of the 
language of presence as applied to the history of Western philosophy. The question of presence 
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signs itself here as an open horizon of possible work -- an infinite task. 
In these terms, this 'work, ' this phenomenological 'task, ' is turned toward itself as the 
I 
articulation of a kind of play -- which always involves intentional play between absence and 
presence. Within its spectrum, we find giving and non-giving, appearing and appearance (which 
structurally includes non-appearing), no-longer and not-yet, etc. We shall see that this inter- and 
intra-play, as the opening of the phenomenological horizon, is not originarily 'constituted' by what 
0 
Gasch6 would identify in terms of a general structure of 'duplicity. ' It actually makes reference to a 
flux of continuous alteration, a self-reflexive continuum that involves a recuperative movement 
generated by a play of deferral and surpassing. 
Suffice it to say, at this point, Husserl's project does not indicate the trace of a residual 
investment in ultimately unknowable regions expressed in the diverse forms of Cartesian matter (res 
extensa), Lockean 'bodies' or Kantian 'things-in-themselves. ' For Husserl, evidence is a certain 
structurality of the phenomenon itself as experienced -- and it is this intentional structurality of 
experience (viewed eidetically) that constitutes the field of his descriptive phenomenology. 
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10. The Constitution of the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart): an 
immanently transcending opening influx 
Phenomenology is primarily and preliminarily descriptive. It is a method, language and 
orientation that focuses on the multiplicity of various forms or essential structures of phenomena as 
experienced. The phenomenological orientations gained through the various methods of reduction 
radically re-situate questions concerning existence or actuality. However, descriptive (static / 
structural) phenomenology as the science of appearing or giving (phenomeno-logos) does not 
terminate merely in the constituted. On the contrary, there is a vertical and explanatory dimension 
which comments upon the 'grace' of consciousness as a meaningful directedness toward something: 
that which constitutes the horizon of the encounter with phenomena without being present as such. 
The phenomenological approach to the question of presence and its many different forms of 
articulation, which already demonstrates a radicalized language of presencing that takes into account 
the question of absence (and its phenomenologically constitutive role) in terms of its own kind of 
evidence, is such that presence is a starting-point and not an end-limit. It is a route of entry that 
ultimately involves a 'turning-back' (Riickgang) upon the question of the possibility of presence 
phenomena and the constitution of Objectivity in general. The transcendental issue of the condition 
of the possibility of the unfolding of presence is a response to a 'static' phenomenology. It is the 
moment at which phenomenology takes on responsibility for putting to itself the question of how it 
can account for both the structurality of the opening and the opening up of structure through which 
any possible evidence or presence can extend itself. From a structural-genetic point of view, this 
orientation is concerned with the temporal 'constitution' of lived experience (which includes the 
constitution of the noeses and the unfolding of characters of appearing in the noema rather than a 
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merely constituted appearance") without which discourse on the phenomenon of presence would 
have no meaning. 
Husserl's intentional investigations into the tracing out of primordial temporalization, as it 
articulates itself within the 'openness' of the Living Present, is precisely this turn from the 
constituted to the constituting. the temporalizing of the temporal. This turn is a re-turn which, as a 
transversal movement from the one to the many and the many to the one, expresses duration in 
0 
terms of an originary interplay of differentiation in flux. Such differentiated moments are not 
discrete, but are intrinsically intertwined, thus--giving time as opposed to times. 28 
There are some contemporary philosophical circles that share a common difficulty in 
understanding this intertwining (Ineinander) or original communality (Urgemeinschaftung) of the 
Living Present as expressed by Husserl in his lectures on time consciousness. The misunderstanding 
has generated a certain degree of confusion over the relations between intentionality, acts, signs, 
meaning, and the distinction between appearing and appearance in phenomenology. The confusion 
has been partly generated and perpetuated by Derrida's Speech and Phenomena and its own 
confusion and systematic conflation of the present (temporal present / Gegenwart) and presence 
(Anwesenheit) throughout its treatment of Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness 
(1928). This compression clearly finds its motivation in Heidegger's claim that ousia and parousia 
have always been thought on the basis of the present (as a specific mode of temporality). Ultimately, 
this is the hinge of Derrida's programme in the text of Speech and Phenomena throughout its 
criticism of Husserl's distinction between indication (Anzeichen) and expression (Ausdruck) as 
presented in the Logical Investigations (1901). 29 Although Derrida! s actual knowledge of The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is not to be limited to what stands out as a rather 
odd reading of this text (since it is more a question of a strategic misreading that is quite different to 
that which surfaces in his earlier and more rigorous Introduction to Husserl's "Origin qf 
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Geometry"30), the upshot of this move is that a number of vital phenomenological differences are 
effaced. These erasures are almost too numerous to mention, but the differences that demand to be 
restored, in the context of the present discussion, are the distinctions between appearance and 
appearing, in relation to the giving of the phenomenon; significational distinctions between primal 
impression and the Living Present; immanence and transcendence; retentions and secondary 
remembrances, and adequacy and apodicticity. All these differences are subsumed (condensed 
0 
conflated) by Derrida within a certain logic ofpresence. The constellation of issues to which it is 
applied is severely (and one might argue, unjustly) limited by the meta-generality of his orientation 
on the theme of presence throughout his labyrinthine discussions on the horizon of diffirance. It is 
somewhat ironic that Derrida's critique of Western philosophy and his project to articulate those 
differences that have been forgotten by this history takes the form of a de-differentiation of the 
horizons of phenomenology. 
Derrida actually deconstructs its language to the point at which its key dimensional 
differences cease to have any phenomenological value. Such a levelling procedure is, in an 
important sense, a de-differentiation: a movement toward 'indifference. ' This definitely has a 
negative impact on his reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena (and it has, rather 
unfortunately, had a negative influence on some readers who follow Derrida in style without 
necessarily responding to the spirit of his own call for vigilance; who play, but without due regard 
for rigour). 31 Within certain limits, there is also a positive side to what we may call Derrida's 
strategy of de-differentiation (particularly in relation to the motif of dýf . 
Tirance and the erasure of the 
substantive difference between spatiality and temporality in the significational play between 
difference and deferral), which we shall have occasion to explore later on. 
To return to the principal citation from The Tain of the Mirror above (TM, P. 228-29), it is 
significant that Gasch6 speaks of the Living Present in terms of the 'instance of the living presence. ' 
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This suggests that Husserl is working with the notion of a discrete and unmediated intuition of the 
thing-itself in person within a corpuscular or point-like present -- an instance or instant of a 
spatialized present -- presence). There is a certain movement of conflation at work here that is 
clearly inspired by Speech and Phenomena and Derrida! s inappropriate assignment of the view to 
Husserlian phenomenology that "... the concept of punctuality, of the now as stigme, still plays a 
major role in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness" (SP. P. 61). Although Derrida, 
0 
acknowledges in the following sentences that Husserl rejects the thought of the now as a point, he 
still goes on to read the lectures on time in these terms, where the "... irreducible spreading-out of 
lived experience ... is nonetheless thought and 
described on the basis of the self-identity of the now as 
point, as a'source-point... (Ibid). Exactly why Derrida! s text distorts Husserl's meaning to this extent, 
by making such an extraordinary claim, is rather mysterious since he clearly displays a more 
sophisticated and appropriate grasp of the actual phenomenological meaning and structure of the 
now or the present in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry. " It is significant that this 
earlier text already demonstrates how such a determination of the present 'as a point' is a 
fundamentally incorrect reading of Husserl. 
The principal problem with Derrida's account of Husserl's concept of the Living Present lies 
in the manner in which he approaches the concept of primary impression. 
For Husserl, primary impression is a now-consciousness whose distinction from retention 
and protention -- which are, respectively, primary remembrance and primary anticipation -- is 
intentional and not substantial. All three intentional ities are intrinsically intertwined in the present, 
but they name different orientations. The present [Gegenwart] is always already a tri-horizonal 
matrix. However, Derrida warps Husserl's meaning to such a degree that primary impression 
becomes reduced to a now-point (a discrete moment) in itself, as if phenomenology has not escaped 
the limits of the Humean impression of an empirical-psycho logical succession. 
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I 1,14 
ý Derrida's reading of Husserl is quite surreal in the assignment of a corpuscular or point-like 
present / now to the central position of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. What 
emerges is a complete distortion of Husserl's discourse on the temporalization of consciousness, 
intuition and the issue of continuity with respect to the question of evidence. 
The constellation of issues raised by the lectures on internal time consciousness is, in fact, a 
set of problems handed down from Hume. His 'introspective' inquiry into that which we call the Self 
0 
(in the study, "Of Personal Identity" -- A Treatise of Human Nature [Treatise]) leads to the claim 
that there is no impression of the Self that is "constant and invariable" (P. 25 1). Hume maintains that 
the mind is "... nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. " (Ibid, P. 252). At no time, 
however, does he ask the question about how there is consciousness of such movement, change, 
succession, etc. In other words, he fails to inquire into the possibility of 'introspection' as an 
'extended' consciousness or project that is somehow coextensive with itself Hume's investigations 
start out as a quest for the legendary Self and it is a limitation that blinds him to a deeper dimension. 
He does have the key, but the original question obscures the door that is to be unlocked. 
Husserl, in his preface to Boyce-Gibson's English translation of Ideen 1, suggests that 
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature "... gives the first systematic sketch of a pure phenomenology" 
(P. 16). This is clearly true, but when Hume maintains that "... all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences" 
(Treatise, P. 636, Appendix), his analyses get stuck in the sphere of empirical phenomenalism. The 
principally psychologistic orientation of his studies only gestures toward- a more profound 
phenomenological field that his language and orientation cannot actually penetrate. Hume is unable 
to explain conlinuity or consciousness of change within what is fundamentally a 'diachronic' flux of 
discrete existences. It is significant that this viewpoint, which is caught up in the thought of time as 
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mere linear successivity, cannot account for the determination of mind as a 'bundle of impressions. ' 
It disregards the question of the meaning and possibility of the kind of co-existence or simultaneity 
that must always already be implicated in the capacity to juxtapose and concatenate various different 
sequential / successive moments within a single grasp. Despite the fact that it can be said that these 
past 'impressions' no longer exist as such, they are, in an extremely important sense, still retained. 
This must be so as a matter of principle if there is to be the consciousness of a flux of differences in 
the first place. It is in response to this issue that Husserl's discourse on retention addresses the 
question of the possibility of the unfolding of continuity that produces the registration ofdifference. 
What Derrida's Speech and Phenomena 'strategically' omits (or perhaps merely fails to 
recognize -- but I doubt that this is simply the case) is that Husserl's theory of intuition is explained 
'by means of his analyses on time-consciousness. These temporal orientations describe a more 
primordial flux in and through which the now is already spanned within itself as the locus of a 
transversal play of retentions and protentions. This temporalizing interplay of intentionalities 
originally permits consciousness of unity and difference as the condition of any possible intuition -- 
where intuition is the product of the sedimentation that is constituted by the retentional and 
protentional flux of time consciousness. ' Retention gives the passing-over of the present into that 
which is no longer (pastness), while protentiona fills the present with the anticipation of that which 
is not-yet (the pre-expectational horizon of open futurity). There is also a second intentionality 
(Ldngsintentionalitiit - longitudinal intentionality) of retention, which gives pastness as a constant 
background to the flow. Therefore, what is given is a continuun-1. 
Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is, in large part, an effective 
response to Hume's problem regarding the issue of continuity. 
Derrida maintains that Husserl's philosophy is centered on the language of 'presence. ' 
However, as we have seen, the meaning of presence, as it functions in Derrida's critical analyses of 
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the phenomenological concept of intuition and primal impression, is thought on the basis of a 
conflation of Gegenwart and Anwesenheit (temporal present and presence as that which is manifest / 
visible). Although Derrida! s logic is based on Heidegger's claim concerning how ousia and parousia. 
have always been thought in terms of a particular temporal determination -- the present -- it is an 
illegitimate move to reduce this history to the thought of the present as a point. This further 
compression leads to a very strange and incoherent reading of The Phenomenologv of Internal Time 
Consciousness, which distorts what Husserl is really doing by actually warping Heidegger's 
meaning. 
Husserl'. s inquiry does not 'terminate' in presence or in an extensionless (point-like) present 
but, as has already been indicated, influx. However, this is not a Humean 'objective' flux of a merely 
successive order. It marks the difference between (to borrow from Derrida's writing on dififirance) 
the written and the writing of the written -- (in Of Grammatology, Derrida speaks of difif9rance as 
"the formation of form" and the "being-imprinted of the imprint" [P. 63]). In both Husserlian terms 
and from the Derridean standpoint, this is the outermost frontier of phenomenology. It announces 
itself in response to the question of the possibility of intuition, presence, evidence, etc. 
The absolute Ur-region of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness -- a field for 
which, as Husserl says, 'names are lacking' (PlTC. Sec. 3 6, P. 100) -- does not explain itself by means 
of the language of presence (certainly not in terms of the way in which Derrida defines such logic), 
but is that which permits the functioning of such a language. This dimension does not extend itself 
beyond transcendental phenomenology, but only the'intuitional foundation' that Derrida incorrectly 
attributes to it through an inverted and illegitimate reading of Husserl's reflections on the Living. 
Present of temporal experience. Husserl's analyses are already attuned to the question of the 
possibility of continuity and presence in terms of a pure movement of rourn involving deferral and 
. 
Terance that has differentiation. is this just a vague anticipation of Derrida's own discourse on df 
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been projected retroactively onto phenomenology or is Husserl's writing actually one of the original 
sites of its germination? 
The answer depends on whether one adheres to that which Derrida unearths in his 
Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" or to that which is expressed in the later text of 
Speech and Phenomena. Each text is the inverse of the other. 
To reiterate one of the main points of our discussion, it is vital to understand that the concept 
0 
of primary impression, as adumbrated in Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, 
is not be confused with a 'Humean impression. ' For Husserl, Hume's discrete impressions can be 
nothing more than abstractions / idealizing fictions, which are constituted through a form of 
narrative return that forgets its own conditions of possibility. There must be extendedness. 
In order for perception to occur - here we speak of the appearing of sense -- that which is 
given up through primary impression must first be able to return upon itseýf (Husserl was not by any 
means the first to recognize that cognition was primarily a matter of re-cognition). The structural 
possibility of return -- which permits the 'I can do so again' - precedes the issue of personal identity 
as the condition of its possibility. As we have seen, Husserl describes this recursive structuration in 
terms of a Primordial Flux: an interplay or intra-play of transversal intentionalities (which must 
necessarily precede and condition a flux of an Humean order). According to his phenomenological 
position, the meaning of Primordial flux is not to be understood on the basis of primary impression 
as its actual starting-point. The discourse on flux is that which originally explains the opening-up of 
the Living Present in which primary impression serves in the form of a specific intentional index 
within a tri-horizonal interplay. It is this folding-unfolding of the 'horizon' of the present that 
produces unity and distanciation / continuity and surpassing. 
The Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart), as a transversal 'play' of intentional relations, is 
an open / extended / extending matrix 'constituted' through a retentional and protentional flux in 
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which primal impression is the spacing of their negotiation. From the standpoint of the Living 
Present, this inter-play is actually an intra-play. It is not a question of external relations between 
individual nows strung out side by side, but of an intra-relational matrix at work within the present. 
For Husserl, the 'now' is grasped on the basis of the original possibility of such an inter / intra-play 
within the heart of itself. This means that the possibility of the present and the continuity of presence 
rests on the possibility of return / repetition. It is the structuralizing possibility of return - 
returnability-- that produces a continuum. 
As Wood writes in The Deconstruction of Time, 
Husserl's real achievement is to have supplied an answer to the problem of continuity 
through time (P. 72). 
In sum, Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is a rigorous response to (and an 
effective resolution of) the problem of 'association' that plays such a crucial role in The Treatise of 
Human Nature. Hume was the first to acknowledge that the problem of association could not be 
addressed with any sort of adequacy (let alone explained) on the basis of his description of the mind 
as a stream of discrete impressions. This latter view makes it impossible to take into account the 
structuralization of the unfolding of a continuum. Consciousness (or mind), when thought in terms 
of a 'bundle of impressions' -- a succession of fleeting and distinct present perceptions -_ does not 
give us continuity. The lffie of consciousness cannot be made up of discrete packets of perception or 
time as if they popped in and out of existence from moment to moment. The consciousness of 
sameness and difference must, in some sense, extend itself beyond the limits of such a model of the 
mind (as a running-off of discrete impressions and point-like 'nows') if there is to be the possibility 
of 'association. ' This is a form of bringing-logether whose meaning is not to be reduced to a 
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movement of homogenization, since it also includes, in an original manner, the bringing-together-of- 
differences as differences -- a weaving of temporally disparate moments within a quasi- 
simultaneous web of juxtaposition. This cannot be taken into account within the logical bounds of a 
mere 'order of corpuscular successions. ' 
11. The Problem of Association and the Continuity of Consciousness 
as Consciousness of Continuity -- the Play of Unity in Difference and 
Difference in Unity. 
Hume's empirical-psychologistic standpoint barred him from access to a transcendental plane 
of orientation on the question of 'unity, ' and thus the possibility of 'association! This is ironic, in 
view of the weight of significance this concept has for the theoretical structure and methodology of 
The Treatise of Human Nature -- which is one of the reasons why Hume's writing is so admirable. 
He develops the theory of association only to see the grounding ripped out from beneath it when he 
conscientiously reviews the issue of continuity upon which it depends. Hume not only climbs a 
ladder and kicks it away; he is also prepared to fall back down and to begin anew. Perhaps it is this 
conscientious rigour of Hume's analyses of experience that Husserl most admires - given that his 
own philosophical enterprise is continually defined as 'a perpetual return to beginnings. ' 
It was the development of the theory of intentionality by Brentano and Husserl that allowed a 
new orientation on the problem of continuity. As we have seen, in phenomenology, consciousness is 
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defined in terms of a transitive movement. It is literally nothing without such transitivity: its 
directedness-toward something. The concept of the 'outside-itself' ekstatic movement of 
consciousness is the principal theoretical basis on which existentialism depends. This is the core of 
Heidegger's meaning in the expression Dasein (Being-there) and Sartre's 'for' in ttre pour soi 
(Being-for-itself). The 'towards, ' indicated by the preposition 'of, ' is the essential determination of 
the meaning of consciousness. 
In these terms, the consciousness of similarity and difference necessarily implies a stretched- 
out consciousness that is irreducible to a flux of 'atomic' impressions. Impressions cannot be discrete 
consciousnesses or point-like presents since this would imply something like perception without 
perceiving, meaning without reference, foreground without background, presence without horizon, 
situation without relation, etc. The life of consciousness cannot be a mere aggregate either -- the sum 
of a collection of impressions, which are said to pass-away with 'inconceivable rapidity. ' Without 
continuity -a continuum that has past and futural horizons how could we speak of the mind as a 
'collection' or a 'bundle'? In the case of the mind as a whole, these expressions have to be applied to 
a form of non-linear / hologrammatic co-extension or quasi-simultaneous structurality (the latter can 
be thought in a 'virtual' sense without necessarily invoking the language of presence), which not 
only retains the impressions that pass-away, but is also already at work anticipating their arrival. 
Both of these performances constitute the consciousness of transition itself. 
However, Hume's introspective narrative gives us a purely linear order of successions that 
cannot actually account for the consciousness of 'duration' -- a consciousness that must, in some 
way, be coextensive with itself through change as consciousness qf change. Consciousness has to 
exceed its various moments if there is to be the registration of difference. Running-off impressions 
must somehow be able to 'express' the duration qf their running-qf 
Therefore, to speak in terms of a flux of impressions that successively flash in and out of 
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existence (remember that for Hume, perceptions are 'distinct existences') already presupposes a 
'stretched' consciousness, which, in some sense, precedes and outlives the impressions that pass- 
away. What must be taken into account is the 'continuing-through' or living-through' of temporal 
movement. Discrete consciousnesses could never register 'transition. ' Therein lies the paradox; such 
a form of successivity as that expressed by Hume would literally never give succession. 
The thernatization of motion / change in terms of 'phases, ' 'passing-over, ' 'passing-away, ' 
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'running-off, ' etc., speaks of the consciousness of duration, change, modal variations, etc. These 
transitions cannot be given in a point-like impression or a mere collection (in the case of the latter 
we would still need to inquire into that which permits such a synthesis). Therefore, we find that the 
collecting together of a series of different temporal points would not give time in much the same 
sense that a collection of spatial points would not give motion. 
Husserl's expression running-off-phenomena (Ablaufsphanomene) does not so much name 
impressions that are shading off as the consciousness ofthe shading off itself. 
The lectures on time-consciousness explore the question. of the primordial possibility of an 
extending consciousness, which, when understood in intentional terms as a transitive consciousness 
of something, gives duration. Without duration there cannot be change, without an enduring 
(temporalized / temporalizing) consciousness there cannot be consciousness of change. Hume's 
narrative forgets its own condition of possibility, beyond the'corpusculae schema that it thernatizes. 
Narratives report duration precisely because they have duration, or, rather, they are fiorms of 
duration. Association, is a kind of narrative return -- an unfolding of structure, the writing of con- 
texture that, in a peculiar sense, combines instantaneity and duration, differentiation and 
concatenation. Such structuration emerges out of the possibility of comparison, as a kind of 
compression of 'lived-time. ' This compression is structurally identical to the process of idealization - 
- which, once again, rests on returnability. 
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The opening-up of structure, then, points to a general structurality that first permits such an 
opening. It prescribes the possibility of association. One can still respect Hume's observation that we 
do not perceive any "real connexion among distinct existences, " when it comes to questions of 
causality, but the issue of 'relatedness' is irreducible to these terms. 
Husserl's theory of intentionality emerged out of a manoeuvre of suspension that bracketed 
questions of causation. His source of inspiration, as Husserl's introduction to Boyce-Gibson's 
I 
English translation of Ideas I (193 1) appears to show, can be found in his encounter with Hume as a 
rigorous response to the kinds of aporia that announce themselves at the limits of his investigations. 
For Hume, our notion of causality is not derived from the perception of real connections among 
distinct existences, but from 'habitual association' -- which, as we have already seen, cannot actually 
be explained by Hume's schema concerning the corpuscular temporalization of experience[s]. His 
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is well known. It is in the Appendix to the Treatise that 
Hume confesses 
all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive 
perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me 
satisfaction on this head (P. 635). 
The theory of intentionality, when considered from the point of view of the temporalization 
of consciousness, explains continuity in terms of the possibility of return: returnability. It is the 
retentional and protentional extending of 'return' that gives the 'possibility' of habituation and 
association -- which, in turn, permits the idea of causality. 
Husserl's expression running-off-phenomena (Ablaufsphanon7ene) does not so much name 
itself. impressions that are shading off as the consciousness qf1he shading qf 
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Is there not another fundamental question that Hume has overlooked? Is he correct in his 
assumption that perceptions are actually 'distinct' existences? Is there not a certain degree of 
hypostatization going on here? For Husserl, "... no concrete experience can pass as independent in 
the full sense of the term" (Ideas 1, Sec. 83, P. 221). Consciousness, or experience (in the most 
general sense), when understood according to the logic of intentionality, is a transitive upsurge, a 
unity of a projection, a comportment-towards -- which is precisely a 'stretched' consciousness: the 
extended / extending of a history. 
Is not Hume taking rather a great deal for granted? Existence, when thought in terms of its 
etymological relation to the Greek word ekstaticon, literally means, to-stand-outside-itself 
However, that which stands- outside-itself already implies a whole matrix of referential differences 
(that must in some sense register themselves as such) from which no ekstatic node can be absolutely 
distinct. Distinctness arises out of the possibility of the consciousness of difference. Therefore, 
consciousness is essentially spaced-out. We should say, in consonance with Husserl, that these 
moments are not 'distinct existences, ' but rather phases, modes, or streams of one 'unity of lived- 
experience! 
In the section entitled, "Intentionality as the Main Phenomenological Theme" of Ideas 1, 
Husserl writes, 
It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the term, and 
justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness 
and unity of one consciousness (Sec. 84, P. 222). 
It is important to remember that in Husserl's phenomenology the question concerning the 
unity of the consciousness of time -- as consciousness through time -- is not restricted to (understood 
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on the basis of) a mere expression of Self or personal identity, as it seems to be for Hume. The unity 
about which Husserl speaks indicates something earlier: temporalized / temporalizing consciousness 
(the a priori condition of possibility of what we would normally name as the Self); a retentional and 
protentional tracing of a projection -- a reflexive unity of a history. 
The life of consciousness (as a whole) is another name for the intentionality of 
consciousness. This is in stark contrast to the sense of intentionality with which we are left after 
reading Derrida's engagement with Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. As we have seen, Husserl 
has, in fact, already tackled the paradoxes that arise through the classic 'discretist' doctrine that the 
primary components of perception are 'corpuscular' impressions. Far from being a mere resumption 
of the Humean view, the theory of intentionality is an effective response and overturning of this 
thesis. 
The somewhat notorious (from a strict phenomenological point of view), but ever-readable 
Speech and Phenomena presents us with a re-reading of Husserl that is a kind of flip-side (or dark- 
side) to the earlier Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry. " One has to admire Derrida's 
cheek when he specifically rejects the thought of the now as a point by drawing on Husserl's own 
studies on temporal consciousness while, at the same time, actually attributing this corpuscular 
viewpoint to phenomenology as a whole. Continuing in this attitude, Gaschd's claim regarding "the 
privilege Husserl attributes to the instance of the living presence" (TM, P. 228), is one in which the 
meaning of 'instance' clearly doubles as 'instant. But, for Husserl, such a present / now / instant 
could never be more than an abstraction from aflux (a Primordial flux, the Ur-region that precedes 
and constitutes the purely successive flux in Hume's account). 
There is an important difference that must be taken into account: any consideration of the 
meaning of living presence must take attend to the question of its unfolding or constitution as a unity 
qf duration. The internal dynamics -- which trace out both dispersion and recuperation in (1UX -- are 
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also those that open up the 'Living Present. ' In its very principle, the now cannot be a point-like 
moment or presence. As we have seen, an atomic or corpuscular now, within the context of Husserl's 
phenomenological orientation, could never be anything more than an idealization, a fiction. A now- 
point can be nothing for itself. Husserl's 4th law of temporal experience., tells us that the now is 
intrinsically transitive. Every time has a before and after. As the lectures on time-consciousness 
unfold, it becomes clear that this is no external relation, 
10 
but that the past and future are necessarily 
embodied 'within' the present. 
There is a certain 'virtuality' expressed by the Living Present in that it is not a presence in the 
sense of an objective appearance, but is the opening and the depth of any possible mode of 
'appearing. ' As a horizon, it recedes before that which stands out or comes to presence. In this sense, 
it is pure transcendence. Deferring and surpassing trace out the structure of its performance as 
opening. 
There is also another sense in which it expresses a fundamental form of immanence. For 
Husserl, the structurality of the opening-up of the Living Present is precisely. flux -- through which 
the giving of temporal objects is lived. The thought of the Living Present is irreducible to the 
boundaries of what has become (by courtesy of deconstruction) a meta-general form of discourse on 
presence, since it is the opening of presencing itself. However -- and here is the paradox that Derrida 
cannot disentangle because of the limits of his own orientation concerning the question of presence - 
- although the Living Present does not actually appear it is not a pure absence, for it is, in an 
important phenomenological sense, immanent in its transcendence. Like the Earth as ground- 
horizon (the from-which) which is immanent and yet unseen in that it is not principally an object: 
that which is closest to us recedes from our noticing grasp. In other words, the lebendige Gegenwart 
is not present to consciousness in any 'objective' sense, but is the presentform of consciousness in its 
directedness toward something. 
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It must be noted that we are indifferent as to whether such 'directedness' is an orientation 
toward the now, past or future. Both the horizon of pastness and that of futurity already inhabit the 
Living Present (as interplaying fringes of the now) in that retention and protention are present modes 
of consciousness, e. g., retention is not a past moment as such, but a present consciousness (a 
retaining) of the past - giving pastness within the present. Retentions retain retentions within 
themselves - they are continua of continua. 
In sum, the Living Present is a tri-horizonal nexus of interplaying orientations: retention, 
primal impression, and protention. Each orientation is a 'present' form of consciousness with a 
unique intentional index. 32 
Primal impression is the boundary to retention and protention. It marks the point at which 
they pass over into one another. Such a point is ideal of course. Another way of looking at primary 
impression is in terms of a boundary that has no thickness. The sense of this is to be found in 
Husserl's agreement with the radicalization of the concept of the 'boundary' (Grenze) in Brentano's 
philosophy -- which specifically rejects the notion that it is composed of two adjacent points. In the 
same terms, retention and protention are not adjacent to one another in the sense in which they could 
be said to either lie alongside one another (touching without blending) or that they are separated by 
an unspecified gap. Boundary is pure transition. There is not a strict divide between retention and 
protention, for that division to which the concept of primal impression refers is more a kind of zone 
of transitional smudging -- a blending and a bleeding of one into the other. Boundary, here, signifies 
a nexus of 'play' where the Living present is precisely a spacing of negotiation between the three 
intentional ekstases. 
What is given through this movement is the unfolding of a horizon, not discrete things. The 
thought of the boundary as a dividing line without thickness or as a point is, once again, merely an 
ideal limit -- an idealizing fiction. 
33 
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There is a number of ways in which we might understand this play or interplay. Firstly, in 
the sense in which there is an absence of rigidity -- unfixedness. This kind of play occurs through 
erosion; a loosening that comes with the passage of time. The now is always protentionally ahead of 
itself while being the cutting edge of a train of retentions. This brings us to the following sense: it is 
a perfect metaphor for the openendedness of the present -- the retentional and protentional interplay 
that gives the play of the now -- its unfolding and its unfixedness. It is a kind of blurring of edges. 
The Living Present is a horizon with fringes (as opposed to the common notion of boundaries), 
which extend on both sides of itself. These fringes (or overlapping zones) are not merely external 
supports to the present, but constitute its extendedness from within itself. Therefore, the interplay, 
once again, is in a very fundamental sense, also an intra-play. 
The idea of primal impression brings with it the all-important phenomenological concepts 
concerning apodicticity and adequacy and the play between fulfilment, non-fulfilment, and degrees 
of fulfilment. Primal impression is the fulfilment of what was a protention. The movement gives, to 
paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, the germination of what will have already been given. 34 Primal 
impression is the present actualization of what was futural. This is the fold of a structure of 
negotiation which originarily permits us to distinguish between phantasy and the real. 
At a 'higher' level, an example of this would be when a figure, perhaps shrouded in darkness, 
may seem familiar, but when it is approached (on the basis of the apprehension of familiarity), it 
turns out to be someone (or even something) quite different in actuality. What signs itself here is the 
moment at which a determinate expectation, whose material is delivered up from the past (through 
memory), is forced to undergo adjustment on the basis of a present consciousness (primal 
impression) of something with which the expectation does not correspond. As the protention passes 
over into retention the content of expectation is annulled and retained only as unfulfilled and 
mistaken. Primal impression marks (to speak metaphorically) the 'point' at which expectations are 
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fulfilled or otherwise. It is the spacing through which existence pours in, disrupting imagination and 
ideality. 
Therefore, it is important to understand that the term primal impression (or now- 
consciousness) is not synonymous with the meaning of the expression Living Present. It refers to 
only one present form of 'orientation' that articulates the way in which retention and protention (as 
present modes of orientation of that which is no-longer and that which is not-yet) pass over into one 
I 
another in the constitution of the ever-flowing present. The Living Present itself, far from being 
point-like, is a tri-horizonal 'field. ' Along with Merleau-Ponty, we may describe it as a 'bulb' made 
up of indeterminately extended fringes stretching into the past and the future. 
The Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) is a waiting-towards presence. It is not so much 
the present (in an objective sense) as the living, through ofpresencing. 
12. The Phenomenology of the Standing-Ont of that which Stands- 
Outside-Itself 
With these phenomenological issues in mind, which clearly show the constitutive nature of 
the play between appearance and absence and the originarity of the intertwining (as opposed to 
heterogeneity) of the now and not-now, we question Gaschd's ill-advised tendency to speak of the 
limits of phenomenology in terms of that which can be'plienomenologized' -- given the limitations 
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of his application of this term. 35 This ignores the theme of the 'horizon' by maintaining the reduction 
of the phenomenon of phenomenology to an'obj ective' presence in which the language of appearing 
is subsumed under the logics of the appearance (a mere doubling of content if you wish). That they 
are inseparably bound together (from the point of view of the performance of phenomenal disclosure 
in general) is clear, but there is a vital 'difference' that actually defines the space or dimensionality of 
their intrinsic unity: a unity of content and context, story and narrative, noema and noesis. A 
phenomenological noetics (that is, a phenomenology of a 'noetic' orientation) concerns itself with 
the logic of appearing -- which is irreducible to either the language of the appearance or that which 
appears (through the appearance). Here, we cannot settle for the standard language of 'presence' -- 
not in terms of the way in which Gasch6 sets up the expression 'living presence' as a simple and full 
presence given in coincidence with itself. that is, in a point-like present. This, as we have seen, is far 
from Husserl's meaning. 
TI-le logic(s) of appearing cannot be divorced from a phenomenology of the appearance -- 
given that, the phenomenon, for Husserl, expresses the essential intertwining of both. However, this 
is not to say that the language of appearing is merely a kind of secondary auxiliary to the appearance 
or that the former is to be understood on the basis of the latter. This would be a dangerous confusion 
of different dimensions. The appearing of the appearance is a constitutive movement that plays 
about that which appears in the manner of an illumination, which permits objects (in the most 
general phenomenological sense) to 'stand-out. ' It is a mood, a contextualizing narrative that is a 
presencing rather than a presence - the character of the standing-out. Do not narratives efface 
themselves, in a sense, through their performance? Indeed, is not this self-effacement essential to 
their performance? A narrative is not the terminus of what is read (leaving the 'object! of a purely 
textual analysis aside for a moment), it transports the reader beyond its configuration of empirical 
marks toward that which it expresses (that which announces itself through its noematic component). 
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It is like an arrow. The ability of the narrative to 'transport' the reader beyond itself lies in a 
movement of 'self-surpassing' which, as the very structure of comportment, signification, 
[re] presentation, etc., permits the presence of meaning without necessarily being present itself. This 
structurality of the narrative cannot be grasped sufficiently in the language of 'appearances' since it 
speaks more of the appearing of that which appears, the giving of the given, the presencing of the 
present, etc. It traces out a certain invisibility and transcendence as the condition of the visibility of 
the visible. 
The question of the structurality of the unfolding of the narrative, then, can be thought in 
terms of a phenomenological rjOetics. The noetics of appearing are ekstatic, but the sense of the 
ekstatic here (ekstaticon = to-stand-outside-itself) should not be reduced to the sense in which that 
which 'stands-out' is an 'objective' presence. Like the sign in its performance, it is never 
'coincidental' with itself as a presence, but 'surpasses' itself (in the manner described above -- e. g., 
through self-erasure, detour and delay) toward that which it signifies. All signification stands- 
outside-itself. 
This is the logic of intentionality that is applied to consciousness as a directedness-toward 
something. Consciousness is ekstatic. It 'stands-outside-itself temporally and can never catch itself 
except as performance in its already having-beenness as a constituted unity of duration. Its relation- 
to-itself is essentially one of perpetual surpassing. Self-co incidence in a point-like moment is 
impossible in principle, but (and this would now appear to be in contradistinction to DerriMs actual 
position) this does not then refer phenomenology 'to a zone in which its principle of principles is 
radically put into question. ' Certainly not if this- is meant to sign the absolute limit beyond which 
phenomenology cannot extend itself. 
36 
As we have seen, Husserl's 'principle of principles' is also irreducible to a mere metaphysical 
assertion built upon a divide between appearances and things-in-themselves or originals and copies. 
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It is rather a call to the critical task of interrogating the 'how' of thinking: a turn (an altering re-turn) 
that is facilitated through the movement of epochd -- a gesture that has a variety of different forms 
and methodological signatures. 
For Husserl, the phenomenality (the giving) of the appearance is not contingent (as it would 
be for a naturalistic objectivism) upon an original objective relation between appearances and extra- 
phenomenal entities. It rather springs from the intentional / temporal structurality of experience (and 
the consciousness of temporality), which originarily opens up the space of such a difference. The 
very postulation of a world existentially transcendent to the phenomenal horizon is contingent upon 
the evidential sense of transcendence: that it has meaning / experiential significance. Even if this is 
usually expressed in terms of a lack, such a'lack' still signifies. 
The first-stage phenomenological reduction (epochj) institutes itself on the basis that to 
refuse any position-taking with regard to the 'actuality' of a world transcendent to its appearance 
does not mean that we then lose the 'sense' of transcendence. The sense is conveyed through its 
manner of appearing (or non-appearing) -- the 'appearing of as distinct from 'mere appearance' or 
'that which appears'. Transcendence and absence are structural moments or modes of the appearing 
of 'things' that constitute them from within: a horizonal unfolding of forms of illumination and 
patterns of relation through which entities announce their existence, when existence is thought 
according to its etymological relation to the word ekstaticon. For any entity to be able to 'stand-out' 
(in the objective sense), it not only requires illumination (in the terms so far discussed), but also a 
horizon of differentiated relations through which it can mark out its own identity and position and 
thus stand-outside-itself. This, let us say, is the 'spatial' moment (with its mundane and objective 
sense) of ekstasis. The horizonal unfolding of these differences, however, expresses a certain 
movement and relation of self-surpassing through which that which stands-out slandv-oulside-ilse? f 
temporally: it is 'stretched-out' in time. Nothing can stand-out unless it is already extended and 
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extending. Only by standing-outside-itself, by passing over into what it is-not and was-not (in the 
Heraclitean sense), can an entity stand-out as an objective presence. In other words, it must have 
'duration. ' The structurality of such an extending, or stretching-out, takes us beyond the language of 
the visible. However, this does not fall outside the scope of phenomenology's 'principle of principles' 
-- not when it is understood according to agenetic' orientation, which concerns the constitution (in 
flux) of the noeses, which efface themselves through a retentional delay in their self-surpassing 
towards that which is illuminated noematically. Correlatively, there is the essential withdrawal of 
the phenomenon that always already accompanies its giving of itself. 
That there is a constitutive function to 'surpassing' that falls outside the language of the 
appearance does not mean that we can no longer speak of the evidence of a certain form of 
surpassing; evidence in appearing --which would include non-appearing -- rather than evidence of 
appearance or the mere appearance of absence. If transcendence or surpassing is equated with the 
name of a problem, this can only be so in that it first 'announces' itself as such. Phenomenology 
concerns itself with the structures and formý of such an announcement. It will be shown that, 
without such 'evidence of surpassing' (which, from another point of view, is also a deferring) 
nothing would appear at all -- and that includes difference. One might be tempted to argue that the 
theme of difference and its constitutive role in the production of individual meaningful appearances 
is precisely that which is prior to any question of presence. Individuated objects / meanings cannot 
'stand-out' unless they are already situated within a matrix of differences against which they can 
stand-out as distinct entities. However, there are different kinds of differences, and each kind, if it is 
to function as such must, in some sense, be able to stand-out (to register -- be capable of 
registration). 
The meaning of the expression to-stand-out, as indicated above, need not be reduced to the 
language of appearances in the classical 'objective' sense. Likewise, the evidential logics of which 
we speak cannot be adequately subsumed under the accepted limits of the language or metaphysics 
of presence as delineated by both Derrida and Gasch6. Ekstaticon, when understood in temporal 
(and intentional) terms -- ekýtasis -- as a 'standing-outside-itself, ' refers us to a movement of 
surpassing brought about by a certain deferment of itself in relation to itself: giving evidence of a 
durational difference -- interval. Such a deferment or delay produces differences in a very special 
sense that is prior to the process of, what Gasch6 calls, 'doubling' and falls outside the apparent 
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'generality' of his principal theory. For Husserl Oust as much as for Derrida), such significations as 
delay, postponement, to hold in reserve, etc., speak of a play of presence and absence that does not 
limit absence to a mere mode of a more original presence. This questions, at the deepest level, the 
view that Husserlian phenomenology is limited to the language of presence (which easily translates 
to the more specific terms of 'appearance' or'visibility') since, as Derrida himself writes, 
In the originary temporalization and the movement of relationship with the outside, as 
Husserl actually describes them, non-presentation or depresentation is as "originary" as 
presentation. That is why a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental 
phenomenology than be reduced to it (Of Grammatology, P. 62). 
So much, at least, for the 'descriptive limits' of Husserl's phenomenology. This must surely 
make us pause for thought when we are faced with the assertion that it is imprisoned in a 
metaphysics of presence: a metaphysic which is purported to limit its language to that of immediate 
(non-mediated and point-like) manifestation from the very beginning. And, with the last sentence, 
we find that the question concerning the sense in which deconstruction allegedly goes 'beyond' 
phenomenology is getting more complex without actually shedding any light on the actual value of 
such a claim (note: value, here, should not be limited to matters of 'truth'). Since the 'thought of the 
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trace can no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it, ' we find that 
what Derrida takes away with one hand he restores with the other. His own claims regarding the 
limits of phenomenology and their suPercession by deconstruction are always tempered by the 
quasi-parasitical nature of deconstruction itself -- as a perpetual writing of prefaces, whose own 
language, for reasons of principle, cannot break with that with which it is engaged. The self- 
understanding within which this writing moves is the principal meaning of deconstructive irony. It is 
the original space in which its many different forms of ironic orientation play, e. g., satire, parody, 
doubling or substitution, contrariness, maieutic inquisition, etc. ). 
Gasch6's misunderstanding of Husserl concerning the question of 'living presence' is clearly 
based on Derrida's own undoubtedly 'strategic' (in view of his comments above) misrepresentation 
of the phenomenological sense of the Living Present in Speech and Phenomena. It constitutes an 
impoverishment of the meaning of Husserl's project, by completely disregarding the actual context 
and orientation of his analyses on time-consciousness. The phenomenological-temporal analyses set 
the scene for a radical approach to such issues as difference, deferral, supercession, and absence (in 
terms of their constitutive functioning in the movement of presencing without limiting them to the 
language of appearances, or presence in the narrower sense). The impoverished version blinds the 
'Derrida of Speech and Phenomena' (and consequently also the reader of this text, Gasch6) to one of 
the most profound shifts in Husserlian thought -- and not as an implication invisible to Husserl 
himself, but as one which was fully thernatized in his own work. The later stages of phenomenology, 
as transcendental-genetic phenomenology (post Logical Investigations), actually provide the 
resources for Derrida's critique of the limitations of static phenomenology. 
37 This, - in turn, equips 
Derrida with the means to implement a deconstructive critique of the 'static' limitations of 
structuralism. 
. 
Tjrance as 'differing and deferring' (spatializing and temporalizing) The notion of Q 
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essentially recapitulates and then isolates, in a genuinely creative way, that which Husserl's genetic / 
temporal analyses have already uncovered and thernatized in the concept of the Primordial Flux. 
Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" [1962]) already shows that the lectures on 
time-consciousness establish (in a thematic form) that consciousness of duration is a matter of 
consciousness o difference / divergence and that the duration-of consciousness itself is constituted )f 
through an originary retentional / protentional flux of continuous modification. This flux permits a 
stretching-out through the recursive temporalizing and spacing of a certain delay: repetition and 
reserve. It is curious that Derrida forgets this (perhaps, once again, for reasons of strategy) in his 
later publication: Speech andPhenomena [1967]. And again in Of Grammatology [1967] which, in 
the midst of its forgetfulness, nevertheless puts to work a certain Husserlian theoretical matrix that 
guides the course of Derrida's project to delineate a meta-general concept of writing: an arche- 
writing. This quasi-concept confounds the limits of the language of presence and yet its intrinsic 
logic essentially re-plays that which he discovers in Husserl's research on time-consciousness -- 
which he correctly determines as the basis for Husserl's discourse on the theme of Geschichtlichkeit 
(historicity). 
It is actually extremely difficult to graft the concept of the 'metaphysics of presence' (and its 
consequent limitations) onto the phenomenological horizon with any real degree of consistency. A 
careful re-reading of Husserl makes it almost impossible to sustain the view that the intertwined 
concepts of diffirance, iterability, the arche-trace, supplementarity, arche-writing, doubling, etc., go 
beyond the dimension of his phenomenology (particularly Husserl's later work). We cannot accept 
that Gasch6's- general theory of duplicity 'reaches beyond phenomenology' in general and " ... in 
particular in its Husserlian form" (TM, P. 228). Gasch6s assumption, that it does, ultimately blinds 
. 
Tirance that is te principal resource for him to a central dynamic in the thernatization of dif 
Derrida's discourse on trace structure. In fact, it is Gaschd's general theory of duplicity that lags 
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behind Husserl. 
We shall see that Gaschd's critique of phenomenology still sustains some of the common 
misconceptions that have arisen and found themselves maintained within the milieu of 
deconstruction regarding the limits of Husserl's project. Despite the careful demonstration of the 
intimate relations between phenomenology and deconstruction, Gasch6 is still primarily influenced 
by the 'strong' polemical tone of Derrida! s texts and its reiteration within the deconstructive milieu. 
I- 
And, here is the irony: this leads, by way of certain 'structural' ambitions, to an insufficient and one- 
sided understanding of the deep logics in play in Derrida's own writing. This limited perspective 
underplays (through the failure to re-read both Husserl and Derrida with sufficient critical reserve) 
the strategic and theoretical significance of Derrida! s own treatment of temporal themes and their 
relevance for the development of the quasi-transcendental concept of the tracing of diffirance. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TEMPORALITY AND THE SPACING OF 
DE., LAY 
13. History Re-Visited: iterability, tradition, and pluri-dimensional 
returnability 
Whether it is intended or not, Gasch6's text reduces Husserl's phenomenology as-a-whole to 
the static phenomenological orientation of the Logical Investigations. He works with a very limited 
perspective of phenomenology, which has been refracted through the lens-piece of Derrida! s Speech 
and Phenomena. Ironically, this is one of the principal weaknesses of The Tain of the Mirror 
because it is not at all clear that even Speech and Phenomena would authorize such a reduction. 
Derrida! s numerous references to (and quotations from) The PhenomenoloiT of Internal Time 
Consciousness, in particular, clearly show that the resources from which he draws, throughout his 
critique of Husserl's seminal work (1901), are to be found in the phenomenological study on time- 
consciousness (1905-10) and the later genetic research (1917 up to, and including, the Crisis). 
Derrida is quite explicit about this, if one looks hard enough. 
In many ways, Speech and Phenomena can be read not so much as a criticism of the Logical 
Investigations, but as a reading of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness -- and as an 
inspired application of Husserl's theses on temporality. The latter text provides an effective critical 
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language through which Derrida acts as the mediator of a dialogue between the later and earlier 
Husserl. Although it may seem somewhat perverse, given the content of the preceding chapter, there 
is much to be said for a reading of Speech and Phenomena in which Derrida's writing can be seen as 
a vigorous response to -- and a radical continuation of -- Husserl's own passionate call for ongoing 
critical vigilance as the hallmark of the phenomenological enterprise. To see this, we must double- 
back on ourselves and find another route of entry. It is worthy of note that Gaschd virtually 
0 
overlooks the importance of Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" (introduction 
is a misnomer here, since Deffida! s essay dwarfs the shorter text that it introduces and translates). 
One might suggest that it is in relation to this text that Derrida's Speech and Phenomena fulfils a 
broader ambition than that which is generally assigned to it alone. It is significant that this early 
work by Deffida -- which precedes Speech and Phenomena by five years -- focuses on one of the 
appendices to the text that develops the theme of Geschichtlichkeit (historicity): Husserl's Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Crisis]. It is only towards the end of The 
Tain of the Mirror that Gaschd momentarily considers the roots of the theme of arche-writing and its 
relation to developments in Husserl's phenomenology. However, lie still misses the fundamental 
importance of Husserl's discourse on historicity (the unfolding of tradition) and its theoretical 
background in the lectures on time-consciousness for Derrida! s development of the quasi-concept 
dififirance -- as arche-tracing or arche-writing. 
Gaschd writes,... 
... to contend, as 
I do here, that Derrida continues Husserl (and this is true of his relation to 
Heidegger as well) precisely on those issues that foreground the classical ethico-theoretical 
decisions constitutive of philosophy as philosophy is also to say that such a continuation is at 
the same time a decisive break with the idea of tradition, continuity, Oedipality, and so on. 
Indeed, since the motifs in question are of such a nature that they themselves are radically 
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more fundamental than the possibility of continuity, and since, moreover, they cannot be 
developed within the philosophical discourse as such, their continuation is possible only from 
a perspective that is marginal with respect to the history of philosophical development. From 
this standpoint, the fact that Derrida may have discovered these motifs in Husserl's works is, 
in a certain way, radically contingent (TM, P. 246). 
I 
There is another serious misconception here -- this time regarding Husserl's own attitude to 
the question of tradition. His last (and unfinished) text, the Crisis, explores the general structurality 
of the unfolding of any kind of tradition, while simultaneously exploring the problem of the 
operative presuppositional (traditional) baggage that such an inquiry can carry with it. This is why 
the question of the limits of the epochi, once again, announces its urgency for phenomenology as 
method. Husserl ultimately warns us against complacency and stresses that the reduction is 
something that must be repeated again and again. In more Derridean terms, this would be like saying 
that deconstruction must continually deconstruct itself -- a call that we should actually acknowledge 
as being vital to the very movement of deconstruction. 
In this sense, it is almost impossible to begin to reduce phenomenology (without an 
unacceptable degree of critical violence) to the articulation of a 'Particular tradition' in 'static' terms. 
Phenomenology, in principle (as the expression of an infinite task), undermines this disastrously 
reduced (de-temporalized) notion of tradition at its very core. It does this in both the concept of 
historicity and through the ceaselessly shifting, and re-shifting, motion of critical return (reflexivity) 
that characterizes phenomenological interrogation itself. a pluri-diniensional movement of return 
generated out of a certain kind of epochal suspension or 'deferral. ' Husserl's definition of 
phenomenology as a 'perpetual' return to beginnings embraces non-linearitY and non-totalization 
118 
(the absence of an absolute beginning or end-point). It celebrates at the level of method that which 
Derrida raises to the level of a thesis (that of supplementarity) in Of GranimatoloMy.. 
However, Gasch6 maintains that, in a certain sense, Derrida! s indebtedness to Husserl is 
merely 'contingent. ' The implication is that Derrida could have arrived at . the opening onto the same 
pathway of deconstruction by way of a different route and from quite a different source -- regardless 
of the specific theoretical, contextual, and methodological background that constituted the 
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beginnings. In other words, in line with Derrida's essentialist trait in his reduction of Western 
metaphysics to the articulation of the desire for full unmediated 'presence, ' any'source' can be said 
to be a mere moment (and thus index) of a more general character of motivation that has traced 
itself throughout the history of Occidental philosophy. 
A number of possible objections announce themselves here, but that which springs most 
immediately into the foreground (which involves a whole matrix of related difficulties) is that this 
'contingency thesis' disregards the complexity of the issue of history. At the same time, it leaves 
Derrida open to the possible objection that his project is ruled by a hermeneutical teleology and, 
perhaps, even by a naive commitment to the 'return of the repressed. ' These are positions that 
Derrida himself has forcefully rejected. We must also realize that we cannot ignore the factical / 
empirical development (history) of Derridean thought. To suggest that Derrida's theoretical and 
methodological rootedness in phenomenology is merely 'contingent' is to forget that his first three 
significant works (which secured such a unique place for his writing in the contemporary continental 
philosophical forum) were engaged in a critical dialogue with Husserlian phenomenology. The 
primary focus of these texts concerned different aspects of phenomenologucal discourse on 
temporality under the headings of genesis, historicity and the sign. 
Derrida's MA dissertation is entitled: The Problem Qf Genesis in the Philosophy (Y'Husserl. 
This text was written during the years 1953-54, but not published until 1990. We have already made 
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many references to his first publication, Husserl's "Origin of Geometry". - An Introduction (1962) 
and. the strategic parody of this text, Speech and Phenomena (1967). There is also a number of 
shorter essays which dedicate themselves to further examination of Husserl's phenomenology. These 
include "Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology, " which was first given as a lecture in 1959 and 
published in 1964, and "Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language" which 
was originally published in 1967.1 
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These texts engage with Husserl by name. Other texts of this period do not -- but still 
Husserl is there like a shadow. The essay "Diff6rance" (first presented as a lecture and published in 
1968) is just such a writing. 2 Derrida's engagement with Husserl's philosophy inaugurates a number 
of radical openings for the working out of the limits of the possibility of deconstruction as a critical 
praxis. One cannot ignore or underplay the importance of this formative period in Derrida's 
thinking. The published texts of 1962-68 exhibit a style of development in their movement from one 
to the other (which is eminently open to description). However, when we speak of DerriMs 
development this is hardly reducible to a'linear' movement because his texts do not start out along 
the same plane of orientation. It is more a case of the play of an ongoing dialogue. To be sure, if we 
speak of a progression that we measure in clock time, then there is a linear form to the duration, but 
this is not to say that the contextual passage (and narrative form) of such development is linear. 
In the way of an example, let us consider (in purely phenomenological terms) some of the 
practical possibilities of remembering, given that we concern ourselves with the articulation of a 
history. 
Take a slice of the duration of the remembrance. This may be five minutes in length 
(although it can seem like hours or seconds as it spans the years of accumulated experience), but that 
which is remembered -- the lived experiencing of the remembered -- is rarely motivated in a purely 
linear formation. For instance, a memory of an incident that occurred three years ago, may be 
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sparked off by its significance in relation to the situation in which one finds oneself now. This, in 
turn, may transport one back to an earlier period whose relevance for the future can motivate one 
into a frenzy of anticipation. Perhaps it evokes the memory of something that happened a week ago 
in such a way as to transform its significance (like the punch line of a joke, an ironic moment, or the 
Freudian "Aha! ") and mutate its affects with respect to one's self-relation and the style of one's 
comportment in the world. At what point can we demarcate remembering from anticipation when it 
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is generally concern about the future that motivates remembering: that is, as an act of evocation? 
There are also many instances in which different times (memories) are given up in a quasi- 
simultaneous web, where the 'patterns of significance' that bind them become the principal horizon 
in which they stand-out-together. Their objective and linear temporal positions in relation to one 
another, e. g., before, after, or at the same time, are not eradicated. The different temporal signatures 
remain intact, but these indices of linear time (chronology) are not the principal temporal forms 
through which these moments give themselves. Here, the 4all-at-once' is not the simultaneity of a 
non-time and it is an entirely different mode of temporality to that of a sequence of successions. It is 
a temporality that folds in upon itself 
The passage of remembering is pluri-dimensional and multi-directional in that such a 
movement reorganizes time (time thought phenomenologically: as a nexus of 
interplaying relations 
[not just 'chains'] of significance unfolding through flux), but then this is true of thought and 
language in general. Even biographical writing rarely confines itself to a linear / chronological 
sequence. Derrida has been one of the most outspoken protagonists 
in the contemporary 
philosophical theatre regarding the necessity of embracing non-linear orientations on 
language, 
writing, experience, etc. The profoundly pluri-dimensional structurality of symbolic thought or, 
in 
more general terms, the play / unfolding of meaning tends to 
be reduced to a point of extreme 
impoverishment when articulated within the confines of a purely linearist conception of temporality. 
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In these terms, the thought of the development of Derrida! s writing between the years of 1953 to 
1968 is not simply caught up with clock and calendar time. In other words, we are not to confine 
ourselves to the merely abstract thought of development as an incremental process that is stretched 
out over a specific duration, measured in the form of a line. There is a linear sequence that must be 
taken into account, in terms of the chronology of Derrida! s early writing, but there are other forms of 
temporality that we must also acknowledge. 3 
VAien we speak of Derrida! s development of deconstruction as a strategy for re-reading and 
re-writing, we do not mean a linear 'progression' in the name of epistemi, but an unravelling and a 
deepening (and often a form of side-stepping) whose forms of passage unfold a multiplicity of 
variant deconstructive readings. These re-readings do not add to themselves in the form of an 
incremental (linear) growth in a particular body of knowledge, but extend themselves toward one 
another in the manner of a'critical' dialogue: a dialogical field that operates on many different levels 
and in a variety of alternative dimensions. The deepening proceeds by means of a movement of 
Abbau - an unbuilding, de-sedimentation, dissemination. It is a form of passage that involves a 
constant transformational excavation of itself that is both intra-dialogical and inter-dialogical. It 
involves a critical relatedness to itself. 
In the radical spirit of the epochi, deconstruction maintains an element of irony in its self- 
relation and is thus constantly re-positioning itself. This is why it is always difficult to situate and 
isolate the constructive moments of deconstruction. Its principal form of strategic play involves a 
continuously shifting critical relation to itself. Deconstruction openly embraces its own de- 
construction. The pluri-dimensional passage of deconstructive play, for reasons of principle, tends to 
put the drive toward re-construction into suspense. Each step forward is also a step back, but, given 
that the deconstructive character of such a step is one that subjects its field (which includes itself) to 
a form of critical displacement, it is also a kind of step sideways, which 'cuts' time as fine. This 
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cutting or epochi gives us a form of suspension through which the line is subjected to an unravelling 
in which it is diffracted into multiple strands. We shall get to the meaning and role of the 'cow of 
this de-con-struction later. It is in this sense of developmental movement, as an unfolding of variant 
readings and narratives that produce a critical deepening -- a hollowing out rather than a linear and 
homogeneous movement of addition - that our reading of key Husserlian methodological and 
theoretical motifs demonstrates how his phenomenology stands out as a contemporary to 
deconstruction as well as one of its principal theoretical and methodological resources. 
Derrida's development of the logics at play in the thought of diffirance (e. g., its various key 
moments such as iterability, trace structure, arche-writing, etc. ) and his careful problematizing of 
such philosophical themes as genesis, the sign, intentionality, perception, presence, the present, 
teleology, etc., show a methodological and theoretical indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology that 
we cannot responsibly ignore. - or merely, like Gaschd, class as 'contingent'. Derrida's own call for 
critical vigilance (rigour) announces that the movement of critical return -- which is characterized by 
deconstruction as a kind of 'archaeological' praxis that subjects its field of inquiry to careful de- 
sedimentation, rather than mere bulldozing -- must, in some sense, be an 'ethical return., Just as 
Derrida has produced a variety of different strategiesfor reading, thus simultaneously delineating a 
radical form of critique, there are operative methodological elements that trace their way throughout 
deconstruction (as critique). These happen to be irreducible to Gaschd's, or even Derridals, 
thernatizations of the development of deconstructive strategy and its variety of styles. 
Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology presents us with a number of new styles of 
re-rcading. which, in their more positive sense, illuminate openings for important phenomenological 
research yet to be undertaken. However, it must also be stressed that the negative aspect of many of 
Derrida's critical evaluations of the limits of phenomenology are based on readings that are, to put it 
diplomatically, by no means exilmstive. I'licy certainly do not exclude other orientations or 
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deconstructions, further kinds of re-reading and re-writing, which actually undercut the view that 
deconstruction transgresses the 'limits' of phenomenology. 4 On most occasions, Derrida's 
characterizations of these limits cannot withstand a careful re-reading. Ultimately, Gaschd's 
contention that Derrida's theoretical roots in phenomenology are'radically contingent' simply do not 
stand up to an interrogation of the various senses of diffirance, which must take into account the 
historical-contextual background of their thematic development in his writing. Derrida has never 
really stopped inviting Husserl to dance (the diversity of their mobile forms of embrace range from 
something like the waltz through to the tango and on to breakdancing). 
To extend our examination of the theme of 'return' further, consider the Derridean concept of 
'iterability. ' Did the logics of iterability abruptly announce themselves out of thin air? One cannot 
disregard the content and thrust of Derrida's first publication, Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of 
Geometry, " in which his analysis of Husserl's concept of historicity is the site of the germination of 
the concept of 'arche-writing. ' It is here that we find the thernatization of the crucial function of 
repetition (this latter thernatization leads to the quasi-transcendental concept of 'iterability'). 
In the fifth Appendix to the Crisis ("Objectivity and the World of Experience" -- which 
immediately precedes "The Origin of Geometry"), 
5 Husserl directs his attention to the possibility of 
the 'idealizing' activities of the sciences that aim toward 'exact objectivity! He gesture's toward a 
sense of 'iteration! that must already be in play as the original opening of the expectational horizon 
that permits the possibility of such a project, when he writes, 
What arises first is- the idea of continuation which is repeatable with unconditional 
generality, with its own self-evidence, as a freely thinkable and self-evident infinity ... rather 
than finite iteration, this is iteration within the sphere of the unconditional 'again and again, ' 
of what can be renewed with ideal freedom (P. 346). 
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The importance of return-ability in the "idea of continuation which is repeatable with 
unconditional jeýierality" and the phrase "again and again" (immer wieder) is made quite explicit as 
the expression of the essential condition of the possibility of any kind of objectivation and 
idealization. Here the "idea of continuation" is provided through the retentional reserve of former 
protentional traces, where the future fulfils itself in its transmutation into the past through the play of 
the Living Present. It announces the 'anticipatory, ' or 'protentional' field of futural openness, which 
is contrasted with particular (content-laden) expectations. 
6 There is a particularly significant passage 
in Husserl's Experience and Judgement that not only expresses the important difference between 
protention and expectation, but also further contradicts Derrida's (and Gaschd's) delimitation of the 
phenomenological concept of the temporal present as the maintenance of the model of a point-like 
now. 
Husserl writes... 
... the consciousness of a concrete 
present includes in itself a consciousness of a retentional 
extension of the past .... And the 
like holds true of what is to come, namely, that to every new 
experience in the flow of lived experience there belongs a horizon of original, even if 
entirely empty, expectation, an expectation at first purely passive (protention). Thus, to the 
consciousness of a concrete present belongs not only the retentional extension of the past but, 
just as much, the protentional, although completely empty, extension of the future (Sec. 23b, 
P. 1 11). 
Without anticipation as the openness of the present upon futurity there would literally not be 
any room in which to project possibilities -- as 
determinate expectations. The present as Gegenwart 
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also means a 'waiting-towards. ' In this context waiting-towards means an anticipatory openness and 
not an expectational fixation. It is the difference between looking toward the open expanse of the 
horizon and the objects that stand-out within it. We shall see that a similar contrast is to be found 
between 'retention! and 'recollection. ' Just as before, when we addressed the meaning of the 
'phenomenon, ' we find that there is a fundamental difference between the meanings of appearance 
and appearing, which articulates itself within the very structure of retention. 
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Retention is an originary giving of the past. We do not speak only of particular retained 
objects that announce themselves as past, but of a retentional movement of giving (that involves a 
form of holding-back) as an always already pastness, which has never actually been present. This 
simultaneous movement of giving and withholding originally permits the situation of past-presents 
(that which has been retained). Retention illuminates the same as Other: as not-now. It is a 
horizonal determination, a certain kind of significational opening, which situates presence rather 
than being anything extant in itself. In the retentional deliverance of something, the content is not 
doubled, but is modified in its appearing. In other words, it is the return of the same as Other -- the 
same as given up in changing modes of illumination. However, 'retentional illumination' is not to be 
reduced to the 'retained, ' as such. 7 It is not, as we shall discover, a mere modification or 
representation of a more original presence (or present), but is itself originally constitutive of the 
unity of the retained in the temporal flux. It is the giving of pastness as that which always already 
precedes the present and present-remembering. This movement is examined in finer detail a little 
later on. 
The thernatization of repetition or returnability points to the primordial opening of the 
stretching-out of experience itself -- an originary opening in which the past and future are in a 
reflexive relation of encroachment as well as distanciation (differentiation). Husserl's earlier 
analyses on time-consciousness (which, as Derrida indicates, form the basis of Husserl's later studies 
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on the question of historicity) show that, more generally, the possibility of repetition underlies any 
possible form of experience. Our task, then, must consist in unearthing this sense of pure iteration 
and its importance for Derrida -- as iterability. But first, in order to prepare for a new orientation 
regarding the level of Derrida! s radicality in his theoretical utilization of this theme, we require a 
general outline of Gaschd's orientation on the sense of diffirance (in his engagement with Derrida's 
writing) that understates it. By means of an examination of the limitations of Gasch6's conception of 
'doubling' (and the problem of assigning such a principal role to it), it becomes clear how the logics 
of iterability and supplementarity (as they function in deconstruction) draw their sense from 
Derrida's reading of Husserl's research on time-consciousness. They actually owe much more to the 
structurality of intentionality (as reflexivity in transcendence) and the phenomenology of 'primordial 
temporalization' than either Derrida or Gaschd seem to be prepared to admit. 
14. The Problem of Gasche's Account of Infrastructural Equi- 
Primordial Heterogeneity 
Gaschd contends that "a general theory of duplication seems necessarily to underlie all the 
infrastructures" (expressed by the term diffirance) which, according to his standpoint, includes 
iterability. To support his argument, he appeals to the root iter of iterability (which means Other) as 
the basis for what, in practice, becomes a clairn for the 'meta-generality' of his theory of duplicity. 
However, what Gaschd does not consider is the question of hovi, the Other, the different, (alterity in 
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general -- Otherness) speaks out as Other. He also refers to the particle re- as another example of 
duplicity, but this time acknowledges its intrinsic sense as 'return / repetition. ' In the quotation 
below, the dual meaning of re- announces itself in the senses of 'again' and 'against, ' which are 
treated (in accordance to Gaschd's aim) as equi-primordial significations. 
The Latin particle re-, which corresponds to the English 'again' and 'against, ' properly 
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denotes a turning back (upon oneself or itself) or an opposition. Its figurative meaning 
denotes either a restoration of a thing to its original condition, a transition into an opposite 
state, or the repetition of an action. Insofar as some of the infrastructures make explicit use of 
the logic of re- by tying all or several of these meanings together, as is the case of the re- 
mark or the re-trait (but also re-presentation, re-production, restance, and so on), and others, 
such as the infrastructures of iterability and supplementarity, presuppose it, a general theory 
of duplication seems necessarily to underlie all the infrastructures. Yet duplication is not 
more original than, say, iteration, although one could show duplication to be a presupposition 
as easily as an effect of that infrastructure; rather, as I have suggested, they are 
equiprimordial. This becomes particularly obvious in those infrastructures, such as 
iterability, in which duplication and repetition are clearly tied together. Thus, although I am 
about to concentrate on doubling, I could just as easily focus on iterability, diffdrance, or re- 
marking (TM, P. 225). 
In regard to the final sentence, what 
is telling is that Gaschd does not attempt to focus on 
these alternatives. He stresses that "duplication 
is not more original than ... iteration, " but then 
comfortably settles with the idea that "they are equiprimordial. 
11 Perhaps we can take our lead from 
Gaschd (but only ironically), and point out, contrary to 
his aim, that 'again' is the root of 'again[st]. ' 
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It can also be argued with some force that the 'again' (return) is the very hinge (brisure), pivot, 
folding-joint (articulation), which binds doubles as doubles in their differentiation: that is, against 
themselves in their 'encounter! The thought of encounter and negotiation is important here for how 
else could we speak of 'contrast' or 'conflict'? Otherness must always, primarily, speak of 
returnability -- for this traces out the opening through which difference / alterity is first literally 
'articulated. ' 
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This recursive structurality is the opening through which the articulation of Otherness can 
occur. For instance, the remembrance of a past decision that has since been rejected would be the 
return of the same as Other in the return. Such a difference, if it is to stand-out and function as such, 
must first be capable of return (this theme is interrogated in more detail when we finally come to 
examine Husserl's theory of retention). This is to think return not in terms of the mere recuperation 
of an original divisive movement or doubling, but as a stretching and twisting of the same: a 
bending-back. This is still a spacing, but it is also an extending in the sense of an approach or to 
reach-out. In these terms, recuper-ability speaks of a recovery that bridges distance without 
removing it. Extension is a key term here, for it not only speaks of spacing as a stretching-out, but 
also in the temporizing sense of a postponement, a deferral. Presence is the gift of an extending: a 
restoration that gives difference through a certain delay in the presencing of presence. 
According to the logics of this orientation then, it would be consistent to argue that the 
'against' of difference, opposition, etc., is contingent on the 'again' -- or rather, againness / return- 
ability. For reasons of strategy alone, we shall continue in these terms. 
One of the main problems in Gasch6's discussion on the manifold senses of dijfjrance is that 
its various moments are thought purely in terms of 'infra-struclures' that are tied together in a 
relation of equi-primordial, but radical heterogeneity. Here, Gaschd is concerned to show that 
although their differences are such that they cannot be reduced to any of the others, through an 
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assimilative process of sublation, they are, nonetheless, involved in an open-ended relation of 
mutual referral. One of the main points of this argument is that there are irreducible differences 
between different kinds of differences -- differences that cannot be subsumed under straightforward 
discourse on 'contradiction. '8 This is the basis of Gaschd's over-development of a heterology of 
diffirance. This model of diffirance as a non-unitary matrix (arche-synthesis) of contemporaneous, 
but radically heterogeneous, infrastructures bears a striking resemblance to that which can be 
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attained through a quasi-transcendental reading of Saussure's concept of langue -- as a synchronic 
matrix of diacritical differences. As we shall discover, this is no coincidence. It is questionable, 
however, whether such an infrastructural matrix of heterogeneities could ever be more than a 
grouping of 'instituted traces. '9 If this is actually the case, their thernatization as such would not 
easily permit us to attend to what is at stake in the opening up of structure. In the same terms, the 
discourse would not easily adapt itself to the question of what is in play in the structurality of such 
an opening. These express important and interwoven differences that must be taken into account in 
any discourse on the trace / dififirance, but they resist articulation here for largely 'systematic' 
reasons. The 'play' of dififirance must, in principle, elude systematization. There is an insoluble 
problem in any attempt to impose a structural (even infra-structural) grid on the question of 
diffirance -- for this neologism must, 
in principle, always remain the name of a question. 
Of course, Gaschd would strongly argue against such a reduction of infrastructures to 
'instituted' traces, given that one of the starting points of his central thesis concerns the ways in 
which deconstruction has problematized the question of origins (and thus the distinction between the 
originary and the instituted). For example, it is the 'open referentiality' of signification (a concept 
which displaces the traditional relation between original and copy) that provides Gaschd with the 
basis for his development of a general theory of doubling. Following Derrida's theme, the double is 
not merely secondary to what, in the traditional 
logic, is said to be an original that it doubles. 
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Iterability is not exactly what one would call an 'instituted' trace -- certainly not if 'instituted' is 
thought to signify a mere 'product, ' which presupposes some kind of source that is originally 
constitutive of (thus prior to) it. To what extent is it an infrastructure? Can iterability really be tied in 
an 'equi-primordial' relation of difference with other infrastructures in the way that Gasch6 claims 
(infrastructures that he has so carefully brought together only to hold them apart)? Are these 
concepts not already limited by an orientation that de-temporalizes them? And, what about spacing 
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and temporalizing? Are these terms also to be reduced to discourse on irreducibly different, but 
equi-primordial infrastructures? Is there a truly primordial difference that separates them 
simultaneously? -- or is it rather merely a sign imposed by the divisive hand of history (yet another 
schernatization -- another grid)? In which case, would it really be appropriate to continue to speak in 
terms of their equi-primordiality? Would not their participation in history (their historicality) 
problematize such a designation? Our aim here is not strictly to polemicize against Gasch6's 
discourse on infrastructures, but, and this is a singularly Derridean strategy, to unbalance the reader 
in regard to such discourse. This is to unsettle the foundations of the discourse itself in order to 
permit what is primary and yet unspoken in Gaschd's theoretical adoption of Derrida's language to 
unearth itself. With this aim in mind, let us ask a few more questions. 
Is it really the case, as Gaschd suggests, that "a general theory of duplication seems 
necessarily to underlie all the infrastructures"? Is this a matrix in which the question of iterability 
can be adequately subsumed and then systematically articulated? Does the expression, 'underlie, ' 
carry the implicit meaning that, from a theoretical point of view, the theme of duplication is 
sufficient' for any discourse on the multiplicity of dif) .. 
Tirance? Alternatively, does it merely suggest 
that the logic of duplicity is so inescapably caught up with the other logics, which constitute the 
. 
Tirance, that it must always imply the others? Since Gaschd rejects any assumption thematic of dif 
that duplication is any more original than iteration (iteration is his example), it would seem that the 
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second option is closer to his meaning. The former suggests a unique and overarching status for the 
theory of duplicity, while the latter recapitulates the main tenets of (what I have decided to call) 
Gasch6's'equi-primordiality thesis. ' 
There is a sense in which we cannot completely discard the former implication in Gasch6's 
claim. We cannot disregard an underlying and unquestioned 'structuralist orientation' in his writing 
that privileges a certain language of duplicity at the very start. The claim that such infrastructures as 
iterability and duplicity are 'equi-primordial' is the mark of a levelling procedure that reduces them, 
by means of a structural-synchronic-conflation, to a timeless plane. 
A double-reading of the general tone and strategy of The Tain of the Mirror -- in regard to 
the attempt to uncover a geo-logy or geo-graphe of the philosophy of reflection through, the eyes of 
Derridean deconstruction -- shows an unspoken and yet operative drive on Gasch6s part to unearth a 
geo-logy or geo-graphe of diffirance. His orientation is ineradicably caught up, in a Saussurean. 
manner, within the horizon of synchrony without giving due regard to the question of how the 
synchronic can be explained, without implicitly falling back into a primitive spatial (horizontal) 
horizon: a flattened plane of equi-primordiality. Although he avoids the limitations of the language 
of co-Presence, his theory still expresses a certain linear simultaneity that does not explain the 
verticality or depth of any 'possible' horizon (when 'horizon' is not simply limited to a timeless 
horizontal abstraction). Should we not extend Gasch6's aim beyond the limits of his a temporal 
standpoint by recognizing that geo-logy and geo-graphe are names which, in speaking of earth as 
stratification and formation, etc., must equally take into account another aspect of sedimentation that 
speaks of erosion and disorganization? Is this not precisely the double-edged horizon we call time? 
Duration is the tracing out of disruption and continuity. Each element is reciprocally implicated in 
change -- where difference stands-out as difference of a 'durational order. ' A geo-logy or geo- 
graphe, however, are forms of classification that aim toward a certain kind of stasis -- to 'fix' within 
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boundaries, to map-out, etc. A cartography or topography of time, however, must surely miss its 
mark. Gaschd's treatment of the quasi-concept diffirance as a matrix of heterogeneous 
infrastructures is indicative of an orientation that is caught up within a purely synchronic horizon of 
diacritical differences (a field of equi-primordialities), which underplays the temporal aspects of the 
trace -- i. e., the function of 'delay. ' The question of deferral, for both Husserl and Derrida, is 
irreducible to this language of 'difference! It cannot be grasped within the boundaries of the concept 
of duplicity / doubling alone and, for reasons of principle, it cannot be thought in terms of the equi- 
primordial. Deferral cannot be taken into account within any kind of static / synchronous matrix 
(even if synchrony is expressed on the basis of a heterology). Deferral, in giving the 'differences' 
between appearing, appearances, and that which appears, constitutes the opening of the structural 
space of doubling. The double polarizes itself in a relation of difference with the doubled through a 
certain delay. 
Gasch6 never subjects his own starting-point to critical scrutiny and thus fails to recognize 
that such a simultaneous plane of synchrony and equi-primordiality can only be the name of a 
problem. The spacing about which Derrida speaks always expresses a certain extending / extension / 
postponement -- whose different senses are irreducible to the mere language of the 'spatial' or the Zý 
'simultaneous. ' 
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15. Temporalizing and / is Spacing 
From a linguistic point of view, spacing is often conceived, in line with Saussure's general 
notion of language as a structural field of differences, in 'horizonal' terms. However, there is another 
aspect to this sense of horizon that has undergone a kind of occultation. We shall see that this 
occultation is not accidental, since this issue refers us to the necessity of such a movement of 
'deferring' and'veiling' at the most primordial level of lived time -- which, in the most original sense, 
gives duration as such. This concerns an undercurrent tendency to assume a metonymic relation of 
complicity between horizonality and the horizontal, or worse, to treat them as symmetrical terms -- a 
situation that is exacerbated by their lexico-graphic and phonetic ties. These perspectives, which 
have become deeply sedimented and firmly habituated, trace their way throughout discourse on the 
synchronic. 
The synchronic field of language -- as langue (a matrix of diacritical differences, as opposed 
to 'positive' terms) is generally considered in terms of a horizon that knows no time itself. This is 
because it is originally supposed to permit, in a purely structural sense, continuily of meaning 
throughout the tracing of the 'successive' (temporal) unfolding of parole. In these terms, it is only 
because this synchronic fold sustains syntactical (and, at a higher level, semantical) relations 
between differences in duration (provides continuity) that the diachronic movement of parole -- the 
articulation of time and meaning -- can occur. 
But, what of the 'vertical'? Does not Derrida! s utilization of the term spacing take account, 
according to another, and equally vital orientation on the question of arche-writing, of how, on the 
other hand, synchrony is possible, or even conceivable, by considering the opening up of such 
structurality from the point of view of diachrony? Tracing, arche-writing, spacing, etc., also speak 
of the movement of sedimentation, of the vertical hollow in the horizontal. The depth is irreducible 
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to the common dyadic site of discourse on space as an 'order of co-existences' and time as an 'order 
of successions. 110 
This 'depth-movement, ' of reciprocal implication must be understood, to borrow from 
Derrida, in terms of the "formation of form" and the "being imprinted of the imprint" (OG, P. 63). It 
is through the notion of iterability (the possibility of return) that the synchronic can be understood in 
terms of the diachronic without merely subordinating all discourse on the latter to the former in an 
0 
asymmetrical relation. 
In these terms, the question of 'repeatability, ' when carefully deconstructed, permits us to 
take account of the question of 'synchrony' without getting caught up in the myth of a pre-temporal 
structural matrix that occupies an eternal present, a horizon of pure simultaneity, or Parmenidean 
Plenum. Saussure raises the theme of synchrony to a level of 'ideality' (a 'system' of co-existences 
that is independent of temporality), which provides the basis upon which time is to be understood as 
the mere 'evolution' of an already existing system. Diachrony is only ever really treated as the 
unfolding of a succession of 'empirical facts' and is thus considered 'non-essential. ' Is history, then, 
non-essential? The problem lies in Saussure's rather restricted ideas about time and history, which 
do not allow the possibility of grasping another, and perhaps more fundamental (and essential), 
sense of diachrony that is irreducible to a merely linear and emp'irical evolution. Whether this is 
purely a limitation in Saussure's thinking, or due to the way in which his ideas are represented by the 
editors of the Course in General Linguistics, is (infinitely) open to conjecture. " 
We, however, must re-think the relation between synchrony and diachrony. Husserl and 
Derrida. are our guides. As Derrida writes in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry, " 
"Neither pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history" (P. 61). We shall see how it is the 
possibility of repetition, or iterability, that permits (in theoretical terms) the thought of synchrony 
without co-presence, taking it beyond the 'horizontal' limits of a purely simultaneous (equi- 
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primordial) plane of juxtaposed differences. An extension of this orientation also unearths how the 
theme of iterability permits us to think diachrony beyond the restrictions of a purely linear and 
successive conception of time. 
One of Derrida! s main aims in the delineation of the logic of supplementarity is the 
exploration of alternatives to linear models of time, writing, trace-structure and signification. Of 
Grammatology is an exercise in the deconstruction of the linearization of writing. In accordance 
I 
with this aim Derrida refers to Jacobsorfs substitution of Saussure's notion of the temporality of the 
signifier as a'homogeneous line' with "... the structure of the musical staff, 'the chord in music... (OG, 
P. 72). 
Derrida writes, 
What is in question here is not Saussure's affirmation of the temporal essence of discourse 
but the concept of time that guides this affirmation and analysis: time conceived as linear 
successivity, as 'consecutivity. ' This model works by itself and all through the Course ... (Ibid, 
P. 72). 
In this model, time is thought merely in terms of a linear 'order of succession. ' The linear 
limits of this, according to Derrida, also play themselves out in the concept of simultaneity. 
Simultaneity co-ordinates two absolute presents, two points or instants of presence, and it 
remains a linearist concept (Ibid, P. 85). 12 
We should bear this last point in mind, for the complicity shared by the concepts of 
simultaneity and equi-primordiality cannot be ignored. Without further elaborating on the question 
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of linearity at this point, however, the one general theoretical disjunction that plays itself out in 
Saussure is a pre-phenomenological presupposition that maintains strict distinctions between 
simultaneity and succession, system and becoming, and spatiality and temporality. 
The logic of iterability primarily allows us to stand outside the traditional constitutional dyad 
in which the diachronic is set in opposition to the synchronic. We are referred to 'spaced-out-time' 
and the 'between-time-of-space' as intertwined moments of an opening that precedes the classical 
0 
distinction between space and time -- the becoming-time-of-space and the becoming-space-of-time: 
an 'opening-up' which, in a certain sense, speaks of chiasm -- the Ineinander of the horizontal and 
the vertical of any possible horizon. 
When tied to the thought of infrastructural equi-primordiality, the language of doubling 
expresses a 'horizontal' logic that permits us to speak of a kind of 'contemporaneous' play (of 
contrast) between a multiplicity of doubles. These doubles do not merely spring from an 'earlier' 
presence. They are said to originarily constitute the possibility of presence. 
However, the theory of duplicity cannot immediately account for the 'vertical' dimension of 
its unfolding -- which must already be in play within itself. The general structure of duplicity alone, 
as delineated by Gasch6, could never give 'duration. ' It is in Derrida's thernatization of the tracing of 
'iterability, ' that we find the themes of differentiation and doubling re-located according to a 
temporal (and thus vertical) orientation. This re-situation is a profound expression of the idea that 
differentiation as doubling (a gerund whose verbal aspect, like all verbs, expresses time) can not be 
grasped sufficiently within the limits of a 'non-temporal' (simultaneous / synchronic / equi- 
primordial) plane of differences. 
The Derridean concept of iterabilitY refers us to the movement of repetition that, for Husserl, 
permits the possibility of difference as duration through which the Living Present is 'stretched' 
within itself. There is no corpuscular present except that captured in 'spatial' tropes (e. g., 
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simultaneity, co-existence, co-presence, etc. ), which have already forgotten the intimacy that is 
shared, in the most originary sense, by space and time. Iterability speaks of temporal-spacing / 
spatio-temporizing -- and is that which allows any double or difference to do its work. 
For Derrida, iterability names that which permits synchiony in a discourse that takes into 
account the vital question of 'duration' or 'interval': an extending that implicates both simultaneity 
and succession; the spacing of change, as the playing out of sameness and difference; a tracing of 
unity and fragmentation. Gasch6s account of doubling (duplicity), as indicated above, does not 
immediately convey anything other than differentiation of a 'contemporaneous' order. But, what 
about the kind of differentiation that announces itself through duration, the temporal unfolding of 
differences? In the most mundane terms, let us say, I would not consider myself as a 'double of that 
(myself) which sat here five minutes ago, ' but the very same, only now rather than then -- extended 
or spaced-out through time. The difference between now and then is also not a question of doubling, 
but one of a certain kind of 'delay. ' This delay produces a space: a spacing. For Gaschd, spacing 
seems to speak, principally, of the divisive movement of doubling -- the unfolding of difference 
through which identity and meaning crystallizes -- an internal differentiation through which ideality 
(ideal identity) stands out from what it is not. However, spacing designates more than a 
'contemporaneous' differentiality - that is suggested by such logical forms as P is not S, or P is such 
that it is also not-not P. In order for something to stand out from what it is not, time is always 
implied -- in terms of the duration throughout which something passes over into what it is-not and 
was-not (this is the temporal horizon of the logical forms above). Duration indicates the vertical 
hollow in any possible identity as a spacing / extending through which identity has its depth -- and is 
filled out. 
It is to be granted that Gasch6's re-working of the sense of difference, which re-capitulates 
the synchronic [horizontal] dimension of differences in Saussurcan linguistics, allows him to avoid 
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the allegation that doubling (as he articulates it) is merely the expression of a language of co- 
presence. However, his analyses fail to gesture toward the more radical significance of its 
transformation in Derrida! s thought with any real degree of adequacy. Although Saussure's 
characterization of the synchronic dimension of language emphasizes that identity is originarily 
constituted through differences (i. e., such relations, without more original- positive terms, are 
irreducible to discourse on primary units of meaning, or the more mundane sense of presence, as the 
0 
visible) the temporal horizon of language is largely consigned to the mere characterization of the 
successive movement of parole. We cannot disregard the very recognizable disjunction in play here 
that re-plays the traditional dyadic opposition between space and time. Saussure formally articulates 
this bi-polarity in terms of the distinction between static linguistics and evolutionary linguistics. 
Saussure writes, 
Everything is synchronic which relates to the static aspect of our science, and diachronic 
everything which concerns evolution. Likewise synchrony and diachrony will designate 
respectively a linguistic state and a phase of evolution (Course in General Linguistics, [117- 
118] P. 81). 
Saussure then goes on to stress that 
The contrast between the two points of view -- synchronic and diachronic -- is absolute and 
admits no compromise (Ibid, [119-120] P. 83). 
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The 'absolute' space that constitutes the dyadic relation between synchrony and diachrony in 
Saussurean linguistics continues a traditional thetic and methodological distinction that interferes 
with the'theoretical space' concerning its subject-matter. Such a'contrast, ' that is said to be 'absolute 
and admits no compromise, ' refers us to a strategic decision regarding route of entry we which, in a 
sense, must first disentangle its field of interrogation in order to allow it to express its internal unity 
(e. g., in the sense in which one might unravel a mystery, or interrogate the essence of something 
0 
through the application of a form of eidetic reduction). The division between static linguistics and 
evolutionary linguistics rests, on the one hand, on a desire to disclose how language is in motion 
within itself (writing itself, as Derrida might say), and on the other, how there is continuity through 
such change. However, both orientations express 'idealized' points of departure that repeat the 
classic distinction between the temporal and non-temporal and, in more general terms, the 
successive and the simultaneous. This translates, according to the inherited logics of Saussure's 
linguistic schema, as the 'essential' form of the opposition between the temporal and spatial. Here is 
the unrevised source that seriously limits Saussure's project in that it expresses what Derrida, after 
Heidegger, calls a "vulgar concept of time" (OG, P. 72) -- where writing, as an expression of 
temporality, is thought in terms of mere linear successivity, and situated outside language as 
something that is secondary to it. 13 
In Husserl's phenomenology, however, what Saussure would call'states' cannot be divorced 
from considerations on temporality, and 'evolutionary phases' always express structurality (or 
continuity through difference -- which, in a certain sense, still speaks of 'states'). Husserl carefully 
shows that simultaneity is inextricably intertwined with succession and that they do not spring from 
two different sources. 14 The question of succession is never treated as a secondary issue to 
considerations on simultaneity for this intertwining does not share the 'particular' asymmetry of 
Saussure's synchronic / diachronic relation. 
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Husserl's phenomenological orientation, which brackets objective (cosmological) theories on 
space and time, discloses that the question of the 'unfolding' of spatiality and temporality indicates a 
dimension in which they are intertwined in an originary way. They are not con conjoined as two 
distinct (heterogeneous) horizons that have 'fortuitously' (and equi-primordially) entered into 
relation. They are articulations of the originary opening up of relation itself. This opening is 
precisely 'flux. ' The relevance of this transition for Derrida's own writing is immense. When 
11 
questioning the basis of Saussure's assignment of "... writing to the outer darkness of language" (OG, 
P. 45), he discloses that his "... quarry is not primarily Ferdinand de Saussure's intention or 
motivation, but rather the entire uncritical tradition which he inherits" (Ibid, P. 46). Clearly, this 
inheritance has still not been fully spent. 
In Derrida's development of the theme of arche-writing we find a shift from the dyad 'outside 
and inside' to a horizon where the 'outside is the inside. ' We are introduced to writing as the outside 
of the inside -- the exteriority within the 
interiority of language. This means that they are not to be 
thought as two distinct fields, where the former is merely an external 'addition' to the latter -- a 
'supplement' in the classical sense: as in the outside and the inside. It is important to remember how 
Derrida likes to play with the French homophonic complicity between the supplement'and' and the 
copula 'is' -- et and est. It also serves as a rather powerful metaphorical device for overturning the 
classical hierarchy at work in the conception of 'language as speech' and writing, where speech is the 
expression of the primary interiority as distinct from the exteriority and secondariness of writing. 
The difference in meaning (like the 'a' in diffirance) is only apparent in writing. The difference is 
given more 'originally' through the graphic rather than the phonic sign. 
15 
The relation of alterity signified by the 'and' is also that which permits the 'is' of identity, 
unity, individuation, entities, beings, meanings, etc., 
in that it is the Iracing out of their structurality 
and the ways in which they stand out. Derrida! s concept of arche-writing designates the structurality 
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of supplementarity through which language writes itself. Language as speech is a kind of writing. 
The outside is the inside. 
In the case of space and time, according to the same logics, the former is not merely an 
'external' addition to some kind of hermetically sealed 'internal' time (and vice versa). Addition here 
speaks only of the 'effect' of return -- of returnability -- of the originary Ineinander of spatiality and 
temporality. The unlocatable difference between the spatial and the temporal, within the dimension 
0 
of this orientation, is best expressed through the 'essential' ambivalence of spatial and temporal 
metaphors. If they are interrogated in terms of the structure of such ambiguity, this prohibits their 
restriction to the either / or limitations of the principle of contradiction. This original ambivalence 
and ambiguity is celebrated by Derrida and raised to the level of a theme. Following Husserl (17ux), 
Heidegger (time-space), Merleau-Ponty (chiasm), the hyper-transcendental orientation of Derrida's 
writing -- as expressed by his discourse on diffirance -- shows that spacing is temporalizing and 
temporalizing is spacing. 
Langue, as the synchronic itself, should not be reduced to a kind of a temporal or non- 
temporal plenum. It already implicates its temporality with the theme of repeatability (as the 
condition of any possible 'contrast'). This points to the possibility of the polarization, and thus 
extension, of structure and meaning throughout the fleeting moments of articulation (parole) which 
continually pass away into the past (and which also, in an important sense, extend, in an 
evolutionary manner, into the 'not-yet'). Which is to say that there is a kind of writing, tracing, 
temporizing or re-marking that is always already behind and ahead of language as system -- and, as 
such, it is irreducible to the dyadic plane of Saussurean linguistics and its particular hierarchical 
structure. 
Here, the diachronic cannot be reduced to a 'successiotV of facts -- where phonetic and 
orthographic changes occur, but without radically affecting the 'system' as a whole'. Saussure's 
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"... definition of a language assumes that we disregard everything which does not belong to its 
structure as a system; in short everything that is designated by the term 'external linguistics"' 
(Course, P. 21 [40]). However, when he goes on to say that... "Everything is internal which alters the 
system in any degree whatsoever" (Ibid, P. 23 [43]), by acknowledging that diachrony does play a 
role in affecting the system in minor ways over extended periods of time, the diachronic (which, 
from Saussure's point of view would translate as time in general) still has a hard time fighting off its 
I 
expulsion into a field that is designated, along with 'writing, ' as exterior to language. This is because 
everything is thought purely in terms of the alteration of a pre-existing system. However, diachrony 
cannot be a merely secondary and non-essential feature of language (as Saussure already knows and 
indicates, albeit inadequately) -- certainly not if the 'opening-up' of structurality is to be taken into 
account. Discourse on diachrony should not be a reduction to 'evolutionary linguistics' in such terms 
that 'evolution' only comes to express an 'empirical' phase in an order of succession. There is also a 
fundamental pre-empirical sense in which it functions as a condition of the possibility of language 
(and is important to any consideration of the 'unmotivatedness' of the relation between signal and 
signification). 
We shall see how the spacing-out of the 'depth' of differentiation and continuity that is 
integral to 'any' system of language (as a matrix of contrasting signs) brings us back to the thought of 
'flux. ' Not only does it originally problematize the question of synchrony and its related signification 
in the language of simultaneity, it also actually explains it. Derrida takes into account the possibility 
of idealityfrom, what we might call, a diachronic point of view (but this is not diachrony in the mere 
form of a linear and empirical evolution). By working through an analysis of the function of 
repetition and arriving at the theme of repeat-abilily, his writing displaces the concept of langue as a 
synchronous field of differences from the privileged position to which it has been assigned by 
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Saussure. By implication, he also anticipates and undermines this operative, though unthernatized, 
prejudice at work in Gaschd's approach to diffirance. 
Gasch6's delineation of dififirance as an infrastructural matrix of 'incommensurable, 
differences (heterogeneities) does not give enough emphasis to the importance of the 'ways' in which 
the differing moments of this plurality overlap. When he does, such overlapping, as we have seen, is 
merely discussed in the manner of a matrix of equi-primordial diacritical differences which, in a 
very crucial sense, refuses time. Is it not vital that we should consider this overlapping from the 
'deferring' (temporizing / temporalizing) point of view of diffirance -- the temporalizing dynamics 
that permit different kinds of differences to stand-out in depth -- where depth signifies a certain 
sedimented / historical interwovenness: 'relations' of a temporal contexture? By further developing 
the theme of overlapping (according to the demands of a historical analysis of the theoretical 
movement of the thought of the trace as arche-tracing / writing), we would do well to bear in mind 
that Derrida has written a great deal about Husserl's own development of this line of thinking (i. e., 
Husserl's analyses on the primordial movement of temporal ization) in the concepts of retention and 
protention (and their interplay), sedimentation, habitus, and the theme of historicity. 
The issue of interwovenness here is vital in establishing the context of the theoretical 
. relations between Husserl and Derrida. We need to remember that the Latin expression contexere, 
from which the word context is derived, literally means to weave a fabric (con, together; texere, to 
weave, braid). The con also forms the middle part of de-con-struction (which serves to differentiate 
Derrida's project from that of Heidegger's task of de-struktion). 
The overlapping or interwovenness of which Husserl and Derrida speak must be understood 
in reference to temporality (flux -- temporal unfolding and sedimentation), and not from the 
standpoint of what, in Gaschd's Tain of the Mirror, is essentially a simultaneous plane of orientation 
. 
Tirance. on the infrastructural plurality of dV 
16 
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A phenomenological-temporal orientation on Derrida! s approach to the question of 
temporality reveals a radicality that is suppressed by the limits of Gasch6's understanding of time 
and his treatment of the theme of reflexivity in Husserl's phenomenology. Derrida's insights extend 
Husserl's thought of reflexivity as constituted through deferral. In accordance with this orientation 
then, we do not so much completely disregard the differences in character of the various moments of 
dififirance, throughout our examination of the theme of temporality in Derrida! s writing, but turn 
0 
toward the thought of the structure[s] (or infrastructure [s]) of this plurality in terms of intertwining 
or chiasm. This interweaving and extending is more primordial than the differences between 
spatiality and temporality, when these terms are understood according to their traditional and 
dualistic significations, as the opening-up of their play: as temporalizing and spacing, where the 
'and' also functions as an 'is. ' This is the logic of supplementarity as it is applied to temporalizing 
and spacing. 
These issues mark out the place where the related questions of overlapping and 
sedimentation begin to reveal their intimate connection to the question of history, or rather, that 
which is uncovered, at a transcendental-phenomenological level -- the horizon of historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit). The first step, however, requires a further examination of the structuralizing 
dynamics of primordial temporalization (as originally delineated by Husserl in The Phenomenology 
ofInternal Time Consciousness), where we can attend to the question of the relatedness of the issues 
of deferral and return in more detail. It is necessary to work through the various senses of the 'double 
intentionality' of retention, and the intertwining of retention and protention, in terms of the unfolding 
of repetition, in order to explore the logics of iterability. The importance of this concept for 
Derrida's delineation of the structure of the trace must not be underestimated. This is an exemplary 
route for showing precisely why Gasch6's purely 'structural' analyses forget time in the privileging 
of the issue of duplicity. 
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16. Iterability, Supplementarity, and the Tracing of the Retentional 
and Protentional Intentionalities of Primordial Temporalization 
It is according to a transcendental-phenomenological attitude, explored so carefully by 
Husserl, that the questions of duration and the possibility of successivity and contemporaneity find 
themselves addressed in terms of the possibility of returnability. In deconstruction, this theme is 
taken to its limits with the notion of iterability, which serves as the basis for Derrida's radicalization 
of the concept of the supplement: supplementarity. In contradistinction to Gasch6, we shall see (with 
some theoretical corroboration from Derrida), that 'doubling' 'is not strictly equiprimordial with 
'iterability. ' Although one can argue that there is, to a certain extent, a chiasmic relation in which 
they are interwoven, it is far from being clear that it is of a symmetrical order. From a functional 
perspective, doubling is a movement that first finds its sense in iterability as one possible way of 
explaining it, but this, in itself, constitutes a certain movement of return in that doubles, in order to 
function, must be able to stand out against themselves. This already presupposes returnability as the 
horizon of their possibility. 
The essentially structuralist character of Gaschd's general analysis of diffirance tends, as 
indicated above, to conceal the crucial temporal and vertical dimensions of this matrix. This is of 
course the danger in any project of generalization, since the movement itself is one that, in principle 
and by virtue of its operation, de-temporalizes that which it subjects to classification. Gaschd is quite 
clear in his emphasis on the essentially non-totalizable character of the horizon indicated by the 
neologism diffirance. However, his account of its key 
infrastructural moments falls short of an 
adequate establishment of Derrida's theoretical and methodological resources throughout his 
7 
'adumbration' of the various aspects of diffirance. 
1 Gasch6 misses a fundamental transcendental- 
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phenomenological motif -- or question -- at work from a theoretical point of view, and in play, from 
the point of view of the possibility of its motivation and articulation through which the theme of 
diffirance finds its philosophical resonances. Gaschd is careful to show that dififirance is not an 
ultimate resolution of contradiction in the manner of the Hegelian Aujhebung. Equally, diffirance, 
as a differing and deferring, synthesizing and dispersing, spatializing and temporalizing, contingent 
and necessary, passive and active matrix, cannot be situated within the boundaries of the classic 
dualistic logics of Western metaphysics. Diffirance (as the originary 'non-origin' of the tracing of 
any possible kind of presence and the condition of the possibility of the polarization of all the above 
mentioned dyads) is positioned, in a very 'loose' and 'elusive' sense, between these dualities. 
However, for Derrida, betweenness in this context is irreducible to an a temporal spatial model (i. e., 
the language of equi-primordialities), it rather speaks of becoming or the possibility of the becoming 
of these dualities: the movement of delay / postponement, the hollowing out of a reserve, a 
sedimented reservoir of depth. There are differences here that Gasch6's form of discourse cannot 
adequately take into account. 
In this 'temporalizing' sense, diffirance -- as that opening and closing that 'produces' or 
'articulates' presence and absence -- names that which is essentially non-situated (u-topos). It is no- 
place precisely because, on the one hand, the very structurality of the trace is one of self-erasure, and 
on the other, as the pure possibility of repetition, the articulation of any kind of presence indicates 
that it has always already happened. This signifies the pure absence of an origin. It is the already- 
has-beenness of the tracing of dififýrance, without it ever having-been-present, that is the hinge of 
this critique of Gasch6's thesis on the movement of doubling at work in supplementarity. By 
carefully working through this issue, we can see precisely why it is misleading to suggest, as Gaschd 
does, that 'duplicity' is equi-primordial with 'iterability. ' The pure structurality of repetition -- 
iterability -- plays a far more critical role in Derrida's discourse and, from a theoretical point of 
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view, it expresses a more primordial field than that which is delineated within the Gasch6an general 
theory of doubling. 
The logics of iterability (in temporal terms) emerge from Derrida's reading of Husserl's 
lectures on time-consciousness and the peculiar sense of deferral / delay in play in the form of return 
that is announced by the 'double intentionality' of retention and the transversal interplay between 
retention and protention. Neither of these forms can be reduced to a mere relation of doubling in the 
I 
Gaschdan sense. The temporal dimension that is opened regarding the trace as differing / deferring 
return propels Derrida away from the Saussurean synchronic / diachronic divide that is still, to some 
extent, operative in Gasch6's theorizing. 
For Husserl, the primordial transversal interplay of retention and protention is an originary 
intertwining, which is precisely the articulation, extending, or unfolding of return. These 
intentionalities are differentiated within themselves -- e. g., retention is a double intentionality 
because of its intrinsic relation to protention in that it not only retains but, in doing so, it also gives a 
certain evidence of surpassing. In other words (to recapitulate), retention retains that which is no- 
longer now precisely as that which is no-longer noW. 
18 Surpassing is the other face of a movement 
of delay. 
It is precisely because of the intertwining of retention and protention, which traces out the 
movement of primordial temporalization, that retention is doubled within itself However, the very 
sense of the double is intrinsically defined here in terms of the reflexivity of intentionality itself -- 
which cannot be reduced to the Gasch6an language of 'doubling. ' Each intentionality is not strictly a 
repetition of the other. it is not a case of a double repetition, but two moments of one repetition that 
in itself is the repetition of a continuum. It is a matter of the unfolding of the relation between the 
vertical and horizontal -- the horizon and that which 
is spaced-out within it. A unity of duration is 
not produced through a sequence of doubles or mirrorings, but through a delay in the manner in 
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which the same presences -- which is to say, through a deferment that opens up duration and the 
continuous modification of presence. It gives alteration in the return to the same. Whatever 'the 
same' may be lies outside our immediate concern. What is important is that it is not 'doubled' as 
such, but is the same stretched-out. That which is passes over into that which was. What is different 
is the temporal context in which it appears -- which gives the return of the same as Other in the 
same. The alterity of which we speak is precisely the appearing of duration / extension / interval in 
which the 'evidence of surpassing' is constituted by a certain delay. Retentional and protentional 
play is an originary unity or intertwining of transgression and recuperation; the spacing of a 
transcending movement of return: the tracing of the structure of a repetition that transforms. 
It seems, then, that iterability, as the pure structurality of an altering return, refers us to that 
'pivotal' condition of possibility that first defines the spacing of supplementarity and doubling. It is 
above all necessary to understand that, for Husserl, the primordial flux is not a continuum of 
objectivities -- retained doubles of doubles. It 
is rather a continuum of continua -- retentions of 
changing temporal orientations. 
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17. Duration, the Double Intentionality of Retention, and the Tracing 
of Deferral 
It is significant that although Gasch6 goes to great pains to articulate the heterogeneity of the 
matrix diffirance (a non-unitary arche-synthesis of radically heterogeneous infra-structures), his 
structural-linguistic-graphic analysis of this horizon 
ýlso tends to conceal, at another level, 
differences between different kinds of differences or differential marks. The meta-general level to 
which the question of representation is raised, as an integral moment of the critique of the 'language 
of presence, ' can obscure vital and related differences. This is also true, in many instances, for 
Deffida. There are times when discourse on the questions of repetition, reflexivity and 
representation must ultimately suffer through such obscuration (this is certainly the case with the 
crucial distinction between apodictic evidence and that which is classed as adequate). Most 
significantly, we find a fundamental difficulty in disentangling the important differences between 
retention and secondary remembrance that are disclosed in Husserl's research on time consciousness. 
Both forms of remembrance are modes of re-presentation, but the former is also to be understood as 
presentation, since it is an originary giving of -the past. However, the latter is a form of 
presentification (or secondary presentation / reproduction) permitted by retention, which is able to 
work upon that which is more originally given up to it. 
19 The openness of retention and protention is 
to be contrasted with the object-related (finite) character of recollection and expectation. The 
reflexivity of which the first speaks has a pre-objective dimension, whereas the second is a reflexive 
movement of objectivation. 
20 The first movement is the passivity that operates at the heart of the 
activity of the second. Husserl gives us a subtle, but powerful distinction between the reflexive 
i ntentional i ties of temporalizing consciousness as the a priori condition of any possible experience 
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and the objectivating acts of reflection through which consciousness can, secondarily, objectify 
itself. According to his phenomenological studies on time consciousness, "It is thanks to 
retention ... that consciousness can be made an Object" (PITC, Appendix IX, P. 161). It 
is vital to be 
clear at this point that retention is not a form of intentionality that can be reduced to the level of an 
'act. ' According to Husserl, 
0- 
Retention itself is not an 'act' (i. e., an immanent unity of duration constituted in a series of 
retentional phases) but a momentary consciousness of the phase which has expired and, at 
the same time, a foundation for the retentional consciousness of the next phase (Ibid). 
Furthermore, the retentional running-off of consciousness is not to be confused with acts that 
pass-off into a flow of image-objects or doubles, which are representations of representations of 
representations, etc. -- a movement that would produce a kind of infinite regress. Retentions are not 
discrete / distinct objects or points that are adjacent to one another along such a continuum. They 
embody the continuum of retentional modifications within *themselves. This is to be understood in 
relation to what Husserl refers to as a movement of sinking-down (Herabsinken - which is 
represented as a diagonal line moving downwards from the present to the past).. Thus, we have the 
tracing out of the vertical of experience. 
Retentions embody depth in that they bear former retentions within themselves. Retention is 
indeed a retention of a retention and so on, but the structurality of this flux is not ultimately 
reducible to an 'objective' order of successions. This retentional repetition (in its intertwining with 
protention) is that which originarily constitutes the 'space' of succession -- it gives 'duration' through 
a holding-back (here, the it gives expresses a similar sense to Heidegger's use of the term es gibt in 
the essay "Time and Being"). Such an extending (stretching and postponinig) movement of return 
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does not actually negate the possibility of the presence of evidence, certainty, continuity (the 
experience of the marriage of sameness and difference: change), meaning-fulfilment, etc., as if it 
perpetually deferred every kind of intentional fulfilment -- as would be the case with a linear 
continuum of purely 'objective' repetitions that remained separated from (external to) one another. 
The form of the directedness of the interwoven patterns of intentional relations -- the outside-itself 
structure of all intentionalities -- produces the 'field' in which fulfilment of any kind can originally 
0 
take place. At the heart of this transitivity, we find certain forces of deferral, which actually 
constitute the self-fulfilling function of intentional directedness. Here, the terms intentionality and 
directedness are interchangeable. If different moments are to register as different times in relation- 
to-one- another, then a certain structure of delay must be at work in-the-relation without annihilating 
the relation itself Obviously, delay also functions as relation. The holding-back constitutes the 
opening through which the consciousness of succession is possible. 
The sense of Husserl's concept of primal apprehension is to be found within this deep 
transcendental context (which is tied so intimately to the issue of temporalization). It is certainly not 
to be confused with a higher-order psychological impression of an imagistic character that would 
require a further act of apprehension of the act itself in order for perception to occur. This would 
give rise to the necessity of a yet another act, which would need to apprehend the second, and so on, 
indefinitely. 21 Certainly, in order that we can speak of consciousness as consciousness qf something 
in the first place, there must be some kind of articulation of the differences between the 'intending' 
and the 'intended' -- otherwise, how could we speak of the preposition oy? Each act carries this 
difference within itself, not as a mirroring or doubling Of itself and its content, but as a sense- 
directed (transitive) relation that is immanent-in-relation to itself as c, transcending movement 
toward something Other. This immanence of consciousness to itself, through the detour of alterity, 
is the effect of the reflexive unity of duration of the intending itself -- which is pre-objective. The 
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difference is announced in primal apprehension through the articulated play / play of articulation 
between modalities of appearing and that which appears. 
Each consciousness then, does not rely on a further objectivating act in order to function. 
Intentional consciousness, as a 'flow of becoming, ' carries this reflexivity within itself, in principle, 
by virtue of the flux of primordial temporalization that constitutes each act as a 'unity of duration' -- 
an immanently-transcending bending-back-of-a-retum. The following diagram is probably the most I 
famous illustration of this transcending and / is recuperative structural-movement of the 
intentionality of consciousness. 22 
17; ey 1 
> 
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At the level at which Derrida and Gaschd discuss reflexivity, repetition, and representation, it 
often becomes difficult to account for different modes of the inter-relationship between immanence 
and transcendence. As already indicated, Derrida's orientation in Sjmech and Phenomena does not 
adequately distinguish between different senses of presence (appearing / appearance) and the present 
(in temporal terms) and thus cannot account for how absence can still, in a certain sense, be 
immanent. Once again, this is a symptom of his application of Heideager's thesis that ID Being as 
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presence (ousia and parousia) has always been thought in relation to the temporal sense of the 
present as now (although Heidegger does not restrict the form of the now to a point). In Derrida's 
account, Anwesenheit and Gegenwart become almost indistinguishable. 
There are also other significational differences of a subtle kind that are even more elusive 
and yet which are fundamental to any discussion on the functioning of signs. This brings us to the 
theme of the double intentionality of retention, as adumbrated by Husserl in the lectures on time -- a 
0 
discourse that has clearly (and profoundly) influenced Derrida's thernatization of the crucial sense of 
dififirance as deferral. 
The retentional. shading-off, through which lived-experience is stretched out, comprises both 
the language of appearances and the language of appearing in the unfolding of experience through 
the extending / spacing of primordial temporalization. This involves a transformational movement of 
return that originarily gives duration. It is their originary intertwining (as opposed to disjunction) 
that gives the most fundamental differences. The theme of the double-intentionality of retention 
responds to some extremely compelling questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of 
lived time consciousness. It may be understood in the following terms: 
I. Inscription, carving, marking, writing, tracing = the retention qf that which is no-longer --> a 
retaining that is the condition of the possibility of an appearance as a unity of duration: the being- 
inscribed of the inscription. We might, but only very loosely, speak of this aspect of retention as a 
kind of doubling. However, this movement of inscription is actually auxiliary to that second aspect 
of retention which originarily constitutes positional differentiation of a temporal order. An inscribed 
moment must be capable of being delivered up in relation to other temporal positions -- and this 
means that the relations of difference must somehow be able to give themselves within a single 
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grasp. There is a differential 'style' that has to be taken into account that permits the simultaneous 
interpenetration and standing-out of different moments without removing their temporal differences. 
2. The spacing-out of the mark as re-marking in a specific modal form of appearing --> the 
'manner' or 'style' in which the mark (retention) articulates itself = the retention of that which is no- 
longer precisely as that which is no longer. This is the mode of appearing of that which is given in 
relation to other moments of the past. The retained mark must have the 'character' of a retained mark 
(and it must also distinguish itself from other retained marks). It is a deferred presentation; a 
presence that is Other to the present; a presence in the present that is not of the present, in the sense 
in which it falls short of the present -- otherwise it could do no more than appear 'as-now. ' In that 
case, there would not be 'temporal duration / succession, ' but only an eternal present in which all 
was given, as Husserl says, Zugleich (all-at-once). However, there is also another kind of all-at-once 
that is not equal to the lack of the appearing of succession. The very meaning of temporal horizon 
involves a kind of spatialization through which different temporal positions can be given 
simultaneously without eradicating their relative temporal signatures. Any event that gives itself 
must be more than the sum of a singular temporal modality. The event as-it-gives-itself in the Living 
Present is always made up of fringes of the before and after. The second intentionality of which we 
speak, holds together different moments together within a single grasp (a horizontal orientation), 
without nullifying their differences since the other face of this giving is a certain 'holding-back. ' 
This is precisely the twofold relation necessary for the constitution of any horizon and the 
process of sedimentation. It is an intertwining of proximity and distance, a fold that is an unfolding 
of depth. In a way, one could say that a horizon is everywhere (given in a single grasp) and yet it 
recedes. Like a gestalt, this temporal horizon is the contextualizing structure (or connective tissue) 
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that binds different moments together, while simultaneously holding them apart. So here we find 
that the all-at-once does not necessarily mean non-time, but a manner in which time, in its 
unfolding, folds in on itself (like the instantaneity of all spatial points in a hologram). The second 
intentionality of retention is constitutive of the 'unity' of the appearing of that which appears in the 
flux (an unfolding of changing temporal modalities of the same) in that it gives a certain temporal 
difference. It is a stretching-out of duration itself (without restricting the actual appearing to a purely 
discrete appearance that is given in a sequence of successions). There is a kind of presentative scan 
(not re-presentation) of that which is no longer present, where the latter can be anything from a 
particular moment to a sedimented multiplicity. 
Taken together, these forms of intentionality (along with protention as negotiated through 
primal impression) constitute the consciousness of the 'passing-over' of that which was now into that 
which is not-now. Retention does not merely present a temporal object as 'give' a certain interval -- a 
spacing, through which it is stretched out. In section 39 of The Phenomenology of Internal Time 
Consciousness (The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flux of 
Consciousness), Husserl shows how the 'duration' of a sound is articulated as such, when he writes, 
Every shading off of consciousness which is of the 'retentional' kind has a double 
intentionality: one is auxiliary to the constitution of the immanent Object, of the sound. This 
is what we term 'primary remembrance' of the sound just sensed, or more plainly just 
retention of the sound. The other is that which is constitutive of the unity of this primary 
remembrance in the flux. That is, retention is at one with this, that it is. furiher-consciousness 
[Noch-Bewusstsein]; it is that which holds back, in short, it is precisely retention, retention of 
the tonal retention which has passed. In its continuous shading-off in the flux, it is 
continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases (Sec. 3 9, P. 106-7) 
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-ý.. _ In sum, the twofold intentionality of retention gives us a certain movement of reciprocal 
implication: retention of that which is no longer present. This speaks of the logic of appearance -- 
and is auxiliary to the deferring / holding-back which constitutes it as one moment of a 'unity of 
duration. ' With this, we also have the retention of the retentional 'orientation' through which that 
which is no longer present is 'given' precisely as that which is no longer present. This speaks of the 
I 
logic of appearing: the structurality and modality of the given in its givenness, that aspect of 
presencing that gives duration through a certain kind of deferral of presence, or more precisely, the 
deferral of a certain 'mode' of presence, e. g., that of nowness. 
These forms of intentionality express an essential intertwining of absence and presence. 
Within this movement of delayed return, we already find a reference to protention in that the 
articulation of 'pastness' implies a certain evidence ofsurpassing -- a" further-consciousness ... which 
holds back. to23 The relation between these two forms of intentionality is that which can be said to 
obtain between a profile and the constitutive profiling of the profile, the maintained and the 
maintaining of the maintained, or the imprint and (to borrow from Derrida once again) the 'being- 
imprinted of the imprint. ' The unfolding of their relation speaks of the complicity of time and 
alterity -- or more specifically, continuity: as the complicity of alterity and sameness in time. 
Continuity speaks of a certain difference in similarity, the same as Other, where the same does not 
equal the identical in terms of the 'modality' of its givenness. Thus, we find the maintenance of the 
intentional object, content -- which is inscribed as Other / not-now and the primary constitutive 
unfolding of the modalities of its maintenance, context-ualization: 'depth. ' This temporalizing / 
temporizing (deferring) is that which produces the duration / space in which the first can announce 
itself as Other. The flux is not reducible to a continuum of objective moments that are retained, for 
it is primarily a retaining of the retaining -- continua of continua. The movement of deferral that is in 
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play here gives us a kind of spacing in that it is a retentional dynamic that permits forms of 
stretching-out and sinking-down. Retention is the intertwining of the horizontal and the vertical. 24 
Retentions retain retentions in a manner that spaces them out -- gives depth. 
This distanciating interplay gives duration through a movement of sedimentation (a reserve 
reserving, which pre-serves; a reservation; a reservoir), which is precisely the opening up of 
temporality and spatiality: temporal-spacing as deferring return -- a deferring that gives difference 
by spacing-it-out. According to this orientation, spacing and temporalizing are intertwined in an 
originary way. They intrinsically implicate repetition as the expression of both the possibility of the 
announcement of difference, its nullification, and the bringing-together of differences within a 
horizon of belonging. They do this because they speak, principally, of the more primordial 
possibility of return as the pivot of the originary opening-up of an interplay between changing 
temporal modes of orientation and that which is given through the flux of Ablaufsphdnomene. This 
intertwined parallelism produces the space constitutive of the articulated tension between difference 
and sameness, absence and presence, transcendence and immanence, transgression and recuperation, 
etc. Such an opening is also a kind of closure. It is the originary opening and closing of difference 
precisely, because it is the hinge (folding-joint) that permits differences to mark themselves out 
through their return upon themselves as differences. 
Retention is a 'pivotal' signification for Derrida in that it speaks of the functioning -- spacing 
-- of difference in temporizing terms: as altering 
delay and repetition. The movement of retention is 
the manner in which time spaces itself -- that 
is, retention is a returning, which gives temporal 
stretch and depth. It unfolds duration through the continuous retention of the retentional orientation 
of that which is retained. This effectively produces a 
deferring of the retained in relation to itself 
(thus sinking further down) as it extends, by means of protention, into the future. It is a retaining of 
158 
that which gives a certain difference to the character of that which is retained. Such a difference is 
constituted through some form of 'delay. ' 
The essence of retention then (in its intertwining with protention), lies in its production of a 
manifold of different modalities of presencing through a movement of altering return -- a temporal 
continuum of changing orientations, which defers any return of an absolutely coincidental order. 
Here, repeatability is always intertwined with the function of deferral. Most importantly (in 
0 
reference to the context of our discussion on Gaschd's particular development of the concept of 
duplicity), this movement is a temporizing 'flow' of 'modal transition' and not the unfolding of a 
chain of objective contents. The form of this flux is of a completely different order to that which 
Gasch6 reads into Husserl's discourse on intentionality and temporal ization. This movement cannot 
be reduced to a Gasch6an order of doublings. It speaks of something earlier. 
It is the question of 'returnability' itself (iterability) which goes some way toward expressing 
the originary structurality of any possible opening. That would also mean any possible functional 
opening of difference and duplicity. 
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CHAPTER THREE: WRITING ON TIME AS WRITING 
18. Diffirance as Iterability and Duplicity: heterogeneity of a 
simultaneous Isynchronous kind? 
The movement toward the thought of dififirance -- 'as doubling, ' 'as supplementarity, ' 'as 
differing and deferring, ' etc. -- is a 'critical' response to a teleological thrust, which seeks the 
conditions of the possibility of spatio-temporal differentiation and the constitution of identity and 
meaning: in a word, presence. Derrida, by working through the question of ideality, in terms of the 
logics of repetition, also uncovers a horizon in which to re-situate the question of difference or 
duplicity. 
Iterability cannot be subsumed under a general theory of duplicity. As we have already seen, 
there is an important sense in which differentiation and duplication presuppose repeat-ability in a 
manner that is irreducible to the language of doubling. This happens every time we thematically re- 
incorporate the other integral moment of dififirance: deferral -- the component that is underplayed in 
Gaschd's account of doubling. With the thought of the Latin df ý.. )Terre and its indifference with regard 
to any common regional distinction between difference and deferral, we find that Gaschd's stronger 
claims for the significance and breadth of application of the theory of doubling are susceptible to 
collapse. Repeatability is the horizon of duration and differentiation in 'depth. ' Through the 
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structurality of delay, it is the opening in which differences can play -- a play of identity and 
difference and presence and absence. 
This issue makes reference to the manner in which the Ideal depends for its very ideality on 
the fundamental possibility of repetition within itself through which it becomes individuated, 
recognizable (re-activatable) and stretched-out through time. It speaks of the 'return of the same' -- 
as illuminated within the temporalizing fold of the universal form of the Living Present. The essence 
0, 
of ideality lies in its iterability. Repeatability certainly speaks of the 'tracing out of alterity, ' but only 
insofar as differentiation, according to the logic of 'doubling, ' is announced in actual iteration. The 
'structurality' of actual or possible iteration, however, expresses far more than the 'divisive' structure 
of duplicity (and the 'horizontally' bound images of heterogeneity and equi-primordiality). The 
quasi-transcendental concept of iterability itself primarily concerns the possibility of return, the 
horizon of the 'again, ' which originally permits ideality, an extending in both senses of giving and 
postponing (recuperation and deferral). The divisive sense of doubling at work in iteration is not its 
principal or defining characteristic. It should not be confused with that which iterability originally 
unfolds -- whose extension is one which folds in upon itself in the opening and closing of the play of 
identity and difference and presence and absence. This structure is also the condition of possibility 
of the functioning of difference, division, the double, etc. This speaks of the verticality of an 
againness, which also makes possible the suppression of difference and absence. In the case of the 
grasping of an ideal meaning, for example (that which stands-out as the same), we might say that we 
have a postponement of any form of durational difference, which would otherwise only permit us to 
speak of the 'return of the same as 01her in the same. 
The sense of the apparent a temporality of the 'ideal' emerges out of a movement that is 
temporal in a very fundamental way. There is a temporization at work: a postponement of the 
appearing of duration. The timelessness of the Idea has to do with thefi)rm qfils apIvaring (there is 
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a delay in the appearing of differentiation, dispersion, change, and so forth). The ideal is not non- 
temporal, but supertemporal [Oberzeitlich]): its 'apparent' non-temporality is still a mode of 
temporality. This is one sense in which the theme of returnability expresses a unique peculiarity: it 
simultaneously speaks of both difference and the annulment or erasure of difference. Writing or 
arche-writing is an exemplary name for the structurality of this interplay. It is the paradox of 
iterability that it can express a movement of 'recovery' that, by deferring the articulation of itself as a 
differential return, permits the constitution and extension of meaning -- ideal meaning (Ideality). Its 
structure implicates the play (like that of the relation between eidos and Idea) and, more 
significantly here, the re-play of deferral and differentiation that must necessarily erase themselves 
in order to perform -- and that they have always already done so. It is the open againness of 
iterability that must already be in play in the logic of doubling. 
Iterability is the 'structurality of the opening' through which the movement of differentiation 
(as one aspect of supplementarity) announces itself as the 'opening up of structure. ' The absence that 
occurs through this tracing of self-effacement refers us to the infrastructural possibility of the 
becoming of sense and structure which takes into account the pivotal implication of 'becoming' as 
the always already unfolding of continuity in difference and difference in continuity. 
In Speech and Phenomena, we find a theoretical matrix that is fully cognizant of the 
temporalizing of difference, a matrix that 'repeats' itself -- quite literally through its repetition of the 
theme of return as transformational repetition (supplementarity) -- in Of Grammatology. Derrida's 
reading of the tracing out of time-consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology allows him to develop 
an orientation on difference that brings out its spatializing and temporalizing aspects: as both 
differing and deferring. This thematic in deconstruction provides, as we have seen, a means with 
which to explain synchrony, simultaneity, contemporaneity (and their various cognates, such as co- 
presence, co-existence, etc. ) in termsqf a certain kind qf temporal-spacing. This 'temporal -spac i ng' 
162 
is more original than time as succession and more complex and pluri-dimensional than the mere 
'diachronic' in Saussure. For Derrida, this movement is precisely the tracing out of supplementarity. 
It is an arche-writing. 
The primarily 'structural' attitude of The Tain of the Mirror plays itself out in the 'generality' 
of Gasch6's theoretical orientation, which has a tendency to obscure the originality of Derrida! s 
critical reading of Saussure. Gasch6s critique of the 'philosophy of reflection' takes us on an 
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excursion through the Hegelian tradition to Saussure without carefully attending to Husserl's distinct 
contributions to this field. His text exhibits a misunderstanding concerning Husserl's treatment of the 
question of reflexivity (in intentional terms) in relation to the question of the temporality of lived- 
experience and it underestimates Derrida! s theoretical grounding in Husserl's intentional 
phenomenology -- as distinct from Hegelian dialectical phenomenology. To be sure, Derrida draws 
from the work of both philosophers and he often refers to the interplay between retention and 
protention in terms of a dialectical movement. ' However, he does this without excluding Husserl's 
unique language of intentionality, his radical contributions to the theme of reflexivity, or the 
methodological care of his phenomenology. 
Derrida! s radicalization of Saussure's concept of language 'as a matrix of differences, ' in the 
related themes of supplementarity, arche-writing, and arche-tracing, etc. (which restores its temporal 
aspect), hinges upon the fact that, from a methodological and attitudinal point of view, he returns to 
Saussure via Husserl. The route taken is by way of his reading of Husserl's phenomenological 
analyses on perception, time-consciousness and the method of transcendental-phenomeno logical 
reduction. 2 Husserl is a principal player, or better, 'interlocutor' in the dialogue between Derrida and 
Saussure. Derrida! s theoretical appropriation of the concept of retention in its intertwining with 
protention (whose structurality is integral to the tracing of difference) allows a shift to what lie sees 
as the more primordial condition of the Possibility of difference. This possibility is Q, . 
firance. 
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It is precisely because of the residual Saussurean character in Gasch6's analyses, that they do 
not really grasp the quasi-transcendental designation diffirance in its truly radical sense. The 
limitations of his 'horizontal' orientation are such that he falls short of it. The 'general dieory of 
doubling' brings together a number of aspects of diffirance, by processing them within the limits of 
a theoretical matrix that knows no time. Gasch6's appeal to Derrida! s re-reading of Saussure in Of 
Grammatology misses the radical twist at work in his treatment of the theme of language as 
0 
differing / deferring play that rediscovers temporality. In order to bring these issues even further into 
the foreground, we shall examine how Gaschd's presentation of the theory of doubling organizes 
itself on the basis of the concept of the non-Platonic simulacrum. 
19. Platonic and Non-Platonic Simulacra 
Plato makes numerous references to the problem of the simulacrum in relation to his theory 
of Forrns. Perhaps the most relevant of his varied kinds of discourse on this issue is to be found in 
the rather ironical approach to art in Book 10 of the Republic. Here, we are presented with a 
somewhat impoverished theory on art where the work of the artisan is considered to be nobler than 
that of the artist. According to Plato, the artisan attempts to recreate, in matter, the true Form. The 
artist, on the other hand, merely reproduces the 'material' object, thus producing a copy of a copy. 
For Plato, the artist's production (which is seen as a kind of secondary re-production) is less true and 
somehow ignoble. The divine spark of inspiration is bestowed on the artisan, so to speak, in the 
form of a passive intuition -- pure reception as opposed to creative / active representation. Plato's 
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theory sets itself up on the basis of a rigid disjunction between passivity and activity, which is built 
upon a theoretical divide between the apparent immanence of intuition and the secondary nature of 
representational perception. It is the difference between the representation of the real world and the 
representation of the apparent. 
The working of matter, as inspired by the passive intuition of a pure Form, is set over and 
above the active representation of the worked matter. What is in operation here, as the immediate 
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correlate of the passive / active divide, is a distinction between good and bad representation. The 
former is meant to express a first-order representation of something given (intuitively) in its original 
unmediated Form, while the latter indicates a mere representation of a representation. However, the 
distinction is problematic at the outset because Plato is unable to locate that which would indicate 
the 'veracity' of the intuition of a pure Form. This is not surprising since such indication would 
imply a mediating or re-presentative function at work in intuition, which Plato's narrow conception 
of the distinction between intuition and representation will not allow. The theory of Forms presents 
us with an objective horizon -- designated as 'real' (a hypostatization of the ideal) -- which is not of 
consciousness or subjectivity. The factor of mediation between what are ostensibly two different 
realms remains unanswered. Representation, according to Plato's viewpoint, is always bad, but at 
least a first-order representation is tolerable in that it still retains its reference to something more 
than a mere image (for Plato, images, like the shadows on the walls of the cave obscure truth more 
than indicate it). However, if the concept of representation is broadened in order to accommodate 
intuition then it is far from clear how the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' representation can be 
formulated. We might call this the problem of mimesis. 
Both the artisan and artist work within the sphere of representation. 3 The latter announces 
itself as essential to the articulalion of the Forms. Considered within the limits of Plato's schema, 
theirTall' into representation -- which is always 'deformation' -- means that there must, in principle, 
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be a crisis in regard to the possibility of deciding between good and bad representation (for one 
cannot get out of representation). Despite this, the distinction is maintained, forming the basis of a 
problematic ethics that ultimately prescribes the banishment of artists from the Republic. 
Plato's schema is one in which the circle of representation does not include the pure Forms 
themselves. Derrida quite literally turns this model on its head. He does not start with an 
apodictically self-evident presence of some-thing simple and unitary but, at a more transcendental 
level, deconstructs the idea of such a presence and examines what is at stake in regard to its 
possibility. Mimesis, rather than designating a secondary movement -- which simply re-produces 
something originally extant, according to varying degrees of truth and clarity -- becomes the vital 
movement or condition of the possibility of the simple. There is no immediate relation to a pure 
presentation by means of which the truth of any particular representation can be judged. However, 
this does not signify the adoption of an extreme form of scepticism that asserts, in a 'doctrinal' sense, 
that there is no truth simply because its means of verification is fractured at its core. It is certainly 
the case that we are sucked into the vortex of an infinite openness of signification, i. e., in terms of 
the sense, and thus truth, of each re-presentation relying on other re-presentations which, in turn, are 
themselves intrinsically enmeshed in a matrix of further re-presentations, etc. However, at this level, 
we are referred to an area which is pre-empirical / without necessarily being pre-epistemological -- 
although it is vital that the latter must be understood according to a transcendental- 
phenomenological orientation. 
This radical horizon still concerns itself with the questions of the possibilily of truth and 
knowledge, but only insofar as it is committed to the deconstruction / Abbau of their deeply 
sedimented sense. Therefore, such regression is a 'critical return, ' which must be understood as de- 
con-struction, as opposed to de-struction. It proceeds as a movement of de-sedimentation where the 
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con (as a bringing together) is simultaneously at play with a movement of unravelling and holding- 
apart. 
Since the systematic construction of a new, or restoration of an old, model of truth is 
perpetually suspended or deferred (in line with the primary principle that guides both 
phenomenology and deconstruction), and since it is the question of the possibility of disclosure 
itself, as the opening up of structure and the structurality of this opening (language as vi, riting and 
or time, depending on one's point of orientation or taste in names), our discourse cannot be 
permitted any epistemic privileges. Truth, according to Derrida! s perspective, is not simply 
uncovered or distorted through representations, but is constituted by such performances. 4 
It is this logic that serves as the basis for Gaschd's appropriation of Derrida's discourse on 
supplementarity, doubling, and the non-Platonic simulacrum -- providing the fundamental 
background for his own development and promotion of a'general theory of doubling. ' 
Gaschd writes, 
A simulacrum, as defined by Plato, is a copy of a copy, a double of a double, which 
itself signifies an original. Within philosophy, the simulacrurn is indeed dependent on an 
ontology, since the nontruth of the copy of the copy is linked to the truth of the present 
referent of which the first copy is the true repetition. Therefore, the subtle excess of truth and 
ontology that the originary duplication designates cannot be qualified simply as a 
simulacrum. To call it by this name within philosophy is not only to call it by one of the 
names of that which is severely condemned by this discourse as spurious, if not bad 
duplication (and repetition), but also to strip it of its most unsettling implications. To name 
the originary duplication -- that is, a doubling anterior to the metaphysical oppositions of 
truth and nontruth -- a simulacrurn is to continue to speak within these comforting 
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oppositions. Yet what this asks us to conceive is a simulacrum without any ultimate referent, 
in other words, a non-Platonic simulacrum. Indeed, the original duplication, doubling the 
opposition between copy and original, is neither preceded nor followed by any referent, 
presence, or unbreached identity. The originary duplication, or non-Platonic simulacrum, 
initiates but also displaces the metaphysical opposition of original and copy, and of the copy 
of the copy, into a completely different field (TM, P. 226-27). 
I 
Ultimately, according to Gaschd, Derrida asks us to conceive of a simulacrum without an 
ultimate referent. This only makes sense after the application of what could be described as a form 
of epochg: a careful attitudinal and methodological re-orientation that remains suspicious in regard 
to its subject-matter and the language through which it is articulated. 
The methodological route to this inversion of the traditional concept of mimesis (where re- 
presentation was once defined as an imperfect copy of an original presence and was motivated by a 
purely receptive [non-representational] intuition) involves a strategic withholding of judgement 
about the actuality or non-actuality of that which is given through appearances. This is in order to 
focus on the how and the ways in which sense or meaning appears, i. e., in terms of the 'manners' of 
the appearing of appearances. Attitudinally, this is equivalent to that which is attained through the 
phenomenological reduction in Husserlian phenomenology. The world is not lost but, as 'world- 
thesis, ' it is retained purely as phenomenon -- a meaning-complex comprising both the language of 
appearances and the language of appearing. In Ideas 1, this space comes to be formally expressed 
(through eidetic reduction) as the noetic-noematic correlation -- an intentional intertwining. A strict 
analogue to this orientation is at work in Derrida! s thesis on the structure of re-marking and re- 
presentation where, in Derrida's case, it evolves into a question of the writing of any possible 
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meaning or, in more general terms: presence. In both movements, the Husserlian eidetic reduction 
clearly traces out its signature. 
For Derrida, the non Platonic simulacrum derives its sense from the logic of 'undecidability, 
(a concept that originated with Godel [1931]). In other words, it is a simulacrum in an analogous 
sense. It stands outside the positive / negative dyad of traditional logical discourse on truth and 
nontruth, original and copy, etc., for it represents a kind 
0 
of excluded middle. The copula'is, ' as the 
defining moment of the principle of contradiction, becomes imbued with a supplementary character 
through which the scope of discourse is no longer determined by the formal limit of either / or. It 
embraces ambivalence and ambiguity in the play of the 'and' -- where such play disrupts the 
language of propositional statements. 
The re- of re-presentation, as Derrida shows in Speech and Phenomena, is not simply (as in 
traditional ontology and epistemology) a niodification of an original presence, but refers to a 
fundamental condition of possibility of presence in general. Since the term representation no longer 
finds itself chained to the foundations of the schema in which its function was limited to a kind of 
echo of something more original, we find that the whole meaning of representation in general begins 
to slide. This brings us to the concept of the 're-mark! and the structurality of re-marking. 
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20. Re-Marking the Re-Marking 
Following the logic of the non-Platonic simulacrum, the relationship between mark and re- 
mark is not a simple linear progression. The mark is possible only in that it is derived from the 
structurality of re-marking. The relationship is more complex than the traditional language of 
'causal' chains (and successive and irreversible temporal sequences) in which the mark is said to 
come first. In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida! s examination of Husserl's utilization of the terms 
retention and protention brings to light a form of dialectical play that points the way to a general 
theory on the structure of representation (see also Of Grammatology and the essay "Diffirance" 
[Margins]). It effectively transgresses the limits of the Platonic notion of mimesis -- a notion that 
carries with it a strict distinction between original and copy and good and bad representation 
(despite the fact that the possibility of such a distinction is problematized at the very start by the 
limits of Plato's own language). 
There is no clear and direct means of distinguishing between good (true) and bad (false) 
representation if we rigorously apply the basic principles of Plato's own system. The notion of a 
pure / non-representational access to the Forms maintains an insoluble tension within Plato's 
conception of the true and its articulation since he cannot point out how to get beyond the circle of 
representation. 
By means of a double-reading of that which Derrida calls 'the dialectic of retention and 
protention, ' we can see that the re of re-presentation is not a simple modification of an original 
presentation. It rather speaks of the tracing out of a repetition that first makes such a presentation 
possible -- a repetition that 
functions through a movement of delay. The re of re-presentation then, is 
an index to the condition of the possibility of any 
kind of presence and not merely a reference to an 
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impoverished simulacrum that 'stands-in' for something originally extant. For Derrida, once again, 
re-presentation is not preceded by an original, unmediated, or primordial presence. 
Gaschd does not present a balanced account of Derrida's theoretical appropriation of the 
Istructure' of primordial temporalization, which was first presented by Husserl in The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This text plays 'the' pivotal role in Derrida's 
construction of the central argument of Speech and Phenomena, even though he comments on not 
5 being able to discuss it in depth . If he had actually engaged with this series of lectures in greater 
detail, it would have been counter-productive to the whole of his 'strong' thesis -- but then there is a 
world of difference between the style of a piece of writing (which says more about that which is 
demanded by a certain tradition of philosophical presentation, i. e., disputation) and the deep 
contexture of a writing. One has to excavate Derrida's texts and uproot the often superficial 
polemical tone, in order to uncover that which is really significant in his thinking -- a writing within 
the written, whose subtle lessons are often concealed by the foreground spur that more immediately 
inscribes itself in the form of sensational slogans on the imagination of the superficial and 
inattentive reader. Not that Gasch6 ever falls into the latter category, but lie does have a tendency to 
merely incorporate the negative sloganizing into his overall account of Derrida's deconstruction 
without criticism. 
The structure of the transversal interplay between retention and protention, in the opening up 
of the Living Present, gives us, with very little modification, the tracing of re-presentation or re- 
marking in a theoretical matrix that is far deeper and quite other to the mundane / objectivist thesis 
of perception that Gaschd (perhaps on the basis of a less than critical reading of Derrida's 'strong' 
thesis in Speech and Phenoniena) implicitly assigns to Husserl's phenomenological concept of 
intentionality. it is to be granted that, for Husserl, something must first be given in accordance with 
the phenomeno logical concept of evidence / fulfilment (which involves the concept of primary 
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impression -- which is not a seýflsqfflcient perception), but once again this is built upon the 
retentional / protentional flux of originary temporal articulation. The flux is an extending of continua 
of continua. This retentional and protentional interplay, when these intentionalities are thought with 
the addition of their respective parallels in the presentificational dimension of secondary 
remembrance and expectation, is the precise correlate to the structurality of the movement / tracing 
of re-marking or supplementarity, as described by Derrida: a primordial writing -- an arche-writing. 
I 
In sum, although one ordinarily assumes that a mark is a reference to some extant thing, 
according to the logics of re-marking, if referral takes place it is between mark and mark. Meaning, 
according to this orientation, is merely like foam on the wave. It emerges through the intrinsic 
interplay of a network of marks -- a syntactical matrix that, in re-marking (upon) itself, permits the 
crystallization of meaning. If we suspend all interest in the ontological status of the mark, or the 
meaning it delivers up, then we are referred, as Gasch6 puts it, to an asemic space. With this, we 
finally arrive at the point at which we may bring the question of-supplementarity into sharp focus. 
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21. The Historicity of Supplementarity: temporalization as altering 
return 
Supplementarity designates no mere movement of addition -- as in the way in which one 
might speak of an 'incremental' growth in knowledge. But then again, the becoming of knowledge 
(in that it is not reducible to a linear / successive assimilation of facts) also follows a more complex 
and dialectical passage. It is an inter- and intra- dialogical movement of negotiation involving shifts, 
negations, radical deflections -- as well as conservations and syntheses -- through which the 
epistemological horizon (which includes self-knowing as a unity of a life-history made thematic) 
organizes and re-organizes itself. The repetition through which it writes itself is a repetition that 
transforms. We speak of a matrix that is in motion, changing within itself. a pluri-dimensional 
shifting from significance to significance whose extending and self-organization is irreducible to the 
mere linearity of addition. 
For Derrida, the history of "linearity ... is the repression of pluri-dimensional symbolic 
thought" (OG, P-87). This is the sense in which we begin to approach the pluri-dimensional- 
temporal logics of supplementarity. The structurality of this pluri-dimensional play is. also the 
principal working theme that binds Husserl's lectures on temporality. That it is expressed in slightly 
different terms is almost incidental, for Husserl is clear that the proto-horizon to which the name 
flux refers is a region for which "names are lacking" (PITC. Sec. 3)6, P. 100). He has no choice but to 
employ metaphors. Derrida has employed a 
few metaphors of his own, but the primary logics 
remain enmeshed in the principal structures of Husserl's tropes. Derrida has radically opened up 
these metaphors and that which they signify through a kind of supplementary project. Here, the 
radical tone of the opening cancels out the traditional sense of the supplement. Derrida's contribution 
173 
to this field is not simply the production of further non-critical addenda following a linear agenda. 
His writing of supplements to the originary writing-out of what he names as the structure of 
supplementarity is an unbuilding and re-building (A bbau and A ujbau) of this Ur-region first 'named' 
by Husserl. Derrida not only fleshes-out the deepest levels of phenomenology, he also shows that 
this can only be achieved (to extend the envelope of this chiasmic metaphor) by turning its, flesh 
inside-out -- where the outside is the inside. 
The occasionally hyper-critical tone of Derrida's treatment of Husserl does not so much rest 
on any kind of doctrinally motivated polemic as on an adherence to Husserl's own call for a 
phenomenology (which is to say: phenomenological criti4ue -- and thus 'reduction) of the 
phenomenological reduction. This is actually the space in (or spacing through) which 
phenomenology first inaugurates itself. However, there are sensational claims (sometimes implicit, 
often explicit, but always only strategic) that have continued to stick and which still obscure the 
originality of Husserl's discourse on time. These must be swept away. 
As we have seen, Husserl's project, throughout his lectures on temporality, is not, in 
contradistinction to the 'strong' perspective at work in Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, 
theoretically bound by the limits of a corpuscular model of time. Neither is it rooted in a purely 
linear conception. ' With respect to the question of linearity, Husserl aims at describing those 
structures that must always already be implicated by such a conception: a proto-structure, which (as 
it turns out) organizes the conditions of possibility of linear experience without being reducible to 
the same order or language. What his analyses uncover is a dimension of non-static structurality. ' it 
is pure flux, it flows, but it is not a process. It is not'in' time -- certainly not as a unity of duration. 
This proto-region, in which the usual categories of time do not apply, is pluri-dimensional 
and non-linear -- yet it produces linearity. The Absolute of the expression Absolute flux, in these 
terms, is the mark of its resistance to the traditional language of time. Since we primarily wish to 
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bring out particular aspects of the 'structurality' of this flux and its parallels in Derrida! s discourse on 
arche-writing (where supplementarity is irreducible to a general language of duplicity) we shall not 
confine ourselves to the now traditional, thanks to Derrida, space of a 'grammatology' in which it is 
usually articulated. However, we should emphasize that our aim is not simply to displace the theme 
into another, perhaps contemporaneous, though different, sphere of discourse, but to uncover the 
structurality of the temporalizing play designated by the term supplementarity. Ironically, this is to 
I 
aim toward its 'essence, ' a word that must be used with caution, since it often suggests a rootedness 
within the language of the'static'- cut adrift from time -- and is thus to be read, as always, [between 
brackets]. We need to turn to that temporalizing play of deferral and repetition that traces itself out 
as a constitutive movement of transformational return -- the inscription of duration / change 
difference. 
One might say that to talk about the structurality of sýpplementarity, from the Derridean 
point of view, is to talk about time as writing. What if we were to initiate an inversion of this idea by 
restoring the full measure and impact of the temporal signification that Derrida cannot do without in 
his delineation of the sense of arche-writing (as the 'structure of supplementarity, ' if structure is to 
extend its sense beyond a mere static determination)? What if we were to restore such temporal 
signification in its own right? What might we unearth if we take a little time to write about writing 
as temporalizing? 
The structurality of the play of supplementarity refers us to a horizon that confounds the 
distinction between genesis and structure. The phenomenological correlate to this, as we have 
already seen, is that zone for which, as Husserl says, "names are lacking. " Derrida has offered us a 
number of fascinating candidates, which make up the constellation of the quasi-concePt designated 
by the neologism diffirance. To this extent, Derrida is actually quite faithful to Husserl's 
. 
firance as deferring / differing repetition announces itself as both a phenomenological project. Dij 
175 
quasi-transcendental condition of the possibility of structure, meaning, presence and the very threat, 
of their dissolution. It further extends and deepens that primary aspect of the Husserlian flux that 
speaks of both continuity and fragmentation. 
In this context, one cannot ignore the main thrust of Husserl's delineation of the structurality 
of flux as 'continuous alteration, ' in which change and continuity are originarily intertwined. For 
both Husserl and Derrida, at this deep level, repetition is not to be understood as a continuous replay 
I 
of the same as the same -- a mere addition or identical reduplication -- but a replay that temporalizes 
and transforms. Once again, this draws us back to Husserl's discussions on repetition and the 
structure of temporalization. 
7 
Let us adopt another Husserlian mode of orientation for a moment. As each of us moves on 
from childhood to maturity, judgements undergo modification through the light of experience (shifts 
that occur through changing situations, social conditioning, alterations in personal facticities, etc. ), 
even deeply sedimented doxic structures (beliefs) can be subjected to revision. For instance, 
throughout the process of maturation, every time that one remembers (Presentifles as opposed to 
presents) a past event it marks -- through the very movement of re-marking / return -- a 'change' in 
the significance of the reiterated phase according to the narrative structure or manner in which the 
past is restored to the present. This is not a supplement that merely adds itself to an original 
meaning, but one that transforms it. Therefore, we cannot simply speak of a 'passive giving' of that 
which was, but must equally consider the generative or constitutive thrust of remembering that, in an 
important sense, organizes and articulates its history -- re-tells the story of the past (note: we can 
also consider the movement in the pre-conscious terms of the re-writing of habiius; to tidy up one's 
house / habitation; the fluid reorganization of the 'ego as substrate of habitualities, ). 8 
This 'dialogical' matrix is in excess of the order of linear time and causality. Within the 
horizon of a rigorously sustained epochi, there never was an original, objectively concrete past- in- 
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itself -- a monolithic past that subsists in a real piece of past-time that is rigidly positioned within a 
one-dimensional continuum. There never was an originary, unmediated moment that inaugurated a 
causal sequence of events and which inflexibly 'determines' the pathways of future action. All this 
can be said because there never was an original, singular and pure event (objective complex of 
significance) that could be said to lie behind the constituting (or distorting, if one clings to the old 
world-view) effects of remembering. We do not speak of a substantive plenitude of meaning that 
0 
escapes the limiting parameters of the narrative form of the movement of return. It is not as if there 
is a field of original meaning that has the potential for full self-disclosure, if only it could give itself 
purely -- without being mediated 
by the flux of contingent and fleeting modalities of recollection, 
whose ever changing manners of illumination equally veil that which they are meant to unveil. This 
is ahermeneutical' problem insofar as it traces the 
limits of the possibility of hermeneutics and its 
methods of interpretation / interrogation). 
Appropriation or re-appropFiation is always an index to a certain character or tone of 
illuminating that which comes to light. It is never merely passive, but in a crucial phenomenological 
sense, it creates or constitutes the significance of 
its field of interrogation -- thus giving shape and 
tone to that which is articulated. This refers us to the fundamentally important theme of 
Sinngebegung (sense-bestowal) in Husserl's theory of intentionality. 
In this light, let us return for a moment to the constitutive aspect of 'recollection' (as distinct 
from primary retention). The presentation 
in memory of a past event involves an active component 
in that one often remembers past events 
in accordance with the character in which one last 
remembered them. However, this 
is not to say that a more radical shift of meaning cannot occur. 
Consider what may happen as a consequence of 
discovering, in the light of new evidence, that one's 
judgement about the significance of a past moment was erroneous, e. g., I thought that he was doing 
me a favour when he advised me to 
buy those shares in B. C. C. l. " Furthermore, are there not also 
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moments when it seems as if the past rears up of itself, like a nightmare flashback? Such moments 
(the feeling of deJA vu for instance, where past, present, and future appear to coincide) find 
themselves drawn up, in a peculiar way, by the present in an intimate relation of encroachment. The 
past surges up into the present, while the present can undergo a startling re-organization as it 
seemingly finds itself sucked into the past. For instance, consider the effect of returning, after a long 
absence, to an area in which one lived as a child -- or recognizing an odour (stimuli of an olfactory 
0 
kind has an extraordinary capacity to instantaneously transport one back into the past). This is not 
the relatively dissociated re-experiencing of something drawn up by an act of evocation, but an 
immanent re-living of the past. However, once again, this is not to say that there is an absolutely 
static and monolithic past. Even deep-seated inscriptions or memories, which might ordinarily be 
considered to be static, undergo alteratign in the ways in which they resonate significance through 
time. 
The past is constantly being re-visited, re-organized or re-written on the basis of ever- 
changing present and futural concerns. At the same time, the meaningful shape of the past can be as 
much a matter of affect as effect, since it can 'unconsciously' influence present and future acts -- 
which takes us into the realm of psychoanalytical concerns. However, despite their changes in 
resonance, remembered events still retain their relative 'positions' in the past (thanks to primary 
memory / retention) as 'before' or 'after' other remembered events. There is no shuffling here 
(although it is sometimes possible to be mistaken). 9 So it is never really possible to bracket the 
theme of linearity completely. It is always there as a background horizon to other forms of 
temporality which are, themselves, not reducible to a purely linear form of time. Since Husserl's 
concept of pure flux is not to be thought in terms of process or any kind of movement in the 
ordinary linear sense, it expresses a shift to a pluri-dimensional discourse on temporality that looks 
less and less like time. He is in good company when we also consider Heidegger's writing on time- 
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space and Merleau-Ponty's concept of chiasm. Flux is that which constitutes the linearity we take for 
granted, but it cannot be expressed by it. 
When we turn to the question of the unfolding and development of relations between 
different kinds of significance across time, we see that this is indeed irreducible to a merely linear 
formula. In Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, this level designates the 
constitutive role played by 'secondary remembrance' or 'presentification, l which must be 
distinguished from 'primary remembrance' or 'retention. ' As we have seen, retention, as an originary 
giving of the no-longer precisely as that which is no longer, should be understood as presentation 
(in which deferral and absence play constitutive roles). The mode of the appearing is an originary 
presentation that gives pastness, while that which appears as retained in the movement of secondary 
remembrance is 'presentified. ' This is not to be given. It is only in retention that it is originally given 
in its pastness (a 'virtual' presence available for reiteration by secondary remembrance). What is 
important is that it is in retention (primary remembrance) that that which appears originally 
announces itself as not-now. Pastness is the mode of its appearing. That which appears to secondary 
remembrance -- as retained -- undergoes 
further modification in the manner of its givenness, which 
is itself retained and so on. 
What we must recognize here, at a higher level, is that we do not merely find ourselves faced 
with the problem of how, according to the classical epistemological orientation, we can judge the 
veracity of that which is unearthed through interrogation (which would always remain Plato's 
problem), when interrogation itself, like any narrative form, plays a constitutive role in establishing 
the 'cliaracter[sl' of that which it delivers up -- i. e., what can be unsaid and yet operative within the 
very passage of the question: the affective though unthernatized teleology of the task. Perhaps, with 
this realization, we find that a purely objective and naturalistic ideal of truth-veri fi cation announces 
both its limits and its collapse. If one avoids absolute scepticism (Hume's Treatise is an excellent 
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example of the way in which a radical / pure empirical method must ultimately undermine the sense- 
validity of its own criteria of truth-verificationlo), there emerges a different kind of question. What is 
at stake when reason, knowledge or -- in more general phenomenological terms -- lived-experience 
(Erlebnis) must return to itself as a becoming? 
Hegelian dialectics is a response to this question -- by means of which the attempt to restore 
the thematic of history to philosophy reached a new level of dignity. However, what if we put into 
question the specific teleological presumption that an Absolute awaits its ultimate disclosure 
through a linear progression -- a synthesis of determinate negations, conservations and moments of 
sublation? This model implicitly suggests (although this is by no means the only reading) that no 
historical phase with its own unique character is essential, since all moments are ostensibly 
accidents along the ideal and universal path of Geist returning to itself as Absolute. This dialectical 
economy of negotiation says little about deflection, dispersion, delay, and radical 
incommensurability, but this is not surprising, since these dynamics completely disrupt its 
teleological presuppositions. From aTunctional' point of view, there is a kind of backward causation 
at work in the latter. At one level we can grant that no particular moment is necessary in its own 
right -- logically, it is not inconceivable that things could have been otherwise. However, this is not 
to say that it does not of itself play a constitutive role in affecting historical movement by 
transforming the meaning of the past and the shape of that which is to'come. There is always a 
tracing of relativity and chance throughout the unfolding of the moments of history. These both 
differ from and defer the realization of the eschatological ideal that is supposed to prescribe their 
characters of development. 
For Husserl and Derrida, there is no universal or totalizing form of historical significance 
under which personal, ed-inic and cultural differences are ultimately subsumed. We must take into 
account the very real differences or dýf . 
f&ends that mark out, and thus re-mark upon, the plurality of 
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histories that make up humankind as a whole. These are not accidents merely in the sense that they 
ultimately refer back to a necessary and universal teleological passage through which they find their 
significance, but whose direction they are unable to affect. It is rather the case that they are 
accidental in that their significance is always open to revision within an open horizon of possible 
interpretation / re-interpretation (here we can also speak of both continuity and radical discontinuity 
as they announce themselves throughout the writing of a single life). However, we do not stop here, 
for we must not commit ourselves to psychologism, anthropologism or historicism. 
The passage of history is not to be reduced to the empirical instances through which 
historicality or historicalness inscribes itself from moment to moment. The pure movement of 
Geschichtlichkeit (historicity) -- the unfolding or tracing of history (Geschichte as distinct from 
Historie) -- is both in excess of and less than 
its constituted moments. Its horizon extends beyond 
the parameters of any particular regional vocabulary, but at the same time it is nothing more than the 
structurality of the opening of (or the articulating oo the phases through which any particular 
tradition, language or cultural horizon evolves. 
II 
The meaning of tradition involves the collective transmission of ideal meanings and norms 
through which it establishes the character of its own significational horizon. As we have already 
seen, in reference to the structure of temporalization in Husserlian phenomenology, all ideality is 
possible only because of the possibility of repetition. This is the case in both quasi-transcendental 
terms as arche-writing and in mundane empirical terms as the written transmission of ideas and the 
organization of tradition (which provides the structurality of the opening through which there can be 
the opening up of structure). The notion of Geschichtlichkeit and the logics of the retentional and 
protentional intertwining of primordial temporalization are thus appropriated by Derrida and put to 
work in his discourse on the tracing of arche-wriling -- which announces itself as the pure 
structurality of the tracing of supplementarity. 
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Supplementarity combines both elements of constitution and fragmentation. It is the very 
articulation of the passage of time, the writing of any possible history. Therefore, supplementarity is 
not an external accident, but the condition of the possibility of the disruption and extendedness -_ 
evolution -- of meaning. It gives the possibility of excess, while simultaneously marking out 
finitude. Despite the idea of a movement toward totalization, which it first makes possible, the very 
tracing of supplementarity undermines the possibi lity of 0 
'actual' totalization. The movement is like a 
dialogue, a dialectic between finitization and infinitization through which any telos (as the flip-side 
of origin) unfolds itself through the play of negotiation that internally constitutes it. The non- 
totalizable play between eide andIdeas in the Kantian sense' is a significant example here, in view 
of the way in which Derrida plays with this concept in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of 
Geometry. " 
Understood in terms of temporal-spacing, dififirance, as arche-tracing or arche-writing, 
expresses 'openness' in both the dimensions of the past and future. It always already speaks of the 
recursive structurality (the essential possibility of actual repetition and representation) through 
which, as in Husserl's phenomenology of temporality, the Living Present is originarily stretched 
within itself. This movement of repetition is the essential condition of possibility for the presencing 
and maintenance of structure and meaning as they evolve toward any number of possible futures. It 
constitutes and re- organizes the significance of the past from which their shapes are drawn and, in 
doing so, the form of the passage is a re-organization / re-writing of itself The openness of the 
futural horizon is that which permits the possibility of the re-reading and re-writing of the past (to 
act / work upon it) while the sedimented textuality of the past is that which first delivers up the 
material (doxa, judgements, and investments, etc. ) for a range of possible projects that give 
significance / meaning to the future. Passivity and activity are eternally intertwined in the writing 
out of temporality (even the affective 
is motivated). This pluri-dimensional reflexivity of allerinýq 
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re-turn (as indicated by the re-) indicates a form of temporalizing play that expresses the true 
radicality of the concept of supplementarity. 
In these terms, we can see that the structure of supplementarity shows that retentions retain 
signatures of secondary remembrances and that the latter re-organize the significance of the former. 
They are different moments of the same movement (and it is this intertwining that constitutes the 
relation of difference between Geschichte and Historie). There is no strict bifurcation here between 
I 
passivity and activity. Once again, the constellation of movements expressed in the Heideggerian es 
gibt and ereignis of the lecture entitled "Time and Being" -- which announces the it-gives of a 
primordial and impersonal event ofAppropriation -- is an excellent analogue to what is in play. The 
concept of time-space (that introduces them) refers to a fourth dimension that is no mere increment 
to the other three ekstases of time, but is the originary giving of each to each. 
Derrida! s discourse on dififirance as spacing / temporizing / writing / articulation, etc., 
expresses a pure movement of opening and closing (and a pre-teleological form of becoming). 
Dififirance is that which, like Heidegger's conception of time-space, 'makes room' in the most 
primary sense. It is not simply the announcement of a third term that bisects the common space / 
time dyad by means of a dialectical motion. This quasi-concept indicates a zone that is always 
already disrupting the trinitarian horizon of dialectics while, at the same time, making it possible. 
Difference, alone, is insufficient in expressing the 'excess' of diffirance (hence the introduction of 
such a neologism -- expressing neither passivity nor activity, but at the same time also expressing 
both) -- which is irreducible to the traditional language of mere spatio-temporal differences. The 
ance of diffirance indicates its'active' aspect, but this is also tempered by the fundamental sense of 
the trace as pure 'non-origin' and 'self-erasure': an opening and closing in repetition that produces 
only in that it has always already happened. It is always already the trace of an erasure. This speaks 
of an essential interwovenness of activity and passivity. According to Derrida, "... the ending -ance 
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remains undecided between the active and passive" ("Dififirance, " Margins, P. 9). DO 
. 
Tjrance as 
difference and deferral, announces the intertwining (Ineinander) of spacing and temporalizing -- 
which is not so much 'beyond' as 'earlier' than the classic Leibnizean bifurcation between space and 
time. In contrast to the emphasis generally placed on difference and heterogeneity, dififirance also 
expresses an orientation that permits us to speak Of such temporal differences as past, present, and 
future in terms of their interpenetration in the movement that traces out their differences. Once 
again, we find echoes of the thought of flux (Husserl), chiasm (Merleau-Ponty) and time-space 
(Heidegger). 
The issue of the 'always-already-happening' of dififirance finally brings us to a most 
fundamental oversight in Gaschd's thesis on'duplicity. ' 
22. Diffirance and the De-Differentiation of Space and Time 
Our project to express the importance of opening up a dialogical space in which to contrast 
Derrida with Gasch6s Derrida, never implied that there is, in the end, just one Derrida. His style of 
philosophizing is a living example of the alterity that already inhabits his (or indeed 'any') writing. 
Derrida! s texts, in particular, make up a community of writing that is in dialogue with itself. 
In the foregoing elaboration of some of the key moments of the differential space between 
Derrida and Gasch6's incarnation of Derrida, it has been argued that the originality of the former lies 
in the fact that his writing strategically avoids limiting itself to the traditional distinction between 
temporality and spatiality and the traditional schematics that are based upon it. Derrida places great 
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emphasis on the 'disruptive' elements of the trace / dififirance / arche-writing. Therefore, it is easy to 
see why his writing announces that temporalizing is spacing -- in that peculiar sense of suspension 
in which the is is crossed out, put under erasure (sous rature). However, we must also remember 
that the term spacing is an index to more than mere distanciation or differentiation. 
It was suggested, earlier, that the very meta-generality of the operative quasi-concept 
differance in deconstruction gives us a horizon in which, from a certain point of view, differences 
between differences can be said to break down, e. g., differences between quantity, quality, modality; 
conflation of the various moments of the sign, such as the distinct, but intertwined, moments of the 
style and content of the movement of signification, the appearing of the appearance, etc. In other 
words, with the suspension of a specific framework of values (since the operative language is 
generally employed under erasure), dififirance can refer us to a horizon of indifference. Gasch6, on 
the other hand, makes much of its heterogeneity throughout his attempts to define, systematically, 
the 'essential' differences that constitute the sense of the plurality of diffirance. But, he only really 
does so from the point of view of the traditional concepts from which the various infrastructural 
moments of dif . 
Tjrance (e. g., temporalizing, spacing, etc. ) are drawn -- that is, from within the 
boundaries of the synchronic / diachronic duality. However, it is important to recognize that, in fact 
and in principle, there is no fundamental difference between these particular terms from Derrida's 
standpoint, throughout his delineation of the horizon of diffirance (especially in the essay of that 
title), since he does not 'start out' with the traditional distinction between space as an 'order of 
coexistence[s]' and time as an 'order of successions. ' The consequences of this de-differentiation 
express quite another side to the negative aspects that were mentioned earlier, concerning the 
'conflation' or 'compression! of presence and the present that is at work in Derrida's reading of 
Husserl's phenomenology. 
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Since Gaschd concentrates on the 'active' and 'divisive' aspects of diffirance, he only ever 
really speaks of pure 'difference' in similarity (assigning greater emphasis to difference in general). 
In these terms, he is only half way toward approaching Deirida's actual position. A truly rigorous 
propaedeutic to the study of diffirance must equally consider its 'passivity' and questions of 
similarity in difference -- which also leads to a form of indifference. It is to be granted that there are 
irreducible differences between such terms as spacing and temporalizing in relation to their 
I 
traditional significations as spatiality and temporality. However, there are not any real differences 
that divide them from the point of view of their 'functioning' within the meta-structurality and play 
of diffirance. 
As opposed to Gasch6's one-sided tendency toward the articulation of the differences 
between temporalizing and spacing, it is important that we emphasize the common resources from 
which both terms draw in the announcement of their sense. Not only must this be taken into account 
from a historical perspective, it must also be acknowledged in terms of the manner of their 
appropriation and function within deconstruction itself When arche-writing is understood as the 
movement of inscription and articulation (the textual analogue to the dynamics of primordial 
temporalization in Husserl's lectures on time) we see that, in the most profound functional sense, 
ternporalizing is spacing. 
It is Husserl's arrival at the concept of Primordial or Absolute Flux that has had the greatest 
impact on contemporary philosophical thought on temporality, pushing out the limits of the question 
of time to the point at which it has begun to lack any resemblance to traditional (linear) discourse on 
this theme. VA-ien Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger speak of chiasm and time-space respectively, they 
focus on a kind of invaginated time, a folding-unfolding temporality. This form is to be understood 
as giving and encroachment (extending in the sense of extending a gift), while at the same time it 
also expresses extension in terms of stretching / postponement / distanciation / duration. The word 
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4spacing' encompasses both senses of proximity and distance. In functional terms, there is no strict 
schematic (or metaphysical) distinction between, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty's and Heidegger's 
theses on time as intertwining and giving, and on the other, Derrida! s discussion on time as spacing, 
since they all speak of the structurality of an unfolding of differentiation. These differences are 
always already intertwined. Husserl's concept of Primordial or Absolute Flux is the arche-type that 
binds these three writers together in their community of differences. 
0 
For Derrida, once again (but this time to quote from Of Grammatology) 
Spacing ... speaks the articulation of space and 
time, the becoming-space of time and the 
becoming-time of space (OG, P. 68). 
It is here that deconstruction and transcendental-phenomenology find themselves 
theoretically interwoven (and, attitudinally, eye to eye). It is at this point that we should question 
whether it is appropriate to continue adding the prefix 'quasi' to what is clearly a full-blown 
transcendental-phenomenological orientation in Derrida's writing. 
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23. The Return of the Vertical: recovery, postponement and the 
unfolding of depth 
If we take the following passage from The Tain of the Mirror and compare it with a very 
pregnant statement (cf., P. 224) drawn from Of Grammatology, on what is at stake in the opening up 
e of difference, we find that, despite the obvious stylistic similarity to a number of Derrida! s 
discussions on the tracing of difference, a rather interesting absence in the order of content makes 
itself felt in Gasch6's formulation. 
Gasch6 writes, 
A general theory of doubling should help account for duplicity in general. In conformity with 
what infrastructures are supposed to achieve, such a theory will not explain duplicity by way 
of an undivided whole that would precede it .... To explain duplicity and doubling presupposes 
an originary doubling, which would not be preceded by any unity, and which thus annuls the 
traditional restriction of doubling to a matter of accidentality and secondariness (TM, P. 225). 
Gasch6's discourse on the infrastructural condition of possibility of unity and so-called 
simplicity places emphasis on the primacy of duplicity and doubling precisely because unity and 
ideality (identity in general) presupposes difference. Once again, this is not a million miles away 
from the assertion that P must be such that it is also not-not P -- double negation as a positivity -- 
because positive identity or existence 'polarizes' itself through the possibility of its non-being or 
non-existence (its absolute Other). 'Polarization' is meant literally here since positivity is 
inextricably bound up in a dyad. This is a bi-polar opposition of the type that expresses itself on the 
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same plane as such traditional 'absolute dualities' as truth and non-truth, essence and existence, light 
and darkness, etc. Thus, for an identity to crystallize and stand-out it must already be polarized as a 
mirror of itself. Alterity is part of its structure. It must be internally differentiated in order to stand- 
out 'again and against' itself. In other words, when we come to consider the condition of the 
possibility of 'identity, ' we are introduced to the thought of the necessary possibility of division 
within itself This emphasizes the 'contingent' nature of the Ideal by bringing into focus the motion 
of icart (indicated by the logic of duplicity without being reducible to it -- since icart also has its 
temporal meaning as 'interval'). As the condition of the possibility of the Ideal, it is also the very 
threat of its dissolution. 
However, as we have seen, there is an absence in Gaschd's account that Derrida has already 
subjected to phenomenological-deconstruction, which announces the intrinsic importance of the 
question of temporalization (from a phenomenological-genetic point of view [which takes into 
account both the opening up of structure and the structurality of this opening]) in regard to the 
functional sense of 'doubling' -- i. e., the pure tracing of iteration, the primary movement of return. 
Derrida's orientation on the question of the possibility of ideality reveals that its very essence is its 
repeatability, the 'possibility of its repetition. ' Without the possibility of return (returnability / 
iterability) we would be unable to speak of the constitution and maintenance of structure and 
meaning through time. 
12 
For Derrida the re- of re-presentation, when thought in just one of its aspects -- as an index 
to a general duplicity within the heart of the possibility of presence -- is not to be confused with the 
level at which Saussure speaks of language as a network of differences. The latter model relies very 
heavily on 'spatial' tropes of a contemporaneous and linear order. As we have already seen, the 
manner in which the synchronic can be understood 
in terms of the movement of the diachronic (and 
vice-versa) is still a problem. Dýffjrance 
(with an a) designates a field in which synchrony can be 
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thought without co-existence (or in terms of pure simultaneity) and diachrony can be thought 
beyond a mere order of successions. As 'differing and deferring, ' the question of the functioning of 
dififirance refers us to the unfolding of the horizon that is more traditionally considered in terms of 
the space / time dyad, mentioned above. However, the tracing of differences that Derrida has in 
mind is more primordial. It extends the Husserlian concept of 'Primordial or Absolute Flux, ' which 
situates itself in a different and deeper dimension to the 'distinction' (that is often foundational) 
between space and time. In order for differences to stand-out, and thus perform as the condition of 
the possibility of individuation, difference must already contain within itself a reference to much 
more than division or distanciation in spatial or horizontal terms -- which is in contrast to the 
Saussurean schema. Its own functioning must, in principle, presuppose the temporality of 
returnability. 13 
It cannot have escaped the reader's attention that Gasch6 would be entitled to respond with 
the claim that 'returnability' can equally be thought as a function or product of doubling. However, 
quite paradoxically, this would be to undermine the radical sense of duplicity as it is theoretically 
rooted in the concept of the non-Platonic simulacrum. This quasi-simulacrum does not have a 
beginning-point. It has always already been extended toward and away from itself. It is a trace that 
retains through a delay, whose deep structure is that of an articulation that has always already bent 
back upon itself, without completely reaching itself. It is this recursive movement through a certain 
ten7poral detour that is always already at play in the constitution of the double, for this delay is such 
that the movement of re-iteration never quite meets itself in coincidence with itself. It never quite 
reaches back far enough. This is not a defect but the very spacing constitutive of its movement. In a 
sense, there is an absolute past that already inhabits the movement of doubling, for it is only by 
means of this horizon that it can return upon itself dij r-a-mly. There cannot be a process of 
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doubling without a certain returning / retaining, which produces the conditions of possibility for the 
registration of difference. 
The moment of 'deferring' in its intertwining with 'differing' speaks of a certain kind of 
recovery through delay and distanciation. This is apparent in such instances of deferral as that in 
which one might forestall a decision in order to consider other possibilities; to hold at bay, in the 
sense of a movement toward mastery, by reducing the threat of engulfment by the Other; to suspend 
I 
in order to return anew; to dally awhile; play; foreplay, which, in aiming toward producing a 
difference in the other, often defers its telos or eschatological fulfilment in orgasm when its focus 
turns toward its own movementfor its own sake, etc. In the case of deconstructive strategy, play is 
really infinitely extended foreplay. In a certain sense, this constitutes a peculiar kind of suspension 
of its object without necessarily losing sight of it. It is a shift in orientation that aims toward the 
illumination of the various characters of the movement of desire itself-, to reappropriate itself through 
a kind of positional suspension -- a u-topic movement that seeks no 'site' -- which is precisely 
deferral / temporization. 
The 'strategic' here is the expression, in style, of a temporizing / temporalizing movement 
that is always already at work, invisibly tracing out the possibility of sense through the spacing of 
language in general. 
Derrida radicalizes the Saussurean thought of difference and re-presentation by re-storing 
the full measure of the again of the Latin particle re. This is the fulcrum that permits Derrida to shift 
into a deeper dimension than that which is presented by the limits of Saussure's (and, by implication, 
Gaschd's) perspective. Derrida! s transcendental attitude is such that the 'against' cannot strictly be the 
correlate to the 'again' in an equi-primordial relation. It is rather a corollary, a derivative of the 
possibility of againness: the horizon in which differences are crystallized only because of the 
original spacing of return that produces differential 'registration. ' Such registration is produced 
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through the spacing of their encounter. It is this return upon themselves that allows them to stand- 
out against and toward one another as differences. When we speak of 'possibility, ' this meta- 
structural trace is clearly not to be confused with 'actual repetitions' that provide the differences 
through which 'identity' is articulated from one moment to another. Rather, as before, we make 
reference to a'horizon'that is presupposed by their ability to function. 
With the notion of iterability an essential temporal dimension to the sign is re-covered. 
I 
When we speak of a recovery through a certain delay, it is open to question whether this always 
carries with it a 'privative' sense in which to re-cover also means to cover again (as in to conceal 
once more). For our purposes, it is enough to clarify Derrida! s principal claim when we consider the 
re- of re-presentation in terms of the structurality of the 'again and again' (Husserl's immer wieder -- 
that which is in play in the possibility of the 'I can do so again'). This is what makes the 'doubling' at 
work in re-presentation theoretically intelligible. 
Iterability speaks of the constitutive tracing of a certain delay and reserve. It is the structural 
and dynamical parallel to Husserl's movement of retention and protention (and their correlates in 
secondary remembrance and expectation) as 'altering return' -- a re-covering that 'transforms'; an 
appropriating, which also covers up; 'an unveiling that veils and a veiling that unveils. ' The re is an 
index to a pure tracing of return: returnability. 14 
Derrida writes that... 
... the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not 
preceded by any absolute simplicity. Such would be the originary trace. Without retention in 
the minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the 
same, no difference would do its work and no meaning would appear. It is not the question of 
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a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the pure 
movement which produces difference. The [pure] trace is dififirance (OG, P. 62). 
With the thought of 'retention' the truly 'pivotal' function of delay / deferral in repetition 
begins to make itself felt. The sense of the bending-back-of-a-return is not so much a form of self- 
differentiation or doubling, as a kind of self-deflection or refraction -- a detour, 'which produces 
difference' in a retention that transforms. Otherness is like the curvature of the same in its delayed 
return upon itself In intentional terms, delay is the pivot of a bending that permits difference -- 
temporal difference, duration, interval. Derrida! s claim that "without retention ... without a trace 
retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its work" amounts to saying that: 
difference, if it is to function as such, must be able to stand-out as such. Even though this is not to 
say that it requires objectification -- as a thing-like 'presence' -- difference must still, in some sense, 
be able to register, and this involves the ability to stand-outside-itself through a structure of 
repetition. For instance, without such registration the sense of 'substitution' (with all its references to 
detour and postponement), as one of the key moments associated with the performance of a sign, 
would be meaningless -- it would not'give' itself. To be out-standing requires a retentional trace that 
produces such an extension / articulation. 
One of the fundamental differences in standpoint between Gasch6 and Derrida makes itself 
clear here. When Gasch6 speaks of "an originary doubling, which would not be preceded by any 
unity, " he only ever really considers unity in a 'substantive' sense -- thus continuing the opposition 
between syntax and semantics -- by claiming that names, identities, simples, units of meaning, states 
of affairs, etc., are constituted out of the syntactical possibility of differentiation, duplicity, re- 
presentation, etc. However, this is merely like 'the return of the repressed' -- in which the opposite 
pole is in ascendancy -- the syntactical over the semantic. For Derrida, this can only be a preliminary 
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gesture that must surpass the dyad in the form of an inverted sublation. When Derrida writes 
that... "the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded 
by any absolute simplicity, " his analysis is not situated within such a straightforward constitutional 
dyad -- neither is it operating with the classic bifurcation between identity and difference. 
This 'originary synthesis' indicates a different dimension that is situated between the poles of 
continuity and change. It expresses a thought that borrows from, and further elaborates on, the 
I 
structure of pure flux in the Husserlian sense: flux is continuous alteration. 
24. The Angle of diffirance and the Repetition of the Always Already 
According to Derrida, diffirance, "(is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporizing" 
("Diffe'rance, " Margins, P. 13). This also applies to the significations, arche-writing and arche-trace. 
However, this does not mean that diffirance merely functions in a generic sense -- as the 
overarching class or system within which the various infrastructures remain related in an originary 
. 
Tirance signs the point at which state of differentiation (equi-primordial and incommensurable). Dýf 
their differences are effaced. In this sense, diffirance defers difference. 
For Derrida, 
. 
Tirance is to be conceived prior to the separation between deferring as delay and differing D? f 
as the active work of difference (SP, P. 88). 
194 
Gasch6's emphasis on diffirance as a non-unitary matrix appears to set up an opposition to 
the thought in which it expresses its pure unity as the tracing of both difference and deferral 
according to the logic of supplementarity. A non-unitary horizon of equi-primordialities only 
expresses the 'and' in its mundane supplemental sense as a contemporaneous (non-temporal) relation 
of differential ity, whereas diffirance, when thought in its more unitary aspect as the pure dqferring / 
differing unfolding of any possible difference, expresses the Ineinander of deferral and 
I 
differentiation in differre where, as we have already seen, the supplement 'and' also functions as the 
copula 'is. ' The 'is' transforms the 'and' and vice-versa. Spacing and temporizing are not simply 
involved in a relation of contemporaneous differentiality. There is not yet any active difference that 
divides them when they are thought according to the standpoint of diffirance. 
It should be remembered that the signification diffirance does not only function as a quasi- 
concept -- a radical non-metaphysical replacement 
for a host of unifying transcendental principles - 
since, when it succeeds in these terms, it originally designates an attitude / strategy, one which 
remains playful / ironic in relation to itself. As such, it remains, for precisely 'strategic' reasons, 
open. 'ften Derrida, in Of Grammatology, writes... "To make enigmatic what one thinks one 
understands by the words 'proximity, ' 'inimediacy, ' 'presence, (the proximate [Proche], the own 
(proprel, and the pre- of presence) is my final intention in this book" (P. 70) ... he expresses and puts 
into operation a critical gesture that must repeat itself indefinitely. 
The various critical strategies and orientations that Derrida puts to work (or perhaps we 
should say: brings into 'play') are never, at any time, treated as immune to a critical re-reading in 
themselves. The effort to "make enigmatic, " de'stabilize, render uncertain (and thereby, in a sense, 
to restore a certain wonder) also characterizes 
deconstruction's relation to itself. The movement 
'interrupts' the desire for continuity and upsets the balance of the operative language that is criticized 
at the very moment it is put 
into use. Derrida certainly succeeds in his , intention" (interesting how 
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this word resists complete neutralization despite the care with which he subjects it to a kind of 
parenthetical suspension), but not without also failing, at certain critical points, to adequately 
express the subtleties and complexities of Husserl's own phenomenological critique of these 
significations. 
This absence opened the space of our present discussion, in that it is a lack that is deeply 
sedimented within the deconstructive milieu and which continues to operate invisibly 
unreflectively in the reading (as distinct from re-reading as we have defined it) and writing 
(practice) of deconstruction. It marks a non-evolving duplication of Derrida's own readings that 
treats them as if they were exhaustive and, in some sense, canonical. Perhaps we might call this 'the 
problem of the supplement' in that here each further reading of the Derridean text becomes a 
supplement to a supplement. But, this is to speak of the supplement in the mundane sense -- which 
merely continues one kind of reading (adds to it) rather than another. It represents a continuation of 
Derrida's 'strong' reading of Husserl that closes itself off from interruption, i. e., the possibility of a 
Husserlian re-reading of Derrida! s reading of Husserl. Does not Derrida himself encourage such a 
re-reading? Deconstruction is a kind of preface-writing that demands a re-oriented return to the 
original texts -- to re-read these texts, not to bypass them. Derrida tells us "... that above all it is 
necessary to reread those in whose wake I write" (Positions, PA). 
What we have unearthed here is a further, more radical, supplementary reading / orientation 
that has a certain transformative power. We have unfolded a supplementary-alteration in attitude 
which, in line with the radical sense of supplementarity in Derridean thought, has steered between 
the idea of the supplement in the mundane sense of addition and the sense in which it is nothing 
more than a mere distortion - of the type that often creeps 
in through a chain of poor readings (e. g., 
as in a game of Chinese Whispers where after a protracted sequence of repetitions the original 
message has changed due to phonetic and 
intentional discrepancies that occurred during the 
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moments of exchange). It is not so much a question of a difference in content here as an alteration in 
style and tone. 
In style, Gasch6 treats diffirance (as we have seen) primarily in terms of a radical non- 
metaphysical 'replacement' for a metaphysical structural origin. He presupposes, but underplays, the 
sense of diffirance as a radical critical strategy, which institutes itself in the understanding that it 
must perpetually remain a problem to itself. The movement maintains a degree of suspicion in 
regard to itself for reasons of principle. Its efficacy as a stratagem depends on its ability to unsettle 
the relation between reader and text. Gaschd's project does have the virtue of de-mystifying many 
key themes in deconstruction, thus providing a more comfortable basis for a relationship between 
the Derridean text and the uninitiated (or philosophically unconvinced), but this carries a price. It 
conceals the intrinsic discomfort that gives the quasi-concept diffirance its power as a critical 
device. 
Gasch6's analyses are focused, from a Saussurean structural-linguistic point of view, on how 
identity emerges through a matrix of differences -- that the very structure or essence of a sign lies in 
its movement of differentiation and duplication -- that all signification (and ultimately presence) 
involves duplicity. Thus, he overemphasizes the functional value of differences, diffdrends, etc., in 
the production of individuated meanings. However, this orientation, as we have'seen, is still caught 
up within a rigid 'structural' relation analogous to that which obtains between langue and parole or 
synchrony and diachrony in Saussurean linguistics. Unfortunately, it tends to obscure tile more 
profound (meta-structural and meta-genetic) sense of the arche-writing or arche-Iracing of 
dififirance. Iterability 'as the possibility of repetition' -- which is the hinge of the Ineinander of 
differing and deferring as spacing and temporalizing -- indicates an 'originary synthesis' (the sense 
of synthesis being stretched to its utmost 
limits) that permits differences to do their work. Therefore, 
unity, in this context, is not a reference to a 
'substantive' (homogeneous) primordiality, but a pure 
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tracing of similarity in difference and difference in similarity. What we have, then, is an extending 
or spacing that is irreducible to traditional structuralist discourse on doubles, differences, diffidrends, 
etc. Such tracing is an extending as arche-writing -- the writing out of difference and delay 
(continuity and disruption), spatial and temporal extension; duration, which we may also understand 
in the form of the intentional (and / is) dialectical 'extending' of the Living Present. This is a 
horizonal opening of presence -- presencing, as an unfolding or stretching-out of identity in 
difference and difference in identity. 
The deconstructive turn, or re-turn, to the 'question of reflection, ' takes the structure of its 
own movement of return into account and announces a possibility that is absolutely essential to the 
perfonnance of reflection itself in general. A 'critical return' is one that gets closest to the matter, so 
to speak, since it articulates, by the character of its own movement, what is essential to return as 
return in general: a certain movement of delay, detour, reserve. 
The Tain of the Mirror sets itself up as a critique of the language of reflection, but its 
radicality and effectiveness as critique is diminished by an apparent lack in its appreciation of the 
profundity and radicality of Husserl's intentional analyses on reflexivity. This is quite apart from 
missing the descriptive and theoretical power of his phenomenology and its influence on Derrida's 
development of the thought of the trace. The sophistication of Husserl's treatment of the question of 
reflection and the sheer multiplicity of different types / modes of reflexivity illuminated in his 
research on temporality tend to be left out of Gasch6's theorizing. They remain shut out from an 
historical account of the philosophy of reflection whose reductive limits cannot actually 
accommodate the richness of the language of phenomenology. 
Our analyses, which have brought out the crucial importance of the themes of return and 
delay for such a project, have endeavoured, in a certain sense, to remain more faithful to Gasch6's 
original critical aims. His campaign over the question of duplicity is structurally dependent upon the 
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logic of the non-origin of the re-mark (doubling, supplementarity, difference, etc., which concerns 
the 'open' referentiality of the sign, thus problematizing discourse on original and copy). However, 
the temporal resonances of the meaning of origin (and its absence) get lost somewhere. This is why 
the level designated by the non-temporal limitation of Gasch6's orientation is only representative of 
a provisional step for Derrida, for whom this is primarily a strategic detour. His orientation 
ultimately turns to the non-origin of re-marking itself (the passivity in its activity): the tracing of a 
0 
reflexive 'bending back of a return, ' the articulated / articulating hinge that produces differences or 
doubles. It is this subtle shift, which (it may be added) is distinctly phenomenological in style, that 
literally makes all the difference[s]. 
If we return to the earlier diagram of intentional consciousness, it is easy to see that Derrida 
- through the concepts of the hinge, iterability, delay, and detour -- has focused on the very 
structurality of the opening and closing of intentional reflexivity. This 'pivot' of intentionality, this 
condition of its possibility, can be expressed as the angle of deflection that permits differences to 
play -- a play that is irreducible to a mere doubling since it more originally opens its space. 
ig 
. Fig Z La Brisure / The Hiiige 
The Angle of 
Diffidrance 
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It is misleading to speak of the equi-primordiality of duplicity and iterability since the latter, 
especially when understood in terms of its theoretical / conceptual links with Husserl's 
phenomenological (intentional) investigations on primordial temporalization as flux, is the tracing 
out of the possibility of all differences. In contradistinction to Gasch6's standpoint, it is not at all 
clear that iterability and duplication (doubling) can be treated as equi-primordial significations. To 
automatically treat them as such not only indicates a low degree of critical vigilance (and lack of 
0 
reserve in the face of an admittedly seductive, though ultimately unhelpful, designation of 
temporally uncomplicated co-implication / contemporaneity), but it can also seriously hamper our 
understanding of dififirance as temporizing / temporalizing and precisely why it shakes the basis of 
the issue of origins and ends. 
Gaschd writes, 
An original division of the reflected must double the dual relation between the double and 
the original if the original is to lend itself to duplication at all. The originary duplication 
eliminates the possibility of establishing a last source, origin, and original, installing instead 
an infinite reference between originals and doubles. The dual relation of the simple, and the 
secondary, of the original and the double, becomes derivative of this structure of dividing 
reference, or infinite duplicity (TM, P. 226). 
This passage speaks of an originary doubling of that which 'appears' (appearance in the 
widest of its applications, e. g., sign, image, the reflected, etc. ), thus re-situating the language of 
origins as far as traditional discourse on the horizontal relation between originals and copies 
(doubles) is concerned. It brings out a sense in which any identity or simple "... must inscribe the 
possibility of being divided within itselr' (TM, P. 226). For Gasclid, this divisive movement, this 
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duplicity "... logically precedes the philosophical opposition of the simple and the derivative double" 
(Ibid), but we must equally consider what is at stake when Derrida seemingly embraces paradox by 
speaking of diffirance as the trace of an originary non-origin in itself. We may call this the trace or 
tracing of the verticality of doubling. Here, the very tracing of differentiation and doubling that 
produces structure and meaning also does not have an origin. 15 The shift in orientation to the thought 
of an original "structure of dividing reference, or infinite duplicity" that sets up "infinite reference 
01 
between originals and doubles" (Ibid) is one thing, but the consideration of the vertical infinity of 
referentiality itself, as the expression of a passivity in relation to an absolute past (pastness) in which 
it has always-already been in opening and closing, is another. 
It is the articulation of the passive aspect of the ance of diffirance that finds itself 
interminably delayed in the dynamic orientation of Gaschd's analyses. In those studies, the logic of 
duplicity is generally founded upon its gerundial form (doubling), which exhibits a bias that can 
easily lead to the thought of an originary 'activity' that produces the structural conditions for what 
we might, but only at a higher level, call passivity. However, there is a passivity intrinsic to the trace 
itself, which is the articulation of the 'absolute pastness' of diffýrance. Such passivity is not an after- 
effect of its activity. It is not a mere echo, retention, or reverberation of a 'more original activity. ' 
Diffirance 'produces' only in that its own erasure marks out the passivity of a pastness that always 
already inhabits its activity. 
The central issue is surely not the question of 'doubling' (which is one el ct of the spacing- 
out of an extended / extending or temporalizing-spacing), but the question of temporality itself as 
both constituted and constituting (temporalized / temporalizing). When thought in terms of the 
opening up of space through the possibility of its return upon itself, temporality expresses the 
structurality -- articulated / articulating play -- of 'iterability. ' As the pure structurality of repetition, 
iterability is literally the hinge that opens and closes difference (permitting it to re-turn and re-mark 
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upon itself) thus originally articulating the space of doubling. In contradistinction to the main thrust 
of what we have called Gasch6's 'equi-primordiality thesis, ' we must not ignore that the logics of a 
general theory of 'doubling' must, from the standpoint of diffirance, account for the fact that 
doubling is such that it already presupposes (in a more primordial way) the possibility of repetition 
(iterability / repeatability). It must, in principle, have always already recurred. This is essential to its 
structure. 
There never was any (originao repetition. 
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AFTERWORD 
25. The Structure of a Double Ruse 
It has been indicated that the preceding analyses of the relations between phenomenology 
and deconstruction and the emergence of the theme of diffirance have endeavoured to remain 
faithful to Gasch6's original critical aims. This has involved a rather convoluted and labyrinthine 
form of re-reading. With respect to the discourse on the in-difference of the infrastructures of 
diffirance, it must be stressed that this text does not commit itself to adhering to one position (in- 
difference) or its opposite (heterogeneity). The theme of Ineinander or chiasm (the flesh), that has 
insinuated itself throughout this study, refers us to a form of 'infrastructural intertwining' that 
originally permits such differences to stand-out within a 
horizon of belonging. This is a kind of 
middle-ground. It does not, by any means, 
do away with difference, but it does radically tip the 
balance away from heterogeneity of a 
Gaschdan order. 
The Tain of the Mirror's thesis on infrastructural 'heterogeneity' is caught up within the 
specific limits of Derrida! s 
discourse on the polysemic excess of dýffjrance- However, these limits 
only have a provisional function 
in his writing, since his texts are also concerned with the horizon of 
dififirance that is originally constitutive of such semic differences. Although Gaschd is concerned to 
draw out this deeper asemic dimension, 
he delimits the latter by retaining the irreducible differences 
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that are only really appropriate at a semantic level. Given the context of his discourse, he is clearly 
confusing different dimensions. 
When speaking of the 'indifferentiation' between temporalizing and spacing, one must of 
course be careful -- e. g.., from aTunctional' point of view, the constitution of a state of affairs may 
involve a number of different functions to occur simultaneously, but this does not annul their 
differences. One could say that, in a limited sense, there is no temporalizing without spacing and 
vice-versa (e. g., at a more mundane level, there is no thunder without lightning), but this displaces 
the thought of radical heterogeneity. 
To maintain that temporalizing 'is' spacing, in that sense in which the copula 'is' also 
functions as the supplement 'and, must include some sort of difference, but what kind? We have 
spoken of indifference with regard to temporalizing and spacing, which is in stark contrast to 
Gaschd1s view-point. However, It is also important to readjust the orientation in order to take 
difference into account, but without being seduced into using the language of 'heterogeneities. ' The 
point is that we do not simply substitute 
indifference for heterogeneity. The emphasis has been 
placed on a certain movement towards 
indifference; a 'movement' of de-differentiation that does not 
actually 'terminate' in non-difference. 
Principally, this represents a 'strategic' aim. One can just as 
easily show that diffirance expresses a certain 
indifference with respect to its infrastructural horizon. 
It is almost as if Gaschd's conception of the relations between infrastructures is caught up in 
an antiquated concept of the 
'boundary' (Grenze), which is usually expressed in terms of an 
unspecified gap / difference 
between two distinct horizons or poles -- the boundary as signified by 
'two adjacent points. ' Husserl, 
following Brentano's definition of the boundary, withdraws from this 
view. The boundary between spacing and 
temporalizing is not some kind of magnitude, but the site 
of pure 'transition. ' it is not something 
to be crossed, for it is, already, a pure 'crossing-over. ' This 
brings us to the thought of giving, extending, 
blending, intertwining, etc. 
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Gasch6 is quite clear that the heterogeneous infrastructures are tied together, (TM. P. 225), 
but his text says little about what actually provides the thread that binds them. It has been shown 
how we may relate Gasch6's particular theme of heterogeneity (designated by the neologism 
dififirance) to a pluri-dimensionality (a community of differences) that also takes the sense of unity 
into account -- which Gasch6's thesis already presupposes, but cannot explain -- by taking a detour 
through the work of Merleau-Ponty and the concept of 'chiasm' or 'Ineinander. ' This detour raises the 
thought of the 'helix. ' Derrida makes much of this form in his Introduction to Husserl s Origin of 
Geometry. " What is relevant here, is that aspect of helical form that is tied to invagination -- a 
folding-unfolding. 
In these terms, we need not relate the theme of the 'multiplicity, of diffirance to a matrix of 
'heterogeneous' infrastructures, but to an infrastructural intertwining / intra-communality that returns 
upon itself diffirantly. As Merleau-Ponty would say (in a slightly different context), each moment 
offers itself up as flesh to flesh. 
Each moment is not a distinct entity, but only a distinct fold in the 
same flesh. The flesh is the spacing of the 
between. This does not radically alter the thought of the 
movement toward in-difference when we speak of temporalizing and spacing because the originary 
fold of the unfolding of differences 
is indifferent to them. This thought works with respect to the 
intra-coinmunality of diffirance and disrupts the idea of an inter-communality of principally 
heterogeneous infrastructures. 
Therefore, the concept of 'Ineinander' does not nullify difference with respect to -- or from 
the standpoint of -- the horizon of 
diffirance (as the latter names an 'ideal' limit). We merely 
withdraw from the thought of radical 
heterogeneity. The question of the differences between the 
infrastructures is resituated and not eradicated. This is the effect of a vertical analysis rather than 
that of a horizontal order -- but then this 
is the site of the restoration of a certain 'balance. ' Gaschd's 
text does not necessarily occupy a position 
that is diametrically opposed to this thesis. These two 
I 
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texts can be bound together according to the logic of a certain complementarity. One of the primary 
orientations of our analyses can be seen as a careful Derridean response to Gasch6 -- a style of re- 
reading that takes the form of a deconstruction of the manner in which he has appropriated a number 
of the central motifs of deconstruction. Gasch6's reading had to be re-read with a certain critical 
reserve and, at the same time, his text had to be invited to dance at the very limits of exhaustion. 
Although strategically understated, we do not at any time question the scholarly devotion to 
Derrida's writing and the inspired development of Derridean themes in Gasch6's book. However, it 
has been necessary to question some of the stronger claims made by The Tain of the Mirror 
regarding the nature of Derrida's relation to Husserl -- especially the degree to which deconstruction 
is said to transgress the limits of phenomenology through some arche-typal orientation expressed in 
terms of an overarching theory of duplicity. What about a 'general theory of delayT It would be 
difficult to employ the language of equi-primordiality within the horizon of such a theme. The 
language of doubling itself would also be deferred -- interminably. The study of the constitutive 
logics of such a language would demand this, for the double and the difference it reflects still 
implies the language of visibility to some extent, whereas 'delay' is never actually present. Deferral 
only leaves traces of itself through the differences that it produces. 
Our inquiries have directed themselves to the task of unearthing the temporalizing dynamics 
and structures that are presupposed by Gasch6's discourse on doubling, but which are not rigorously 
examined or thernatized in his study. The principal thesis of The Tain of the Mirror has not so much 
been turned on its head as shaken at its foundations and turned inside-out in order to redress a 
balance that is lacking in its account. 
Gaschd is sincere in his undertaking to articulate a general theory of duplicity according to 
rigorous principles. However, alongside (doubling) our determination to remain faithful to his 
original aims, it has also been necessary for the present analysis to institute a certain degree of 
206 
double-dealing (strategic duplicity) in its engagement with the pivotal concept of The Tain of the 
Mirror. -- 
Phenomenologically, it would be all too easy to apply a sympathetic reading to Gasch6ls 
writing on doubling and to bend or twist his expressions to fit almost anything. This has been 
avoided for purely strategic reasons. It is just as easy to twist them out of shape. In this sense, we 
are guilty of having applied the same methods as Derrida in his 'strong' reading of Husserl. The 
I 
irony is fascinating and disturbing. In both cases, the deconstuctive critique turns toward, and upon, 
the greatest of allies. 
The relevance of this strategic route has to do with the need to unravel the labyrinth of 
strategies in play in Derrida! s own texts. 
One could argue that we arrive at a certain impasse when we admit that there is indeed an 
element of duplicity in the structural performance of retention, i. e., the double intentionality of 
retention. There are strong elements of doubling involved, but only within certain limits -_ 
parameters that we have adumbrated in regard to their formal development in Derrida's studies on 
Husserl's lectures on temporality. Unearthing this historico-philosophical trace has ultimately served 
to flesh-out the 'depths' of doubling. 
A 'general theory' of doubling has significant value as a tool for understanding the 'linguistic, 
orientation of certain Derridean texts (which is one of the reasons why Gaschd, s book is so 
important), but the generality of its application does not stretch as far as to cover the specific 
theoretical traces at work in Derrida! s engagement with Husserl on the questions of time, 
intentionality, reflexivity, and the sign. There are other writings by Derrida that 'qualify' his ideas 
from a temporal point of view and, 
just as importantly, there are other forms of re-reading that 
encourage the subtle resonances of their phenomenological significance to stand out. Our form of 
re-reading has focused on the 
'other' writing. This 'other' writing is also 'other' to the contemporary 
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Derridian text. The 'history' of his writing is the marking out of changes in orientation and strategy. 
This history (I speak of Geschichte and not just Historie) is like a 'community' of Derridas. * 
The Deffida (or Derridas) of the period 1962-68 who works through the constitutive logics 
that are at the heart of discourse on doubling is earlier and quite other to the writer who occupies 
central position in Gaschd's book-' These two Derridas were invited to enter into discourse with one 
another. Thus, Gaschd's text is presented here on the basis of a ruse (this is one of the duplicitous 
aspects of our critique of duplicity). The empirical and authorial difference that is represented by the 
insertion of his writing into this history has a strong metaphorical value. One of its principal 
functions is to focus the reader's attention on the alterity that already inhabits Derrida's own writing. 
It is a double-ruse in that our'strong' reading of Gaschd's book mirrors Derrida's 'strong' reading of 
Husserl -- and, as such, it also translates as a 'strong' Derridean reading of Derrida. 
... And what 
is the philosophical value of this 'strong' reading? The reader may spiral back to 
the Preface and Introduction of this study to re-view the question. 
Several references have been made to a distinction between Derrida and Gaschd's Derrida. 
At first sight, this appears to be a legitimate distinction that calls for attention. However, it also 
proved to be highly problematic from the outset. To ask: "who is the 'true' Derrida? " is rather like 
asking whether it is possible to step 
into the same piece of water twice. The only really appropriate 
response would be to say that, in this case, one can not even step into the same piece of water once. 
'Derrida' is elusive. Perhaps this creature is nothing more than a chimera (a ghost in the textual 
machine) for he always resists capture -- as 
he unbuilds and re-constructs in a multiplicity of 
changing styles within a textual maze, which 
does not refer back to any centre that can be pinned 
down. In an important sense, our engagement with Gaschd is to actually encounter Derrida. This is 
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why we have strategically bracketed the excesses of 'our' Derridian discourse on phenomenology 
and allowed them to remain in place in Gasch6's Derrida. 
To bring out what is highly questionable in Gasch6's text, regarding some of the central 
claims of deconstruction, is not to set 'the' (or 'my') Derrida in opposition to his, but to establish a 
dialogue between Derrida and Derrida and Deffida 
Derrida himself has set the precedent, for this is what he is doing when he engages with 
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Husserl (particularly in Speech and Phenomena -- remembering the strange tension that exists 
between this text and the earlier Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry). Husserl is invited to 
enter into discourse with Husserl. 
The 'tone' of this present study, with respect to its treatment of Gaschd, is 'strong' purely 
from a strategic and methodological point of view. The principal value for such a reading has to do 
with the way in which it mirrors Derrida! s 'strong' reading of Husserl. It thus provides a radical 
opening for a careful re-reading of the space / spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction. 
It is this spacing, as articulated through the medium of Gaschd's text, that has been at the focus of 
this critique -- a medium, a tone, a contextual grid that needed to be unravelled. Gasch6's text has 
been a necessary detour, an oblique form of return to Derrida. 2 
It is difficult to express the subtlety of Dcrrida! s treatment of Husscrt by just talking 'about' 
the structures of his analyses, as most commentators have done (including Evans, Gasch6 and 
Wood). These structures have to speak-out by a process of a certain 'doing. ' By 'strategically' 
appealing to Derrida! s early studies on phenomenology, as the foundation of later developments in 
his writing (a kind of genealogy of deconstructive technique), we have put into performance an 
analogue to one of the provisional working strategies of Derrida's Speech and Phenomena in its 
engagement with Husserl's enterprise. The emphasis here lies with its 'provisional' character 
because, of course, Derrida's approach is not limited to a linear architecture -- but then, neither is 
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Husserl's phenomenology (although Derrida! s reading, in Speech and Phenomena, sometimes tends 
toward another view). There are other temporalities that need to be fleshed out. 3 
It is only in a superficial sense that this thesis appears to be a historiological. analysis. If the 
discourse has travelled the route of Historie, it has only been to disentangle a certain linear paradigm 
-- a necessary detour for a reading that is ultimately interested in the pluri-dimensional and non- 
linear horizons of Geschichte. However, at the same time, we have also seen that we cannot do away 
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with the language of linearity completely. It is re-situated with respect to the metaphysical primacy 
that has always been attached to it. 
Herein lies the value of Husserl's research on time-consciousness and its significance for 
Derrida's writing. The temporal analyses are inaugurated in order to describe how linearity itself is 
constituted. 
The space of mediation that Gasch6's text provides in this study gives us (as indicated above) 
a kind of refracted view of the way in which Derrida! s own texts are always in dialogue with 
themselves. Our aim has been to bring out the complicity between time and alterity in Derrida's 
writing by example. Gaschd's text facilitates this form of engagement because of the seriousness 
with which it explores the 'philosophical' (rather than just the literary) tone of Derrida! s 
deconstruction[s]. It is very close to that which courses its way through Derrida! s early writing on 
diffirance (as a quasi-concept and strategy that is aimed at the deconstruction of phenomenological 
discourse on presence). We say very close, but not coincidental. Once again, it also speaks of a 
period that is slightly later, for the tone suggests that the delimitation of the phenomenological 
project, as the mere restoration of the metaphysics of presence. is an enterprise that has somehow 
been exhausted. It expresses a confidence in the readings that have preceded and conditioned this 
confidence. This is a singularly linear orientation that is in need of critique precisely because it fails 
to address ilse? f crilically. 
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In the publication of Derrida's MA thesis (1990, but written 1953-4) we find a recently 
composed Foreword in which he, once again, expresses the problem of hearing-oneself-speak. After 
so many years since writing the dissertation, this is hardly surprising. The interval that marks the 
difference between the writing of the Foreword and the earlier text -- to which it attaches itself -- 
represents a massive lacuna at the heart of the book's self-relation. The theme is re-iterated as the 
announcement of a problem, one which echoes itself with an intensity that must force us to take up 
this issue in reference to the structure and strategy of Derrida! s readings of the philosophy of the 
West and, in particular, his readings of Husserl's phenomenology. The contemporary Derrida is, 
perhaps, no more intimate with the Derrida[s] of the fifties and sixties than with the Derrida whose 
voice resounds through Gaschd's book. 
26. A Strategy of Indifference 
There are some moments in this text that present the reader with a radical departure from 
certain accepted canons of thought regarding 
Derrida! s writing. Our discourse on the movement of 
de-differentiation or in-differentiation of dififirance may seem a little surprising, but this particular 
point of view (and strategy 
for re-reading Derrida) has certain advantages that have become evident 
throughout the unfolding of the examination. The stratagem does seem somewhat perverse given 
)that Derrida is, in many ways, the champion of 
difference, but the basic logic has to do with a 
generally unthernatized structural aspect of 
Derrida's ineta-general orientation in his re-readings of 
the philosophy of the West. 
It marks a perspective that tends toward the reduction of this history to 
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the desire for pure, unmediated presence -- a history that is said to have forgotten the value of 
difference and absence. Interestingly enough, Derrida shows this indifference to difference through a 
de-differentiation or reduction of the complex and richly diverse moments of the history of the 
Occident to one continuous thread (a reduction to linearity). There is a sense in which these 
moments or threads are also de-historicized -- where one epoch can be exchanged for another, or can 
be juxtaposed on the basis of the logic in which they can be said to be mere repetitions and 
0 
systematizations of a more general motivation and orientation of which they are visible traces. This 
echoes Freudian discourse on the unconscious and the kind of symbolic compression that occurs 
through repression and the constitution of neuroses -- where anything can stand for anything else. 
4 
This is not to suggest that deconstruction is a neurotic enterprise -- although one could 
certainly have fun with such an analogue -- but it is worthy of note that there is a similar movement 
of repression, disavowal and de-differentiation. Actually, the analogue can be further extended by 
remarking that unlike psychosis, which would involve stepping over the line - into a beyond of 
philosophy -- the deconstructive neurosis tends toward pushing the line outwards. Deconstruction 
may be a little eccentric (outside the center of logocentrism) in its re-readings of the philosophy of 
the Occident, but it is definitely not crazy. 
There are other senses of indifferentiation or de-differentiation that have been unearthed -- 
not least of which have to do with the deconstruction of the traditional differences that have always 
separated time and space in philosophical and scientific discourse. The route to this de- 
differentiation is to be found in the way in which Derrida has responded to one of the most profound 
and disturbing aspects of Husserl's method of reduction (epochj) -- namely, the fact that the limits 
placed on the power of the reduction are not in any way 'essential. '5 Husserl. recognised tile essential 
openness of the epochd and placed strategic limits on its application. However, he also called for a 
reduction of the reduction -- a task that Derrida appears to have taken up. Since there is no limit to 
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what can be bracketed, that which can be consigned to parenthetical suspension is subjected to a 
certain process of in-differentiation. This is so not only with respect to the other bracketed matter, 
but also (and perhaps most importantly) with respect to the attitude of the one doing the bracketing. 
For instance, we are familiar with that aspect of deconstruction where it comports itself on the basis 
that it is indifferent regarding the 'values' of its textual other. Primarily, this means that it refuses to 
take up a position. This is an attitude that can best be described as the u-topic (non-located / non- 
lieu) orientation of deconstructive writing. Such in-difference is not simply one strategy among 
others, it is a strategy for re-reading diffirantly. It is an epochi of the epochi and, as such, it requires 
further analysis. 6 This is to respond to what its movement already requires of itself. 
Although Derrida! s writing has restored certain rights to difference, he has not rid his own 
discourse and methodology of a certain movement of indifferentiation that has actually helped to 
facilitate the restoration. In this instance, such indifference has also been the opening up of 
difference. Derrida's playful use of the compression of meaning that ties difference and deferral 
together in the French verb diffdrer and the Latin expression differrc (from which it is derived) is an 
outstanding example of a movement toward indifference. It permits a discourse that does not restrict 
itself to the difference that has classically separated space and time. Consider also, the compression 
at work in Derrida! s association of Anwesenheit and Gegenwart in relation to Being, when he 
deviates from Heidegger's meaning by reducing these significations to traces of a history that has 
always thought of them in terms of immediate presence in a point-like present. This is the 
conceptual grid that he grafts, most inappropriately, onto Husserl's discourse on temporalization -- a 
discourse whose primary concern is with the question of how differences are constituted as the 
condition of the possibility of the temporal extension of consciousness and the consciousness of 
temporal extension. This is the horizon (and not the point) of the Living Present -- the stage of the 
play of differences. 
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Husserl's analyses on the question of temporal continuity were not in any way conducted at 
the expense of the issue of difference. Alterity is by no means relegated to a merely secondary role. 
Temporalizing consciousness is a differentiating and deferring consciousness. It is the consciousness 
of the differences that constitute the extendedness of experience. The primary theme is the question 
of how there is consciousness of duration as 'continuous alteration. ' 
Similarly, Derrida has not shown that Husserl's phenomenology understates the constitutive 
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role of absence in the presencing of presence. Phenomenologically speaking, presence is not 
synonymous with visibility. According to Derrida! s view-point, invisibility or absence, when 
expressed according to the Western metaphysical 'language of presence, ' is only thought in a 
privative sense -- as a mere negation of presence. Derrida restores certain rights to absence in their 
own terms but, contrary to the 'strong' thrust of his writing, he has not shown that these rights were 
ever at risk in the phenomenological horizon. 
Derrida's texts constantly dig up evidence in Husserl's work that tends to undermine his own 
'strong' thesis against the limits of phenomenology, e. g., Husserl's discourse on the 'Idea in the 
Kantian sense, ' which always recedes beyond the grasp of any finite articulation; the Thing of 
experience as an empty pole, a mere 
X of a play of changing adumbrations; the empty intention or 
the protention that intends the future as an empty extension; and the epochi, as a radical movement 
of delay and transformational return, which undermines positional totalization or metaphysical 
grounding. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has extended and deepened some of these Husserlian 
themes. Their respective forms of phenomenological 
discourse on absence upset the specific 
hierarchical structure of the language of presence that Derrida's writing wields like the sword of 
Damocles (occasionally bashing phenomenology over the head with it). Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology of the 
invisible names that which is always the horizon or the possibility of tile 
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visible. Invisibility is not merely an after-effect of presence, the negation of presence or the non- 
fulfilment of an anticipated presence. A certain occultation is always contemporaneous with that 
which comes to presence as the horizon of its possibility, because non-presence is always already 
the other face of presence and the betweenness of presencing. Like the spacing-between things, the 
invisible flesh through which they are intertwined is that which originally permits them to stand-out 
as differentiated folds of the same flesh. In temporal terms, according to the logic of chiasm, this 
horizon does not merely lie behind us, it is also that which constitutes the fabric of the futural field 
ahead of us. Without this folding-unfolding, which is not present in itself, but is like the wave of the 
foam of presence, there would not be a horizon of presence at all. 
Derrida has little to say about Merleau-Ponty, which is odd. This represents a rather glaring 
absence in his writing, which is certainly worth pointing out even though we cannot pursue the issue 
here. 
There are numerous examples of other phenomenological forms of approach to absence, 
difference and nothingness that do not treat them as if they were merely secondary to presence. 
Sartre's writing stands out in this respect. There are also many examples in Heidegger's work, e. g., 
his definition of that aspect of the phenomenon that involves a certain withholding of itself, the 
essential emptiness "or nothing that makes up the receptacle ("The Thing, " Poetry, Language, 
Thought), the fourth dimension of time as a giving that is not a presence or the 'It' of 'It gives, ' etc. 
It has been one of the primary aims of this study to show how Husserl uncovered a language 
and critical orientation that demonstrate the possibility and urgency of a discourse that takes absence 
into account in the constitution of presence. It has also been our task to demonstrate that his 
phenomenology, when understood on the basis of its motivation and the manner in which it unfolds 
through the method of epochi, is a radical critique of the very language of presence that Derrida 
accuses him of sustaining. 
215 
As for the meaning of the present as Gegenwart, we have seen how Husserl's discourse on 
time consciousness does not treat it as a point-like now (as Derrida! s Speech and Phenomena likes to 
claim from time to time -- but only according to one type of reading). For Husserl, the present is 
always a 'field. ' It is always stretched -- an extended-extending. The movement of primordial 
temporalization, as explored by phenomenology, names a form of play that is always already at the 
heart of the present and presence. This 'always-al ready' is that for which the trace is another name -- 
while arche-writing is another name for the structure of the trace. 
Derrida has experimented with forms of discourse that express a sense of pastness that is not 
preceded by an originary present. His texts also consider the theme of futurity in a way that does not 
restrict it to the thought of a mere future-present. It is maintained that such restriction is the mark of 
the limitation of the language of time itself, which, as far as Derrida is concerned, can never be more 
than a metaphysical concept -- and that it "... cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace" 
(OG, P. 67). It is precisely along these lines that he speaks of an incompatibility between retention 
and trace. However, retention is not reducible to the production of a line of modified present-tenses. 
Although Deffida is quick to criticize retention in these terms, he actually employs the more 
sophisticated Husserlian meaning of such retaining and repeptition, in reference to dif Prance, in 
-order to express what 
is at stake in the heart of the presencing of the present (and thus, any kind of 
presence). This permits him to raise the theme of the trace as the name of an urgent task, in its own 
right. it is through the question of the structure of retention that such a task becomes intelligible. 
It would only be true to say that retention alone is insufficient in describing the structure of 
the trace. However, when it is thought 
in terms of the second intentionality of retention and its 
intrinsic intertwining with protention, then the alleged incompatibility dissolves: for the trace is also 
a tracing -- and it has always already 
been so, thus confounding the logic of origins and ends. The 
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trace does not merely lie behind presence and the present, it also lies ahead. It is before in that dual 
sense in which it is also after. 
if we are to speak about what is at issue in the possibility "... that a postmetaphysical account 
of temporality can rise again after Derrida" (Wood. The Deconstruction of Time, P. 113 [my 
emphasis]), then surely we must turn, with care, to that which already lies before Derrida. 
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NOTES 
NOTES: Preface 
0 
1. See David Wood's The Deconstruction of Time (Part 2, Chapter 2, P. 392). Also Oskar 
Kraus's "Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness" (1930), in The Philosophy of 
Brentano (pp. 234-39). Edited by Linda L. McAlister. Duckworth. 1976. 
There is a very accessible collection of Brentano's proto-phenomeno logical studies, entitled: 
Space, Time, and the Continuum which brings together a range of transformations in his thought that 
exceed the limitations placed on his discourse on time in the critical analyses of Husserl's 
Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness (see bibliography). 
2. Although the now is the 'between' of past and future as the fold of their negotiation, the 
between about which we speak makes reference to much more than this. There is a deeper sense of 
betweenness that is the flesh of the three ekstases through which they are originarily intertwined 
through which they are always already unfolding into one another. 
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Heidegger writes, 
Time-space ... is the name 
for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of 
futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the 
space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the opening up, 
of future, past and present (On Time and Being [OTB] P. 14). 
This 'opening up' is that which also provides time 'as we usually know it. ' The sense of 
extending here, as a ýqrespatial' opening which makes room for space, can be traced back to 1927 
and Heidegger's account of the meaning of extension and continuity (in terms of their relation to 
motion) in Aristotle's Physics. Extension is irreducible to spatiality in the usual sense. 
Extension and continuity are already implicit in motion. They are earlier than motion in the 
sense of being apriori conditions of motion itself.. Extension here has a broader sense than 
specifically spatial dimension. Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows 
extendedness (The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology. [BPP] P. 243). 
In Husserlian terms, the threefold is given through retention, primal impression, and 
protention -- whose correlates in the early language of Heidegger are retaining, enpresentation, and 
expecting. The transcendental sense of Temporalitdt (as expressed by Heidegger) names the 
standpoint which focuses on the 'transversal play' of the three ekstases: the giving that is constitutive 
of the horizon of Zeitlichkeit in which things abide in a 'present' which, by being already outside 
itself (spanned) has its flowing continuity. The'now` is founded through this flux (and in a peculiar 
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sense the contemporaneity) of the three horizons of Temporality -- the 'giving' of each to each in 
their communality of differentiation. 
Heidegger tells us that... 
... the unity of time's 
three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each. This 
interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth 
dimension, so to speak -- not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter (OTB, P. 15). 
This play or interplay is not an aftereffect. The extending of the ekstases toward one another 
is that which originally constitutes time as a stretching-out of past, present, and future. This is the 
fourth dimension of time, which Heidegger calls 'true time' -_ yet it lacks any resemblance to time as 
we usually know it. It is not 'in' time as some kind of process that has duration. It is not of the order 
of successivity. This is also the case 
for Merleau-Ponty's discourse on time as chiasm. As radical as 
these orientations appear, their ideas constitute a deepening of a dimension uncovered in Husserl's 
thought on time as 'Primordial or Absolute Flux. ' The principal theme is intra-play. 
In every case, the traditional disjunction between time and space has found itself to become 
unravelled. Temporalizing and spatializing cannot 
be articulated adequately within the bounds of the 
classic dyad. This century has 
distinguished itself in the deconstruction of the differences that have 
traditionally separated discourse on time from that of a spatial order. For example, the conceptual 
framework of Einstein's theory of relativity is such that space and time should be treated as one 
word: spacetime. 
220 
NOTES: Introduction 
1. Gasch6's text plays a significant role in this thesis for a number of 'strategic' reasons. See 
Chapter One. 
2. For a comprehensive list of combatants, see Evans's Introduction and Conclusion to 
Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice [SD]. 
3. Evans considers this question in the Introduction when he writes, 
it could be argued that the very idea of a critical reading is committed to ideals of truth and 
epistemic accountability that are deconstructed by the texts under consideration. We seem to 
be caught in a dilemma: either we move within the medium of Derridean. writing, in which 
case we cannot raise the traditional questions of justification and legitimation, or we don't 
move within that medium, in which case our traditional questions will a priori receive a 
negative answer, while the Derridean will reject or deconstruct the very questions 
themselves. In either case, a critic may well accuse us of being philosophically naive. 
But it is less clear that the project of a critical reading of Derrida is not to measure his 
work against some external, traditional standard that is rejected by the texts under 
consideration. The task is rather to measure his work against standard that it claims for itself 
(SD. PAV). 
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In the Conclusion of Strategies of Deconstruction, Evans writes that "The present book 
responds to Derrida! s own call for a 'strong' reading of his texts" (P. 167). And, he insists that "The 
results of this critical reading are discouraging: the texts we have examined overwhelmingly fail to 
live up to their own standards" (Ibid). 
4. In the quotation below, Evans raises an important distinction that must be taken into account. 
0 
I certainly grant that every reading is a performance or transformation (a 'writing, ' if 
you will), but not every performance succeeds in being a reading. What one is left with in 
Speech and Phenomena ... is a performance that, instead of reading the texts ostensibly under 
discussion, enframes them as raw material for a writing that, for whatever reasons, ultimately 
exhibits no interest in those texts themselves (Ibid. P. 178). 
5. Derrida speaks of Speech and Phenomena as the "... other side (recto or verso, as you wish) 
of another essay, published in 1962" ("Implications. " Positions. P. 5): Husserl's "Origin of 
Geometry": An Introduction. 
Note: This latter title will generally appear in the present thesis as Derrida! s Introduction to 
Husserl's "Origin of Geometry. " For details concerning its publication, please refer to the 
bibliography. 
6. A comparative study of "Ousia and Grammd" (Margins of Philosophy [Margins]) and 
., Heidegger's Basic Problems qf Phenomenology -- with "Time and Being" (On Time and Being 
[OTB]) in mind throughout -- provides a fertile ground on which to examine some of the 
fundamental differences between Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle's thesis on time and that of 
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Derrida. We cannot pursue this task here. Although they both reject the idea of the now as a point 
(and time, in general, as a linear succession of nows), Heidegger discovers the basis for such a 
rejection way back in antiquity. This tends to problematize Derrida! s specific characterization of the 
history of Western metaphysics discussed so far. Derrida does acknowledge (on P. 59 of "Ousia and 
Gramm6, " [Margins]), to a certain extent, that there is evidence in Aristotle's account of the now 
(nun) which does not restrict it to a point-like moment, but he surely understates its significance 
given the pivotal role that this theme has played in his earlier critique of Husserl's discourse on time. 
7. David Wood's fascinating book, The Deconstruction of Time occupies a kind of middle 
position that is closest to my own orientation (my association with Professor Wood during the time 
that he was my personal supervisor of postgraduate study at Warwick University may have more 
than a little to do with this). Although I do not focus on his book here, at many points my text 
carefully responds to some of its principal questions. 
8. But, does not Husserl say that the Thing is in a certain sense a sign of itself? See Ideas 1: 
Sec. 52. Derrida quotes this himself in a footnote to Speech and Phenomena (P. 61). He asks the 
question "Is being a sign of itself (index sui) the same as not being a sign? It is in this sense that, 'in 
the very instant' it is perceived, experience is a sign of itself, present to itself without the indicative 
detour. " 
Consider the context of Husserl's comment below. 
The thing that appears to sense, which has the sensory properties of shape, colour, smell, and 
taste, is ... far from being a sign for something else, though to a certain extent a sign. for itself 
(Ideas 1: Sec. 52). 
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The real issue here concerns the question of 'substitution. ' For Husserl, what appears is the 
Thing in its multiplicity of manners of appearing. These 'moments' of the self-exhibition of 
something are not 'substitutes' that appear in its place. They are the modes of the Thing's givenness - 
- the as it gives itself They are, 
in a certain sense, transparent in that they always point beyond 
themselves to the greater whole of which they are articulations. They do not principally function as 0 
substitutive indicators. They are expressions of the Thing in its giving of itseýf Also, see note 10 
(Introduction) below. 
All references to Ideas I will be to the classic translation by Boyce Gibson -- Ideas: General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. (I developed a Particular fondness for this translation after 
reading extracts from Boyce-Gibson's journal where he re-counted his close association with 
Husserl during his visit in the late twenties to discuss the issue of translation). For further details on 
this text in German and the more contemporary translation by Fred Kersten, see the bibliography. 
9. See The Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness, Sec. 6, P. 38-9. All references are to 
the Churchill translation (see bibliography and note 25 of Chapter Two). 
Unfortunately, Derrida treats representation and repetition as if they were intimately tied up 
in a 'relation of equivalence. ' For reasons of strategy, I endeavour to show that representation itself is 
dependent upon the possibility of repetition; that if there is a chiasmic relation then it is 
'asymmetrical. ' Only by working through the problems of how to read this relation can we arrive at 
what Derrida is really trying to express 
through his discourse on re-presentation. And, perhaps then 
we shall find ourselves 
in a better position to re-evaluate its meaning in relation to the theme of 
repetition as explored 
by phenomenology. 
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Wood also takes up the issue of whether we can be satisfied with the view that repetition and 
representation are bound up in a symmetrical relation when he writes, 
First, the relationship involved in repetition is neutral with respect to whether the 
repetition actually occurs (the possibility will do), and second, there is consequently no 
constitutive, internal relationship between actual signs so repeated. Other actual signs would 
I- 
just be proof of repeatability and not in themselves required ... even if one acknowledges the 
dependence of representation on repetition, that is not a relation of equivalence (P. 120). 
In Husserl's temporal investigations we find a distinction that Derrida! s meta-general level of 
discourse on representation and repetition has difficulty acknowledging. This is in regard to the 
difference between retention and recollection and their distinctive styles of temporal self-expression. 
Both intentionalities are types of 'return, ' but the second comes closer to what we might call re- 
presentation (certainly in its more traditional sense). For Husserl, retention (or primary 
remembrance) is 'presentative' and literally provides the horizon, time, space (or spacing) that 
permits recollection. Derrida's reduction of the logics of 'return' to the language of representation 
does not easily grasp such a distinction. It is rather the pure structurality of return that traces itself as 
the condition of the possibility of both. 
10. If we consider these faces or profiles as signs, then their 'value' as signs does not present 
itself until their function has been fulfilled in their pointing away from themselves since, as 
indicated above, their performance as signs involves their self-effacement before that which they 
(re)present. The visible, as Merleau-Ponty says, is "centered on a nucleus of absence" (The Visible 
and the Invisible. [VI], P. 229). It surpasses itself toward the invisible in much the same manner in 
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which (to use one of Husserl's favourite examples) one face of a die expresses its position and sense 
within a matrix of meaning as part of a whole. It is a moment of a certain structural unity -- a 
referential horizon -- most of which is unseen at any one time. The perceived 'face' of the die is not 
the terminus of the perception, but through a certain kind of self-effacement, it is an index (an 
arrow) to something more beyond the field of vision. It does not present itself as a totality, but as 
reference-to a totality: as precisely one face of a die. The face or aspect gains its sense (returns upon 
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itself) from the transcendent whole of which it is a part -- and thus, it can be said that the invisible is 
that by means of which the visible is possible as the expression of a unity of sense. We say 
'expression' and not 'indication' for these significational moments do not principally substitute for 
that which they deliver up. In this context, they are the speaking-out of the Thing itself (although 
this must be understood within the space of the phenomenological reduction) -- not some kind of 
indicative medium that speaks on its behalf. This, of course, is a radically different dimension to the 
one in which Derrida discourses on the sign. However, neither orientation actually contradicts the 
other when it comes to the fundamental question concerning the constitutive performance of absence 
in the presencing of any kind of presence. Derrida does not have the monopoly on this. 
11. Ideas 1. Sec. 3 8. P. 112. It is in this work (1913) that Husserl breaks with the inside / outside 
parallelism, preferring the contrast between immanence and transcendence. Despite the title of The 
Phenomenology of 'Internal' Time Consciousness, this text can also be seen as one which moves 
within the later set of categories. Even though the latest of the material of the lectures on time- 
consciousness (edited by Heidegger) pre-dates Ideas I by at least three years, the text was not 
published until 1928 after extensive revision. 
In Speech and Phenomena, much of Derrida! s argument against Husserl's discourse on 
perception exhibits the structure of a polemical attack on the inside / outside dyad, which is wily lie 
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introduces the thought of spacing as the exteriority that already inhabits the interiority of 
autoaffection (see Speech and Phenomena, P. 86). This is understandable in view of the title of 
Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. But here, interiority is more the sign of a 
parenthetical exclusion of the language of objective time (which includes objective space). The 
question of transcendence is not bracketed alongside this. Neither is it a question of bracketing the 
horizon of objects in favour of a pure subjectivity. It is rather a turn to the horizon that is 
constitutive of the extendedness and objectivity of objects. This is to re-situate the question of 
exteriority (including spatiality as extension) not to exclude it. 
Derrida is wrong to reduce Husserlian phenomenology to the attempt to bracket out all 
exteriority and transcendence. For Husserl, the immanence I transcendence parallelism is not to be 
confused with the traditional inside / outside dyad. The movement of temporalizing consciousness 
(internal time consciousness) is constituted by a play of immanence and transcendence -- which is 
the fundamental structurality of intentionality itself. 
The whole of The Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness is, in a very special sense, 
an exercise in eidetic reduction -- imaginatively varying its subject-matter and playing at the limit, 
beyond which it would begin to lose its inner coherence. The use of auditory examples is a useful 
way of introducing questions about time -- and they do eventually break out into their spatial 
moments. Tones run off into other tones as the unfolding of a symphony as-a-ivhole. From the point 
of view of the 'whole, ' each note shares a certain 'virtual' contemporaneity with respect to the other 
notes that, together, form a system, a space. Each new tone, as it passes over into the next, always 
has reference to that which preceded it. Consider how often Husserl refers to the retentional flow as 
a sinking-down (Herabsinken). Consider, also in these terms, the importance of the thought of 
, sedimentation' (a singularly spatial signification) in any reference to the hearing of a melody or 
symphony (as a quasi-simultaneous whole) when the notes, which make up the whole, are only ever 
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heard successively as they sink into the past. Retentim is the unfolding of a certain 'spacing; an 
extending of difference between the presence of that which is occurring, that which has already 
occurred, and that which is to come -- for each note and itg-retentional train is also protentionally 
ahead of itself in relation to that which is to follow: protention / anticipation. See the diagrams in 
Husserl's PITC, which represent one of the two intentionalities of the retentional flow as a vertical 
line -- thus signifying 'depth. ' The horizontal line represents that which is constituted by the second 
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intentionality of retention (through the intertwining of retention and protention), which both spaces- 
out experience and permits the giving of past moments all-at-once as -- that is, within a single grasp 
as opposed to running-off successively. Here, though, the all-at-once does not erase the differences 
in their temporal signatures. Rather, it is a product of the way in which the continuum gives itself 
all-at-once --just as a horizon stretches out into the distance before one's immediate field of vision. 
The spatial analogue gives us differences in distance by changing tones, e. g., a distant mountain 
range is co-present with whatever is immediately in front of the observer, but the considerable 
difference in distance is marked by its blue hue. 
Note: This is a purely stationery analogue, since distance also gives different degrees of change in 
perspective, e. g., when looking out of the window of a moving train, the trees along the side of the 
track flash past one's field of vision at great speed while the view of the same mountain range 
beyond is relatively unchanging. 
12. In the passage below, Derrida continues his analysis of the difference between Husserl and 
Pierce. 
The difference between Husserl's and Pierce's phenomenologies is fundamental since 
it concerns the concept of the sign and of the manifestation of presence, the relationships 
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between the re-presentation and the originary presentation of the thing itself (truth). " On this 
point Pierce is undoubtedly closer to the inventor of the word phenomenology: Lambert 
proposed in fact to 'reduce the theory of things to the theory of signs. ' According to the 
'phaneoroscopy' or phenomenology' of Pierce, manifestation itself does not reveal a 
presence, it makes a sign. One may read in the Principle of Phenomenology that 'the idea of 
manifestation is the idea of a sign. ' There is thus no phenomenality reducing the sign or the 
representer so that the thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its 
presence. The so-called 'thing-itself is always already a representamen shielded from the 
simplicity of intuitive evidence. The representamen functions only by giving rise to an 
interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified 
conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move. The property of the representamen is 
to be itself and another, to be produced as a structure of reference, to be separated from itself 
The property of the representamen is not to be proper [propre], that is to say absolutely 
proximate to itself (prope, proprius). The represented is always already a 
representamen ... From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs (P. 
49- 
50). 
Note: Derrida quotes from The Philosophy of Pierce: Selected Writings. [ed. Justus Buchler 
(New York and London, 1940)], ch. 7, p. 93. 
What does presence mean in this context? For Derrida here, the function of the word 
presence appears to be synonymous with that of the actual exhibition of a metaphysical thing-in- 
itself. Manifestation is a presencing that is not to be restricted to this metaphysical standpoint. Both 
Pierce and Derrida are right in this respect. However, to say that "nicinffestation itself does not reveal 
a presence, it makes a sign" suggests a certain degree of confusion. Signs are forms of presencing. 
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Manifestation, as the making of a sign, is a kind of speaking-out. It is not somehow opposed to -- or 
beyond -- the language of presence. It is only at odds with the definition of the logic of presence that 
Derrida incorrectly attributes to Husserlian phenomenology. 
Derrida appeals to the call "to the thing / matters themselves" as the justification for his 
attribution of a residual metaphysic to Husserl's phenomenology. This is a completely inappropriate 
reading of what he is really doing. The phenomenological call is actually an ironical rejoinder to 
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Kant's metaphysical concept of the Thing-in-itself -- which is purported to reside beyond that which 
is actually given to experience. Husserl is concerned only with the phenomenological description of 
that which is actually given and the structures of its givenness-- without making the Kantian 
metaphysical leap. 
13. See PA 1. of Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols. 
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? ... But no! 
with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world! 
(Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; and of the longest error; zenith of 
mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA). 
14. Consider the 'working note' below (from The Visible and Invisible) which was written by 
Merleau-Ponty in May, 1959. 
Perception -- unconscious -- One* -- retrograde movement of the true -- sedimentation (of 
which the retrograde movement of the true is a part) May 2,1959 
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The taxi driver at Manchester, saying to me (I understood only a few seconds later, so 
briskly were the words-'struck off): I will ask the police where Brixton Avenue is. -- 
Likewise, in the tobacco shop, the woman's phrase: Shall I wrap them together? which I 
understood only after a few seconds -- and all at once cf. recognizing someone from a 
description, or the event from a schematic prevision: once the meaning -is-given the signs 
take on the full value of 'signs. ' But first the meaning must be given. But then how is it 
given? Probably a chunk of the verbal chain is identified, projects the meaning which returns 
upon the signs ... The meaning 
is 'perceived' and the Riickgestaltung [back-formation / 
reverse-structuration] is a 'perception. ' This means: there is a germination of what will have 
been understood. (Insight and Aha Erlebnis) -- And that means: the perception (the first one) 
is of itseýf an openness upon a field of Gestaltungen -- And that means: perception is 
unconsciousness. What is the unconscious? What functions as a pivot, an existential, and in 
this sense, is and is not perceived. For one perceives only figures upon levels -- And one 
perceives them only by relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived. -- The 
perception of the level: always between the objects, it is that about which .... The occult of 
psychoanalysis (the unconscious) is of this sort... (P. 189. Translation modified). 
Note: there is an important translator's comment on this: On -- the indefinite pronoun ". A 
ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation bears within 
itself the germ of a dream or a depersonalization... " (Phenomenology of Perception. P. 215. 
[French edition -- P. 2491). 
15. Derrida's critique of the distinction between indication (Anzeichen) and expression 
(Ausdruck) in Husserl's phenomenology leads, by way of a confusion of different dimensions of 
discourse, to the proposition that there must be an indicative detour in living speech. However, 
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given the context in which Husserl distinguishes between these two types of significational 
functions, this would involve the paradox of having to first intimate to oneself that which one 
already wanted to say. 
For Husserl, the distinction announces itself in the difference between intersubjective 
communication as mediated by linguistic signs and the immanence of meaning to the one who is 
motivated to speak. All signs express something, but in the case of interlocution, they do not 
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immediately 'express' the lived-meaning of the speaker to the auditor, who has to interpret this. Such 
a movement of interpretation through an 'indicative' medium would be quite superfluous for the 
speaker. Therefore, Husserl concludes that although all signs express something, not all expressions 
presuppose an indicative function. 
Derrida sees indication as the principal defining characteristic of the sign in general. 
However, this is only one function of the sign. Indication is that aspect of the sign which, by 
pointing, stands in for that which is not present. This is an 'essential' component of a symbol. 
However, the very sense of such a substitutive performance still relies on an original self-erasure, or 
surpassing -- through which the sign's opacity can first be constituted. If it originally terminated in 
itself, it would not point beyond itself. When someone points, do we look at the finger that points, or 
that towards which the finger is pointing? We only turn back to the finger if there is an apparent 
absence of meaning -- and we do so only fleetingly in order to re-orient ourselves for another look in 
the direction toward which it points. 
A symbol stands outside itself. It recedes before that toward which it points and is thus, 
principally, not an obJject. It can indeed become opaque as an object in itself -- as a proxy or even 
the thing itself, but this already presupposes a more original transparency or self-effacement. A 
religious icon, for instance, is not an object of worship in itself. If it was, then it would be an 'idol' -- 
which would be the dissolution of itself as a symbol for somelhing 01her. The icon points away 
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from itself -- it is an indicator of the sublime, which may not be visible, but need not necessarily 
be 
classed as non-present. It is everywhere and nowhere. The sublime is u-topic. One cannot say, 
"Look, there it is! " One also would not say this of 'roundness' by trying to pinpoint such an anexact 
morphological type in a specific location in objective space. The indicative or substitutive aspect of 
the sign is that which can only stand-out by being indicated itself -- and this can only be a 
consequence of an original detour through that towards which it points (e. g., a meaningful state of 
affairs) in the pointing-away from itself. If that towards which it points is absent, in the sense in 
which there is a lack of significance or the non-fulfilment of a particular form of expectation, then it 
turns back upon itself -- which makes it stand-out in its substitutive capacity in-the-place of that 
toward which it points. 
If a sign (and expression is one kind of sign) does not fulfil its expressive function, it 
becomes opaque -- as a sign that indicates an absence. It stands-out in-the-place-of something else. 
If then, we determine the meaning of indication in terms of a certain kind of substitution, we can just 
as easily argue that this is far from being the most general or primordial of significational functions. 
One could then say that the indicative and substitutional aspect of the sign is a sign of the 
nonfulfilment of an expressive sign. 
16. Words function as signs by pointing away from themselves -- and this applies to 
commutiication and soliloquy. 
If a sign principally terminated in itself, rather than effacing itself through the presentation of 
something Other, it would cease to Tunction! as a signfor something Other. 
Imagine driving along a highway, looking to the side of the road for a sign, only to find a 
signpost that displayed nothing more than the word 'SIGN. ' What would its referential function 
consist in? At most it would be nothing more than an empty token of a generic type which, in itself, 
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has no value. We would not even be able to speak in terms of signification as a horizon in which 
signs refer only to other signs, since there is no 'otherness' in play. 
17. The theme of Vorstellung (representation) in Husserl's phenomenology, and its treatment by 
Derrida, is subjected to an exemplary set of analyses in Evans's text (see Strategies of 
Deconstruction. Chapter 5. "Wanting-to-Say and Representation"). He reminds us that Husserl 
0 
distinguishes 13 different senses of representation in the Logical Investigations [LI] (See section 44 
of the 5th investigation of this text). Evans'suggests that the most general meaning of Vorstellung is 
probably the 4th: Vorstellung as objectivating act. This can be applied to a multiplicity of different 
acts, such as perception, predication, imagination, etc. Vorstellung as a representative or proxy, 
however, is Husserl's eighth sense of this term. And this, according to Evans, is Derrida! s third sense 
-- like a picture of something. But here, Husserl prefers to use the term Repr5sentation for the 
representation of an object by another object. (See P. 79 of Strategies of Deconstruction). 
E. g.: 
Vergegenwartigung = presentiation / presentification 
Stellvertreter = proxy / substitute 
Reprdsentant = representative 
18. Although Heidegger maintains that the "... expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a 
methodological conception" (BT. P. 50. H. 27/28) and that "... it does not characterize the what of the 
objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research" (Ibid), it is 
not so clear that he actually appreciated the full import of this. The real force of the thought of 
phenomenology 'as possibility' (BT, pp. 62/3 H. 38/9, and the last paragraphs of "My Way to 
Phenomenology" [OTB]) only makes itself felt in Heidegger's writing after the analyses of Behkq 
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and Time are already well underway. The fulfilment of the project as originally outlined in this text 
finds itself deferred again and again. The movement of withholding / detour / deferral, which 
Husserl. calls the methodological epocN, expresses that which is already operative at the heart of 
time, history, Being, and presence. This was to become a focal point in Heidegger's later thinking. 
Consider the following reference to the expression epocW in Heidegger's lecture "Time and 
Being" (On Time and Being [OTB]. P. 9). 
The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and 
the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, 
epochi. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a 
span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual 
holding-back of itself in favour of the discernibility of the gift, that is, of Being with regard 
to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, 
nor can it be calculated as necessary. Still, what is appropriate shows itself in the destiny, 
what is appropriate shows itself in the belonging together of the epochs. The epochs overlap 
each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and 
more obscured in different ways (Ibid). 
Fundamentally, one can say that the epochi is the temporizing form of temporality. We are 
justified in this suggestion because the fundamental form of the el)ochi is a postponement that 
maintains, a rupture that retains. It holds back in order to make manifest that which is hidden. It is 
simultaneously a holding-together and a holding apart and it is the inauguration of movement 
I 
without being movement in itself. 
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19. The following passage is the first introduction to the thought of Temporalitdt in Being and 
Time. Temporalitdt means timeliness (not, as one might have imagined, Zeitlichkeit). 
Heidegger writes, 
the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning 
I 
determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its Temporal determinateness 
(seine temporale Bestimmtheit). Thus, the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting 
Being as such includes working out the Temporality (Temporalitat) of Being. In the 
exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first 
be concretely answered (Being and Time. PAO / H. 19. Translation modified). 
Consider this further reference to Ternporalittit in The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology. 
What has to be shown is this: temporality is the condition of the possibility of all 
understanding of being; being is understood and conceptually apprehended by means of 
tin7e. When temporality functions as such a condition we call it Temporality [Teinporalitdtl 
(P. 274). 
20. According to Heidegger, 
I 
Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care (BT. P. 3)74 / H. 326. 
Translation modified). 
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and 
The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality (Ibid. P. 375 / H. 327). 
21. Heidegger writes 
f 
true time appears as the'It' of which we speak when we say: It gives Being. The destiny in 
which It gives Being lies in the extending of time. Does this reference show time to be the'lf 
that gives Being? By no means. For time itself remains the gift of an 'It gives' whose giving 
preserves the realm in which presence is extended. Thus the 'It' continues to be 
undetermined, and we ourselves continue to be puzzled ("Time and Being, " OTB. P. 17). 
22. Heidegger echoes St. Augustine's question in the lecture entitled, "Time and Being" [OTB, 
P. 10]. Being always has to be understood in terms of time, but the relationship is not necessarily of a 
symmetrical order. See, also the opening sentences to Heidegger's lecture, "The Concept of Time" 
(The Concept of Time). 
23. "Time and Being, " M, P. 24. 
24. The question of death that Derrida incorporates into the analyses of Speech and Phenomena 
is another very obvious sign of a Heideggerian orientation in his re-reading of Husserl. See the 
chapter "Meaning and Representation. " And when Derrida engages in a critical examination of the 
phenomenological distinction -- in the Logical Investigations [ 190 1] between expression (A usdruck) 
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and indication (Anzeichen) -- he does so by working through material drawn from a later period in 
Husserl's thought [1905-10]. 
25. Genetic and structural analyses (with reference to phenomenological-temporal studies) 
express themselves in a complementary format under the heading of historicity in Husserl's Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The following quotation from Derrida! s 
Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" is of considerable length. It is presented here in full 
because it represents a pivotal phase in his account of Husserl's phenomenological approach to the 
question of historicity. 
Derrida writes 
traditional development, from which every culture acquires totality at each moment (in a 
mediate or immediate synchrony), does not have a causal style of genesis. In the world of 
natural reality subject to a causal type of development, sedimentation is not that of an 
acquired sense that is continually and internally recapitulated. There is no natural history for 
Husserl any more than for Hegel, and for the same reasons. The analogy will be even greater 
when we see that, for Husserl as for Hegel, culture itself in its finite empirical units is not 
sufficient to constitute the pure unity of a history. This will be the case for all 
anthropological cultures which do not participate in the European eidos. Here the Origin 
repeats Husserl's critique of Dilthey in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. " While 
completely accepting Dilthey's criticism of the causalist naturalization of spirit and the 
principle of an original typo-morphology of cultural totalities, Husserl wishes to extract the 
idea of science (i. e., above all, philosophy) from the subjective immanence of the 
Weltanschauung. 
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As cultural form, the idea of science is undoubtedly also part of the Weltanschauung, 
and the content of science and philosophy is undoubtedly transmitted according to the same 
process as all other forms of culture and tradition in general. The process is analogous, if not 
identical, to that of internal time-consciousness described from the noematic viewpoint in the 
1905-10 lectures. The present appears neither as the rupture nor the effect of a past, but as 
the retention of a present past, i. e., as the retention of a retention, and so forth. Since the 
retentional power of living consciousness is finite, this consciousness preserves 
significations, values, and past acts as habitualities (habitus) and sedimentations. Traditional 
sedimentation in the communal world will have the function of going beyond the retentional 
finitude of individual consciousness. Of course, sedimentary retention is not only the 
condition for the possibility of protention: it also belongs essentially to the general form of 
protention, which is itself conceived under the absolutely unique and universal form of the 
Living Present. The latter, which is the primordial absolute of temporality, is only 
maintenance of what indeed must be called the dialectic of protention and retention, despite 
Husserl's repugnance for that word. In the movement of protention, the present is retained 
and gone beyond as past present, in order to constitute another primordial and original 
Absolute, another Living Present. Without this extraordinary absolute alteration of what 
always remains in the concrete and lived form of an absolute Present, without this always 
renewed originality of an absolute primordiality, always present and always lived as such, no 
history would be possible (pp. 57-8). 
26. These issues permit us to explore a number of different forms of critique on the 'non- 
reflexivity' of Gasch6's language throughout his engagement with Husserlian phenomenology and 
Derridean deconstruction. We shall see how the criticism brings into question the limits of the 
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central argument of The Tain of the Mirror -- a thesis that takes the form of a critique of the theme 
of reflexivity. Our deconstruction of Derrida's deconstruction of the themes of time and essence 
involves playing this orientation off against a deconstruction of 'Gasch6's Derrida' (so to speak). The 
latter is still caught up in a synchronic / diachronic dyad that replays the perennial distinction 
between stasis and becoming. This, in turn, is inappropriately grafted onto Husserl's 
phenomenology. 
27. The question of time radically upsets any idea of instantaneity when it comes to hearing- 
oneself-speak. This passage (Crisis. Part III A, Sec. 50, P. 172) is an exemplary instance of how 
Husserl's own analyses radically upset Derrida! s assignment of such a form of simultaneity to the 
phenomenology of self-discourse. It also clearly shows how the issue of alterity is far from being 
excluded from Husserl's examinations of the structure of the unity of a life-history. 
28. See Derrida! s essay "Ellipsis, " where he writes of "... the center as the sign of a hole that the 
book tried to fill. The center was the name of the hole" (WD, P. 297). 
29. Gadamer's discourse on play problematizes Derrida! s reduction of hermeneutical method to a 
teleological or totalizing orientation when he writes of a "... to-and-fro movement which is not tied to 
any goal which would bring it to an end..... The movement which is play has no goal which brings it 
to an end; rather it remains itself in constant repetition" (Truth and Method. P. 93). 
30. See Husserl's Ideas 1, Sec. 3 1, P. 97. 
240 
31.1 am reminded of Husserl's phenomenological orientation in the Cr, -sis and his discourse on 
the Earth as the general ground horizon of spatiality without it being a spatial object in the usual 
sense. It is principally afrom-which and not a toward-which of observation. Derrida, himself, makes 
reference to this in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry. " See P. 85. 
32. Derrida's comment on the reduction having been thought in the mere "lacklustre guise of a 
I 
technique" (IHOG. P. 153) gestures toward a deeper sense, which expresses his clear understanding 
of the implications of the meaning of the epochi in terms of a pure movement of delay. 
33. These issues are brought out in the chapter entitled "Signs and the Blink of an Eye" (Speech 
and Phenomena), Derrida plays with Husserl's use of the term Augenblick. His inappropriate 
assignment of a corpuscular concept of the now to perception -- as a point-like moment -- in 
Husserl's phenomenology revolves around this. 
In Strategies of Deconstruction, Evans focuses on Derrida! s translation of the term 
Augenblick. It is shown how he over-plays the theme of the now as an "instantaneous moment" 
without giving due credit to Husserl's discourse on the now as something that is "extended" with 
past and futural horizons. Augenblick, when read as "moment, " is suitably ambiguous as to allow it 
to be translated as "blink. " The word "moment" lends itself to the thought of "instantancity" -- which 
works its way throughout Derrida's reading of Husserl's discourse on primal impression, the now, 
perception, and presence in general. Derrida is also quick to point out that even a blink has duration 
-- but somehow he creates the erroneous impression that this shakes the basis of Husserl's discourse. 
Derrida! s translation of Augenblick, as Evans shows, leads to the proposition that... "It is the 
instantaneous moment of the blink, which closes the eye, not the glance, which opens up a field of 
vision" (SD. P. 97). Evans is right to express that this reading, given the actual Husserlian context, is 
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untenable. Derrida appears to go out of his way to conceal that Husserl's phenomenology principally 
concerns itself with 'horizons' of experience. 
The image of instantaneity in the visual metaphor of the blink has its auditory correlate in the 
expression 'hearing-oneself-speak. ' Derrida's writing is deeply critical of the theme of the 
'simultaneity' of speaking and hearing-oneself-speak. According to his perspective, there is a 'delay. ' 
The temporalizing and spacing of 'autoaffectiod that is constitutive of their interwovenness, carries 
this within itself. Given Derrida! s emphasis on the logics of 'hearing-oneself-speak, ' as a means of 
access to the thought in which phenomenology is set up as the last stronghold of the metaphysics of 
presence (logocentrism and phonocentrism), it is interesting how Derrida employs the 'visual' simile 
"blink of an eye" to criticize Husserl's discourse on the now. Has Derrida done this on purpose? The 
ear does not blink (the oscillations of the inner ear do not really constitute a suitable analogue either 
because they do not actually close off the auditory field). This is intriguing, given Derrida! s 
underlying critique of phonocentrism and the degree to which his critique of Husserl is determined 
by it. 
Careful reading undermines the 'strong' tone of Derrida! s engagement with Husserl in Speech 
and Phenomena. Consequently, much of the technical (or quasi-technical) aspects of this text also 
fall if determined purely on the basis that they are meant to constitute a critique of Husserl's 
phenomenology. However, the overall direction is rather fascinating. Much of what holds the 
discourse together is, in essence, interesting for its own sake in that it questions the traditional 
distinctions (inside / outside, presence / absence, structure / genesis, etc. ) that revolve around the 
traditional bifurcation between space and time, and how this distinction has traced out a path that 
has always limited critical reflection on this question. 
The wordly, communication, alterity in general, is classically thought in spatial terms. If the 
voice, the audible, the phoneme, can be thought in purely temporal terms without reference to the 
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spatial then we 'seem' to get closer to the pure form of inner life, the immediate as given within the 
temporal present. It is this thought that Derrida attempts to deconstruct -- although, as already 
indicated (see note 11 above), he is quite incorrect in his assumption that Husserl is working within 
the bounds of the inside / outside dyad). As it was for Kant, temporality is the primordial 'form' of 
inner life for Husserl. His own descriptive analyses show that even here there is a certain 
participation in spatiality from a structural point of view -- and this is not, as Husserl undoubtedly 
recognized, merely a consequence of an inadequate reserve of temporal tropes. Note: Husserl, of 
course, was not limited to Kant's Euclidean models of space and time. 
In his own way, Derrida has brought this issue into the foreground. It is one that is worth 
exploring -- for he has indeed restored the spatializing theme of difference to the temporalizing 
theme of deferral (temporization). However, it must be noted that Derrida seems to attribute a 
'doctrinal' position to Husserl (regarding his utilization of aural examples of temporal experience in 
The Phenomenology ofInternal Time Consciousness) -- and this is inappropriate. Husserl's choice of 
examples is motivated by reasons of strategy and method only. It is to be granted that according to 
the 'classic' distinction between space and time this may be indicative of a strategy that is attempting 
to rid itself of all references to 'spatiality. ' Husserl recognizes, though, that the analogies between the 
dynamic structures of temporal articulation (Ablaufsphdnomene) and that of a spatial order 
(Abschattungen) are so close as to be almost indistinguishable (see Chapter One of this thesis). 
There is a vast difference between the employment of what could be called a phonocentric 
form of description -- which is utilized for 'strategic' purposes -- and full-blown phonocentrism. 
Time, as articulated in classic discourse, had to be Husserl's point of entry. Aural examples were. the 
purest form of articulation of time, in a tradition where space and time were rigidly differentiated, in 
that the unfolding of sounds brings out the phenomenon of 'successivity' in a focused manner that 
can be distinguished from objective-spatial (coextensive) concerns that are traditionally associated 
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with sight. However, in his approach to the essence of what defined time in classical terms -- as a 
linear or4er of successions -- Husserl found himself tackling the question of what 'constituted' such a 
linear continuum of successivity. We are introduced to the thought of temporality or, more precisely, 
a temporalizing horizon which is pluri-dimensional, inexpressible in the language of linearity (yet 
constitutive of linearity), and not 'in' time. For Husserl, this region (for which "names are lacking" 
[see PITC. Sec. 36, P. 100]) is a Primordial Flux -- but it is not'in process! See Husserl's PITC, Sec. 
35, P. 99. -- or see note 13 of chapter two of this thesis for a quotation of the key passage. 
If we reduce the signification 'time' to an order of linear successivity of point-like nows, then 
Derrida is right to say that time is nothing more than a model, a metaphor, a metaphysical concept. 
However, the phenomenological orientations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, which do 
not express time in this way, show that we still have temporality! It may not resemble the classic 
arche-tecture -- and we do need to produce a few more names -- but we still have temporality. 
Derrida deconstructs the history of the signification 'time' and uncovers the impoverishment 
produced through the imposition of the theme of linearity by exposing the narrowness of its 
limitations with respect to the pluri-dimensional richness of symbolic (non-linear) experience. Part 
of this involves turning the thought of the now inside-out. Spacing does not designate distanciation 
between moments -- like, now-points strung out along a linear continuum. For Derrida, spacing is 
that which is already at the heart of the now itself. Contrary to the overall tone of Derrida's Speech 
and Phenomena, the logics of this are to be found in Husserl's discourse on the extended / extending 
structure of the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) and Heidegger's analyses in Being and Time. 
34. At the 'end' of philosophy one has to be aware that this is not a realizable point of 
termination. The end of philosophy is a horizon that constantly recedes into the distance, not a 
termination point or a springboard for some quantum leap into a beyond of philosophy. See 
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Derrida! s own remarks on the problematic idea of the 'death of philosophy' in the interview 
"Implications" (Positions. P. 6). The distance to some mythical moment of absolute closure can no 
more be crossed than Achilles, to repeat a favourite paradigm, can catch up with the tortoise. Of 
course, Derrida's utilization of the term 'closure' steers clear of any notions of absolute termination. 
It is rather related to the idea of a working-through of philosophical problems to the point of their 
own 'exhaustion. ' 
However, there is a great difference between the establishment of such a task, as a regulative 
principle of critical comportment, and the actual fulfilment of the project. One cannot help feeling 
that Derrida exhausted himself first. 
N 
His writing between the years of 1962-68 presents an agenda that is not necessarily in place 
after this phase -- or at least the agenda is one that was radically transformed. What does bind the 
different time frames in Derrida's writing is a continued working-through of the methods of 
deconstruction. The working theoretical models with which Derrida plays are still in performance, 
but the themes to which his writing directs itself -- and the style of the writing itself -- have 
obviously changed (although the publication of his MA dissertation has marked a kind of return). 
Does this suggest, perhaps, that Derrida just got bored with the task in which to "... think play 
radically the ontological and transcendental problematics must first be seriously exhausted... " (OG. 
P. 50) or that this is a task that has already been completed? Does Derrida really leave us with so 
little left to say? Surely not! The above sentence is misleading in the rather inappropriate 
italicization of the word exhausted (with all its eschatological resonances). 
The emphasis, given the larger context of the passage, should rest with "seriously. " This 
makes reference to 'attitude' -- the 'how' rather than the 'what. ' Derrida is expressing the 
complementary relationship between play and rigour. 
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NOTES: Chapter One 
1. The main passage from which this epigram has been taken reads as follows. 
The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book, even if, even today, it is 
within the form of the book that new writings -- literary or theoretical -- allow themselves to 
be, for better or for worse, encased. It is less a question of confiding new writings to the 
envelope of a book than of finally reading what wrote itself between the lines in the volumes. 
That is why, beginning to write without the line, one begins also to reread past writing 
according to a different organization of space. If today the problem of reading occupies the 
forefront of science, it is because of this suspense between two ages of writing. Because we 
are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently (OG, P. 86-7). 
2. The logics of such a suspension are analogous to the way in which Freud, for instance, 
would often dismiss rejections of his psychoanalytical interpretations of neurotic symptoms, by 
passing off such rejection (on the part of the analysand) as a sign of 'resistance. ' This dismissal is 
almost like telling a patient to remain uninvolved in the analysis because s/he lacks the 'relevant 
qualifications. ' The exigencies of therapeutic analysis may require this to some extent, but it points 
to a refusal of dialogue that is still basically an act of violence. 
13. Extension plays a crucial role here. Following Derrida's taste for the ambiguities or 
compression of meanings inherent in Latin, the word 'extensio' means extension in a number of 
246 
different senses -- the most pertinent of which is intimately tied to 'articulation! in the form of a 
'hinged' movement which 'stretches-out. ' 
Extensio = (Latin) a stretching out. Extension / extend / extending 
1. Latin: ex [out] and tendere [to stretch out]. 
2. Extension, in the sense of a delay / deferment- -- to extend the date of a task to be completed. 
The second definition brings out one of the specific temporal senses of extension (and of 
course 'extending) that interests Derrida in his discourse on temporization. The first sense refers to 
the extending of an arm connected to a pivot -- to stretch out one of the arms of a hinge -- to extend 
a folding joint. In this instance, temporalizing and spatializing are intrinsically intertwined. 
With Derrida's metaphor of the hinge, we find the point at which 'extension' is indissolubly 
linked to 'articulation. ' As Derrida writes, "To articulate is to joint. " ("Ellipsis, " P. 300. WD). In a 
certain sense extension is articulation. Consider the passage below from Derrida! s Of 
Grammatology, which is a quotation from RoberVs dictionary. 
... brisure Uoint, break] broken, cracked part. Cf. breach, crack, fracture, fault, split, 
fragment, [breche, cassure, fracture, faille, fente, fragment. ] -- Hinged articulation of two 
parts of wood- or metal-work. The hinge, the brisure [folding-joint] of a shutter. Cf. joint 
(OG. P. 65). 
Ekteeno = stretch, extend, prolong (defer or postpone). 
Teeno = tighten, stretch out, strain, tend-to, lead-to, be inclined. 
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In these terms, from a Husserlian phenomenological standpoint, articulation, extension and 
temporization express the fundamental intentional structurality of consciousness in its tendency 
toward something... 
4. The shift to a 'transcendental' orientation -- which Gasch6's text surely represents (throughout 
its adumbration of the theme of duplicity) -- should not be treated as a levelling' procedure for all 
I 
related (and unrelated) subjects. Differences in 'depth' can be found in abundance. Contrary to the 
general orientation of Gaschd's analyses, that which is designated as transcendental does not 
automatically reveal itself to be equi-primordial with whatever else happens to share this 
designation. There is above all, depth -- further horizons to be unfolded. 
Derrida has focused on one of the deepest levels explored by phenomenology (temporalizing 
flux) and has taken the project of excavation even further. On the one hand, we have spoken of the 
quasi-transcendental orientation of Derrida! s writing -- which means that it is transcendental in a 
purely analogous sense -- but, on the other hand, one must be clear that when deconstruction 
responds to the phenomenological call for 'a critique of transcendental experience, ' its language, 
focus and style of comportment are nothing other than the expressions of the phenomenological- 
transcendental orientation itself The method by which phenomenology approaches this attitude 
involves a process of deconstruction / Abbau. It is a technique that is initiated within the horizon of 
the epochd -- which means that the form of the approach is one which aims toward the suspension of 
any metaphysical decision. Phenomenology, in its most radical form as deconstruction, does not aim 
toward an outside or beyond of transcendental experience. It is the question of a refusal to simply 
take-part-in orlive' the philosophical schematics that are woven into the fabric of what we name as 
transcendental. It is a postponement of a merely passive form of participation, in order to actively 
reflect. Only in the space constituted by this shift can one 'play. ' The similarities between the 
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phenomenological epochi and the procedure of writing under erasure (sous rature) are so close in 
structure and performance as to be almost indistinguishable. 
The meta-transcendental orientation of much of Derrida's writing still takes place, for reasons 
of principle and necessity, within the history of the writing out of the transcendental. Tbere is no 
absolute limit. It represents nothing more than an outer edge to a tradition /a history of radical 
reorientations whose movements, rather than establishing absolute boundaries, have always pushed 
out the envelope. 
The meta- or quasi-transcendental motif of diffirance does not refer us to a plane, but to 
incalculable depths. The image of equi-primordiality, although seductive, can do nothing more than 
obfuscate this depth. One is reminded of Merleau-Ponty's last working notes (see The Visible and 
the Invisible) in which he expresses the urgency and necessity of shifting from a horizontal form of 
interrogation to a 'vertical' orientation. This call has clearly been introjected into deconstructive 
strategy. 
The transcendental does not signify a place or site -- it is u-topic (no-place / non-lieu). It 
speaks rather of horizons of orientation. There are always further depths to uncover since no 
orientation is wholly transparent to itself. See also notes 12 and 15 of this chapter below. 
5. Although Of Grammatology is by no means the only text in which Gasch6 finds his 
inspiration for the further development of Derrida! s logic of doubling, it does, as we shall see, 
literally provide the hinge that extends itself at the heart of his analyses. 
6. The line is the potentiality of the now as point; a point that erases itself as a limit in the 
tracing of a circle. 
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7. In an interview with Richard Kearney (Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers 
[DCC7]), Derrida confess6s that he studied Husserl in a "studious and painstaking fashion" (P. 109). 
He maintains that Husserl taught him "a certain methodical prudence and reserve, a rigorous 
technique of unravelling and formulating questions" (Ibid). However, despite this, Derrida maintains 
that his own deconstructive techniques go beyond the limits of the language and strategies of 
Husserlian phenomenology. 
My discovery of the genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and 
Freud ... helped me to take the step beyond phenomenology towards a more radical, 'non- 
philosophical' questioning, while never renouncing the discipline and methodological rigour 
of phenomenology (Ibid). 
The question is: does Derrida actually maintain 'the discipline and methodological rigour of 
phenomenology'? This is a very difficult question to answer. Why is it that he attributes so much 
value to the 'genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and Freud' without acknowledging his 
indebtedness to Husserl's genetic phenomenology? 
It comes as no surprise that Derrida cites Freud and Nietzsche when he speaks of taking a 
'step beyond' phenomenology -- for it is undoubtedly on the basis of his readings of their texts that 
he returns to phenomenology. There is much in the structure and style of Derrida's writing on 
Husserl's phenomenology that reads like a psychoanalysis. We find that the 'beyond' speaks more of 
a change in the path of the return to the same -- or a change in the site or location of a certain 
questioning rather than a surpassing of the questioned itself. Of course, the questioned must 
consequently show itself in a different light, but not necessarily without qualified resistance. 
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This is not so much a 'step beyond' as an 'altering return. ' A discourse that speaks of a 
'beyond' should be treated with the utmost care and with a high degree of suspicion. We need to 
suspend some of Derrida! s more sensational claims because there are subtler; and more significant 
issues to be taken into account that are often obfuscated by his 'strong' theses. 
8. There are important differences between Husserl's meaning and that of Heidegger and yet 
Gasch6 ostensibly limits his definition of Abbau to its meaning for Heidegger as 'destruction. ' 
Derrida, however, does not restrict it to this. His appropriation and critical implementation of the 
strategy of Abbau (unbuilding) indicates an important grasp of its Husserlian sense -- with its 
intrinsic relation to A ujbau (re-construction) -- by putting the 'coW (bringing-together) back into 'de- 
struction. ' 
Claude Evans is also convinced that Gaschd limits himself to a Heideggerian reading of 
Abbau (unbuilding, deconstruction). See The Journal of the British Society. for Phenomenology 
(JBSP). Vol. 21, No. 1, January, 1990. Article, "Phenomenological Deconstruction: Husserl's Method 
of Abbau. " J. Claude Evans. He is correct to point out, in contradistinction to Gaschd, that it was 
Husserl and not Heidegger who first developed the thought of Abbau (which can be traced back to 
1921). Even Heidegger clearly acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl for allowing him access to 
unpublished manuscripts. See Being and Time, footnote v., of Chapter Two of the Introduction 
(P. 489) and footnote ii., of Chapter One of Division One (Ibid). Heidegger was simply first to 
publish. 
9. The following quotations from Derrida's Of GrammatoloSy are fascinating in the character of 
their adoption of Husserlian insights for the purpose of conlem1wizing, Saussure. They stress the 
decisive phenomenological difference between 'appearing' and 'appearances. ' 
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It is well known that Saussure distinguishes between the 'sound-image' and the 
objective sound (p. 98) [p. 68]. He thus gives himself the right to 'reduce, ' in the 
phenomenological sense, the sciences of acoustics and physiology at the moment that he 
institutes the science of language. The sound-image is the structure of the appearing of the 
sound [Vapparaltre A son] which is anything but the sound appearing [le son apparaissant]. 
I 
It is the sound-image that he calls signifier, reserving the name signified not for the thing, to 
be sure (it is reduced by the act and the very ideality of language), but for the concept, ' 
undoubtedly an unhappy notion here; let us say for the ideality of the sense .... The sound- 
image is what is heard; not the sound heard but the being-heard of the sound. Being-heard is 
structurally phenomenal and belongs to an order radically dissimilar to that of the real sound 
in the world. One can only divide this subtle but absolutely decisive heterogeneity by a 
phenomenological reduction. The latter is therefore indispensable to all analyses of being- 
heard, whether they be inspired by linguistic, psychoanalytic, or other preoccupations (OG, 
P. 63). Derrida is right to express the power of the phenomenological reduction in reference 
to the articulation of the difference between the 'sound-heard' and the 'being-heard of the 
sound. It not only marks out the space in which phenomenology originally moves, it also 
points to what is most profound in Saussure's thinking. The orientation of the latter already 
implicitly involves a form of epocW, even though it is never thematized as such. 
Derrida continues 
Now the 'sound-image, ' the structured appearing [Vapparalire] of the sound, the 'sensory 
matter' lived and informed by dif . 
Tirance, what Hussed would call the hyle / morphe 
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structure, distinct from all mundane reality, is called the 'psychic image' by Saussure 
Although the word 'psychic' is not perhaps convenient, except for exercising in this matter a 
phenomenological caution, the originality of a certain place is well "fliarked (Ibid, P. 63-4). 
Derrida defends this Saussurean schema against a 'mentalist' (and imagist) interpretation by 
citing Husserl, 
0 
The psychic image of which Saussure speaks must not be an internal reality copying 
an external one. Husserl, who criticizes this concept of 'portrait' in Ideen I shows also in the 
Krisis (pp. 63 f. ) how phenomenology should overcome the naturalist opposition -- whereby 
psychology and the other sciences of man survive -- between 'internal' and 'external' 
experience. It is therefore indispensable to preserve the distinction between the appearing 
sound [le son apparaissant] and the appearing of the sound [Vapparaitre du son] in order to 
escape the worst and most prevalent of confusions (Ibid, P. 64). 
This defence of Saussure could be said to introduce balance to a more negative orientation in 
Derrida! s own reading, in another text, when he writes, 
Saussure was ... careful to distinguish between the real word and its image. He also saw the 
expressive value of a 'signifier' only in the form of the 'sound-image. ' 'Signifier' means 
'sound-image. ' But, not taking the 'phenomenological' precaution, Saussure makes the sound- 
image, the signifier a 'mental impression, ' into a reality whose sole originality is to be 
I 
internal, which is only to shift the problem without resolving it (Speech and Phenomena 
[SP], pp. 46-7). 
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Note: Husserl substituted the inside / outside dyad in Ideas I (Sec. 3 8, P. 112 -- 1913) with the 
contrast between immanence and transcendence as the basis for discussing perception. See note II 
of the Introduction above. 
Derrida's re-reading is not simply a case of a 'double-reading' of Saussure; it is an exercise 
in dialogue between Derrida and Derrida. 
10. See in particular sections 43 [Light on a Fundamental Error] and 52 of Husserl's Ideas 1. 
11. Husserl writes, 
The genuine concept of thing-transcendence, which is the standard whereby all 
rational statements about transcendence are measured, cannot be extracted from any source 
other than the perceptions own essential content, or the definitely articulated connexions 
which we call evidential (ausweisenden) experience. The idea of this transcendence is thus 
the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this evidential experience (Ideas 1, sec. 47, P. 13 4). 
12. See sections 38-41 -- and especially sections 42, and 44 of Ideas 1. Also, see Husserl's short 
text entitled, The Idea of Phenomenology (based on a series of lectures given in 1907, but not 
published during his lifetime). This book is an important seminal exploration of the question of 
transcendence. It is no coincidence that this is also the text that first began to develop the method of 
phenomenological reduction in a fully thematic way. See also notes 4 and 15 of this chapter. 
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13. The section entitled The Concept of the Logos (in the second part of the Introduction to 
Being and Time) continues' ihe discussion on the presence of the phenomenon or, rather, the 
phenomenon of presence, by way of an etymological analysis of the word 'logos. ' As the suffix of 
the expression 'phenomeno-logy, ' it is under examination in order to establish the meaning of the 
enterprise it designates. Heidegger defines logos in terms of 'speech' or 'discourse' [rede]. This is 
definitely one of the sites of Derrida's inspiration for the development of the theme of phonologism 
and his consequent critique of this field. 
See also Heidegger's History of the Concept of Time for a discussion on phenomenon and 
logos. 
14. Husserl insists that "a sense-giving consciousness ... is absolute and not dependent in its turn 
on sense bestowed on it from another source. " Ideas 1. Sec. 55, P. 153. This is a clear departure from 
Platonism. However, we must also understand that the 'Absolute' character of a 'sense-giving 
consciousness' is only so from the point of view of an already constituted temporality in which the 
analyses of Ideas I move. There is a deeper field -- that of temporalizing consciousness. This 
dimension is also implicated in Ideas 1, but this is in no way a fall back into Platonism. 
15. Husserl writes that "... the bracketed matter is not wiped off the phenomenological slate, but 
only bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. Taking its sign with 
it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of the inquiry" (Ideas 1. Sec. 76, P. 194). 
Moreover, earlier, in section 3 1, Husserl writes . .... it is still there like the bracketed in the brackets 
These statements are fascinating in that they appear to outline the logic of what we have come to call 
the procedure of'sous rature' (writing under erasure) -- a strategy in which the erasure is only partial. 
The [crossing-out within brackets] gives us a foreground sign that affects our relation to that which 
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is still visible beneath the cross within parentheses. The crossed-out [or bracketed] is not 
annihilated, but modified in the manner of its articulation. See also notes 4 and 12 of this chapter. 
16. Husserl writes, 
The perspective variation (the ý4bschattungq, though verbally similar to the perspected 
0 
variable (the A bgeschattetes ý, differs ftom it generally and in principle. The perspective 
variation is an experience. But experience is possible only as experience, and not as 
something spatial. The perspected variable, however, is in principle possible only as spatial 
(it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not possible as experience (Ideas 1, Sec. 4 1, P. 119). 
17. See Sections 9& 10 of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness for Husserl's 
detailed discussion on 'running-off-phenomena! (Ablaufsphdnomene). Compare this discourse on 
temporal orientation to Husserl's discussion on the difference between Abschattung and 
Abgeschattetes in Ideas I (see note 16 above). Also, see sections 42-46,52 of Ideas I for further 
discussion on 'spatial perspective. ' This issue bears an intrinsic relation to Husserl's discussion on 
Ablaufsphdnomene (running-off-phenomena) since both are understood in terms of the unity of the 
running-off of the temporal'flux. ' 
18. When we consider the appearance of a particular sound we see, according to Husserl, that 
throughout its duration it "... is the same, but 'in the way that' it appears, the sound is different" 
(PITC. Sec. 8, P. 45). Husserl is specifically referring here to the retentional running-off of the sound. 
These'modes of the appearing of something are not simply extraneous additions or supplements to 
the appearing thing but are essential to its constitution. As Husserl writes, "The thing is constituted 
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in the flowing-off of its appearances, which are themselves constituted as immanent unities in the 
flux -of primordial 
impressions and necessarily constituted one with the other" (PITC, Sec. 43. 
P. 120). 
19. As early as section I of PITC, Husserl strategically calls on the significance of the parallels 
between space and time, remarking that "... space and time exhibit so many noted and significant 
analogies. " P. 23. 
In the immediate quotation below, Husserl further explores the time / space analogue as the 
horizon of the intertwining of appearing and non-appearing 
The foreground is nothing without the background; the appearing side is nothing 
without the non-appearing. It is the same with regard to the unity of time-consciousness -- 
the duration reproduced is the foreground; the classifying intentions make us aware of a 
background, a temporal background. And in certain ways, this is continued in the 
constitution of the temporality of the enduring thing itself with its now, before, and after. We 
have the following analogies: for the spatial thing, the ordering into the surrounding space 
and the spatial world on the one side, and on the other, the spatial thing itself with its 
foreground and background. For the temporal thing, we have the ordering into the temporal 
form and the temporal world on the one side, and on the other the temporal thing itself and 
its changing orientation with regard to the living now (PITC, Sec. 25, pp. 78-9). 
Section II continued: Once again -- a spatial / temporal analogue. 
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The originary temporal field is obviously circumscribed exactly like a perceptual one. 
Indeed, generally speaking, one might well venture the assertion that the temporal field 
always has the same extension. It is displaced, as it were, with regard to the perceived and 
freshly remembered motion and its Objective time in a manner similar to the way in which 
the visual field is displaced with regard to Objective space (P. 52). 
The originary temporal field displaces itself There is a kind of recession or self-erasure. As a 
horizon it is immanent even though it simultaneously withdraws. Transcendence is already inscribed 
within and by it. 
20. And in the following section, Husserl writes, 
We should prefer to avoid talk of 'appearance' when referring to phenomena which constitute 
temporal Objects, for these phenomena are themselves immanent Objects and are 
appearances in a wholly different sense. We speak here of 'running-off phenomena! 
[Ablaufsphdnomene], or better yet of 'modes of temporal orientation, ' and with reference to 
the immanent Objects themselves of their 'running-off characters' (e. g., now, past). With 
regard to the running-off phenomenon, we know that it is a continuity of constant 
transformations which form an inseparable unit, not severable into parts which could be by 
themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity, which could be by themselves. 
The parts which by a process of abstraction we can throw into relief can be only in the entire 
'I running-off. 
This is also true of the phases and points of the continuity of running-off. It is 
evident that we can also say of this continuity that in certain ways it is unalterable as to form 
(PITC. See. 10, P. 48). 
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21. Gasch6 discusses this sense of illumination (Erscheinung) in reference to Kant, but fails to 
do so in his treatment of Husserl's phenomenology. 
22. Evans also makes reference to the theme of evidence in Husserl's 'principle of principles' and 
focuses on the clause "... but also only within the limits in which it is presented there ...... Evans #I 
expresses how this is a call to a radical 'critique of evidence. ' 
All evidence is in need of critique so that we may come to an understanding of the 
kind of evidence it is and of the limits of that evidence. And the evidence of the reflecting 
phenomenologist is no exception. Here Husserl recognized the task of a 'critique of 
transcendental self-experience' [Hua 1,67/29, translation altered; cf. 178/151-52], a 
phenomenology of phenomenology, and it was in the course of an attempt to carry out 
aspects of this phenomenology that he was forced to begin revising his own earlier claims 
that there is a core of adequate evidence in phenomenological reflection. 
Given this background, our response to Derrida's references to the principle of 
principles can be brief In the first place, intuition is not the 'source of sense' [SP, 60/531 but 
rather the source of the legitimacy of sense. Second, Husserl's statement that intuition can be 
undermined by intuition clearly shows that the principle of principles itself does not assert or 
require "the self-identity of the now as point, as a 'source-point"' [SP, 69/61]. Husserl does 
speak of primordial presence, but nothing in this text from the Ideas suggests Derrida's 
statement that "In phenomenology, the idea of primordial presence and in general of 
'beginning, ' 'absolute beginning' or principium, always refers back to this 'source-point' 
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[namely, to the self-identity of the now as point]" [SP, 69/61-2] (Evans, Strategies of 
Deconstruction, pp. 109-10). 
It is precisely because primal impression is the site of the passing-over of protention into 
retention in a negotiation of fulfilment, degrees of fulfilment, and non-fulfilment that the now is the 
source of the legitimacy of sense. Should not this 'core of evidence' be classed as apodictic rather 
0 
than adequate? From a methodological point of view, the expression adequacy of evidence makes 
reference to an aim -- a regulative principle of interrogation, which in itself is a response to that 
which is apodictic. The aim is to flesh it out. Husserl does refer to the living-present in terms of 
'adequacy' of experience in the Cartesian Meditations (see note 233 directly below), but he probably 
should have said that this too, was apodictic: a field of possible work. After all, does not the earlier 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness specifically address this field as a problem? The 
passage quoted above is preceded by a reference to Husserl's account of why one of the "major tasks 
of phenomenology" involves a "critique of evidence" (Ibid). This is what leads to the theme of a 
'phenomenology of phenomenology. ' Also, see P. 121 of Strategies of Deconstruction for another 
reference to this. 
The thought of a'phenomenology of phenomenology' traces itself throughout Husserl's work. 
See, in particular, the Conclusion to Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (which I quote in my article 
"Dififirance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction [Epochi]? The lVarivick Journal Qf Philosophy, 
Vol. 2, Issue 2.1989, P. 68). Also, refer to the Preface to the present text for Husserl's call for a 
"phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction" (Crisis. Part III B, Sec. 71, P. 247) -- which 
translates as a'reduction of the reduction! 
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23. Given the context of our discussion, see in particular, the first, second, and third meditations 
of Husserl's CartqSian Meditations. 
In the I st meditation (S ec. 9, P. 22-23. ) of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes, 
... adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go 
hand in hand. Perhaps this remark was 
made precisely with the case of transcendental self-experience in mind. In such experience 
the ego is accessible to himself originaliter. But at any particular time this experience offers 
only a core that is experienced 'with strict adequacy, ' namely the ego's living present (which 
the grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, expresses); while beyond that, only an 
indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising what is 'strictly non- 
experienced but necessarily also meant. To it belong not only the ego's past, most of which is 
completely obscure, but also his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at the 
time. External perception too (though not apodictic) is an experiencing of something itself, 
the physical thing itself- 'it itself is there. ' But in being there itself, the physical thing has for 
the experiencer an open, infinite, indeterminately general horizon, comprising what is itself 
not strictly perceived -- a horizon (this is implicit as a presumption) that can be opened up by 
possible experience. Something similar is true about the apodictic certainty characterizing 
transcendental experience of my transcendental I-am, with the indeterminate generality of 
the latter as having an open horizon. 
Apodicticity is a starting-point -- this is not the same as an 'adequate' core of evidence. The 
apodictic needs to be fleshed out. Although apodicticity means sheer obviousness in one sense, it 
.1 
can also mean a withdrawal of the presence of evidence in any adequate sense. On the other hand, 
'adequacy' is the 'ideal goal' of interrogation in the form of a critique of evidence. The call to 
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adequacy names a regulative principle of interrogative comportment, but it is expressed in full 
realization that adequate determination -- 'in fact' -- is unattainable. Who is to say that all the 
possible questions that we may ask of it will eventually- be exhausted? Phenomenology, as a 
perpetual return to beginnings, is antithetical to such a moment of exhaustion. 
24. Descartes did not make a clear distinction between adequacy of evidence and that of an 
0 
apodictic order. In the "Objections and Replies, " it is quite obvious that he requires such a 
distinction and that it is operative to a certain extent (even though it is never thernatized). It is 
difficult to find any hint of this in the Meditations themselves. 
25. Consider Freud and the conscious / unconscious disjunction. 
Liminal = (Latin: limen = threshold) relating to the point (or threshold) beyond which a 
sensation becomes too faint to be experienced. Subliminal (Latin: sub [under] and limen [threshold]. 
This expression is often treated as being synonymous with subnoetic and anoetic. Residing below 
the threshold of consciousness; beneath recognition by consciousness. See Peter Angeles's 
Dictionary oj'Philosophy. Harper and Row, 198 1. 
For Husserl, the subliminal is not equivalent to the anoetic. The noeses bear this horizon 
within themselves. One must not confuse that which does not appear before consciousness as an 
object of recognition with that which is not of consciousness and which may well be capable of 
being made present as a theme for consciousness. Without this, Freud's clinical 'principle of 
principles' would lack force -- i. e., that'where id was, ego shall be. ' Freud first came to the notion of 
the unconscious through the observation of neurotic symptoms / phenomena -- which he took as 
visible traces / signs of a'repressive activity' that consigned certain ideas to a region of comparative 
invisibility. It is a question of only 'comparative' invisibility, since the repressed material was 
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'indicated' by many forms of neurotic behaviour, dreams, and slips of the tongue (parapraxes), which 
provided a starting-point from which to begin to uncover it -- to illuminate its significance. 
Freud's discourse on the unconscious became more sophisticated and elaborate in the later part of his 
career (see the various metapsychological papers that are included in the collection entitled: On 
Metapsychology: the theory ofpsychoanalysis, Penguin) and extended into diverse aspects of this 
deep-level psychology. His 'economic' model, in particular -- which focused on an unconscious play 
0 
of forces -- extended into a more primordial field of energy (Triebe - drives) than the form of 
unconscious that is originarily produced through higher level acts of repression. This field required a 
whole new set of distinctions. 
All that is repressed is indeed unconscious, but not all that is unconscious, according to 
Freud, has been repressed. Part of the ego itself is, and has always been, unconscious. In this sense, 
there are invisible elements of the psyche that have never been present. 
At yet another level, Freud also had to take account of the pre-conscious dimension of 
virtual information that is available for reiteration (because it has not been repressed), but would 
over-saturate the mind if it were conscious all at once. Imagine what it would be like if the entire 
history of one's knowledge and experience was present contemporaneously. Rather than 'pushing 
away, ' it is more a case of letting go. The latter involves a form of forgetting, while the former 
involves a forgetting of the forgetting. The expression un-conscious points to a field that is 
profoundly deeper. Nevertheless, despite Freud's more mature views, which culminated in his 
discourse on the unconscious as id (es / it) -- which focused not so much on repressed 'ideas' as on 
primordial and unconscious 'drives' (Triebe, which are not to be confused with instincts, as in the 
standard translations) -- the gateway to the unconscious is still illuminated by signs (chains of 
symbolic associations) which showed that that which was unconscious was not wholly invisible. It 
leaves traces of itself. 
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The Freudian disjunctions between the conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious are not at 
work in Husserl's phenomenology precisely because consciousness is by no means equivalent to 
Freud's conception of the 'conscious. ' Freud's writing on consciousness is rather sparse, since his 
inquiries were generally concerned with the 'unconscious' (especially that which had never been 
conscious). This also resulted in a rather sketchy model of the conscious field of mental life. 
The breadth of Husserl's conception of intentional consciousness stands in better comparison 
0 
to Freud's notion of the 'psyche, ' which embodied the conscious / pre-conscious / unconscious 
disjunctions within itself. But here, all similarity ends -- or can only be maintained rather tenuously 
through a distortion of their texts. 
In Fink's 'Appendix on the Problem of the Unconscious' in Husserl's The Crisis of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology it is stressed that 
Only after an explicit analysis of consciousness can the problem of the unconscious be posed 
at all. But only in the working mastery of this problem will it be revealed whether or not the 
#unconscious' can be treated according to the method of intentional analysis (The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Crisis]. P. 3387). 
Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Derrida have made significant contributions to 
this area of analysis. In the case of Merleau-Ponty, see note 14 of the Introduction above. 
26. See, in particular, the second meditation of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations. 
27. For even the presence of an appearance, in the mundane pre-phenomenological sense of an 
image, entails that it must be able to announce itself as image. The apIvaring of tile appearance 
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establishes 'how' the appearance presents itself. It is the modal organization or contextualization of 
the content of appearance in its appearing. 
28. See PITC, Sec. 10, P. 48. 
29. See my article, "Diffirance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction (Epochi)? " The Warwick 
I 
Journal ofPhilosophy. Autumn Edition, Vol. 2, Issue 2,1989. 
30. See pp. 135/37 of the Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry, " for a particularly 
interesting treatment of Husserl's discourse on temporalization. It is here that Derrida recognizes that 
"... the Living Present of consciousness holds itself as the primordial Absolute only in an indefinite 
protention, animated and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense) of the total flux of lived 
experience" (P. 136). 
31. The complementarity of rigour and play in Derrida's writing often seems to go unnoticed. 
Take, for example, the perspective of Richard Rorty -- which appears to be caught up in an either / 
or bi--polarity. See "Deconstruction as a Kind of Writing" (Consequences of Pragmatism. University 
of Nebraska Press, 1982) and especially the essay "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher? " 
(Derrida: a Critical Reader. Edited by David Wood. Blackwell. 1992). 
32. These related issues are partly inspired by St. Augustine's problem, in section 20 of Book XI 
of the Coqfessions, where he ponders over the question of whether we can speak of the future or the 
past as actually existing. St. Augustine decides that we can only do so if we speak of the future as a 
presently occurring anticipation and the past as a presently occurring act of remembering. In view of 
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this it is interesting that Husserl only mentions sections 13-18 of the Confessions when he pays 
tribute to St. Augustine's meditati. Ons on time at the beginning of The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time Consciousness. 
The now is the fulcrum of 'existence' or being for St. Augustine. However, it is the basis of a 
'cosmology, ' not a phenomenology. He oscillates between the two orientations (a symptom of 
Aristotelianism) without realizing that he is doing so -- beginning in a cosmology and ending with a 
singularly phenomenological orientation. "It seems to me, " St. Augustine writes, "that time is merely 
an extension, though of what it is an extension I do not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an 
extension of the mind itself' (Confessions. Book 11, Sec. 26). 
The operative schema that determines St. Augustine's thought on time is one in which the 
now or present is not extended -- even though his speculation about the possibility of time being an 
extension of the mind problematizes such a viewpoint. He never actually raised this as a problem 
and did not really explore the question of the structure of the now itself. Contrary to the 'tone' of 
Derrida's reading of the lectures on time-consciousness, Husserl does! In The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time Consciousness, the discourse on the now does not determine its being in terms of an 
extensionless point (which Derrida realizes, but also equivocates over in a rather disingenuous way 
[see Speech and Phenomena, P. 6 I]), but as a stretched horizon that is protentionally ahead of itself. 
Likewise, with respect to the constitutive role of retention as the horizon of its before-itself. 
In the following passage, quoted below, we find the culmination of Husserl's claim that when 
we speak of retention it is not as a past-consciousness, but a present consciousness of the past: it is 
the giving of having-beenness. The retained is that which is given up by the present retention as that 
which is no-longer. This is just one example of the way in which The Phenomenology qfInternal 
Time Cotuciousness can be seen to provide an extraordinarily sophisticated and yet radically clear 
elaboration of St Augustine's primary themes in his meditations on time. Husserl gives us a 
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phenomenological description of what must necessarily be entailed in the constitution of the past as 
present-recollection and the future as present-expectation. 
Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; I have in it a consciousness of the 'just- 
past' (Husserl. PITC, P. 66). 
However, unlike St. Augustine's discourse on the non-extension of the now, Husserl shows 
how it must necessarily be afield. The former makes the mistake of hypostatizing the mathematical 
point-system by which duration is measured and confusing it with the structure of time itself. 
33. In section 41 of PITC: Self-Evidence of the Immanent Content -- Alteration and Constancy -- 
Husserl writes, 
If one speaks of the self-evident givenness of an immanent content, it is obvious that this 
self-evidence cannot mean indubitable certainty with regard to the temporal existence of a 
sound at a point. Self-evidence so grasped ... I would hold to be fiction (P. I 11). 
34. See note 14 to the Introduction above. 
35. The now is principally a horizonal 'form' not an object or some kind of content. It is "... a 
form that persists through continuous change ofcontent" (Ideas 1. See. 8 1, P. 218). 
36. But, is this Derrida! s 'actual' position? It certainly is according to Gaschd's reading. However, 
let us return for a moment to the textual source from which Gasch6 appropriated this statement -- the 
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essay "Genesis and Structure" (Writing and Difference). Here, we find that Derrida! s claim 
concerning the limits of Husserl's 'principle of principles' is specifically raised in regard to the 'static' 
(structural) context of its thematization in Husserl's Ideas I which, he believes, makes it 
unsuitable for any analysis of 'constitution! that seeks to engage with the related questions of time, 
alterity and history. Derrida writes, 
0 
If, on the level at which Ideas remains, Husserl ... keeps to the constituted 
hyle-morphic 
correlation, it is that his analyses are still developed (and will they not always be so, in a 
certain way? ) from within a constituted temporality. Now, at its greatest depth and in its pure 
specificity the hyle is primarily temporal matter. It is the possibility of genesis itself. Thus at 
these two poles of opening and from within the very transcendental structure of all 
consciousness there would arise the necessity for the transition to a genetic constitution and 
for the new 'transcendental aesthetic' which will be announced unceasingly but will be 
deferred always, and within which the themes of the Other and of time were to have 
permitted their irreducible complicity to appear. It is that the constitution of the other and of 
time refers phenomenology to a zone in which its 'principle of principles' (as we see it, its 
metaphysical principle: the original setf-evidence and presence of the thing itself in person) 
is radically put into question. In any event, as can be seen, the necessity of this 
transformation from the structural to the genetic is nothing less than the necessity of a break 
or a conversion (pp. 163 -64). 
Rather than actually reducing the scope of phenomenology to the limits of an oýjectivist 
principle of principles, ' Derrida is primarily raising the problem of its static aspect within the 
context of Husserl's Ideas I (in terms of the language of 'correlations' based upon an already 
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constituted temporality) and giving voice to the necessity of a radical reorientation by questioning 
its applicability for a genetic phenomenology. This 'break' or 'conversion! is precisely that which is 
announced by Husserl in regard to the transcendental reduction and the movement of Abbau -- 
which is a specifically genetic turn (re-turn inquiry -- Rackfrage) within its horizon. Derrida! s 
remarks on this radical re-orientation do not indicate a transgression of phenomenology in general, 
but only mark out the site of a transition that phenomenology, itself, must embrace (and does, as 
Derrida himself indicates in his essay "Genesis and Structure, " [WD]). The shift from static to 
genetic phenomenology must continually re-evaluate its 'principle of principles. ' The latter does 
refer, even at the level of Ideas 1, to the constitutive role played by the noeses in the unfolding of 
the appearing of appearances, but it must be adjusted to take account of the genetic structurality of 
such constitution in flux (the constitution of temporality). This refers phenomenology to a region for 
which, as Husserl says, "names are lacking" (PITC, Sec. 36, P. 100). 
When Derrida points out the "necessity for the transition to a genetic constitution and for the 
new 'transcendental aesthetic, "' and remarks that this "will be announced unceasingly but will be 
deferred always, " it is strange that he does not acknowledge Husserl's lectures on time 
consciousness (1905-10) in this regard. Although these lectures were not published until 1928 as 
The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (fifteen years after the publication of Ideas 1), 
it could hardly be said, with the addition of the Cartesian Meditations, Crisis of the European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the lecture notes (edited by Ludwig Landgrebe), 
which make up the text entitled Experience and Judgement, that this transition was 'deferred 
always. ' As for whether Husserl does actually disclose a horizon "within which the themes of the 
Other and of time were to have permitted their irreducible complicity to appear", the reader will be 
able to judge for him/herself during our investigation of the double intentionality of retention (a I ittle 
later on). I will show how Husserl's concept of the double intentionality of retention expresses a 
269 
tension and ex-tension that thematically brings out the functional complicity of temporality and 
alterity through a movement of delayed return. 
37. This is apparent to even the most pedestrian readings of Derrida! s Introduction to Husserl's 
"Origin of Geometry" and Speech and Phenomena. 
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NOTES: Chapter Two 
1. Le problime de la genese dans la philosphie de Husserl is the title of DerriUs MA 
dissertation -- which was written during the years 1953-54, but not published until 1990. His first 
published text was the "L'Origine de la Geometrie " de Itusserl (1962 [IHOG]). The most significant 
text that followed -- in that it situated itself in an almost diametrical opposition to the orientation of 
the earlier IHOG -- was La Voix et le PhinomMe [SP] (1967). There are also some shorter essays 
that dedicate themselves to the examination of Husserl's phenomenology. With the context of the 
present discussion in mind, these include "Genese et Structure et la phenomenologie" (which was 
first given as a lecture in 1959 and first published in 1964 "Genese et structure, " edited by 
Gandillac, Goldmann. and Piaget. The Hague: Mouton) and "La Forme et le vouloir-dire: Note sur la 
phenomenologie du langage" (published in Revue internationale de philosophie, 1967). 
2. Derrida is clearly re-iterating the viewpoint of Speech and Phenomena's treatment of 
Husserl's Phenomenoloýy ofInternal Time Consciousness when he writes that 
the concept of trace is incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of 
what has been present. One cannot think the trace -- and therefore, dýf . 
firance -- on the basis 
of the present, or of the presence of the present ("Dififirance, " Margins. P. 21). 
Derrida's attempt to re-think a temporality that is not restricted to the thought of the past as a 
past-present and the future as a future-present is motivated by his inappropriate reading of the 
present as a point-like now in Husserl's lectures on time. For Derrida, phenomenology merely 
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maintains the metaphysical perspective in which the "... past and future are always determined as 
past presents or as future presents ("Ousia and Gramm6, " Margins. P. 34). He clearly, but 
incorrectly, sees 'retention! as a concept that is bound to the thought of the passage of time as the 
production of a "... line of modified present tenses" ("Ellipsis, " WD, P. 300). The phenomenological 
discourse on retention 'cannot' be reduced to this model of temporality! 
If one takes retention in isolation, then it might be true to say that the trace is not compatible 
0 
with retention, but not for the reasons mentioned above. However, when protention is restored as a 
fundamental horizon of retention itself through the thought of their 'essential' interpenetration, then 
the incompatibility dissolves. This is precisely because the trace as tracing rather than retained trace 
is the marking out of the crossing-over of protention into retention -- which is the tracing of the 
present. 
The trace as an 'always-already-in-repetition' also expresses the protentional dimension of 
the tracing of the present in which the latter is the fulfilment of the former. The present is the 
constituted site or stage of the infinite re-iteration of this intertwining of future and past: protention 
passing-over into retention is the condition of the fulfilment of the present. It is in the concept of 
protention that we find the gerundial form of the trace: tracing in contrast to merely retained trace. 
Evans makes a similar point on P. 122 of Strategies of Deconsiruction. 
In Derridean terms, this movement (as is also the case for Husserl) has no beginning. It is the 
originary movement of the trace, of proto-writing. It has always already been in repetition. This 
movement is both temporalizing and spatializing. It is the site of their intertwining, or rather, since 
this is prior to a site, location, or place, it is the u-topic horizon of their articulation. The 
transcendental quasi-concept of dýffjrance, which thernatizes their indifference before the pure 
structurality of repetition -- as difference and delay -- through which they unfold as temporalizing 
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and spatializing, is a motif that indicates, what one might call, the 'essence' of the Husserlian 
concept of pure flux. 
To think this movement in terms of the tri-dimensional play of the horizon of the Living 
Present (lebendige Gegenwart) is to get closest to the meaning of the pluri-dimensionality that 
Husserl's concept of Absolute Flux (as the primordial form of temporality) originally signifies. 
Of course, the real problem with Derrida! s account of Husserl's discourse on time has to do 
I 
with his inappropriate characterization of the present discussed so far. However, when he speaks of 
going through Husserl's texts in terms of the kind of "... reading that can be neither simple 
commentary nor simple interpretation" (SP. The Supplement of Origin, P. 88) Derrida 'does' 
phenomenology as opposed to merely undertaking a critical 'textual analysis. ' His reading of 
Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness and the appropriation of its theoretical 
models (which is not'limited' to the erroneous perspective on the now as point) is more crucial than 
that which he subjects to critical examination in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Derrida's 
enterprise (in Speech and Phenomena) is legitimately 'phenomenological' in that the appropriation of 
Husserl's 'deeper' insights in the lectures on time-consciousness point to the need for a re- 
examination of his earlier claims regarding the respective roles of expression and indication. The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (lectures of 1905-10 -- published in 1928) 
addresses a far deeper dimension than that of the Logical Investigations (190 1). Although it is a later 
text, it explores a dimension of constitution that is 'earlier' than the constituted space of the primarily 
static text of 1901. In other words the horizon in which the analyses of the Logical Investigations 
move already presupposes the constitutive performance of that which is at the focus of the later text. 
Derrida! s approach to Husserl's phenomenology is non-linear and non-chrono logical, and for a 
number of legitimate reasons. The conditions of possibility of any experience -- uncovered in 
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Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness -- demand a continued critique of the meaning of the 
distinction between expression and indication. 
Clearly, this is a response to Husserl's call for a'phenomenology of phenomenology. ' Derrida 
writes, 
The distinction between indication and expression appears first of all in the necessary and 
I 
provisionally 'objectivist' phase of phenomenology, when empirical subjectivity has to be 
neutralized. Will it retain all its value when transcendental themes deepen the analysis? Will 
it do so when we come back to the constituting subjectivity? Such is the question. Husserl 
never again broached it (SP. P. 30). 
First of all, one must not confuse this 'objectitvist phase' with an object-theory of perception. 
Husserl's phenomenological orientation concerns a 'content-theory' of perception. The principal 
thrust of DerriMs question right here, revolves around his determination of Husserl's understanding 
of expression as pure unmediated disclosure -- the instantaneity of hearing-oneself-speak; discourse 
without an indicative detour, without alterity. 
It is from the point of view of time and history that Husserl does, in a sense, return to this 
issue. In the Crisis (his last unfinished text) he presents a very different account of discourse with 
oneself -- as if to an Other. See note 27 of the Introduction above for another reference to the 
relevant quotation (from the Crisis. Part III A, Sec. 50, P. 172). 
It is certainly possible to argue that Derrida is showing a certain fidelity to the basic 
principles of phenomenological interrogation -- as a critique that demands a 'perpetual return to 
beginnings. However, caution is advised since there is still a great difference between the 
conscientiousness of Derrida! s motivation to write and the actual rigour of his reading. When, in 
274 
Speech and Phenomena, he subjects Husserl's distinction between expression and indication to a 
deconstructive critique, he does so through an appeal to the lectures on time. This later research 
focuses on the structures and forms of any possible experience that Husserl's earlier text (the Logical 
Investigations) must, as we have already indicated, already presuppose. However, there is a problem 
with Derrida! s push toward discourse on retention and protention as forms of 'indication. ' Since 
retentions (like primal impressions) are 'perceptions' -- when perception is defined as an 'originary 
giving' -- they too are 'expressions' and 'not' indications. Indications might, more suitably, 
be 
relegated to the sphere of secondary remembrances or expectations -- as distinct from retentions as 
primary remembrances (in which the past is given originarily) or protentions as primary 
anticipations (in which the future originally 'gives' itself as an open horizon prior to any delimited 
forms of expectation). 
The difference between primal impression and retentions and protentions is not that of a 
difference between perception and non-perception, but of different modalities of perception. And, 
despite Derrida! s viewpoint, the difference between retention and secondary remembrance is not a 
question of "a difference between two modifications of non-perception" (SP P. 65), but precisely 
between perception and non-perception (presentation and re-productive presentification) - that is, 
when one is working with the second definition of perception as 'originary presentation' in which 
retention is also a perception. Derrida would maintain (and has) that perception (which primarily 
involves the issue of 'expression) is riddled through and through with 'indications, ' but he does this 
by appealing to the retentional and protentional moments of consciousness, which he sees as 
'indications. ' This is inappropriate given Husserl's general definition of perception as an originary 
giving. Derrida! s argument only works if one applies it to Husserl's narrower reference to perception 
as an immediate giving of that which is'now' in contrast to that which is remembered -- that is, no- 
longer-now. However, there is also an open extension of the past, a horizon that gives itself 
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originarily and not merely through an indicative detour. Retention is a primordial orientation and not 
to be reduced to that which is retained. With protention -- which is the giving (not the indication) of 
the future as an 'open' horizon -- retention is a 'present' performance. In this context it is important 
not to think of 'perforniance' as in any way related to ego motivated activity. Retention is not simply 
a past-consciousness retained, but is a present-consciousness of the past. That this consciousness of 
the past is a retention of that which was a former present is only one component of the retentional 
I 
horizon. When retention is thought in its intertwining with protention (the latter being an empty or 
open extension of the future), we also find an 'open' horizon of the past. This openness is not a 
question of an empty or vacant past, but of an 'always-already-past': pastness. This is the horizon in 
which past-presents can first stand-out as such. Retention is 'primary' because it produces that which 
offers itself up to the reflective performance of secondary remembrance. It is the difference between 
the horizon (which must always already be available for re-iteration) and that which can be made to 
stand-out within or from this horizon. 
3. The non-linearity of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought: consider multimedia forms -- 
multiple choice applications that have no pre-determined sequential form to the way in which they 
are organised. The consecutivity of their order occurs through choices. Linearity is something that 
patterns itself upon a more originary order of significance. This is a purely phenomenological point 
of view! Thus, linearity does not determine the 'ways' in which states of affairs unfold. It is only a 
consequence of 'how` they ultimately unfold. We cannot disregard the theme of linearity, but by the 
same token, it cannot maintain the sense of primacy that has always been attributed to it. 
Derrida! s comments in the interview "Implications" (Positions) on the labyrinthine structure 
of his writing is particularly relevant here. He speaks of a'strange geometry' that makes reference to 
the pluri-dimensional and non-linear connectivity of his early texts. 
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Derrida: One can take Of Grammatology as a long essay articulated in two parts (whose 
juncture is not empirical, but theoretical, systematic) into the middle of which one could 
staple Writing and Difference. Grammatology often calls upon it. In this case, the 
interpretation of Rousseau would also be the twelfth'table' of the collection. Inversely, one 
could insert Of Grammatology into the middle of Writing and Difference, since six of the 
texts in that work preceded -- defacto and dejure -- the publication in Critique (two years 
ago) of the articles that announced Of Grammatology; the last five texts, beginning with 
'Freud and the Scene of Writing, ' are engaged in the grammatological opening. But things 
cannot be reconstituted so easily, as you may well imagine. In any case, that two 'volumes' 
are to be inscribed one in the middle of the other is due, you will agree, to a strange 
geometry, of which these texts are doubtless the contemporaries. 
Ronse: And Speech and Phenomena? 
Derrida: I forgot. It is perhaps the essay which I like the most. Doubtless, I could have bound 
it as a long note to one or the other of the two works. Of Grammatology refers to it and 
economizes its development. But in a classical philosophical architecture, Speech and 
Phenomena would come first: in it is posed, at a point which appears juridically decisive for 
reasons that I cannot explain here, the question of the privilege of the voice and of phonetic 
writing in their relationship to the entire history of the West, such as this history can be 
represented by the history of metaphysics, and metaphysics in its most modern, critical, and 
vigilant form: Husserl's transcendent phenomenology. What is 'meaning, ' what are its 
historical relationships to what is purportedly identified under the rubric 'voice' as a value of 
presence, presence of the object, presence of meaning to consciousness, self-presence in so- 
called living speech and in self-consciousness? The essay which asks these questions can 
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also be read as the other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of another essay, published in 
1962, as the Introduction to Husserl's The Origin of Geometry. In this essay the problematic 
of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of 'deferral' in its 
relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the 
disappearance or delay of the origin, etc. (pp. 4-5). 
Henri Ronse charges Derrida with having led him into a "labyrinth. " 
Derrida: All these texts, which are doubtless the interminable preface to another text that one 
day I would like to have the force to write, or still the epigraph to another that I would never 
have the audacity to write, are only the commentary on the sentence about a labyrinth of 
ciphers that is the epigraph to Speech and Phenomena (P. 5). 
4. See in particular the interview with Richard Kearney (Dialogues with contemporary 
Continental thinkers [DCC7]), and "Implications" (Positions). 
Quite apart from these interviews, virtually every text by Derrida, which engages with 
Husserl (except perhaps the Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry'), has a tendency to 
impress upon us the idea that deconstruction has taken a step beyond the limits of phenomenology. 
However, these limits, as adumbrated by Derrida, are often based on readings that are quite 
inappropriate to the actual context of Husserl's analyses. How are we to assess Derrida! s stronger 
claims about the radicality of deconstruction over, above, and beyond the limits that he has either 
uncovered or projected onto phenomenology? With respect to these two very alternative orientations 
(alternative, but immensely difficult to unravel), we ourselves, should be open to both points of 
view. 
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5. All references are to the appendices as numbered in David Cares rather selective translation. 
6. The past and future give themselves, to speak metaphorically, from the point of view of the 
present (which, in itself, is always already stretched), not only as 'objects of remembrances' (past 
presents) or as determinate 'expectations' (future presents), but also as 'open extensions. ' These 
0 
horizons always recede from the actual point of vision. Derrida has the habit of attributing a 
hypostatized model of the present to Western philosophy (see note two to this chapter above). From 
a phenomenological perspective, the present is not an object. It is not even reducible to a noematic 
counterpart. It is a field, but not one that is principally a 'toward-which. ' It is the locus of an 
orientation -- a 'from-which. ' The former is indeed one aspect of the present as lived, but it is not 
primordial. The present as a 't0ward-which' is always accompanied by past and futural horizons 
whose signatures or traces are already constitutive of the present as a Trom-which. ' The present as 
Gegenwart also means a 'waiting-towards. ' This is not merely about a waiting towards some thing. 
This speaks of the 'open horizon' in which there can be such an extending in the first place. 
7. Retentions are not simply retentions in an 'objective' sense i. e., specific contents of 
apprehensions retained. Retentions retain other temporal orientations -- 'of or 'toward' obj ects. These 
temporal orientations are not objects 'for' temporalizing consciousness (although they can be made 
to appear as such at a higher level of reflection), but are orientations of consciousness in its 
changing 'modes' of directedness-toward temporal objects. Retended orientations retain previously 
retended orientations within themselves. Each retention bears within itself a history of continuous 
modification of orientation -- where the continuous modification means a certain holding-back / 
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delay which produces a sinking-down of experience into the past. In other words, retention is the 
extension of a continuum that is embodied within itself. 
Such a retentional tracing of modification or 'continuous alteration' always already precedes 
the apprehension of any temporal object, for this shifting of orientation is the originary illumination 
of any content. In a sense, the content is the same, but delayed in its givenness with reference to the 
present. It is given in different lights (the same, but non-identical) -- beacons, signs of the unfolding Cý I 
of its duration. 
From this angle, retention cannot be adequately grasped or explained in terms of a process of 
doubling -- unless one really stretches its meaning(s]. It might be possible to say that the continuum 
itself involves doubling, but again, the temporality of delay gets lost. 
8. Gaschd writes 
... diffirance is ... an archesynthesis that no longer privileges contradiction as the one 
outstanding and dominating mode of difference, destined to subjugate all other kinds of 
difference. Diffirance, in this sense, is more originary than difference modelled after the laxv 
of thought according to which the opposite of a true proposition is necessarily false, or after 
the dialectical law according to which the negativity of true contradiction makes it the 
speculative Other, and hence one moment in the becoming of truth. " TM, P. 204. 
9. The reader should refer to Derrida! s remarks about 'institution. ' Instituted traces are 
'I 
instituting and instituting traces are instituted. Therefore, the sense of 'instituted' here is not easily 
reducible to the traditional distinction between producer and produced. It is rather a case of 
production as 'prod uced-producing. ' 
280 
Consider Derrida! s following remarks on 'retention' and the sense in which 'difference 
appears. ' They are worth bearing in mind when we examine, in closer detail, the question of 
iterability and the structure of retention as fundamental conditions of temporal constitution. The first 
part of the following passage can be found in the Introduction of this thesis in the section entitled 
"The Epochal Play of Time as Task. " 
0 
The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a 
structure of reference where difference appears as such and thus permits a certain liberty of 
variations among the full terms. The absence of another here-and-now, of another 
transcendental present, of another origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself as 
irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, is not a metaphysical formula 
substituted for a scientific concept of writing (OG, P. 46-47). 
10. See Derrida! s comments on this classic Leibnizean formulation of the space / time dyad 
(which stretches back into antiquity) in the essay "Ousia and Grammd" (Margins, P. 54). 
11. This has been the subject of a protracted debate between Saussurean scholars. If any kind of 
criticism is to be directed at Saussure's editors, it should be remembered that they were faced with 
an almost impossible task. Saussure did not prepare the Course for publication. The text we know 
today was published three years after his death -- the structure of which was the result of a careful, 
but also 'creative, ' synthesis of a number of student lecture notes. The devotion and commitment of 
Saussure's editors to such a difficult project can only be admired. 
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12. In the following passage Derrida comments on linearist thinking as the expression of a 
mundane and vulgar concept of time -- a linear model that has become so firmly habituated in our 
language (even as a model for language) that it tends to resist a critical form of access to it. 
The process of linearization, as Leroi-Gourhan describes it on a very vast historical scale, 
and the Jacobsonian critique of Saussure's linearist concept, must be thought of together. The 
I 
'line' represents only a particular model, whatever might be its privilege. This model has 
become a model and, as a model, it remains inaccessible. If one allows that the linearity of 
language entails this vulgar and mundane concept of temporality (homogeneous, dominated 
by the form of the now and the ideal of continuous movement, straight or circular) which 
Heidegger shows to be the intrinsic determining concept of all ontology from Aristotle to 
Hegel, the meditation upon writing and the deconstruction of the history of philosophy 
become inseparable. The enigmatic model of the line is thus the very thing that philosophy 
could not see when it had its eyes open on the interior of its own history. This night begins to 
lighten a little at the moment when linearity -- which is not loss or absence but the repression 
of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought -- relaxes its oppression because it begins to sterilize 
the technical and scientific economy that it has long favoured (OG, P. 87). 
There is an even stronger thesis in DerriUs writing, in the claim that there is no other 
'authentic' concept of temporal ization beyond the vulgar, which would also suggest that 
perhaps there is no 'vulgar concept of time. ' The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs 
to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only conclude 
that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history, develops the so-called 
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'vulgarity' of the concept of time (which Heidegger, doubtless, would not contest), but also 
that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to 
metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would 
come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates 
("Ousia and Gramm6, " Margins. P. 63). 
Derrida then goes on to ask 
is there not at least some Platonism in the verfallen? Why determine as fall the passage 
from one temporality to another? And why qualify temporality as authentic -- or proper 
(eigentlich) -- and as inauthentic -- or improper -- when every ethical preoccupation has been 
suspended? (Ibiiý. 
This is a fair question -- and one that is certainly applicable to Heidegger's discourse on time. 
However, Derrida arrives at this thought via a slightly different proposition. 
Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to the derivative still metaphysical? Is not the 
quest for an archia in general, no matter with what precautions one surrounds the concept, 
still the 'essential' operation of metaphysics? (Ibid). 
Derrida is saying that the difference between the originary and secondary exhibits the same 
kind of value structure. Is this always the case? It is not at all clear that Derrida himself has escaped 
this particular difference. 
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When Derrida suggests that there is no 'authentic' alternative to the 'vulgar concept of time, ' 
he provides alternatives without attaching any of them to either one side or the other of the authentic 
inauthentic dyad. However, would he be entitled to say that he has shifted beyond the theme of 
time because he has substituted this expression by writing? What is in a name? Derrida begins with 
a very narrow conception of the meaning of time as applied to Western metaphysics. Although his 
own discourse on temporally related themes is extremely sophisticated, he does not revise this 
0 
viewpoint, but simply re-situates discourse on temporality by employing a constellation of 
alternative neologisms. However, Derrida's whole discourse exhibits an "inability to keep 
temporally loaded terms out of his analysis" (Wood, The Deconstruction of Time. P. 113). 
13. It is with respect to this that Derrida asks why the phonetic evolution of language through 
writing (i. e., the changes it brings by means of the gradual alteration of the phonemes's graphic 
counterparts) is 'bad. ' This question echoes Derrida's discussion on the platonic bias in the Phaedrus 
(see SP), which assigns privilege to spoken language, while ostensibly denigrating the role of 
writing. This division also finds its correlate in the way in which Plato distinguishes between'good' 
and 'bad' representation in Book X of The Republic. What is the reason for such an 'ethical' 
distinction? For Derrida, it is borne out of a strict bifurcation between presence and re-presentation - 
- which also translates 
into the classical disjunctions between passivity and activity and the static 
and evolutionary. 
There is no such ethical limitation in Husserl's phenomenology of temporal constitution, but 
there is a distinction between originary giving and that of a secondary order. One could say of the 
following quotation from Husserl's PITC that it expresses the conditions of possibility of both the 
synchronic (static) and diachronic (evolutionary) dimensions of language as defined by Saussure 
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without formally bifurcating them. In Section 35: Differences between the Constituted Unities and 
the Constitutive Flux, Husserl writes, 
In principle, every phase of alteration can broaden into something static, every phase of the 
static can lead to an alteration. If, in comparison therewith, we now consider the constitutive 
phenomena, we find a flux, and every phase of this flux is a continuity of shading. However, 
0 
in principle, no phase of this flux is to be broadened out to a continuous succession; 
therefore, the flux should not be thought to be so transformed that this phase is extended in 
identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we find necessarily and essentially a flux of 
continuous alteration, ' and this alteration has the absurd property [das Absurde] that it flows 
exactly as it flows and can flow neither 'more swiftly' nor 'more slowly. ' Consequently, any 
Object which is altered is lacking here, and inasmuch as in every process 'something' 
proceeds, it is not a question here of a process. There is nothing here which is altered, and 
therefore it makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is also senseless, therefore, 
to wish to find anything which in a duration is not once altered (Sec. 35, P. 99). 
Of course with this orientation, the usual dyadic categories that delimit discourse on langue 
and parole (the static and evolutionary) space and time, continuity and alteration, genesis and 
structure, etc., are quite insufficient. They are inadequate to the task of grasping the structurality of 
such a dimension. This horizon bears little in resemblance to that which can be adumbrated by any 
traditional discourse on time. It also upsets the specific form of the primordial / constituted 
disjunction that Derrida applies to Husserl. 
The intertwining of passivity and activity: activity, in its directedness towards the future, 
establishes its focus by simultaneously being informed [passivity] by the past -- while at the same 
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time reorganizing (in other words, acting / working upon) the significance, structural presentation, 
and thus the meaning of the past. In Husserl's phenomenology, the reproductive (presentificational 
rather than presentational) correlates to retention and protention are known as secondary 
remembrance and expectation. These are generally active, whereas the former intentionalities are, to 
a certain extent, passive. It is the difference between an 'act of evocation' and the tracing of a past 
horizon that extends itseýf to such an act -- a horizon that always already precedes a reflective 
0 
performance as a remembering. Absolute Flux is that which constitutes this horizon. At this depth 
though, we have to accept that we cannot rigidly separate passivity from activity. Here, we find that 
there is always activity in passivity and passivity in activity. 
14. In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness -- section 38: Unity of the Flux of 
Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession, Husserl writes 
simultaneity is never without temporal succession and temporal succession is never 
without simultaneity. Consequently, simultaneity and temporal succession must be 
correlatively and inseparably constituted (P. 104). 
See also Appendix V11, The Constitution of Simultaneity, P. 155. And in Ideas 1, Husserl 
writes 
every experience comes not only under the rubric of temporal succession in an essentially 
self-contained organization of experiences, but also under that of simultaneity. This means 
that every present moment of experience has about it a fringe of experiences, which also 
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share the primordial now-form, and as such constitute the one primordial ftinge of the pure 
ego, its total primordial now consciousness (Sec. 82, P. 219). 
15. The 'a' in diffirance cannot be discerned phonetically (it is not an 'audible' difference), but 
only visually (unless of course one is reading in Braille -- but then audibility is already a secondary 
translation of that which is given through a 'tactile' medium). It is in the visual dimension that the 'a' 
I 
in diffirance 'stands out' with all its spatial (graphic, structural) references. Braille too, has spatial 
references, for touch requires movement -- kinaesthesis: the brushing of the fingers across rough 
surfaces, inscriptions, traces, incisions, which break up the featureless continuity of smooth surfaces. 
Roughness cannot be determined without movement (which is always tied to spatiality), and what is 
movement if not a temporal re-organization of space? 
In this seeing we perceive a sign of difference -- and one which is distinctive in that, like the 
threefold continuity of sight, it signifies an intertwining of the spatial and temporal. With the sign of 
the V we are referred to a certain spatial/temporal indifference -- for diffirance signifies a zone that 
is earlier than the difference between space and time. 
16. There are, however, possibilities for re-situating Gasch6's structuralist ambitions and 
reconstituting his model of infrastructures from the point of view of Merleau-Ponty's discourse on 
chiasm. 
17. To speak of 'aspects' of diffirance does not restrict discourse to 'heterogeneous' 
infrastructures. These different aspects are spread-out by Gaschd in a horizontal relation with one 
another. The verticality of their intertwining is never really brought into account. 
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18. Retention 'gives' pastness. In other words (to recapitulate), retention retains that which is no- 
longer now precisely by extending it (by means of retentions within retentions) as that which is no- 
longer now. Such an 'extending' is simultaneously a 'giving' and a Velaying! However, this is not to 
limit retention to a past-present. Pastness, as given through retention, is always already a 'horizon' of 
the present. It is more a question of the Heideggerian 'It-gives' -- which is prior to any site. 
19. This gives us the practical possibility of the I can. " 
20. According to Husserl, 
Every experience is in itself a flow of becoming, it is what it is within an original 
engendering (Erzeugung) of an essential type that never changes: a constant flow of 
retentions and protentions mediated by a primordial phase which is itself in flux, in which 
the living now of the experience comes to consciousness contrasting with its 'before' and 
'after. ' On the other hand, every experience has its parallels in different forms of reproduction 
which can be regarded as ideal 'operative' transformations of the original experience; each 
has its 'exactly corresponding' and yet radically modified counterpart in a recollection, as 
also in a possible anticipation, in a possible fancy, and again in repetitions of such 
transformations (Ideas 1, Sec. 78, P. 202). 
The source of this passage is particularly interesting given that Derrida treats Ideas I as a 
paradigm for that which is static in Husserl's phenomenology. 
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21. Husserl writes that 
If one says that every content attains consciousness only through an act of apprehension 
directed thereon, then the question immediately arises as to the consciousness in which we 
are aware of this act, which itself is still a content. Thus, the infinite regress is unavoidable. 
However, if every 'content' necessarily and in itself is 'unconscious' then the question of an 
I 
additional dator consciousness becomes senseless. 
Furthermore, every act of apprehension is itself a constituted unity of duration. 
During the time that it is built up, that which it is to make into an Object is long since gone 
by and would be -- if we did not already presuppose the entire play of primal consciousness 
and retentions -- no longer accessible to the act at all. However, because primal 
consciousness and retentions are on hand, the possibility exists in reflection of looking to the 
constituted lived experience and the constituting phases, and even becoming aware of the 
differences which exist, for example, between the primordial flux as we are conscious of it in 
primal consciousness and its retentional modifications (PITC, P. 163). 
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida distorts the principal thrust of the first part of this 
passage in an attempt to show that Husserl could not accommodate the language of the Freudian 
unconscious. We cannot enter into this question here. See footnote 25 of chapter 1. 
The paragraph immediately continues with the statement 
'I 
All the objections which have been raised against the method of reflection can be explained 
as arising from ignorance of the essential constitution of consciousness (Ibid). 
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The 'essential constitution of consciousness' is a question of intentionality. Given the 
centrality of Gasch6's critique of the philosophy of reflection, ' and the limits of the language of 
duplicity that he employs to facilitate this critique, one wonders whether he should have paused 
here. 
22. The reflexivity of intentional consciousness: One can superimpose Husserl's diagrams of the 
'sinking-down' [Herabsinken] of time-consciousness (through its movement of retention) -- the 
vertical sedimentation of pastness -- onto the standard diagram that comprises an outward-directed 
arrow that simultaneously turns back upon itself in the form of a circle. To express this extension, if 
the circle is turned onto its side, one finds a spiral (imagine a spring). This 'stretching-out' indicates 
the temporal duration of the movement. Unlike the movement of the circle, the spiral is not closed. 
The circular tracing of the helix is such that, in lifting itself, it never quite reaches back upon itself. 
Although it traces out the same path of the circle from the point of view of the plane, when it is 
viewed vertically there is a dimensional difference. 
23. In "Time and Being, " Heidegger speaks of a'holding-back' as a way of giving. 
What has-been which, by refusing the present, lets that be present which is no longer present; 
and the coming toward us of what is to come which, by withholding the present, lets that be 
present which is not yet present -- both made manifest the manner of an extending opening 
up which gives all presencing into the open (OTB, P. 17). 
24. Uingsintentionaliffit is the German expression for this second intentionality of retention. 
John Brough translates it as 'horizontal' intentionality (refer to P. 85 of his translation or the very 
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comprehensive collection of Husserl's temporal analyses: On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of--Internal Time [see bibliography]). In the Churchill translation it appears as 
'longitudinal intentionality. ' There is little to choose between their respective translations of this 
expression. However, since this intentionality is that which makes possible the bringing-together of 
different temporal moments all at once (without 'erasing their different temporal signatures -- e. g., 
like a moment of intuition when several ideas announce themselves simultaneously), this would 
I 
indeed be constitutive of the 'horizontal' dimension of experience. 
My decision to use the Churchill translation rather than the Brough version was based on a 
desire to resist being seduced into utilizing material that was not in the 1928 publication of Husserl's 
discourse on time consciousness. Brough's excellent translation, based on the Rudolph Boehm 
edition, includes notes that were not required for the task at hand since Derrida himself refers to the 
much shorter version of Husserl's temporal analyses as edited by Heidegger. Although Brough 
reproduces this version in full, the other notes presented an irresistible temptation to me. 
Avoidance was required because the aim of the present study is to engage with Derrida on 
his own ground. 
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NOTES: Chapter Three 
1. Retention and protention are interwoven through primal impression: the latter is literally the 
site of their intertwining. There is also a further triadic element in play here, which Derrida is right 
to thernatize: a dialectic that, in "Ousia and Gramm6, "*is said to re-lift [relever) itself through a 
shifting movement of maintenance [maintenance, maintenant, maintenir - maintain, now, to uphold; 
main - hand; tenir - to hold, ready-to-hand, etc. ]. He is not speaking directly about Husserl's 
concept of primal impression, for it is clear that he goes out of his way to misrepresent it in the 
context of Husserl's investigations. However, Derrida! s insight regarding the notion of re-lifting is 
such that it can be incorporated into Husserl's account. 
Primal impression, as the boundary between retention and protention, is the focus of a play 
of negotiation between fulfilment and non-fulfilment that, like all negotiation, involves 'degrees' of 
fulfilment. The writing of a life history is the marking out of reorganizations of orientation on the 
basis of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of anticipations and expectations. This movement of 
negotiation and reorganization is built upon a certain constitutive moment of Aujhebung. 
See note 25 to the Introduction above for a quotation of Derrida! s thematization of the 
dialectic of retention-and protention. 
2. See note 9 to Chapter One in reference to DerridA employment of the pivotal 
phenomenological insight regarding the difference between the logic of appearing and that of 
appearances. 
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In the case of an instrument-maker, there is a certain question of 'use'. What is also required 
is advice from a musician - someone who also plays the instrument. However, this falls short of the 
'ideal' purity that Plato appears to seek. The latter half of book X looks at the problem of poetry in 
relation to truth. Plato's whole approach is ironic in orientation in that he is really conducting a 
critique of the universal value attached to Homeric writing. 
4. This effectively upsets the canon of thought by which representation is understood in terms 
of mere reproduction. It is significant that the very word canon is derived from the Greek kanon, 
which literally means "a rule such as used by carpenters to set a straight line" (Peter Angeles. 
Dictionary of Philosophy, P. 28). Once again we are drawn back to the apparently more authentic 
position of the artisan as distinct from the artist. The rule of measure is caused to slide in Derrida's 
discourse on representation. 
There is a sense in which Derrida plays between the poles of artist and artisan (providing that 
we contemporize the role of the artist beyond Plato's impoverished definition) when we consider his 
comments on embracing both chance and necessity. One might be inclined to say that the 
deconstructionist requires the imagination of the artist and the conscience of the artisan. This would 
also be a defining characteristic of the phenomenologist -- methodological necessity on the one hand 
and strategic risk on the other. Of course, any effective form of interrogation must involve both 
attitudes, but in phenomenology and deconstruction (or phenomenological-deconstruction), this is 
made thematic. 
Necessity = rigour / method 
Chance == risk / strategy 
Both moments define the movement of play. 
29.3) 
5. See Speech and Phenomena, P. 6 1. 
6. See note 13 of chapter two above for a quotation of Husserl's comments. 
7. Also, see Husserl's Experience and Judgement and Cartesian Meditations for some 
alternative routes of entry to these intertwined themes. 
8. See the fourth meditation of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations for a thoroughgoing 
examination of a multiplicity of different forms of ego-functioning. The ego as substrate of 
habitualities names a matrix of what in Experience and Judgement is expressed in terms of 
'secondary passivity' -- which does not restrict itself to the classic passive / active and structure 
genesis disjunctions. 
Habituated activity is an exemplary instance of 'passivity in activity' and 'activity in 
passivity. ' This quasi-mechanical form of activity is one that does not require thought as such -- in 
other words, it is a 'passive-active' performance. Nonetheless, habituated behavioural patterns are 
not to be deemed non-volitional -- there is still an element of choice to be considered. At the same 
time, a reflective turn may bring about an alteration in the habituated behaviour and even rob it of its 
influence -- thus rendering it passive by acting upon it. Despite the barely liminal nature of 
habituated performances -- which gives them the right to be designated as passive (certainly from 
the point of view of 'conscious' experience) -- they, themselves, are 'motivated! Whether we should 
speak of an even deeperlevel' here is open to conjecture. The metaphorical power of the word level 
cannot be ignored in its capacity to conjure up the thought of the 'vertical' -- for such motivations are 
certainly (to use another metaphor) more'deeply sedimented. ' 
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It is interesting how certain animals (and human animals), when they find themselves in 
stressful situations, often lapse into ritualistic modes of behaviour that seem to ease their discomfort. 
Grooming and nesting behaviours are extremely common in a variety of different symbolic act- 
forms (e. g., some species of birds, when threatened by a competitor, play out the habituated 
behaviour of preening themselves). Habit designates a way of being that is 'familiar' and non- 
threatening. Habituation / habitation is the way in which one lives. 
Habit is homely -- an active / passive performance or mode of being into which one can relax 
when the world appears unheimlich (un-homely, uncanny). The key point has to do with the need 
for a certain kind of 'repetition. ' The Freudian concept of the 'pleasure principle' comes to mind here. 
Similarly, the idea of the 'death-drive, ' as the motivated inversion of the 'pleasure principle, ' suggests 
rich possibilities for speculation. 
If we look to the Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian concepts of anxiety, we find other ways 
in which to examine the question of the impulse constitutive of the development of habituated 
performances. This brings us back to the Latin connection: habitat / habitus -- habit is the product of 
a motivation that takes the form of flight from that which is un-homely / uncanny (unheimlich). 
9. There is also a form of remembering that is only structurally analogous to the chronological- 
causal sequence of different times. It is not always the case that a linear causality makes itselffielt. 
We do not always re-live the past from the standpoint of the present judgmental ego, which re-traces 
the order of former steps in its evolution according to present concerns. The question: "how did I 
come to this? " does not always have an answer. Sometimes it feels as though oile-has-always-been- 
this (e. g., remembering a particularly traumatic moment in the distant past and feeling that one not 
only still feels this way, but that one has always felt this way). There is a form of experiential time- 
travel (cerebral time-tripping) where different times can be experienced immanently without 
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reflective critique of a causal-linear order -- like being cut adrift from the present and the 
psychological-causal chains that lead back to it. In this kind of experience, the past is the present. 
This form of time-travel is a common structure of dreams. 
The history of Western philosophical thought persistently confuses time with the 
chronometer that measures rate of motion and change according to a purely linear perspective. This t) I 
is the temporality about which Freud speaks in his denial that the unconscious knows anything of 
I 
time. It is fair to ask whether this 'mode' of temporality is 'all' that he understood by the expression 
time. 
10. Whenever I return to Hume's Treatise ofHuman Nature (a child stillborn from the Press) my 
admiration for the conscientiousness, rigour, and courage of his investigations increases 
exponentially. The essay "Of Personal Identity" shakes the whole foundation of everything that 
precedes and works up to it. The Appendix gives us an honest declaration concerning the limits of 
his investigations. Hume's problem was twofold in that he considered 
that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 
any real conncxion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something 
simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there 
wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and 
confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to 
pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature 
I 
reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions (A Treatise 
qf Human Nalure, Appendix. P. 636). 
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Thus, Hume claims the ... privilege' of a sceptic" without committing himself to full blown 
scepticism. Hii -philosophical writing embodies an extremely rare combination of startling 
intellectual brilliance, methodological rigour (without doing away with risk), and genuine humility. 
11. Husserl addresses the conditions of the possibility of any kind of history while, at the same 
time, taking account of real cultural, - ethnic, and personal differences. He avoids the absolute 
I 
incommensurabilities of pure relativism on the one hand, and on the other, avoids the concealment 
of difference that would be the consequence of a reduction of all sociality and tradition to a 'meta- 
general, "universal' or 'totalizing' language of history. 
12. The 'practical I-caif of return is constituted through a kind of maintenance. Derrida makes 
much of the connection between the now and maintenance: maintenant / now (the maintenance of 
the now) / to hold in one's hand / the ready-to-hand, etc. 
13. The Saussurean orientation, as Wood points out in The Deconstruction of Time, "... more 
modestly ... gives some insight into the virtuality underlying the idea of repetition. Repetition 
supplies the numerical difference on the basis of which ideal identity (that is, ideality) can be made 
to appear. Derrida! s reversal of the relationship between ideality and repetition might be said to have 
completed in a temporal dimension what Saussure had begun from a synchronic perspective" 
I 19). 
t 
14. In order to show this, I have introduced a little repetition of my own -- in the form of a return 
to a quotation from Derrida! s Of Grammatology that surfaced in an article penned by the [present] 
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author -- entitled: "Diffirance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction [Epoch6]? " The Warwick 
Journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. 2, Issue 2,1989. 
15. Derrida writes, 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin -- within the discourse that we sustain and 
according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it 
was never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes the 
origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical 
scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which 
would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche- 
trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, 
there is above all no originary trace (OG, P. 61). 
I 
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NOTES: Afterword 
1. Gasch6's Derrida is more comfortably situated in the period beginning with Disseminations 
(originally published in 1972 as La dissimination. Paris: Seuil) than the phase of deconstruction 
examined by this thesis (1962-68). 1 
By engaging with Gasch6's text, we are addressing a slightly different time-frame in 
Derrida's writing. It is not a case of confusing Derrida with Gasch6's Derrida, but of pointing to a 
theme in Derrida! s own writing that should be brought out: that is, the problem of "hearing-oneself 
speak. " Time / duration is the rupture in such self-coincidence. It is the alterity that already inhabits 
the space of hearing-oneself speak. 
2. My inspiration came from Derrida himself when I met him a few years ago during his visit to 
Warwick University. After waiting for some time in the inevitable cue, I managed to speak with 
him. I did not want to take up too much of his time, but I did want to secure his attention. So, I told 
him that I hated his writing (a half-truth). He was great -- the man did not flinch. There was a 
twinkle in his eye that expressed a subtle humour. Actually, what I meant to say was that I hated and 
loved his writing. The hate really came from the intense and protracted focus that his texts demand - 
- the endless re-readings, not only of his writing, but also of the original texts that his writing 
deconstructs. The love expressed itself in the passion with which I continually responded to 
Derrida's invitation to return to the critical task at hand. Having got his attention I took full 
advantage of it and managed to find an answer (of a kind) to a question I had wondered about for 
some time. I ventured the opinion that the central argument of S17eech and Phenomena, concerning 
Husserl's distinction between indication and expression in the Logical Investigalions, was just a 
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ruse. I went on to suggest that despite the principal focus of virtually every other text that has been 
written 'about' this engagement, his book is primarily a reading of Husserl's Phenomenology of 
Internal Time Consciousness -- an examination of how its radical orientation forces us to re-situate 
discourse on the sign-- and that this is the true agenda and the real significance of Speech and 
Phenomena. Although the inclusion of the Logical Investigations serves as a useful strategic device, 
it is actually a superfluous gesture from a theoretical point of view. 
Apart from David Wood and J. Claude Evans, Derrida! s reading of Husserl's lectures on 
time-consciousness is generally treated by most other commentators as a mere auxiliary to what is 
really going on. Evans also suggests that the tension in Husserl that Derrida brings out is not, 
perhaps, so much a difference between the lectures on time (1905-10) and the Logical Investigations 
(190 1), but a tension that exists in the lectures themselves. However, he does not develop this. 
When I expressed my viewpoint to Derrida, he raised an eyebrow (an 'indicative' sign), a 
gesture which, in this instance, did not suggest boredom or displeasure. I decided to take this as a 
positive sign that I was on a significant track in my re-reading of the relations between DerriUs 
work and that of Husserl. The principal problem lay in the question of'how' I was to explore this 
field. I felt that it would be insufficient to simply write about the complex relatidris between 
Derrida's deconstruction and Husserl's phenomenology (a narrative format that is closer to Evans's 
approach). It was really a question of doubling or duplicating a number of Derrida's different 
narrative types in order to open a space in which their logics would unfold by the process of a 
certain doing. 
My deconstruction of Gaschd's text doubles Derrida's strategic re-reading of Husserl: his 
double-reading. In both cases, it is actually a case of the deconstruction of the closest of allies. 
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3. Gasch6's appeal to deconstruction's roots in rigorous transcendental philosophy only really 
brings out the linearity of the movement. There are other non-linear temporalities that must be taken 
into account. Perhaps Gasch6 imagines that he is doing this when he also suggests that Derrida! s 
discoveries are not contingent with respect to the particular routes that have been taken through 
Western philosophy. However, these are two extremes. 
4. There is an interesting text that focuses on this movement of in / de-differentiation called The 
Unconscious as Infinite Sets: an essay in bi-logic by Ignacio Matte-Blanco. Duckworth. 1975. 
5. See the opening paragraph to Sec. 32, P. 99. of Husserl's Ideas 1, where he writes 
... on good grounds we limit the universality of this epochi. For were it as inclusive as it is in 
general capable of being, then since every thesis and every judgement can be modified freely 
to any extent, and every objectivity that we can judge or criticize can be bracketed, no field 
would be left over for unmodif led judgements, to say nothing of a science. But our design is 
just to uncover a new scientific domain, such as can be won precisely through the method of 
bracketing, though only through a definitely limited form of it. 
6. One cannot ignore the trace of the phenomenological reduction in play here. The suspension 
that occurs through the process of bracketing is not to be confused with any form of 
systematic doubt, for it signs the intention to withdraw from any position-taking whatsoever. 
It is the question of a certain kind of disinterestedness or indifference with respect to 
negativity or positivity and the law of the excluded-middle. 
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